Yes, but the 12th Army Group operations in March 1945 - Lumberjack - were co-ordinated with this; which is what SHAEF/land force commander should have doing in 1944.
Broadly agree with the rest; however US history tends not to be too critical of their commanders in WW2.
The Land Force Commander - Montgomery - was initially there until there was space and need for a second Army Group HQ to manage the space then a third with Dragoon And some suggestion because Devers could manage the French) . SHAEF then took over and followed a Broad Front. The problem is it stalls and Bradley mismanages his armies and the army commanders mismanage their formations continually making little to no progress on a single axis. Where they have strength ( 6th is really too weak to do much until the French come along).
This is not entirely his fault as some inadequacies of the US army are becoming apparent. Its not that good ( this is a qualified statement, its probably the second best in WW2, the problem is the best is the British so problems are highlighted) at attacking fortifications even field fortifications much less the Westwall and Atlantic Wall positions they are now faced with. This is a new problem for them. Their training and systems are more geared to open and maneuver warfare, which is fine until you have crack a fortified position and it takes 60 hours or so to dig a trench line with bunkers proof against anything short of 150mm shell fire.
Even if the Broad Front is continued the whole is going to be at the pace of the slowest and for 12 AG an advance to the Rhine means you are opposite the heavily Urbanised area of the Ruhr, which is a bad place to fight in in its own right and based on say Aachen will be very heavily defended. Essentially Geography takes over. The fortifications generally do not extend along the Dutch Border and its flat and good armour country, unlike South of Koblenz. The Germans can read maps as well if they have forces the logic is they would place them at the point of greatest strategic threat,
That they expend their forces in the Bulge then west of the Rhine and off to the wrong place in the East is out with SHAEF control.
The Criticism of Eisenhower and SHAEF is that the Geography is a constant and while attacking towards Aachen and the Hurtgen is perfectly reasonable continuing to do so for months is not.
Looking at the terrain version of Google Maps makes this pretty clear once across the Rhine you are either fighting through a series of cities or hill/mountain ranges with the low ground taking you towards Nuremburg or Munich.
The Bulge changes that. SHAEF seems to lose confidence in Bradley but the army and corps commanders react very well and effectively. Lumberjack is a conformal operation based on the progress of the 21 AG who started a month earlier.
But the key point is you don't need a land force commander to do that. SHAEF is perfectly able to set the priorities for his army groups, its his job and by doing so he is also setting the priorities for the Air and Naval commanders.
To put it mildly, the British and Russians had more command training than the American army? American historIan's are not generally critical of their WW2 command?
Proof is necessary, as I have read nothing of the kind. These absolute statements are not generally supported by the record.
Yes. Basically up to 1940 the US promotion system is seniority with a hump of WW1 officers, who are then retired by Marshall McNair in 1940. So up to then the higher command positions are held by people who by and large are not given field command in WW2. The problem is that for 20 years the very small US army has limited options for command training or indeed troop command outside maybe two years in school and maybe a couple more teaching what you have been taught in school
Devers for example is promoted to Brigadier General over 474 more senior colonels to become the youngest Brigadier General in the US Army. In1940.
What the US does is rotate people more comprehensively around all its Duties The problem is those duties include representative at the Worlds Fair, supervising the ROTC and they never really get a long period running anything and when they go back to the troops its generally in small scattered outposts with limited opportunities for large scale training until 1940 at which point the expansion of the army is so fast that the guys who will command are either being promoted or managing base construction or weapon procurement projects.
And critical for the learning experience who is teaching them and what is being taught. The US has about 7 weeks experience of WW1 and lots of the guys with that experience are dead. So a WW2 General officer taught in the 1920s or early 1930s has a narrow perspective - and the War College is effectively a think tank for War Plans Divisions not a teaching space. Its very effective at that but its not about command training of formations in battle.
Now the guys are smart and adapt and learn but some learn really fast and others really don't learn at all.
And no US authors are lagging way behind Commonwealth or even German authors ( or frankly Americans writing about Germans) on the west less so on the Pacific Air War. They are still stuck in the Rick Atkinson level, these are fine books but they miss out on the revolution in Military Historiography that comes out of Kings and its alumni which takes things back to original contemporary sources like manuals and written orders, strength rather than memoirs constructed after the event.
You can pick others but for example Devers and Dempsey.
Devers Graduates West Point 1909, Arty Officer in Wa and the PI to 1912, Maths Teacher West Point Manages sports programmes, Battery commander 9th FA 1916/17 Instructor School fire to October 1918 then exec officer then commander of an Arty Regiment which never leaves the US. Appointed commander 1st FA March 1919. May 1919 sent on a study tour to Europe. August 1919 he is back as captain and instructor at West Point on field artillery for 5 years. Command and General Staff school for 10 months. Director of Field Artillery Gunnery School 1929 DC on staff of the Chief of Field artillery Army war college for a year. XO and Commander of Arty Bn for a couple of years where he stuns his troops by letting them fire their guns. This is about 1935. Then back to West point until 1939 where he manages atheletics programmes - and builds sports fields.
1939 to Canal Zone as Chief of staff to a brigade sized formation. Promoted Brigadier, Commands a provisional Brigade for a couple of months, Inspection tour of the Destroyers for Bases.
1 October 1940 promoted Major General 9th infantry, training them, but mainly supervising the building of Fort Bragg. 1 August Chief of the armoured force, May 1943 Chief of ETOUSA where is main jobs are the Bomber offensive and planning for Overlord. Sent o Med as the Logistics and Admin Commander for US forces in the Med, ( and deputy SAC med where Maitland Wilson has him do fun stuff like deal with the french and poles.) and is generally very capable at managing things. Major player in planning Dragoon July 1944 - VE day Commands 6 AG.
So couple of years school after west point, rather more than most US officers troop command at a senior level Bn or Bn XO, but never for long because something more important comes up. Thoroughly professional gunner and sports administrator. also pretty good at building things and managing programmes.
Dempsey Sandhurst graduates 1915, Platoon and company commander, with a stint at Corps Staff to 1917. 1918 back as company commander gassed has a lung removed, returns to duty in July to 11/11. 3 years as a company commander in the middle east. Instructor at Sandhurst for 4 years. Back as company commander mainly in Germany.
1930 staff college then GSO3 to the Military Secretary ( HR department for officers) which puts him in charge of the careers of everyone under colonel. Promoted Major in 1932. In 1934 Brigade Chief of Staff for a couple of years with a lot of maneuvres. HQ company commander for his Bn for a year. Senior Officer School ( which was a tri service academy) for a year. GSO2 to the South African Defence forces. CO inf Bn 38/9. Promoted Brigade commander at 42 in France. July 40 Brigadier General Staff to the Canadian Corps. June 41 Division commander, December 42 Corps commander in Egypt not needed on the line so plans Husky then executes. Pulled out to plan Baytown Executes. EO 43 goes with Montgomery to plan Overlord commands 2nd Army.
So combat veteran, thoroughly experienced in troop command, Instructor, Couple of years at Brigade staff, couple of years at National command level, several years at Staff colleges. Battalion and Brigade command for extended periods and corps staff and Divisional command. Plans then executes three amphib operations.