Burgoyne wins at Saratoga--how do rebels succeed?

Washington didn't have to win battles, he just had to keep an army in the field- and even with the defeat at Saratoga (which wasn't even suffered by the main Continental Army), the Continental Army under Washington is still operational. With the POD being Clinton's army reinforces Burgoyne's army that means that Washington and the Continental Army are going to be able to go into winter quarters for 77-78, and thus get the training of Von Stueben.
True.
If Benedict Arnold isn't dead, then he is probably in New England, organizing militia there to harass the British. New England was the originial hotbed of anti-British activity, and the political leaders there (John Hancock, John Adams, Sam Adams, etc) know that they are marked for death in the event of the British forcing the conflict to end.
So what would the next move be? I would say the British have two options:
-an attack on Philadelphia, which is the largest and most important city in the American colonies, and whose loss would keep up the feeling that all is lost;
-or a new campaign in the South, where the British believed that there were large pockets of Loyalists waiting to support the Crown.

Victory at Saratoga does not take the whole rebel army out of the field. But what it does is contribute to the feeling of hopelessness, creeping defeat and losing war of attrition on the rebel side. Lack of conspicuous conventional victories would stave off French joining the war. Only Continental Congress can surrender at a large scale, but summer soldiers can individually choose to defect, surrender, desert or retreat.

Benedict Arnold defected OTL and one of the excuses he offered was that the Brits had redressed the grievances. Now, with Arnold isolated in New England and the Brits offering terms, he might very well be able, instead of secretly attempting to deliver forts, address openly his summer soldiers and persuade them to accept British surrender terms the next time they are at a tight spot. After some political leaders in New England have been hanged, the Continental Congress in Philadelphia will debate on whether to wait for Washington to follow Arnold´s lead, or take the British terms and save their own necks and those of their remaining adherents.

Is it plausible?
 
With regard to General Washington, he himself, after the Revolution stated that in his thinking it was "a standing miracle" that the revolution succeeded. He was very aware of all the things that had gone right that saved him and his army from disaster repeatedly. With regard to British activities post-Saratoga, Burgoyne himself would have presumeably had additional commands in the following campaigns. This might be significant, insofar as he, like Cornwallis actually seemed to have an aggressive sense of tactics. The point of the Saratoga camapaign, from his point of view was the isolation of New England from the other colonies. Control of the Hudson valley hindered movement of Continental troops in central NY and provided means to move British forces into New England from the west. With the RN blockading the ports and cities of New England, a major source of unrest is contained. On the frontier in NY and western PA, the British were quite capable of combating geurrilla warfare by supplying and supporting Indian attacks on disloyal settlements, and would fit within the general policy towards the Indian tribes.
 
Plausibility Check:

I agree with the faction that says: we need to know HOW Burgoyne wins the northern campaign/Saratoga.

The only way he can really "win" is by re-planning the whole operation. If he manages to persuade Guy Carleton to loose a few thousand more troops, invests Ticonderoga a few days quicker than in OTL, and then gives the time back carrying his artillery train to Lake George, then picks one of the two possible routes southward, whichever he picks, takes the artillery with him, advances Fraser's force far ahead of the main army to prevent Schuyler and St. Clair from blocking the road to Ft. Anne, then re-crosses the Hudson as soon as possible, and advances likewise, he may be in Albany by September. No sooner, simply due to the distance. And he will have to fight and win at least one big battle somewhere - and it will not be a rout, what with the continual influx of New England militia, plus Morgan and Arnold from Washington's army. There's no way the campaign can be finished that season, and in any case Clinton was pulling back from the highlands. Given the record with messangers captured, a Burgoyne victory will probably not change that fact, so at least the middle Hudson (highlands to Albany) will remain open for a season.

Meanwhile, we have no reason to believe St. Croix will fall, so at best Burgoyne will have Albany, a shaky supply route, and no more than 6,000 troops facing at least that many Americans. The river cannot fall in 1777, and Burgoyne cannot move off of the river-lake line.

On the other hand, if we just change an event in battle, and have Fraser, say, shift a few hundred feet west and hit the Vermont troops in their flank, instead of front, at Freeman's Farm (no actual battle took place at Saratoga - there were two seperate battles, Freeman's Farm in September, and the Balcarres Redoubt in October, both fought near Bemis Heights at least 5 miles south of Saratoga), then it changes nothing. Burgoyne was not committing all of his troops into a single attack - given the roads of the area, Gates' troops have secure lines of retreat to their own fortifications at Bemis Heights. There is no way to flank these, and the Americans, for once, had artillery equality/superiority to the British, plus the thousands more troops arriving all autumn. Gates has a good supply line (for once), and plenty of engineers. If he loses a few hundred more troops, well, who cares? More are arriving, and he did not plan to retreat. Burgoyne has to attack to win, and if he attacks he will not win.
 
He's a Canadian (descendant of exiled Tories, possibly?)

The term is "United Empire Loyalist", thank you very much. ;)

And - this bears saying repeatedly - Britain did not lose because of the Americans. George Washington had nothing to do with the Peace of Paris. Britain lost because the French, Spanish and Dutch beat them, and at the treaty in addition to the usual Caribbean islands and Indian ports changing hands they managed to pry the large part of the Americas away from the British.

The American Revolutionary War - and this bears saying a lot too - was not a case of plucky rebels brilliantly defeating the largest empire on Earth. It was WWI.5 (after the Seven Years War) in which the largest, third-largest, and fourth-largest empires fought the second-largest empire, and beat it. Oh, and there was some kind of a rebellion against #2 as well to start the whole thing off and since the Allies won the rebels got most of what they were asking for. That's what the ARW was.

With no Saratoga and no French intervention the rebels are screwed, screwed, screwed. You might legitimately claim the French will find an excuse to come in anyways and that might lead to an Allied victory, but if they don't? Screwed.
 
Tegytsgurb, it seems like you put the rebel situation in New England in a much sunnier predicament than the previous posters . . . is it still possible for the rebels to conduct a non-guerilla campaign in New England even after Burgoyne secures Albany and most of the Hudson?
 
Not quite. I claim that he can't secure Albany and most of the Hudson.

The first thing to realize is that, for 1777, no matter how wildly successful Burgoyne may be (which he won't be), he's on his own. Of the five or so messages sent from Burgoyne to Clinton or vice-versa by land in OTL, exactly 1 got through. Their securest communication was by water. If Burgoyne does significantly better than in OTL after mid-summer (before that he was pretty darn successful), it will take weeks for Clinton to find out, maybe months - the message is relayed back to Ft. Anne, by foot to Lake George, up that, past Ticonderoga, a week by ship to Montreal, by hand across the fords, then to a much larger ship up the St. Lawrence and to NYC. Secure, but not exactly quick.

Clinton, meanwhile, had no more than 11,000 troops in the city, and he was unwilling to risk more than 3,000 even on raids. He waited until fall to start an attack up the Hudson, barely won the highlands forts through a clever ruse, but then he retreated. He had been explicitly ordered by Howe to not make a round-trip that would take more than 72 hours. This is patently not a large enough radius to effect Burgoyne. If he goes northward as far as possible, they will get maybe to Esopus. There is still at least a 20-mile stretch of river between Esopus and Albany, quite crossable by the Americans. If you want the river closed, Burgoyne must do it himself.

The second point is the latent military strength in New England. As soon as Burgoyne secured Ticonderoga, each state summoned its militias. Certain commanders, like John Starke of NH, were better than others, but as a rule these militias were as well-trained as could be expected given that they're militias, under some very good commanders, in just about the most "densely populated" (relatively speaking) part of the colonies, near autumn, when there is no supply problem. The terrain of the Lakes-Hudson route, if one goes a mile to either side, becomes mountains and woods - militias with knowledge of the land would perform the best here. And the states only sent a fraction of the troops they raised. Rest assured, if Burgoyne started marching eastward, towards Massachusetts, that state alone would have 10,000 men in arms within 24 hours. This is ignoring the solid core of 4-5000 continentals, plus the already-mentioned re-inforcements from Washington.

The third point is morale. Burgoyne's force was about half British and half German, with small contingents of loyalists and Canadians, and a continuously fluctuating number of Indians. Once past Ticonderoga, even during the month when Burgoyne could still be said to be winning in OTL, the morale of everyone but the British regulars plummetted. Far from home, mediocre food, isolated in the wilderness, desertions were high even before the tables turned militarily. Meanwhile, the Americans were becoming ever more determined. The Indian raids were meant to frighten and cowe them, but in fact the settlers just became more enraged, through the ever-efficient American propaganda system.

Fourth, supply. I already mentioned the route needed for messages to travel, but it is even harder for food and ammunition. As soon as supplies had to be carried past the relatively easy Lake Champlain, they dimished. Burgoyne was foraging, it was a plain necessity. Bennington has been significantly overplayed in the history books - it was simply one of the larger expeditions Burgoyne launched, one that didn't work. He was already alienating the people near the invasion route, taking all the cattle and food - they were already having cattle shipped southward to avoid the British.

I can come up with some more, but no time right now.....
 
Plausibility Check:

I agree with the faction that says: we need to know HOW Burgoyne wins the northern campaign/Saratoga.

The only way he can really "win" is by re-planning the whole operation. If he manages to persuade Guy Carleton to loose a few thousand more troops, invests Ticonderoga a few days quicker than in OTL, and then gives the time back carrying his artillery train to Lake George, then picks one of the two possible routes southward, whichever he picks, takes the artillery with him, advances Fraser's force far ahead of the main army to prevent Schuyler and St. Clair from blocking the road to Ft. Anne, then re-crosses the Hudson as soon as possible, and advances likewise, he may be in Albany by September. No sooner, simply due to the distance. And he will have to fight and win at least one big battle somewhere - and it will not be a rout, what with the continual influx of New England militia, plus Morgan and Arnold from Washington's army. There's no way the campaign can be finished that season, and in any case Clinton was pulling back from the highlands. Given the record with messangers captured, a Burgoyne victory will probably not change that fact, so at least the middle Hudson (highlands to Albany) will remain open for a season.
Someone convincing him to lose the bloody baggage train would help! I forget the details, but 'Gentleman Johnny' liked campaigning in comfort and the most ridiculous stuff was carted along, which really, really slowed his travel through the wilderness. Given that he was unlikely to give up his creature comforts, maybe you could have those waggons burnt or stolen by (a tiny number of) deserting troops.
 
Very well. I am then convinced Burgoyne could not hold Albany.

Suppose that Burgoyne gets some smart ideas, or takes wise counsel, or has good luck early enough in his campaign that it makes a difference. He reaches Albany and in the view of the rebel forces breathing on his heels decides not to try to hold or take Albany - instead he passes round and moves with all speed downstream for safety of New York vicinity. Since Clinton did reach Highlands, Burgoyne marches to Newburgh at the northern end of Highlands and puts his more tired and demoralized troops to work building forts to the northern portal, and returns with the better part of his army and supply fleet procured from Clinton to try and build another fortress at Kingston or Poughkeepsie. And evacuate with the said supply fleet to Highland fortresses if the pursuing rebel army should prove too strong.

What next?
 
Yes, of course, Mr. Tory

Zyzzyva wrote:
Britain did not lose because of the Americans.
Yes, of course, Mr. Tory, whatever you say. The Treaty of Paris appeared at once, fully formed, into Georgie-boy 3's and Louis-boy 16's heads, and they met, and it was good. No Americans involved in any way atall.

French shadow-troops and shadow-ships fought in all those years before the real ones finally made it to where they could make a difference here.
 
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