Broken Symmetry

This first post is mostly a teaser for the rest of the TL, including the PoD and a copious amount of setting. It also is somewhat long. If y'all think that this particular installment is too long, lemme know and I can try to cut down. Comments, questions, extrapolation, all are of course welcome, encouraged, and desired. :)

Please hold off on "wank" accusations until more is posted. ;)

Dread Intrusion.

“Damn! We’re in a tight spot!”
-Ulysses Everett McGill

On June 3, 1863, Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia began to move away from Fredericksburg, where it had been bivouacked for some weeks opposite Joe Hooker’s Army of the Potomac. Lee’s army’s march route led first northwest, then northeast, carrying it beyond the South Mountain ridge and towards Maryland and Pennsylvania. Lee had decided to renew his invasion of the North, having been halted last year at Antietam. The defensive stand he had conducted in Virginia over the last few months, while it had seriously bloodied the Federal armies and gained the Confederacy moral ascendancy, had not proved productive in forcing Washington to terms. In order to do that, it seemed necessary to invade the northern States and bring the war to their farms, fields, and cities.

Hooker learned of this, too, and told his men to pack up. As the massive Army of the Potomac prepared to leave its cantonments on the Rappahannock, the Federal cavalry under Alfred Pleasonton was dispatched to keep tabs on Lee and best his own horsemen. Those horsemen, under the command of J. E. B. Stuart, were unpleasantly surprised at Brandy Station on June 9. Outnumbered by over a thousand men, the Confederates took all day to repel the Union attack, which at one point overran Stuart’s headquarters. Though in the end Pleasonton was beaten off, this engagement stood in stark comparison to the performance of the Federal cavalry earlier in the war. It was a dangerous omen. Hooker had originally opted, in a bold stroke typical of his planning, to move south and attack Richmond. The supreme command in Washington, Lincoln especially, rebuffed this scheme. Hooker was to keep his army between the District of Columbia and Lee’s forces, and work to repel it from any lodgment it might seek in the northern states. Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania militia was called up, under Governor Curtin.

As the Army of Northern Virginia moved north, shielded by Stuart’s cavalry and South Mountain, Pleasonton repeatedly tried to get a fix on their location. In the Loudoun Valley, the Federals attempted to push through Stuart’s cavalry and gain intelligence on the rebels’ position, but three times, at Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville, his advances were rebuffed (so to speak) and Hooker remained largely without information on Lee’s whereabouts. Lee then ordered Stuart to use part of his cavalry force to catch up with his leading corps, under Richard Ewell, which had already crossed the Potomac and was entering Pennsylvania. In order to erase part of the embarrassment from Brandy Station and perform one of his standard feats of circumnavigating an enemy army, Stuart elected to move further east than would be necessary, taking his best three brigades. While he began to capture a significant portion of the Federals’ supplies, and scare the bejeezus out of a large portion of Maryland and Pennsylvania, he was not performing his usual role in blocking off the Federal cavalry, nor was he reporting on the movements of the main Army of the Potomac.

Hooker was, in the meantime, exchanging heated words with Halleck et al in Washington, which combined with his failure at Chancellorsville made his tenure in command of the Army of the Potomac come to an end. On June 27, he was formally relieved. The next morning, the commander of V Corps, George Meade, was promoted to command the main army. After an initial surprised and confused exchange (Meade, a somewhat temperamental commander, had never really considered the top spot, and thought he was being placed under arrest when he was woken up), he informed Lincoln and Halleck that Washington’s safety was the first object, but if Lee should turn east he would bring the Confederates to battle. The army was ordered to continue its march, and concentrate in the vicinity of the town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania on July 1. Meanwhile, Lee himself, noticing the Federal movements, ordered his army to concentrate at Cashtown, slightly west of Gettysburg. His army was strung out from Chambersburg to the Susquehanna River, and would need to combine for safety against the approaching Union troops. The first corps to reach Cashtown, that of A. P. Hill, began to initiate reconnaissance on June 30 to replace the information that Stuart wasn’t providing. Johnston Pettigrew, one of his brigade commanders, advanced to Gettysburg with his brigade and noticed Union troops south of the town, namely the van of the Federal cavalry, two brigades under John Buford. Pettigrew elected to withdraw without contesting the town.

Buford thus had his choice of the ground around the town on which to make a stand if and when the rebels returned. He noted the excellent defensive terrain southeast of the town, along Cemetery Ridge, which with the hill Little Round Top and Culp’s Hill formed a upside down fishhook, a compact position from which it would be difficult to dislodge any army. By his estimation, though, it would be impossible for his men to hold that against superior forces long enough for the remainder of the army to arrive. Thus it would be more sensible for his cavalry to position themselves forward of Cemetery Ridge, to allow the Army of the Potomac enough time to reach Gettysburg. Northwest of Gettysburg lay two ridges, Seminary Ridge closer to the town and McPherson Ridge further out. Buford arrayed his troops on McPherson Ridge, with outposts along Willoughby Run, which lay at the bottom of the ridge along the road to Cashtown, the Chambersburg Pike.

A. P. Hill, upon the revelation of some troops in Gettysburg, was induced to make a reconnaissance in force with two brigades from Harry Heth’s division the following day, July 1, 1863. Heth’s troops moved down the Chambersburg Pike, expecting to encounter only the Pennsylvania militia. Their initial repulse by Buford’s dismounted battle-hardened cavalry veterans (who were also armed with breech-loading carbines) in the morning was initially shocking to the rebels. They were aided by the arrival of the first of the Federal regular infantry, the First Division of the I Corps under James Wadsworth, with John Reynolds, the commander of I Corps, accompanying them. As Reynolds directed troops south of the Pike to move forward and clear the Herbst Woods of Confederate infantry, to help dislocate the enemy attack, he was killed, and Abner Doubleday assumed command of both I Corps and the overall action. The battle soon turned to the Federal side. Heth’s brigades were repulsed, and the fighting began to die down as midday approached and reinforcements for both sides arrived.

As Doubleday struggled to organize the elements of I Corps into a recognizable line, he was superseded in command by Oliver Howard, commander of XI Corps, whose troops were now on the scene. I Corps was left in its positions north of the town, arrayed across the Chambersburg Pike, while XI Corps was to assume a position guarding its northern flank, in the open ground north of Gettysburg between Oak Hill and Barlow’s Knoll. How Howard expected to hold that expanse with a single poorly trained corps (XI Corps did not have a good history, having utterly collapsed at Chancellorsville some months before) was unknown, especially as gray troops occupied Oak Hill; these were men of Rodes’ Division, in Ewell’s Corps, who were finally reaching the battlefield as the first from their unit. Hill’s Corps was also being reinforced; the remainder of Heth’s Division was there, as well as much of Pender’s Division. More Confederate troops of Ewell’s Corps were on their way under Jubal Early.

As afternoon continued, the Confederate attack was renewed. Rodes’ troops began to roll down Oak Hill, roughly coordinated with Heth and Pender to the south. But in all instances the southern commanders seem to have conducted poor reconnaissance, have had insufficient vigor, or were wounded. Heth was shot in the head and only survived narrowly, and elements of Rodes’ Division were shredded by Federal fire. As the attack on I Corps stalled, Early’s Division arrived from the north and began to attack the widely spaced troops of the XI Corps north of town. Early was able to surround and eliminate the salient that had been created to be able to hold Barlow’s Knoll and with that hole in the enemy lines began to roll up the corps, assisted by elements of Rodes’ Division. The collapse of XI Corps resistance allowed the parts of Hill’s and Ewell’s Corps that were on the scene to concentrate in full against the already battered I Corps. To make matters worse, elements of I Corps were already retreating, having been thoroughly pummeled during the day’s events.

What prevailed in the twilight of 1 July was a disorganized, disorderly flight southwest, through the town of Gettysburg towards Cemetery Ridge to the south. As the scattered troops of I and XI Corps reached Cemetery Ridge, they were reinforced by the van of II Corps, under the command of Winfield Scott Hancock. Hancock had been sent by Meade to take control of the situation as one of the Union’s best tacticians, and his opinion concurred with that of Buford the previous day: this would be one of the best locations the Federals had yet had on which to fight a battle. The significance of the place was recognized by Robert E. Lee, who also reached the battlefield in twilight and immediately sent word to Ewell to occupy Cemetery Hill, an integral part of the proposed Union fishhook line – but only ‘if he found it practicable’. Ewell, noting his troops’ fatigue and the overall difficulty of assaulting the position, and observing some Federal troops on the hill in the fading light, decided that it wasn’t practicable, and paused to reorganize his corps and rest for the night.

Lee’s plans for July 2 would involve his entire army. Both his Second (Ewell) and Third (Hill) Corps were there on the battlefield, and James Longstreet’s Corps was still descending from South Mountain. Longstreet, who was already there, tried to convince Lee to try something else, and leave the battlefield, march around the Union flank, and rob them of their good ground. His commander, though, believed that the Southern troops would be able to carry any position, just as they had at Chancellorsville and indeed the previous day. Lee wanted to outflank the Union army as well, but his plan was for a tactical flanking movement, with Longstreet moving against the southern flank of the Union troops on Cemetery Ridge to seize Cemetery Hill and command the battlefield from that high ground. His scheme, though, was colored by false information: Stuart had still not returned from his joyride throughout Maryland, and he didn’t really know where the Army of the Potomac was exactly. Longstreet was ordered to move his men out as soon as possible and attack as soon as they were on the field, and Ewell would demonstrate against Culp’s Hill as soon as he heard the sound of the guns further south in order to draw Union attention.

On the Federal side, the major reinforcements during the night were Henry Slocum’s XII Corps (sent to anchor the northern flank) and Daniel Sickles’ III Corps, dispatched to the southern flank on Cemetery Ridge. Sickles, upon reaching his ground, was dismayed to find that it was actually lower than the series of terrain obstacles in front of it. At Chancellorsville two months prior his Corps had been stuck in front of high ground held by the Confederates, who had inflicted a brutal artillery bombardment upon it. To forestall a recurrence of such a disaster, Sickles elected to place his men on the high ground in front of Cemetery Ridge, which included a peach orchard, the formation called ‘Devil’s Den’, and the Rose Woods. These positions were reached by about midday on July 2. Meade was receiving reports of the approach of Longstreet’s Corps and of Sickles’ repositioning at the same time, and was enraged to learn that the III Corps was now, as XI Corps had the day before, in possession of far too much territory for it to safely hold. Meade had neither time nor other options, though, and elected to feed as many men as he safely could to reinforce III Corps and hopefully avert disaster.

Sickles’ movement had had a fortunate consequence as well, though: it broke up Longstreet’s attack. James Longstreet was not expecting troops in the vicinity of the peach orchard and Devil’s Den, and the plan had called for him to move his two divisions (those of John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws) up the Emmitsburg Road into the flank of Hancock’s II Corps. The revelation of bluecoats at the peach orchard forced Longstreet to radically alter his direction of attack on the fly, already seriously dislocating Lee’s grand design for a double envelopment. It was further dislocated when Hood gave his troops rather unclear orders: the shout “go forward, and take those heights!” was inspirational, true, but it was insufficiently clear which heights he meant: Devil’s Den, Little Round Top, Cemetery Ridge – all were viable options. Hood probably would have helped direct his division had he not been badly wounded by a Federal shell and taken to the rear. His troops lurched ahead, directionless, and further weakened the momentum of the critical attack. His compatriot, McLaws, was unintentionally advancing perpendicular to elements of Sickles’ Corps (under Birney), and too stumbled into disaster: his men were hit by enfilading fire from both infantry and artillery, and his division degenerated into chaos.

Evander Law, the Alabama history professor, was theoretically in command of Hood’s Division. He was sadly unaware of this new burden, forced on him with Hood’s injury, and thus he continued to lead his men in the wrong direction, that is towards Big and Little Round Top, the hills to the southeast of III Corps. In weakening the Confederate attack on Sickles, though, he unintentionally created a new threat. Should Law have seized the heights of Big and Little Round Top, the Army of Northern Virginia would have been in a perfect position to do exactly what Lee had planned: debouch onto the flank of the Federals on Cemetery Ridge and defeat them in detail. As elements of disparate Union corps arrived, the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, Governeur Warren, noticed the Confederate troops massing southeast of Little Round Top. Orders were sent to marshal all available reinforcements on the hill. The terrible terrain on the Round Top hills bought precious time for the Union troops, for the already-exhausted rebel soldiers had had to march twenty miles already in the past few days and were now being thrown into thickets and highly irregular ground on the hills. By the time Law’s brigade managed to reach Little Round Top, Col. Strong Vincent had collected a brigade of the V Corps and arrayed it in a wedge on the top of the hill. As Warren flung more men into the fight for the Federals, the Confederates mounted their assault, and all along the line were beaten back, in a fight in which the extreme left wing regiment of the 20th Maine and its commander Col. Joshua Chamberlain made a particular name for itself, in part because Chamberlain survived but most of the other regimental commanders – who performed great feats of defense on Little Round Top – were killed in the fighting.

Little Round Top was retained at some cost, forcing Law’s Brigade to retire, and Sickles’ III Corps had managed to halt the attack of the remainder of Longstreet’s Corps on Devil’s Den and the peach orchard. But as twilight rolled on, Longstreet’s support arrived. Richard Anderson, commander of Hill’s only fresh division, now moved purposefully against Sickles’ northern flank. While III Corps had been able to hold out thus far, it was already on life support, as Warren pulled more men into the fight, and it was not helped that Sickles himself was wounded in the leg and brought to the rear. Anderson’s attack collapsed the northern wing of III Corps and forced it to pull back. While Longstreet’s divisions were too exhausted to renew the attack on the Federals in their new positions, Anderson was relatively fresh, and the segments of the Union line in front of him were nearly denuded. He elected to move forward onto Cemetery Ridge and seize the initiative. Cadmus Wilcox’s Brigade, the southernmost element of Anderson’s Division, was met and checked by the amazing charge of the 1st Minnesota Regiment, which had been ordered by the frantically active Hancock (who was desperately, like Warren, finding troops to plug the holes in the Union lines) to ‘advance, and take those [Wilcox’s] colors!’. Suffering in excess of two-thirds the regiment in casualties, the Minnesotans forced Wilcox to withdraw in disorder, doubtless aided by the onset of darkness and the overall confusion in the Confederate ranks. The other attacking brigade that Anderson had on line, that of Ambrose Wright, got much further. In the darkness and confusion, Wright crested the ridge before it was beaten back by a Federal I Corps brigade under George Stannard, which had largely avoided the fighting from the previous day.

Longstreet’s Corps had seized some ground and bloodied the Federal southern wing, and elements of Hill’s Corps had achieved some success before retiring, but the news from the northern wing of the rebel army, Ewell’s Corps, was somewhat disheartening. Two of Ewell’s divisions, those of Early and Edward Johnson, had taken part in the attack on Culp’s and Cemetery Hills. Johnson had been beaten back with severe casualties, and Early managed to crest the heights before he was driven back, also with significant losses. The bad news was at least tempered by the arrival of Stuart and his cavalry that afternoon. Having won considerable glory to no good (and significant ill) effect, Stuart was chastised by Lee for having been of no help. Lee then elected to try another combination. Again, Ewell was ordered to bring his Corps to bear against the Federal northern wing. Noticing the apparent weakness of the center of the Federal line, though, Lee made preparations to mass a grand battery of artillery to sweep that area clean and then would order elements of Longstreet’s and Hill’s Corps through it. George Pickett, whose division was fresh, would form a key element of the charge. Finally, Stuart’s newly arrived cavalry would be ordered to circle south of the Round Top hills, performing the wide outflanking maneuver that Longstreet wished he were allowed to do, and exploit any success by either Ewell or the central attack.

In council on the Federal side, Meade and his assembled generals decided to hold at Gettysburg. The fishhook position had been well established and all elements of the army were there. Outside of local attacks, preparations would be made to counter any attack by Lee. Meade notably predicted that the main assault by the Confederates, were it to occur at all, would strike hardest against the center of his line, and informed the local divisional commander, John Gibbon, of his opinion. Meade also began preparations to exploit the attack. Distrustful of Alfred Pleasonton after his mixed record against Stuart’s cavalry the previous month, Meade ordered him to detach George Custer’s cavalry brigade as an Army reserve, to be used at Meade’s discretion. John Sedgwick and the VI Corps would provide support to Pleasonton’s remaining brigades on the southern flank of the Army of the Potomac, south of the Round Top hills.

A local Federal counterattack against Johnson’s Division on Culp’s Hill dislocated Ewell’s Corps’ own preparations for attack. Shaken by the Union artillery barrage, the Confederate troops then were ordered by Ewell to launch their own attack before they were further pummeled by the shelling. Vicious fighting ensued on the slopes of Culp’s Hill, which did not seem likely to resolve in rebel favor as midday approached. Somewhat disgusted, Lee ordered the preparations for the central assault to continue. Around one in the afternoon, the initial bombardment began. The Confederate grand battery was comprised of some 150 cannon, which when firing in concert made the loudest sound yet heard on the American continent. For all of the magnificent splendor of the simultaneous fire of over a hundred large guns, the cannonfire was mostly ineffective. Many shells overshot the Federal lines. The outnumbered Union artillery, under the command of Henry Hunt, elected to cease firing, conserve ammunition, and prepare for the imminent Confederate assault. Porter Alexander, Longstreet’s artillery commander and the man who, due to the ineffectual leadership of Lee’s overall artillery chief, William Pendleton, was in command of the bombardment, chose to see this as a sign that the Federal batteries had been silenced, a tragic mistake.

Nearly thirteen thousand men were to take place in the massed assault, on a line stretching a mile long from north to south. Led by the divisional commanders George Pickett, Isaac Trimble, and Johnston Pettigrew, they stepped off at around 2:50 in the afternoon, having already had to endure the midday summer Pennsylvania heat for some hours. As the gray line emerged from the trees on Seminary Ridge and to its south, they came under fire from the Federal batteries. Hunt gave the word that the artillery should fire not in unison, but somewhat scattered and disorganized, so that the assault should not be prematurely canceled and the Confederate soldiers would soak up all the Union cannons could throw at them. The deliberate infantry advance was halted so that the commanders could dress ranks, and then was resumed. Not long after the first halt, the northernmost brigade, John Brockenbrough’s, came under fire from Federal infantry and was the worst hit by the Union artillery. It simply came apart, along with a part of the other infantry brigades near it. The disorganization that resulted forced the commanders to dress their lines again. In serried ranks their soldiers plowed onward, finally reaching the wall at the Cemetery Ridge crest. The fighting degenerated into a close-in infantry brawl. A few Union regiments bolted; artillery batteries on the scene had to fend for themselves with canister in a few cases as reinforcements were brought up.

The sanguinary struggle was concluded quickly enough. Bit by bit the gray soldiers disengaged and ran or trudged across the field towards their starting point, exhausted from their valiant effort and ultimately unable to crack the Federal defenses. But their trial wasn’t over yet, for the reserve Meade had kept was launched after the southern troops in pursuit, aided by an extemporized force of infantry cobbled together from V, VI, and the remnants of I Corps. It was not a pretty force, but it served, and better still it was made up of men who had been largely out of the action over the previous two days. Combined with Custer’s cavalry brigade, the pursuit unit closed with the mass of fleeing gray-clad troops and tore through them. What resistance was put up was shredded. On Seminary Ridge, Porter Alexander refused to allow his batteries to open fire on the attacking Federals. Some isolated cannons opened up, sowing confusion in both the blue and gray ranks, but eventually these were silenced. It helped that many of the rebel cannons were low on ammunition already. When the Federal pursuit force finally broke contact, its losses were held to easily acceptable levels because of the dearth of Confederate ammunition.

Meade, thinking that the moment had come, sent word to the forces in the south to take advantage of the perceived southern weakness. Earlier in the afternoon, just as Alexander’s artillery was beginning its tremendous bombardment, Stuart’s cavalry had made contact with Pleasonton and elements of VI Corps in the vicinity of Cress Ridge and the Rummel farm to the south. Judson Kilpatrick’s cavalry division, some of the troopers of which were armed with the new Spencer repeating rifle, were in opposition, and held at Little Run long enough for reinforcements of infantry from Sedgwick’s VI Corps to arrive. Those infantry, Horatio Wright’s Division, managed to reinforce and extend the cavalry line. Stuart was driven back by three in the afternoon. At this juncture, Meade’s orders came through. Kilpatrick was to first shield the two divisions of Sedgwick’s that were there in the south (Wright’s and Frank Wheaton’s) from Stuart’s cavalry, eliminating or driving off the Confederate horsemen if practicable. Then he was to cooperate in an attack on the brigade of Evander Law, which was disposed around Devil’s Den, having captured it the previous day. Though the attack was not well supported by artillery (save for the horse-artillery batteries of Pleasonton’s command), Sedgwick’s divisions had the aid of morale and of shock cavalry. Law’s Brigade was driven out of Devil’s Den with heavy losses by five in the afternoon.

By the end of July 3, the situation from before the battle of Gettysburg’s commencement had been totally reversed. Lee was now contemplating either a defensive stand or, barring that, a general withdrawal. His cavalry had been battered, and his infantry had suffered serious losses as well. A. P. Hill’s and Longstreet’s Corps had been badly mauled, more than the rest of the army. The Army of Northern Virginia was also out of much of its artillery ammunition and running low on supplies. But the alternatives to a continued stand at Gettysburg were difficult to contemplate as well. A withdrawal would be difficult to effect at best. It would be somewhat simple to salvage the remains of Longstreet’s and Hill’s Corps, but Ewell was on the other side of Cemetery Hill, and would be exceedingly difficult to extricate. Before any retreat commenced, he would have to withdraw through Gettysburg back to Seminary Ridge. In another Federal council of war that evening, Meade predicted that Lee would attempt to withdraw, but also noted his own troops’ battered condition. They could not reasonably hope to seize the Seminary Ridge, especially as the Confederate troops were fortifying it during the evening of July 3. So on the Fourth of July, Meade transferred most of his fresh troops towards the northern wing, along with much of his artillery, kept under the command of Henry Hunt. The primary objective would be to contest Ewell’s Corps’ withdrawal through the town, and if at all possible to cut it off from the remainder of the rebel army and force it to capitulate.

Hancock, Slocum, and the relief commander for I Corps, John Newton, would be the primary commanders to contest the Confederate passage through the town. Time was working against them, though, for Early’s and Johnson’s Divisions had managed to break contact during the night, save for isolated outposts. They would be passing through the town during the morning. As the garrisons on Culp’s and Cemetery Hills clashed with the delaying forces that Ewell had left behind, Hunt opened up on Ewell’s Corps with his batteries on Cemetery Hill. The artillery moderated its fire somewhat as the Confederates began to pass through the town, but by then the Federal infantry were beginning to catch up, and in a scene eerily reminiscent of Fredericksburg the previous year or Leipzig in 1813 the town of Gettysburg was turned into a confusing whirlwind of fire, with a constant running fight going on. In the confusion, Ewell and Johnson were captured by Federal infantry, who conducted both safely to the rear. Early and Rodes managed to extricate the remainder of the corps, which reached Oak Hill by noon. Not long after that, a light rain began to fall, precluding major Federal operations. Lee began to reorganize his shattered corps and prepare for withdrawal.

During the four days of the Battle of Gettysburg, one can say that the tide of the War Between the States completely turned. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, out of 72,000 men in strength, lost the frightening total of 31,000 in casualties. By July 4, it was reduced to, to all intents and purposes, two shrunken corps compared to the three with which it had entered the campaign. The assessment of Lee’s generalship offers a stark contrast to his previous actions. While his concentration of forces was well managed, he was unable to rely on his subordinate commanders as well as he once could have. He also seems to have had an excessively high opinion of his army’s capabilities, an opinion that, while it may have seemed justified after the twin victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, proved to be the downfall of the Army of Northern Virginia. The tremendous casualties it suffered were not merely the result of its and its commanders' failings, however. The Federal army, though it was much maligned in the past two years, had had the opportunity to learn from its experiences. It had an extremely competent and aggressive commander in George Meade, and many of its corps commanders (especially Hancock, Sedgwick, and the fallen Reynolds) were outstanding. The Federal cavalry, too, exhibited a competence in this campaign that it had not previously evinced, especially its new young dynamo, Brigadier General George Custer, and the initial, possibly war-winning ground choice by Brigadier General John Buford.

It will forever be a matter of debate among historians as to which of the July 4 victories was the more critical. For in the West, Ulysses Grant, the commander of the Army of the Tennessee, had completed his siege of the stronghold of Vicksburg in Mississippi, following a genial campaign. With this victory, the Confederate cause lost all pretense to control of the Mississippi River. As Abraham Lincoln put it, ‘the Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea’. Grant, at the head of another experienced, battle-hardened professional force, would now be able to direct operations against the Confederacy in the Deep South. These twin events, which immortalized the Independence Day of 1863 as the greatest single day in the history of American arms, proved that it was but a matter of time and effort before the Confederate States were defeated and the United States once more made whole.

It remained to be seen if those rebel States quite knew that yet.
 
Top