Brits don't get into Greek campaign, capture Libya in 1941 instead

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What would happen if the British decided to finish off Libya instead of moving into Greece, taking out Tripoli before Rommel can arrive in force? Let's say that somehow Churchill is convinced that Greece is a bad idea and doesn't opt to intervene, leaving the Greeks to handle the Italians on their own.

Does Germany not then invade Greece and leave that to the Italians? What do the Brits do with Libya? Could Tunisia/Vichy North Africa become a front or would the British leave that alone? What happens to Mussolini and his political career? If Germany does invade Greece does it fall much quick and Crete with it? What does that mean for the rest of 1941?
 
Even without Op Lustre the British wouldn't be able to win the race to reinforce Libya.

After Compass the 7th AD was pulled back to Egypt to refit and its tanks didn't make an appearance gain until 53 tanks fought in Op Brevity in May 41.

The 2nd AD had 2 Armoured Regts each with about 50 light and 50 cruiser tanks, plus about 50 captured Italian tanks and a support group with 2 mot in btns. These were in place by March 1941 and were very unreliable although without Lustre they may have been given the support they needed to be reasonably effective.

Rommel had the 5th Light in Libya in March and undertook Sonenblume in late March early April. The 15th Panzer was in Libya by late April and deployed by May.

The 238 out of 295 tanks transported by the Tiger Convoy were used in Battleaxe in June.

So basically if the entire 2AD is deployed to Libya with about 250 tanks all Rommel has to do is wait for a couple of weeks later than OTL to launch Sonnemblume with both of his divisions plus whatever the Italians can provide. This would give the Axis superiority in armour with no further armour available to the British apart from the 53 tanks used in OTL Brevity.

Perhaps the best course of action would be that 2AD conducts a fighting retreat and holds at somewhere like Tobruk with much of its strength intact. This would allow the Brevity tanks to increase its strength and a counter offensive from a better position with the Battleaxe tanks in June.
 
one of my favorite PODs of all time is this one, basically "WI the Brits don't bother with Greece and manage to conquer Libya". Of course, as noted earlier, you have to get the Germans to not bother trying to prop up Italy's African empire (maybe they get bogged down more in the Balkans?). Regardless of how you get there, once you have Britain in control of Libya, the interesting question is "what next?"...
 
This PoD is a big one and has been discussed many times before, basically no North African campaign means Britain has stronger forces available to reinforce Malaya and Burma in response to Japanese aggression. British pre war planning assumed that the French would take the lead in the Med if Italy supported Germany and if Japan subsequently came in the the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet would be sent east to defend Singapore. France's implosion meant that strategy went out the window and there weren't the resources to fight both theatres.

It depends on a lot of things as to how SE Asia would go but it's likely that the Commonwealth either defeats Japan or makes the Conquest of Malaya much more of a meat grinder than IOTL either of which will significantly shorten the Pacific War.

As for Mussolini I suspect that a humiliation in Libya will cost him a lot of support and bring forward his ousting.
 
What does no Op Lustre mean for the port of Benghazi?

IOTL the British didn't get Benghazi operational as a port and abandoned using it for supply before Sonnenblume started. As a result 2AD was reduced to moving between supply dumps and was on mileage restrictions and the 9th AIF was moved north of Benghazi to Tocra on March 20 to ease the supply situation.

Getting Benghazi up and running would do wonders for the British supply situation, it would make mobile units more mobile than OTL and a better supply chain would increase reliability as well. This could force Rommel to delay Sonnenblume until he had the strength to overpower these British units, maybe not months but perhaps a week or two.
 
As for Mussolini I suspect that a humiliation in Libya will cost him a lot of support and bring forward his ousting.
Interesting - if implausible - butterfly: what happens if Mussolini is so angry at a lack of German support in North Africa that he signs a separate peace with the UK? The UK would probably be prepared to be quite generous, and Mussolini might be angry enough with Hitler to take such a deal...
 
The Brits being clever enough to trick Mussolini into a peace treaty, or at least a armistice & peace negotiations. Simply diabolical. Perfidious Albion strikes again. This could save Italy from the extreme economic collapse it was faced with in 1943. The British would have to accept that a lot of imports to Italy would 'flow through' to Germany. Enforcing the sort of tight blockade they imposed on Spain or Sweden would be a show stopper for a Anglo/Italian peace.

Taking French North Africa would be a much tougher proposition than taking French Syria, needless to say.

Might not be necessary to invade. A large portion of the remaining French army officers were so anti German they were effectively pro Allied. In the autum of 1942 Petain told Darlan he was authorized to take the North African colonies to the Allied side if that best preserved remaining French power. There are several possibilities in this direction should the African phase of the war end in 1941.
 
Might not be necessary to invade. A large portion of the remaining French army officers were so anti German they were effectively pro Allied. In the autum of 1942 Petain told Darlan he was authorized to take the North African colonies to the Allied side if that best preserved remaining French power. There are several possibilities in this direction should the African phase of the war end in 1941.

my understanding the Vichy-Nazi collaboration really fell apart over (effective) loss of Indochina and actual loss of Syria?

that might argue for stronger presence and/or plan in Syria and not attempting to project forces into Iraq.

in Libya, could the Germans arrive fast enough to hold in Tripolitania? (supplied through Tunisia)
 
Could Tunisia/Vichy North Africa become a front or would the British leave that alone?
IIRC Vichy France signed an agreement with Germany in late 1940 or early 1941 to turn over all the lorries they had in North Africa to try and help ease the Italo-German logistical problems and open up several ports in Tunisia to land supplies for the same reason. If that were to happen before the British had finished capturing Libya then it would provide a handy casus belli. I could see them deciding that the benefits of controlling Tunisia outweighed the possible drawbacks whilst emphasising to Vichy that as long as they didn't support Axis forces from them that they would continue to respect Algeria's and Morocco's neutrality. It would however require a fair gap between any capture of Tripoli to rest, refit, and resupply before anything like that could be reasonably thought about.
 
my understanding the Vichy-Nazi collaboration really fell apart over (effective) loss of Indochina and actual loss of Syria?

One of several problems. The first great disillusioment came when the nazi government made no initiative for negotiating a post armistice peace treaty. Petains government had expected that to occur fairly quickly & the lack of interest suggested the armistice had been a fundamental stratigic error.

Another indicator was the haphazard looting of French industry during 1940-41. Much of that has straight forward looting & not even loosly connected to any sort of Reparations plan. Some of the industrial material looted actually was counterproductive to the implimented reparations.

Related to the industrial looting was the currency manipulation by the nazis, which forced the sale of food & consumer items of the occupied nations including France to German merchants at very favorable prices & leaving the occupied populations short & out of cash.

Then there was the policy of retention of the French PoW as cheap labor in Germany. That embittered millions of Frenchmen as their husbands & sons or brothers supported Germany with their labor & not their families.

All that started before or during the Japanese ocupation of Indochina.

Then there were the severe restrictions on military recovery which ran directly against Petains policy of recovery of independant French power.
 
my understanding the Vichy-Nazi collaboration really fell apart over (effective) loss of Indochina and actual loss of Syria?

One of several problems. The first great disillusioment came when the nazi government made no initiative for negotiating a post armistice peace treaty. Petains government had expected that to occur fairly quickly & the lack of interest suggested the armistice had been a fundamental stratigic error.

had the idea French calculus changed when Barbarossa started? that Darlan was perfect barometer of German success and realized they had stepped in it with invasion of USSR?

do you think if they had signed some type of accord during high point of collaboration, allowing use of Tunisia ports, that they could have held on in Tripolitania region about as long as IOTL? without the campaigns into British territory and later reinforcements?
 
Both sides end up much better off without having to fight a Greece/Crete campaign and then a long pointless war in North Africa.

I've just read the Germans lost 174 Junkers 52s in Crete and another 432 transport aircraft two years later trying evacuate the Afrika Korps from Tunisia. Those planes might have made a big difference in Russia.
 
Rommel getting his forces into N.Africa as in OTL is not a must with such POD. Britain staying out of Greece means less losses for the RAF and RN in mainland Greece and Crete. Perhaps the British can interdict German troop movements better?

This POD also opens the question of whether the Germans will intervene at all in Greece. In OTL British deployments and promises also triggered that. Perhaps Italy and Greece sign a truce in January 1941 with Greece going neutral for the rest of the war?
 
Hm, so the Brits can't take all of Libya, but maybe they can keep Halfaya pass? Such a thing would greatly weaken the siege on Tobruk.
 
Hm, so the Brits can't take all of Libya, but maybe they can keep Halfaya pass? Such a thing would greatly weaken the siege on Tobruk.

They can't take Libya with the forces that were sent to Libya and Greece by March/April 41. I think they do have the forces to hold Halfaya pass which would make Brevity not required and give Battleaxe a better chance.
 
had the idea French calculus changed when Barbarossa started? that Darlan was perfect barometer of German success and realized they had stepped in it with invasion of USSR?

I'd have to review the time lines Jacksons 'The Dark Years' & Paxtons old 'Vichy France are my on shelf references.

do you think if they had signed some type of accord during high point of collaboration, allowing use of Tunisia ports, that they could have held on in Tripolitania region about as long as IOTL? without the campaigns into British territory and later reinforcements?

From memory the Axis did not show any interest in using the Tunisian ports until the low point in the Lybian supply delivery. France stalled, but cargo was sent via Tunis. The problem was the low capacity railway did not even reach the border. The material had to be off loaded to automotive transport & carried to the Italian railhead in Lybia, then sent east by rail or auto to the pick up point for the auto convoys to the battlefield. Since the Italians were strained trying to extend the railway in Lybia there was not much question of improving the French RR in Tunisia any time soon.
 
do you think if they had signed some type of accord during high point of collaboration, allowing use of Tunisia ports, that they could have held on in Tripolitania region about as long as IOTL? without the campaigns into British territory and later reinforcements?

From memory the Axis did not show any interest in using the Tunisian ports until the low point in the Lybian supply delivery. France stalled, but cargo was sent via Tunis. The problem was the low capacity railway did not even reach the border. The material had to be off loaded to automotive transport & carried to the Italian railhead in Lybia, then sent east by rail or auto to the pick up point for the auto convoys to the battlefield. Since the Italians were strained trying to extend the railway in Lybia there was not much question of improving the French RR in Tunisia any time soon.

my premise was that the Axis (DAK) does not attempt to advance as IOTL but hold in Tripolitania, it follows that the main supply route would be Tunis to Tripoli, not Tunis to Tobruk(?) thought the "dash" from Italy to Tunis (and back) could be made overnight and was much safer than to Tripoli? or certainly ports even further east?

of course this is conflating the reinforcement of Libya with their later retreat to Tunisia.
 
My premise was that the Deutsches Afrikakorps (DAK) does not attempt to advance as in our timeline but hold in Tripolitania...
Well Rommel's orders from Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) were to position his troops around Sirte and set up a defensive blocking force there to help support the Italians, easiest solution to meet your idea is for someone who is less aggressive and unwilling to ignore/disobey orders to be chosen as commander of the DAK. Rommel had a close shave or two during the invasion of France so it would be simple enough to have him be injured and not fully recovered by the beginning of 1941 or killed off. More conservative commander keeps the 5th Light Division in Tripoli to secure his base until the 21st Panzer Division is fully deployed towards the end of May/start of June and then moves them forwards to help defend Sirte, or if the intervening months have allowed the British to reorganise and make another limited advance from El Agheila too take Sirte then they deploy to Misrata instead.
 
What would happen if the British decided to finish off Libya instead of moving into Greece, taking out Tripoli before Rommel can arrive in force? Let's say that somehow Churchill is convinced that Greece is a bad idea and doesn't opt to intervene, leaving the Greeks to handle the Italians on their own.

Does Germany not then invade Greece and leave that to the Italians? What do the Brits do with Libya? Could Tunisia/Vichy North Africa become a front or would the British leave that alone? What happens to Mussolini and his political career? If Germany does invade Greece does it fall much quick and Crete with it? What does that mean for the rest of 1941?

I had a think about this and I would suggest that better communication between Gen's Freyberg and Blamey with their respective governments (NZ and AUS) might result in those governments being disagreeable for the use of their troops in that operation.

This delays any support being sent to Greece other than advisor's, some Squadrons and equipment.

1 or both of 2 things then happen IMO

1: Germany and Bulgaria invades pretty much as per OTL - the Greeks pull back where possible and eventually evacuate forces to Crete - probably with RN Assistance.

2: The unanticipated Operation Sonnenblume (March 24th) starts and any thoughts of sending reinforcements to Greece and / or Crete are stillborn and instead those units that OTL took part in the Greek campaign move up towards Cyrenaica - this includes but is not limited to 2nd NZID, 6th AID, 7th Br Arm Div, 1st Br Arm Brigade

Of course 7th Armor is still rebuilding and would be until the Tiger Convoy arrived - so end of May before it was properly re-equipped (Tiger convoy arrives 12th May with 238 tanks) and there was a lack of transport - so I doubt that these reinforcements would arrive in time to 'stop' Rommel from reaching the Egyptian boarder and investing Tobruk

However its highly likely that Halfaya pass and other important locations in the region would still be in Allied hands and I would expect this TLs equivalent to Op Brevity to be far more successful than OTL given the greater number of uncommitted units and equipment at Wavells disposal

So I do not think that by not getting involved in Greece the British forces can simply capture the rest of Libya - but I believe that by May and certainly by the end of May the Strength of the Desert Army will be far greater and probably in possession of the Halfaya pass and other strategic positions than in OTL and therefore would be far more likely to inflict a defeat on the DAK and Italian forces in May / June and relieve Tobruk.
 
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