Building Jerusalem

[V-J]

Interesting TL, V-J - I'll be keeping an eye on this one. I'd guess that Labour aren't quite going to whitewash the next election so thoroughly as in OTL's 1997, and it'd be interesting to see if Heseltine could swing a few seats in unlikely places.

Hezza as PM. Could be a good contest but think the Tories are still too crippled by their divisions and infighting.

I think you're probably both right. If Labour does win the next election, then it'll be close, but equally, I think it's going to be very difficult for the Tories to win. To gain a working majority they'd basically have to actually net win seats - which is highly unlikely.

Missed your second section earlier so only just seen it now.

Subscribe, subscribe!

Also, thinking about the 'deal' - Portillo = Brown?

Could be...

To expand on something I said earlier I once read that Smith was thinking of a government with the Treasury somewhat reduced in power. So that instead of it dominating just about everything other sections of government might be able to plan more coherently.

The Treasury will neccessarily be a lot weaker here if Labour win, as there's been no 'Deal'. Which means Brown will just be a regular Chancellor - powerful, but not utterly dominant over spending and economic policy as in OTL. Smith is a former Secretary for Trade and Shadow Chancellor himself, so Brown's position will probably be slightly weaker than OTL, surprisingly enough.

 

[MrHola]

Will this be updated?

 

[V-J]

Absolutely, MrHola, I'm just taking a loooonng time to get round to it. As I was saying to EdT just the other day, I'm beginning to realise the vast extent of my own ignorance, and I want to read up a bit about Smith before I continue. I may even re-do 1995, as I'm a bit unhappy with some parts of that at the moment. (McNamara, for instance, should just resign at this point as he did historically rather than be moved.) I'm a bit of a perfectionist really!

Now this is dependent on when the books I've ordered arrive, but I'm looking at 1996 early next week. After that, I think the pace will quicken quite a bit.

 

[MrHola]

That's good to hear. Good luck.

 

[alt_historian]

Yes, please don't give up!

 

[V-J]

Chapter I​

1995​

"This was open government, but the emphasis was more on ‘open’ than on ‘government.’" - Harold Wilson’s opinion of John Russell’s Premiership​

Taken from Building Jerusalem - The Last Three Years of Labour by John Dyer (Third Estate, 2008) ‘Battling for Government’

… and, by 1995 Smith had as sure a grip over the party as any previous Labour leader had. [1] His handling of OMOV and his understanding of what drove and motivated party had been in the highest degree insightful and wise; his leadership had been marked by direction, but not dictation; he had recovered Labour’s sense of purpose after the dismay of 1992. By-election successes, such as the fourteen thousand plus majority in Dudley West in December, 1994, suggested that Labour was well on course to win the next election. Smith had helped Labour to regain it’s self-respect, and in turn the respect of the electorate. [2]​

In many ways, though, Smith had ‘had it easy‘ up to 1995. As John Major’s premiership had progressed, he had increasingly cut a more and more pitiful figure, as the poisoned legacy of the 1992 election became manifest. Norman Lamont’s chastisement that the Tories were in "office but not power" seemed to be almost becoming a political consensus, even amongst Tories. It seemed, indeed, that Labour were going to cruise into the next election.In fact, the hapless Major had gone full circle. He was a threat to Labour once again, as he had been when he first took office, but this time purely because his stature was now so weak, he was at risk of being displaced by someone more effective. He was not so much fiddling, as dithering while Rome burned…​

Taken from The Telegraph, the 5th of May, 1995: ‘Smith reshuffles Shadow Cabinet’​

JOHN Smith reshuffled his front bench team yesterday, in a move which has been widely regarded as preparing Labour’s Shadow Cabinet for the possibility of a general election.​

Frank Dobson becomes Shadow Home Secretary, after his acclaimed handling of Labour’s response to the ‘Homes for Votes’ affair in London. [3] Tony Blair, who Mr Dobson takes over from, replaces Jack Cunningham as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Mr Blair, although lacking in experience of his new brief, is widely regarded as strongly pro-European, and will be sure to support Mr Smith’s own convictions in that respect. It has been suggested that some in Labour’s higher circles have been disappointed by Mr Cunningham’s handling of Labour’s response to the Maastricht Treaty, [4] and the failure to fully exploit the Conservatives’ difficulties over that issue. Mr Cunningham has been transferred to take over the Northern Ireland brief from Kevin McNamara, who has left the opposition front bench over what are understood to be policy differences in relation to his brief. ​

In many respects, it is a cautious reshuffle. Gordon Brown remains as Shadow Chancellor, and David Clark, [5] Ann Taylor, David Blunkett, and Robin Cook [6] all similarly remain at their current shadow portfolios, suggesting that there is unlikely to be any significant changes in Labour’s overall direction over the coming months…​

Taken from The Longman Companion to the Conservative Party since 1830 by A.M Brader, (Longman, 2001) ‘First 1995 Conservative Leadership Election’​

Triggered by the continuing weakness of John Major’s leadership of the party. Major decided to directly confront his critics through a leadership election - probably pre-emptively - telling his MPs to "back me or sack me". Major was challenged by his Welsh Secretary, the eurosceptic John Redwood. The Sun famously called the contest "Redwood vs. Deadwood", although the result was close and was not a foregone conclusion. In the event, the move backfired even though Major won the contest. The election followed soon after the disastrous Stockton South by-election [7] and huge losses in the local elections in May, [8] which have often been cited as factors in the outcome.​

1995 - First Ballot (4th of July)

John Major 204
John Redwood 101 [9]
12 Spoilt Papers
9 Abstentions

Taken from The Tories - Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997 by Alan Clark, (Phoenix, 1998)​

… Major had, statistically speaking, won. The arcane party rules demanded that a candidate receive at least 15% more than their nearest challenger - In addition to a simple majority - to prevent a second round - this Major easily achieved, winning against Redwood by a margin of over thirty percent. But, in another sense, the result was a serious blow to Major’s leadership; a knockout, as it happened. Well over a third of his colleagues had declined to ‘back’ him, and had instead opted, for whatever reasons - and many were surely voting for Redwood, on instruction, merely as a means by which to displace Major in favour of other preferred candidates - for the option of sacking him, or at least, failing to endorse him; one hundred and twenty-two, in all. This was serious. ​

A more strident figure would have been quite content to carry on under such circumstances. The Prime Minister remained personally popular in the country. [10] But Major was by now totally exhausted, and could be entirely forgiven for believing that the party should now be left to stew in it’s own juices. Major had talked of resignation before, more in a sense of personal frustration than anything else, but, now combined with the impact of Redwood - who, it must be remembered, drew from no greater status than that of Welsh Secretary - the decision was more or less out of his hands; Major was gleefully described by the press as ‘hamstrung‘, or, more widely and confidently, ‘totally finished’. As so often happens, the interpretation of a political event in the heat of the moment was more important than the actual real quality of it. Backbenchers began to feverishly talk of a replacement before the Prime Minister had even announced his intentions, such as they were. And those in Cabinet who were now already eyeing the succession clearly had no reason to attempt to disuade him from his determined course of action …​

Taken from John Major - The Autobiography, (HarperCollins, 2000)​

… as I had always believed in being even-handed with not just my party, but the public and ministerial colleagues. I had always made it plain that I had no wish to lead a divided party, a party that no longer was content with itself to allow me to continue.​

No matter how powerful a Prime Minster may be, however threatening they may be able to paint themselves, they must always serve with the consent of the Cabinet, their party, the Sovereign, and the electorate. I have no doubt that had I wished to continue, my Cabinet colleagues would have supported me in such a decision, but a Prime Minister cannot dismiss or lessen the opinion of those outside the Cabinet Room of Downing Street. I believe that my decision was still correct, although I have often re-assessed it, and in some honesty, have sometimes wondered if I made the best choice in the circumstances. But the simple fact remains - when a Prime Minister has more than a third of his party, that is, well over a hundred backbenchers voting against him in anger, rather than in a true, full and open, well-mannered contest for a vacancy, then he is swimming against a rising tide. It would not have been in the interests of the country, my party, or, indeed, my own contentment to continue under such circumstances… [11]​

Taken from The Tories - Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997 by Alan Clark, (Phoenix, 1998)​

… Lamont, despite being a member of Redwood’s campaign team in the first contest, now declared. Lamont had been for the most part pre-occupied with political difficulties of his own. Having been deselected by his party association in Kingston-Upon-Thames, he was searching for a new constituency, and, indeed, many suggested at the time that the bid was an attempt to ‘confirm’ a place in the next parliament by demonstrating his support in it. Certainly, if he had a good showing - sixty votes or so - a safe Tory seat surely beckoned. But some considered, however improbable it may seem in retrospect, that Lamont had a good chance of actually suceeding. Surely he could better Redwood? And then, with Clarke and Heseltine dividing over the left of the party, Lamont could emerge as the ‘unity’ candidate. Was this ever a serious prospect? Perhaps not. Certainly, however, Lamont’s first round tally was, for an ex-Chancellor who had been sacked purely because he had become an electoral liability, astonishingly high. But Redwood’s public appeal was as, if not more limited, than Lamont’s. Lamont had gravitas. Lamont had respect in the party - of a peculiar sort, almost verging on the negative, but certainly present. Redwood was, by contrast, ‘flaky.’​

There are hints, barely discernable in the overall durm und strang, but nevertheless present in this, of the fascination with Europe which was engulfing the party. For what was Lamont to the party, or the party to him? Lamont simply represented to Tory backbenchers a far more weightier Eurosceptic object than Redwood. Redwood had been useful in displacing Major. He had served that purpose well enough. But thanks in part to recent events, stock was now low for a man who was already, when he was mentioned at all, caricatured in the press as ‘the Vulcan.’. As Redwood was to discover, the Parliamentary Conservative Party is an inconstant body.​

Whatever his faults or qualities, Major was firmly of the past. Now, emboldened, the right sensed their chance to ‘re-claim’ the party. The alternative was unthinkable…[12]​

Taken from Heseltine by Iain Laverick, (Genesis, 1999) ‘Government - 1990-1995’​

… and, considering what followed, notions of a ‘deal’ have remained resilient, if unproven. A declaration in favour of Heseltine by Portillo may have appeared incongruous, given Portillo’s image at the time of being a ‘hard’ Thatcherite, or he may simply have been keeping his options open. The matter remains opaque, and seems unlikely to be resolved, at least until the relevant memoirs are published…​

Taken from The Longman Companion to the Conservative Party since 1830 by A.M Brader, (Longman, 2001) ‘Second 1995 Conservative Leadership Election’​

Held after Major’s resignation. Heseltine was the overwhelming favourite, [13] particularly after Michael Portillo declined to run.​

1995 - First Ballot (11th of July ) [14]
Michael Heseltine 148
Norman Lamont 57
Kenneth Clarke 47 [15]
John Redwood 44
Malcolm Rifkind 29
1 Abstention ​

No overall winner. Rifkind withdraws and endorses Heseltine. Redwood withdraws.​

Taken from The Tories - Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997 by Alan Clark, (Phoenix, 1998)​

… Redwood was asked - pro bono publico - to step down in favour of Lamont. Redwood hesitated. There was still a chance that something might ‘happen’ in the second round. But Lamont was flushed with success, and doubtless enjoying his renewed position as the toast of the Eurosceptic right, and ‘the heavies’ were sent in. Redwood relented. All now rested upon Lamont achieving first place in the second ballot. With that he would, surely, be unstoppable. It was unlikely, but against Heseltine and Clarke it was - just - possible…​

Taken from The Longman Companion to the Conservative Party since 1830 by A.M Brader, (Longman, 2001) ‘Second 1995 Conservative Leadership Election’ ​

1995 - Second Ballot (17th of July)
Michael Heseltine 190
Norman Lamont 96
Kenneth Clarke 31
7 Spoilt Papers
2 Abstentions

Heseltine elected.

Taken from The Tories - Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997 by Alan Clark, (Phoenix, 1998)​

… The way Heseltine went about this was, in many ways, shameless. His closest cronies were showered with patronage. All members of his most immediate entourage* received high promotion - including, crucially, the ‘strategic’ post of Party Chairman - despite variable or limited service in the past or, indeed, the lingering air of scandal. But it was also expedient, and, for Heseltine, necessary. He was acutely sensitive to the right, particularly after his bargain with Portillo. [16] An election was visible on the horizon, and Heseltine needed to build up his ‘base’ as swiftly as possible. Political decency was a side concern. [17] Heseltine certainly had no wish to follow in the footsteps of his two immediate predecessors, whose downfalls he had been intimately - and, in the first case, extremely proactively - involved in. Clarke [18] was sent to the Foreign Office, a move which appealed to his ego [19] and indicated what was to come in respect of the government’s European policy. Rifkind was sidelined into the role of Deputy Prime Minister; doubtless an attempt to corral Clarke‘s ambitions. Other ministers who had become a liability to him, such as Jonathon Aitken, [20] were quickly dispatched, as part of the wider impression that the government was ‘getting tough‘…​

* Messers Hampson, Ottaway, Powell, and Mates. Keith Hampson was made Chancellor of the Duchy and a Minister of State; Mates became Defence Secretary; Ottaway became an Under Secretary at the DTI; Bill Powell became Party Chair. Mates at least had five years as Chair of the Defence Select Committee to recommend his promotion; Ottaway, Powell and Hampson’s selection were more clearly influenced by other considerations.​

Taken from Building Jerusalem - The Last Three Years of Labour by John Dyer (Third Estate, 2008) ‘Battling for Government’​

… and in August a MORI/Times poll put the Tories at 35%, Labour at 39%, and the Lib Dems at 22%; the Tories’ highest poll rating recorded by any organisation for nearly two years. Despite this more upbeat mood for the Conservatives, the Littleborough and Saddleworth by-election in late July, at the peak of Heseltine’s personal impact, was still badly lost to them, a factor which has often been cited as staying Heseltine’s hand in contemplating calling a snap general election.​

Smith’s response was in many ways typical of the man. He was unflappable. As some in Labour’s ranks revived the call for a deeper reform of the party, Smith kept his cool, rightly believing that the Heseltine-Portillo duumvirate, fundamentally unstable as it was, would self-destruct in time. And, as many observed, Heseltine had actually received less support in attaining the leadership than Major had received in losing it. Whatever effect the contest would have on the polls, the split in the Conservatives remained; Heseltine was never particularly inclined towards compromise, and his election was seen with only the deepest horror by the Tory backwoodsmen that the government, with it’s fractional majority, was beholden to.​

Despite this, Smith always recognised that ‘staying still’ was not an option, and that the party had to convince to public of it’s case. At the same time, Smith knew that he had to reconcile the desire of the ‘modernisers’, with the desire of the party as a whole to retain it’s basic identity as one committed to equality, ending poverty, and social justice. It was characteristic of Smith that his solution appealed to both these desires - his ‘statement of first principles’ outlined a modern, compassionate vision, which, whilst rejecting the dogmatic language of Clause 4, was inclusive and made no claims to subvert that particular party totem. [21] Issued soon after Shadow Cabinet reshuffle in May, the ‘statement of principles’ would draw wide support, and it was, unsurprisingly, adopted overwhelmingly by the annual party conference in the Autumn, on the back of a memorable speech by Smith which received a standing ovation. The electorate signalled their approval in the opinion polls, and Labour could be confident that the ‘Heseltine challenge’ had been put to flight…​

Appendix​

H E R M A J E S T Y ’ S G O V E R N M E N T​

(The Cabinet, as composed under the Ministry of The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP, July, 1995)​

Prime Minister, First Lord of the Treasury, Minister for the Civil Service and Leader of the Conservative Party - The Rt. Hon. Michael Heseltine, MP ​

Chancellor of the Exchequer and Second Lord of the Treasury - The Rt. Hon. Michael Portillo, MP
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs - The Rt. Hon. Kenneth Clarke, QC, MP
Secretary of State for the Home Department - The Rt. Hon. Michael Howard, QC, MP
Deputy Prime Minister [22] and Secretary of State for Education and Science - The Rt. Hon. Malcolm Rifkind, QC, MP
Secretary of State for Defence - The Rt. Hon. Michael Mates, MP
Secretary of State for Transport - The Rt. Hon. John Gummer, QC, MP
Secretary of State for Health - The Rt. Hon. Gillian Shepherd, MP
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry and President of the Board of Trade - The Rt. Hon. William Waldegrave, MP
Secretary of State for the Environment - The Rt. Hon. Sir George Young, Bt., MP
Secretary of State for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food [23] - The Rt. Hon. Peter Lilley, MP
Secretary of State for Social Security - The Rt. Hon. David Curry, MP
Secretary of State for Employment - The Rt. Hon. Virginia Bottomley, MP
Secretary of State for the Arts and Heritage - The Rt. Hon. The Baroness Blatch, CBE, PC
Secretary of State for Scotland - The Rt. Hon. Ian Lang, MP
Secretary of State for Wales - The Rt. Hon. Rod Richards, MP
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland - The Rt. Hon. Sir Patrick Mayhew, QC, MP
Chief Secretary to the Treasury - The Rt. Hon. Phillip Oppenheim, MP [24]
Lord Chancellor - The Rt. Hon. The Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, QC, PC
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury and Conservative Chief Whip - The Rt. Hon. Tristan Garel-Jones, MP
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for Competitiveness and Investment - The Rt. Hon. Dr. Keith Hampson, MP
Minister without Portfolio and Chairman of the Conservative Party - The Rt. Hon. Bill Powell, MP
Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons - The Rt. Hon. Douglas Hogg, MP
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Lords - The Rt. Hon. The Viscount Cranborne, DL, PC

Notes and Clarifications​

[1] You may note that I’ve completely ASB’ed away Smith’s second heart attack. I honestly don’t think it’s realistic to have him suffer a second non-fatal heart attack and for him to continue in place; I think there’d be too much pressure on him to retire, not least from his family. So I think it’s more realistic if we deploy the ASB’s, perversely enough. Considering it’s an ‘invisible’ health-related POD, I’m not too bothered about this, but it’s the only ASB I’ll be using in the TL. Smith’s overall health is not really changed from OTL.​

[2] Mr Dyer is, as you may have gathered, rather an admirer of Smith.​

[3] Dobson was a frontbench spokesman on matters relating to London from 1993 onwards, in addition to his other frontbench duties.​

[4] Not really; Smith just wants a steady hand at Northern Ireland, although Cunningham probably isn’t too happy about it all the same, albeit slightly placated perhaps by an assurance that he still matters will be promoted if anything ‘comes up’.​

[5] David Clark was an ‘old’ Labour figure who held a number of Shadow Portfolios whilst Labour was in opposition, right up to 1997, principally that of Defence. In OTL, he was a very minor figure in the first Labour Cabinet, who was quickly sacked by Blair in his first reshuffle. Here, he is likely to play a much more significant role if Labour wins the next general election.​

[6] Shadow Defence, Education, Health, and Trade and Industry Secretaries respectively.​

[7] An ATL by-election, triggered by the accidental death of the sitting Conservative MP, Tim Devlin.​

[8] Not quite as big as in OTL, but still very severe for the Conservatives.​

[9] There are a few reasons why Redwood does a little better here (twelve votes better, in fact) than in OTL. Tory MP’s feel a bit more threatened by the prospect of losing to a Smith-lead Party than OTL’s Blair-lead Party; some also feel, on the other hand, more liberated to vote against Major as Smith is not doing quite as well as Blair did in OTL. The Stockton South disaster, coming only a short time before, also has the effect of frightening the bejesus out of Tories in marginal seats who have already been shitting themselves ever since Black Wednesday. It’s a very pointed reminder, if they needed one, that they haven’t won a single by-election now in over six years. ​

There’s also the very notable fact that without Smith dying of a heart-attack as in OTL, Heseltine is still seen as a viable leadership contender, whereas in OTL, Smith’s death more or less put the kibosh on that notion because of the health implications. So one or two MPs favourable to the notion of a Heseltine takeover might decide he’s more credible here than in OTL.​

[10] This is complete bollocks of course. Major was deeply unpopular; his approval poll ratings are reaching levels of historical unpopularity by this point. Clark is hardly the most scrupulously reliable of writers in some respects.​

[11] OTL, Major has claimed that he was only a few votes away from resigning in 1995, and that he had a minimum total of 215 (I think) below which would be immediate resigning territory. So this, while perhaps seeming unlikely, is not all that far-out.​

[12] Well, unthinkable to Clark at least.​

[13] Why? ​

Well, for a start, the health factor is nowhere near as prominent as it was in OTL. Heseltine had a heart attack in 1993, which he had seemingly completely recovered from by 1994, but Smith’s second fatal heart attack raised serious questions about the advisability of putting someone with delicate health into a position of leadership, in effect mostly cutting away Heseltine as a serious leadership prospect. Here, that issue obviously does not arise.​

Heseltine was very much seen as ‘the man’ waiting in the wings in 1994 - he was talked up hugely in the press - and even right up to this period in OTL. A lot of the prejudices regarding his conduct against Thatcher had dissipated by this point (as even Alan Clarke concedes) and he had attracted some support from the Thatcherite right with his pit closure programme and post office privatisation plan. No-one else would have the breadth of his appeal in the party at this point, or the public stature to make them serious election-winning material.​

He is also ostensibly highly loyal to Major here, as he was in OTL; Michael Portillo makes the mistake of installing those telephone lines, as he also did in OTL. Heseltine probably receives Major’s tacit, if not explicit endorsement.​

The only other real contenders are Clarke and Portillo; Portillo, I think, would stand a moderate chance of winning if he runs; (but no more than that - he was exceedingly right-wing at this point) here, on balance, I decided to have him not do so, (Let’s be fair - Portillo’s judgement around this time was poor. But then again, there would be no assuance that he would win in the face of Heseltine, and does he really want to take over a probably irreparable situation, even assuming he could win?) but instead cut a deal with Heseltine which leaves him as the heir apparent; the ‘dream ticket’​

Clarke - well, Clarke is Clarke - the perpetual also-ran; appealing to some sections of the party, but too abrasive personally, politically idle, and percieved as being too pro-European in his opinions for the vast majority. His public profile is also not quite as significant as it was in OTL by 1997, nor does he have his full OTL record on the economy to fall back on. In respect of those people who Clarke would naturally appeal to, Heseltine walks all over him in the credibility stakes.​

[14] I thought about putting Gillian Shepherd into this scramble, but I think on balance she would have been more likely not to throw her hat into the ring. As far as I know, she would probably be likely to endorse Clarke or Heseltine in the first round.​

Another possible contender is Michael Howard - For various reasons, I think on balance he wouldn't be able to secure enough votes to make it worth his while. Better to endorse Heseltine reasonably early.​

In respect of Lamont and Redwood, I should point out that at no stage do all of their supporters expect either to win, or even regard them as particularly credible candidates - it's more a kind of anti-Heseltine protest vote.​

[15] Clarke probably gets a bit too excited and decides to have an impulsive lunge for the leadership (or whatever else is on offer) himself rather than simply endorsing Hezza, a bit similar to OTL’s 1997 contest.​

[16] Clark clearly takes this as a given.​

[17] Maybe Hezza remembers how Thatcher’s Cabinet went wobbly on her at the critical moment?​

[18] In respect of whether Clarke would accept a post - or Hezza would have offered one - after the election scrap: In the end, I think both of them wouldn’t have damaged their mutual relations too badly - it wasn’t a close result, and consequently Clarke will likely be seen as using it to ‘confirm‘ his standing more than anything else - and they basically need each other at this point. I certainly don’t see Clarke being particularly eager to descend to the backbenches, or Heseltine as being too eager to sack the highest-profile pro-European in the Cabinet after himself. So it’s a kiss and make up.​

[19] Because it makes Clarke only the third man behind Rab Butler and Jim Callaghan to ever occupy all three of the Great Offices of State below the PM in the post-war period. (Foreign, Home, Chancellor of the Ex.)​

[20] In OTL, Aitken (Chief Secretary to the Treasury) resigned at this time. Here the spin is that he is 'pushed' before he jumps.​

[21] Smith considered doing something similar to this shortly before he died.​

[22] Though not also, you may notice, First Secretary of State.​

[23] As a sop to Portillo, Hezza sends Lilley to MAFF and allows him to 'up' it to full Department of State level.​

[24] Perhaps slightly over-promoted at this stage, but as a former PPS to Clarke he may be ‘insisted upon’ as part of Clarke’s leaving package.​

 

[V-J]

I present to you the revised 1995. In particularly I'd like to draw your attention to the expanded notes.

1996 will be coming later today. (Hopefully)

 

[Fletch]

I present to you the revised 1995. In particular I'd like to draw your attention to the expanded notes.

1996 will be coming later today. (Hopefully)

Will you be mentioning brown envelopes and Al Fayed?

 

[V-J]

Not directly, no, as I can't think of any ways in which it would significantly diverge here. Same goes for the Scott Report, Nolan, etc.

 

[V-J]

1996​

"A change of nuisance is as good as a holiday." - David Lloyd George (Attrb.)​

Taken from John Smith - a Life in Politics by Simon Trenick, (Simon and Schuster, 2005)​

… The impact of Heseltine has been disputed by psephologists and commentators, but he was almost undoubtedly the impetus for increasing tensions within Labour’s frontbench. Brown, Blair, Straw, and other members of the Shadow Cabinet, as we have seen, were already uneasy about the course Smith had chosen to pursue, believing that he was essentially uncommitted to a serious reform of the party which was needed to ensure electoral victory. Although Smith had arguably risked his leadership over OMOV, and thereby had a proven tack record in reform, these modernisers remained unconvinced, and in particular after Heseltine‘s election a fresh surge of unease ran through long-standing critics of Smith‘s leadership. Straw in particular seems to have been considering renewing a call he had previously made several years before for a re-assessment of Clause Four in late 1995, although events would overtake him on that score. While Smith’s ‘statement’ appeased the modernisers for a time, it was no more than a temporary respite in a continuing saga over the direction of the party. Brown’s disagreements with Smith over economic policy and how precisely to weight and couch the balance of redistribution in the next manifesto continued unabated, and some also privately questioned the wisdom of moving Blair in the reshuffle from a portfolio in which he was seen to be making an impact with the public over crime and disorder. Although ‘new’ Labour had yet to properly coalesce as a coherent concept - that would be years away - it was taking shape gradually and on an unofficial level, and was a phrase increasingly frequently used in the speeches of Blair in particular.​

Many had more serious worries about Smith as an individual, which went beyond his leadership itself. The extent to which Smith could realistically appeal to the large swathe of the electorate located in England was a continuing, if largely unexpressed concern for some. The notion of Smith being a ‘Celt‘, who could not appeal to the South of England however, seems now seems rather eccentric when set against Smith’s public image. Even Smith’s accent seemed, at times, to be distinctly lacking in Scottish timbre. Perhaps these concerns at the time ran to a deeper, more visceral, instinctive distrust; a largely unfocused aversion to the (instinctively left-leaning) politics of Scottish Labour which ran behind Smith, and which was expressed most emphatically in Monklandsgate. ​

Monklands District Council had come into being in the local government reforms of 1974. There was no single place called ‘Monklands‘; instead the council was comprised of various areas of Lanarkshire, principally the two towns of Coatbridge, which was predominantly Catholic, and Airdrie, which was mainly Protestant. Monklands was an altogether strange place, one which would have probably been deeply curious to an English observer, or even someone not acquainted with Central Scotland. The economy had traditionally been centred around various old, declining types of industry, and was almost a closed society economically; Monklands was effectively somewhere you left rather than came into. In this area, Labour was completely dominant, to the effective exclusion of all other parties; Smith’s 1992 majority in Monklands East had been 15,712, with the SNP a very distant second. As so often in such places where pluralistic political competition is virtually unknown, potential malpractice was a constantly lingering concern. The fact that the area was so sharply divided religiously did nothing to ease this. A Labour insider was later to comment that the whole set of allegations were symptomatic of "machine politics at it’s worst."​

Were they? The allegations surrounding Monklands were based on three aspects; That Labour Councillors, from the predominantly Catholic Coatbridge had favoured that area over the mainly Protestant Airdrie; that projects and spending had been allocated accordingly; and that nepotism had been rife, including a two-tier application system for positions with the Council.​

It is worth establishing that the story regarding Monklands of sectarianism was untrue at the basic level; the four suspended Labour Councillors, who had fallen out with the Labour leadership were all Catholics. Equally, the extent to which Coatbridge had been favoured is questionable; Coatbridge had the most available land, and excluding capital projects, Coatbridge and Airdrie received roughly equal amounts of money. In respect of the application process, the Council pointed out that the notorious pink and green forms - apparently only available to favoured candidates - issue was moot, in so far as that green forms were entirely freely available to the public. The suggestions of nepotism was more closely studied. A local investigation concluded that, damagingly, twenty-two relatives of Councillors were employed, and that close relatives were apparently not even interviewed for seasonal jobs. But in an area like Monklands, where the Council formed one of the main employers, the town was relatively closely-knit and of a fixed population. Large, extended, relatively anonymous families were common….​

… Smith’s continued response to the affair had been to insist that it was a local matter, and to stay broadly clear of wading into the issue. This had drawn great criticism, not least from some Tory opponents, most notably David Shaw, the Conservative MP for Dover, who would vexatiously raise the question in the House when Smith was speaking. More than anything else, Monklandsgate raised questions about Smith’s style of leadership. Would it not have been better for Smith to have acted decisively in Monklands, even at the risk of being proven wrong to some extent later, than allow the issue to simmer? Such a suggestion ignores Smith’s fundamental belief in fairness and his lack of Kinnock-style high-handedness, which most people would now believe to have been his strongest suit. It seems implausible to argue that Smith impulsively embroiling himself in the affair directly would have strengthened, rather than weakened his position, either in Labour of the country.​

To clarify the issue, Smith wrote to Ian Lang, the Secretary of State for Scotland, asking for an inquiry into the issue under Section 211 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1973. Lang responded that such powers were not provided for in the Act, and the fight went on. By January 1995, the Monklands authority had voted for hold it’s own investigation into the affair, to be chaired by Professor Robert Black, QC, chair of Scots Law at Edinburgh. This was but a stop-gap measure; the inquiry’s powers were feeble, it’s budget truncated, and it lacked a proper judicial summing-up, which was replaced instead with a simple regurgitation of the evidence.​

Partly, it had been suggested, to contrast with the weakness of this report, Lang finally ordered an inquiry, as Smith had originally requested. This was a much stronger business, headed by William Nimmo Smith, QC, and with full power to summon witnesses. When the report concluded in February 1996, Nimmo Smith concluded that "There is no evidence that any appointment to paid office or employment with the Council .. Had been otherwise than on merit." Aside from also rebuking David Shaw - "I regard his attitude as irresponsible" - the other main conclusion was that the way politics in Monklands had been conducted had given fuel to the accusations, albeit in slightly coded terms:​

"I had a strong impression that here was a substance to the perception that political power was exercised by a small number of Coatbridge councillors. Councillor Brooks (Provost of the Council) in particular struck me as a strong-willed man who liked to control the exercise of power .. If power is exercised in such a way as to lead to a sense of exclusion, suspicions are more readily aroused and rumours and allegations gain currency." [25]​

Was this the sum total of Monklandsgate? That of a falling out between sections of a Labour grouping which had grown complacent? It seems hard to believe, and, certainly, the issue would rumble on in some form until after the next election. To this day, there are some who believe that Monklandsgate represented the ‘unfinest hour’ of Smith early leadership. But the Nimmo Smith report certainly allowed Smith to re-affirm his original position - that of non-involvement - and drew a line under the issue. As Smith had assumed a much higher profile in the media over the last year, indeed, it seemed as if he was now mainly concentrated on a serious, undisturbed challenge in the next general election. Although Monklands would continue to bubble right up to the abolition of the MDC, the story had effectively been shorn of much of it's strength.​

One more surprise lay in wait for Smith, one which followed almost directly on the back of the easing of the circumstances surrounding Monklands. Four days after the publication of the Nimmo Smith report, on Saturday the 17th of February, a man was found unconscious and dishevelled in the garden of a semi-detached house in London, near Clapham Common. The occupants of the house became aware of the man’s presence around 11:30PM and alerted the police. When the police arrived, the man reported that he had no knowledge of how he had found himself in such circumstances, but that his wallet and car keys had been stolen, as well as several other peripheral items, and the man went with the police to report on the incident. At the station, the police reportedly found some drugs paraphernalia on the man’s person which he had no recollection of obtaining. The man was cautioned and released without charge.​

This incident, minor in the telling, would have gone no further except for one crucial factor - the man involved was Ron Davies, the Shadow Welsh Secretary. The following day, the story was already beginning to seep out into the media, and journalists were already priming their newspapers for the Monday editions. Davies decided to telephone Smith (who was preparing to return from Munro Bagging in Scotland at the time) in the afternoon to give a basic account of what happened, and to arrange a meeting for Monday to provide for a full discussion over Davies’ future. Why Smith did that, and what precisely Davies said during this call has been a matter of debate, but the generally accepted line has been that Davies unintentionally mislead Smith over the precise nature of the incident. Smith himself was later recount how he had great sympathy for Davies. Smith was also unwilling to lose a valued member of the Shadow Cabinet who was, at the time of the incident, steering Labour’s policy formulations in respect of Welsh devolution; a critical job which would be disrupted by Davies’ resignation. ​

When the Monday papers were published, the notion that Davies had suffered a misfortune as a result of ‘cruising’ in the area he was located in was sufficiently firm for the press to openly publish it. What precisely befell Davies on that night has never fully emerged, but at their Monday meeting, Davies apparently provided Smith with a frank, if not totally full explanation of what he had been doing, and the two mutually agreed that Davies should resign. Derry Irvine, who sat in on the meeting, reports that Smith was very shocked over the whole business. "I think John was rather taken by surprise, as many of us were. In those circumstances I think John resolved the situation very well." Others have been quicker to point the finger of weak leadership at Smith over this issue, which, so they suggest should have been resolved on the Sunday, citing an apparent reticence on the part of Smith to return to deal with the situation.. Derry Irvine supports Smith: "I think to say that John had no hold there is quite untrue. I talked to John on that Sunday and he was already preparing to have to speak to Ann (Clwyd; Davies successor as Principal Spokesperson on Wales [26] ) on Monday or Tuesday. John was ready for that. He just didn’t want to prejudge the situation or do anything hasty. He wanted the full facts."​

This would be the last misfortune of any real significance Labour would face before the general election, and February 1996 would coincidentally represent one of the low points of Labour‘s standing in the polls under Heseltine. After their main impacts, Heseltine’s leadership would increasingly deteriorate and the focus would shift to the Tories’ increasing divisions. The extent to which either of these episodes damaged Labour is debatable. In all likelihood, the Tories were by that point too mired in the notion of ‘sleaze’ themselves to make that charge stick with anyone else; this was a time of much more notable ‘sleaze‘, in particular the Scott Report and the accusations surrounding Westminster Council. But some within Labour were clearly disquieted at Smith’s handling of Monklands; Smith had, so they believed, been hesitant and had misjudged the public mood. That, on balance, is unfair. However, the Davies affair and Monklandsgate did expose Labour’s vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities which different leadership could, certainly in the latter instance, have lessened. By this reading, it was at least partly fortunate that Davies should have been shadowing his opposite in the Commons…​

Taken from The Tories - Conservatives and the Nation State 1922-1997 by Alan Clark, (Phoenix, 1998)​

Heseltine’s position had been upheld by a perception, part real, part imaginary, that an endorsement of his leadership was the best chance the Tories had of winning the next election; indeed, that it was still conceivably possible to win the next election under the right leadership. MPs, largely satiated as a result of their destruction of Major and eager for prospective advancement, had been understandably reluctant to criticise the new regime, and, much like in the 1990-1992 period, instead began to prepare themselves for the immanent prospect of a dissolution. In this unnatural atmosphere, Heseltine began to become more complacent and contemptuous in regards to backbench opinion, a tendency which was already pronounced.​

This artificial effect of goodwill, which served Heseltine well in his first months of office in the polls, would begin to unravel in the New Year. Partly due to Heseltine’s own poor judgement, and partly due to the realisation by his backbenchers of just how ingrained and determined his fixation with the European project was - which effectively put him to the left of Labour on the issue - the effect would be renew the internal argument mixed with briefing and counter-briefing which had so characterised Major’s last months.​

For reasons which remain mostly elusive, Heseltine, upon his succession, had appointed as Welsh Secretary Roderick Richards, who up to that point had been a junior minister in the Welsh Office and had not yet served a full Parliament. Former Conservative Prime Ministers, in sharp contrast to their behaviour towards the more muscular Scottish Office, had always generally shunned the notion of appointing a Welshman to this position, preferring instead to see the role as an ‘incubator’ of future talent or as a form of internal exile for opponents. Presumably Heseltine thought that a native of the Principality would be able to more effectively argue against the devolving of power, much as the Scottish Office was to begin doing in this period; perhaps he thought that Richards’ fluency in the Welsh tongue would be an effective device against the Nationalists in the north of Wales. Whatever the motive, this was an appointment which was ill-advised. Richards was already known for his prototypically Welsh personality, which would be impressive in operation within the whips office, but was less impressive in a Secretary of State. Enemies were quickly made.​

When allegations began to appear in the press regarding extra-marital activities, therefore, it should have come as little surprise. The real surprise was his appointment. After the inevitable resignation, [27] came the inevitably renewed focus on the behaviour of Ministers, which the press, in it’s wisdom, found to be wanting. The media, which had previously been greatly taken by Heseltine, was released from this adoring slumber and this would trigger a renewed free-for all. Allegations and minor scandals of many years’ standing were re-heated and driven up anew. Mates’ instruction to Asil Nadir to not ‘let the bastards* get you down’ was again prominent. By surrounding himself in Cabinet and government with his close confidants at the expense of strong scruples over their personal behaviour, Heseltine had given the ‘sleaze’ suggestion more vigour than it deserved. Mates would go on to be regularly attacked in the press and through various official mediums right up until the dissolution.​

The resignation, minor in it’s overall scope, served to illustrate Heseltine’s lack of judgement. Richards was over-promoted, seemingly on no better basis than the fact that he could appeal - and this being utterly inconsequential in electoral terms - to the Celtic fringe in Wales, alongside an excessive desire to bind the Cabinet to Heseltine. Why, indeed had the whips office not alerted Heseltine to the potential liability in Richards’ promotion? An oversight? Unlikely. So who had orchestrated it? …​

* H.M Treasury.​

Taken from The Independent, the 11th of March, 1996: ‘Heseltine faces crisis on Euro decision’​

Michael Heseltine's leadership faced fresh challenges over Europe last night as the anti-EU Referendum Party geared up to fight the government over it’s continued reluctance to commit to a referendum over the Euro, and backbenchers threatened a barrage of dissent if tomorrow's White Paper fails to take a tough line on reducing the powers of Brussels.​

There have been calls from some senior Tories for the government to negotiate with the strongly anti-EU tycoon, Sir James Goldsmith, whose self-financed Referendum Party threatens Tories in marginals, and who has reportedly been in discussions with some sitting MPs over possible defection. Sir James has already begun funding a series of advertisements in newspapers suggesting that Britain’s fundamental interests are ‘unsafe’ in the hands of the current government.​

They reproduce a letter from Sir James to candidates and supporters stating that "Britain should resist further integration absolutely ... There should be a referendum, and it should be not on the Euro, but on the basic issue of our continued membership. Britain has been lead into a European construction which is diametrically opposed to that which was approved by the 1975 referendum."​

The Prime Minister is understood to have been reluctant to openly give a clear commitment to a referendum, believing that it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness in the face of increasing backbench pressure. The Chancellor, who meets today with fellow EU finance ministers to asses growth forecasts, upon which a successful launch of the Euro in 1999 would depend, is reported to be increasingly convinced that a referendum will be necessary. Mr Portillo has apparently resisted the notion of a commitment to a referendum up to this point on the grounds that it would suggest a clear aspiration to join the single currency in the future. [28]​

Mr Portillo’s economic centrality and continued reservations do not appear to have reassured backbench Eurosceptic rebels. Christopher Gill, the MP for Ludlow who was previously deprived of the party whip, said that the government was "living on another planet", and that it should "get real", adding that "Increasing numbers of people are wondering what the exact policy of the government is at the moment. If it is current policy to prepare for entry into the Euro without a referendum, then the government should have the courage to say that."​

Taken from Whatever Happened to the Tories - The Conservatives Since 1945 by Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, (Fourth Estate, 1998) ‘Drifting with Dogma - Nearing the End’​

The tendencies which plagued Heseltine from early 1996 onwards were, as we have seen, already well established in the minds of many back-bench MPs. Much of the existing prejudices regarding Heseltine had simmered for many years, and, despite him being clearly the only individual who could command the respect and ability to steer the party into the election, and despite the favourable ‘honeymoon’ Heseltine had enjoyed in late 1995, back-bench MP’s became slowly but progressively incensed as what they saw as his ‘betrayal’, principally over European issues. Heseltine’s policy, which under the circumstances was emminently sensible, was to decide on entry to the Euro and it’s conditions at a later date, and focus on winning the next election. Heseltine was entirely correct in believing that the concessions which Major had often provided for the euro sceptic right had only emboldened them further, and was determined not to repeat his predecessor’s mistake. Eurosceptic backbenchers, however, whose heads at this point were governed by ideology rather than common sense, were unlikely to be swayed by Heseltine’s arguments. That was to engender precisely the kind of image of a ‘split party’ which would make the Tories unelectable. The behaviour of many of these individuals, some of them former Cabinet ministers, in caballing against Heseltine, contrasted poorly with Heseltine’s own behaviour under John Major, which had been exemplary.​

There had already been examples of this before the New Year, such as when David Heathcoat-Amory had resigned from the government in October over the European issue. [29] As the far-right was abandoning Heseltine’s government, more reasonable MPs were abandoning the party. Emma Nicholson would defect to the Liberal Democrats in January, and would shortly be followed by Peter Thurman. Both MP’s cited the Nolan findings as their ‘breaking point‘; [30] some of Heseltine’s more questionable appointments did not help to lessen amongst the perception of ‘sleaze’ amongst the public. Heseltine’s overall approach to the Cabinet was unwise and the ongoing anaemia from resignations and 'sleaze' accusations would lessen Heseltine’s position in his battles with the right over Europe. ​

Although there had been consistent rumblings of discontent since Heseltine had taken over the party, the issue would in the event come to a head in May of 1996. Many backbench MP’s had used to early part of the year in a guerrilla campaign of briefing and threats, in an attempt to force the Prime Minister to change the government’s policy. Michael Portillo, who had been appointed by Heseltine as Chancellor, and was widely considered to be over-promoted, also seemed to join in this foolishness, and stories cluttered the press over the Spring about splits between the Prime Minister and his Chancellor. The fanaticism over Europe had begun to infect even the heart of government. This would reach it’s apogee in May 1996, two months after the Health Secretary, Gillian Shepherd, had told the House of Commons about a possible link between mad-cow disease, and the fatal human equivalent, Creutzfeld-Jakob’s disease.​

In the 1980’s the Thatcher’s government’s idolisation of the market and it’s dogmatism with regards to any hint of regulation had lead it, unlike much of the rest of the developed world, to take inadequate action against BSE in cows. This had two consequences: by 1996, Britain had some 180,000 infected cows, nearly twenty times the rest of the EU combined; and many territories not even in Europe, such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Hong Kong and Kuwait had for many years banned the import of British beef. Quite sensibly, the EU, subsequent to Shepherd’s announcement, placed a world wide export ban on British beef. While the government declared that it would work through the EU to end the ban and reduce the underlying problem of BSE domestically, eurosceptic backbenchers, utterly abandoning all trace of reason and common sense, joined with the tabloid press in railing against what they luridly viewed as the government’s ‘appeasement’ of our European partners. It is typical of this that nothing constructive was ventured by those vehemently opposed to the government’s action, merely that Britain should return to it’s utterly self-defeating Little Englandism of the Thatcher years in respect of Europe..​

That was now provided for them in the unlikely shape of Sir James Goldsmith. While castigating ‘unelected Brussels bureaucrats’, the eurosceptic right applauded the influence of this unelected foreign-based billionaire, who had decided to buy himself into politics à l‘Americaine, although American billionaires, whilst believing that their wealth entitles the to run the country, at least live there and pay taxes. Goldsmith was seldom in Britain and payed only nominal amounts of taxation. Sir James had earlier launched his Referendum Party as a vehicle for keeping the government to account on the European issue…​

…Absurdly, Sir James’ lure now seemed irresistible to those few individuals who had totally abandoned any sort of moderation or political reason. In response to the government’s attitude over BSE, the chair of the backbench ‘92 group, Sir George Gardiner, would defect to the Referendum Party at the end of May, to be followed a week and a half later by the MP for Stroud, Roger Knapman. [31] Both of these individuals, prior to their crossing of the floor, had been deservedly obscure, but their defections, much like the ill-fated SDP many years before, sought to provoke similar action by their more senior ideological compatriots. Much like the SDP itself, that would prove to be a vain hope, despite Christopher Gill, the MP for Ludlow, who had a consistently extreme attitude towards the European issue, deciding to join their martyrdom, although in his case this consisted of merely following Sir Richard Body in voluntarily resigning the whip. [32] Wisely, no other MPs decided to join them in the political wilderness. But the cumulative effect was that the Prime Minister was now heading a minority government; Heseltine would have to rely on the votes of the Ulster Unionist parties to remain in office. [33]​

In a move which combined the most deadly opportunistic timing with keen strategy, the Leader of the Opposition chose this moment to commit Labour to holding a referendum on the issue should it pursue entry in the life of the next Parliament. [34] That would placate critics within his own party whilst exacerbating tensions within the Conservatives: this was a move which threatened to tip the balance in the argument. The Conservative Chief Whip, Tristan Garel-Jones, was reported to have stated to the Prime Minister that the loyalty of up to fifteen more MPs could perhaps not be counted on indefinitely. That in all likelihood would tip the balance and result in a prompt general election, something which the Prime Minister wished to avoid. [35] It was necessary that the Prime Minister make concessions if he wished to avoid further such defections. Consequently, the government stated in July that, in effect, it would feel bound to hold a referendum if it decided to join the single currency in the next parliament. This was a mistake on the Prime Minister’s part. It would have been better both for the country and for the Conservative Party if he had held to his course and, if necessary, gone to the country in the second half of 1996. The government was becoming patently unable to make effective decisions in the interests of the country as a whole. Heseltine would have had a better chance of victory if he had appealed directly to the country from a position of strength rather than cling to the possible impact of positive developments in the economy whilst vainly trying to placate the eurosceptics. Smith, with his customary talent for mockery, drove home the point at Prime Ministers Questions when he said that "The Prime Minister has been revealed to be not so much Tarzan, as the Jane to his party’s eurosceptics." … [36]​

Taken from Building Jerusalem - The Last Three Years of Labour by John Dyer (Third Estate, 2008) ‘Battling for Government’​

…Heseltine had misjudged the public mood. Although clearly seen as a strong character by the public, his insistence on economic efficiency above all else was a mistake when the public wanted investment and a focus on the public services, particularly as the economy rose. It was sick of the dog-eat-dog rhetoric of the eighties. That was a situation which ideally suited the calm reassurance and focus on social justice offered by Smith. Now, the only question was how long it would be before Smith was able to put his famous promise into action: that all he wished was to be give the chance to serve the country...​

Notes and Clarifications​

[25] Almost all of this happened in OTL, albeit on a much earlier timescale; the Nimmo Smith judgement is taken word-for-word from OTL.​

[26] This is not as barmy as it might first sound; Clwyd had previously been Shadow Welsh Secretary (albeit briefly in the Smith-Kinnock interim period) and had served on the front bench under both Smith and Kinnock. She had attempted to run for Deputy Leader in 1992, but failed to get sufficient nominations in the face of the much more credible left-wing candidacies of Beckett and Prescott. She was also consistently the number two Welsh member behind Davies in Shadow Cabinet elections in this period*. So she would have a very strong - probably unassailable - claim to the Welsh portfolio should Davies resign at this point. Whether she was sacked from the front bench here in 1995 as in OTL is a moot point; even if she had, she would still be very hard to pass over.​

There’s also the handy fact that giving her it will fulfil Labour’s promise to have more women in Cabinet, and it balances out the right with the left. (Always something very important to Smith.) Naturally, she’s also very strongly in favour of devolution. In fact she’s possibly one member of the Shadow Cabinet who could give Smith a run for his money on that score.​

The Davies incident, btw, happened in a broadly similar fashion in OTL two years later when he was Welsh Secretary, although the timing here is probably more embarassing.​

*In OTL, for example, she came joint nineteenth in the 1994 elections. Alun Michael came twenty-seventh, with Rhodri Morgan a very distant fifty-first. On that performance, Morgan rather wisely decided not to contest the 1995 and 1996 elections. Davies was twelfth and then a rather incredible fourth (!) in 1995. Much the same sort of distribution will prevail here.​

[27] And replaced by the considerably more austere James Arbuthnot.​

[28] He held this line in OTL; here there is an obvious self-interest as well.​

[29] As in OTL, although a little earlier here.​

[30] But neither of them are accompanied by Alan Howarth in this TL. Here, he becomes a PUSS (or possibly a Minister of State, depending on how things pan out - take your pick) under Heseltine, and he doubtless wouldn’t be particularly comfortable with the notion of joining Smith’s Labour Party anyway.​

[31] In OTL, Gardiner waited until March 1997 to defect; Knapman remained in the party until after defeat. Knapman isn't appointed a whip here in 1995, (And it's pretty obvious he won't be appointed to anything else for the forseeable future) so his frustration is probably more pronounced than OTL.​

[32] ITTL, Body is not re-admitted to the whip in January 1996, as per OTL.​

[33] In OTL, this did not happen until Spring 1997.​

[34] There are disagreements over how Smith wanted to frame policy over the Euro, but by far the most convincing explanation I have seen is that he wanted to commit Labour to a referendum, and probably reasonably quickly too; here I have perhaps delayed that a little bit. About the only person who seems to believe that Smith would have gone into the Euro without a referendum - which would be politically implausible in the extreme, not just a very hard sell in the country, but in Labour as well - is Meghnad Desai, who in any case was variably close to Smith on economic issues and whose political judgement, IMO, is rather in doubt, since Smith himself had to sack him from his position on the Lords Treasury team not once, but twice - he was, primarily, an economist in politics and I don‘t really trust his judgement here. A referendum policy makes the most political sense in a multitude of ways and fits, I believe, with JS’s overall pragmatism. It would be a very strange decision on JS' part indeed if he put at risk Labour's first shot at government since the seventies over an issue as relatively peripheral and as divisive as the Euro.​

[35] Historically, Heseltine wanted to wait until the last minute in the hope that the rising economy would help the Tories; I don’t see that changing here.​

[36] JS was a very good Commons performer - I should really try to bring this out in future updates...​

 

[EdT]

Glad to see this is back- and great stuff too, do carry on!

 

[alt_historian]

This makes me nostalgic for a Labour leadership that never was...

excellent.

 

[V-J]

I didn't realise just what a fat post that was.

Glad to see this is back- and great stuff too, do carry on!

Thanks!

This makes me nostalgic for a Labour leadership that never was...

excellent.

I'm flattered.

 

[MrHola]

Very detailed. When is the next one?

 

[V-J]

Soon, I hope. Obviously it'll cover the general election, so extra work is required. But I think you'll like it.

 

[MrHola]

Will this timeline also explore international politics? I have a good suggestion if you do: a Kerry victory in '04. It's not as cliche as a Gore victory in 2000.

 

[V-J]

Yes, it'll do international politics, although mainly only later. (The 2000+ stage)

Gore very well might win in 2000, because that result was so fractionally close, even the smallest butterfly could effect the result; conversely, Bush might win more decisively than in OTL.

 

[Foreign Minister]

Wonderfully researched and written. I wonder whether Smith will be able to inflict the same kind of historical rout in the next general election given the Monklands Council and Davies incidents?

For clarity - the Heseltine government has committed to a referendum if it decides to join the single currency? I'd suggest that the rebellion over a decision to join EMU would be stronger than that which occurred over Maastricht!

 

[V-J]

Thank you old man.

The Heseltine government has basically now adopted what John Major went into the 1997 election with in OTL - What Major called his 'Negotiate and Decide' policy. Basically, the government isn't committed to joining the euro, but it may do so during the next Parliament depending on the circumstances, and if it does, there will be a referendum on it.

This is obviously very weak, but it was not enough to satisfy the rebels in OTL, (Who wanted a complete and total ruling out of membership of the Euro, and in the case of the more extreme rebels, much much more) and it will be unlikely to do so here. The fact that they have already got Heseltine to shift once may embolden them in respect of a man they already do not trust at all on this issue. Expect troubles ahead.

It is indeed unlikely that Smith will be able to inflict a defeat along the lines of OTL on the Conservatives, with all the things which differentiate him from Blair. However, with Heseltine perhaps appearing weaker on sleaze than Major, and having one of his main personal strengths - 'toughness' - severely weakened, the Conservative leader has plenty of troubles of his own.

 

[The Professor]

But a defeat nonetheless? If I'm reading between the lines enough. Sentiment in England at least was turning decidedly anti-Tory.