British Weapons Enter Service A Year Earlier

hipper

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So what is it that prompts the Government to realise that war is all but inevitable in 1938 instead of after the takeover of Czechoslovakia? Up until then Chamberlain still thought it could be avoided.

Regards the OP prompts the British Goverment to have better weapons a year earlier, or they listen to Chatfield..
 
Is there much, if any, literature on how Japanese 'Naval threat influenced Brit thinking in the 1930s?

It might be only me, but I think if Britain viewed Japanese naval power as a threat in the 1930s, they might have treated Lord Semple's release of RN secrets to the Japanese differently. They might have even considered his spying treasonous, but didn't.
 
It might be only me, but I think if Britain viewed Japanese naval power as a threat in the 1930s, they might have treated Lord Semple's release of RN secrets to the Japanese differently. They might have even considered his spying treasonous, but didn't.

Actually in the early 30's, Japan was seen as the naval threat. But it wasn't an immediate naval threat.
It wasn't until 34-5 when Germany was seen as a far greater threat. However this didn't affect the naval build-up much until 37, when the New Standard Fleet was proposed, able (hopefully) to take on Germany and Japan at the same time.
 
It might be only me, but I think if Britain viewed Japanese naval power as a threat in the 1930s, they might have treated Lord Semple's release of RN secrets to the Japanese differently. They might have even considered his spying treasonous, but didn't.

The Skua was intended to carry a 500lbs semi armour piercing bomb that was intended to penetrate the hangars of aircraft carriers with unarmoured decks. In spite of everything, I think it's unlikely we would have fought the Americans, so they were probably intended for the Japanese.
 
The Skua was intended to carry a 500lbs semi armour piercing bomb that was intended to penetrate the hangars of aircraft carriers with unarmoured decks. In spite of everything, I think it's unlikely we would have fought the Americans, so they were probably intended for the Japanese.

Lucky thing they had those anti-Japanese bombs for the attack on Konigsberg.
 
It might be only me, but I think if Britain viewed Japanese naval power as a threat in the 1930s, they might have treated Lord Semple's release of RN secrets to the Japanese differently. They might have even considered his spying treasonous, but didn't.

Treason, pre-1945, was extremely difficult (i.e. impossible) to prosecute for, since it had a 3 year limitation and required 2 witnesses.
 
Treason, pre-1945, was extremely difficult (i.e. impossible) to prosecute for, since it had a 3 year limitation and required 2 witnesses.

Evidence and witnesses were no problem. The Lord business, and the fact that his father was aide-de-camp to George V was certainly a problem, and prosecution was determined at and by the highest levels, to be an embarrassment to those at the highest levels.
 
A Mosquito entering service in 1937 in place of the Battle and Blenheim is one of my favourite ideas. It will indeed be the slowest of all Mosquitoes. However, it's all relative because they would still be a great improvement over the Battle and Blenheim.

What are the driving forces to bring about the need for either a 'wooden bomber' or an 'unarmed fast bomber' at that time?
OTOH B.9/38 - In early 1938 the AM concerned about problems with continued supply of light alloys, turned to Armstrong Whitworth, Bristol and de Havilland to provide designs for a composite aircraft type to be built from hitherto materials not used for current and planned aircraft construction. In OTL, this led to the Albemarle, but seems plausible IMO to advance the Mosquito's arrival.
 
What are the driving forces to bring about the need for either a 'wooden bomber' or an 'unarmed fast bomber' at that time?
OTOH B.9/38 - In early 1938 the AM concerned about problems with continued supply of light alloys, turned to Armstrong Whitworth, Bristol and de Havilland to provide designs for a composite aircraft type to be built from hitherto materials not used for current and planned aircraft construction. In OTL, this led to the Albemarle, but seems plausible IMO to advance the Mosquito's arrival.
De Havilland submits an unsolicited proposal for an aircraft powered by a pair of 1,000hp engines to Specification B.9/32 or Specification P.27/32 and the head of the RAF's Operational Requirements Branch liked to so much that he orders a prototype which flies in 1936. However, even on paper its performance is so good that the Air Ministry decides to order it into production "off the drawing board" in 1935 as part of Expansion Scheme C in place of the Battle and Blenheim (whose prototypes didn't fly until 1936 either) in spite of the extra cost and having to make more Merlins and fewer Mercuries.
 
De Havilland submits an unsolicited proposal for an aircraft powered by a pair of 1,000hp engines to Specification B.9/32 or Specification P.27/32 and the head of the RAF's Operational Requirements Branch liked to so much that he orders a prototype which flies in 1936. However, even on paper its performance is so good that the Air Ministry decides to order it into production "off the drawing board" in 1935 as part of Expansion Scheme C in place of the Battle and Blenheim (whose prototypes didn't fly until 1936 either) in spite of the extra cost and having to make more Merlins and fewer Mercuries.

Okay. So Bristol's Britain First aircraft had flown in 1935, and had proven faster than the RAF's very latest fighter prototype, so the head of OR branch decides to go with a paper airplane and a totally unproven engine instead. That's a bold move.
 
De Havilland submits an unsolicited proposal for an aircraft powered by a pair of 1,000hp engines to Specification B.9/32 or Specification P.27/32 and the head of the RAF's Operational Requirements Branch liked to so much that he orders a prototype which flies in 1936. However, even on paper its performance is so good that the Air Ministry decides to order it into production "off the drawing board" in 1935 as part of Expansion Scheme C in place of the Battle and Blenheim (whose prototypes didn't fly until 1936 either) in spite of the extra cost and having to make more Merlins and fewer Mercuries.

Goulding and Moyes RAF Bomber Command and its Aircraft 1936-1940 does say that DH proposed two designs 1937/38 that were unsatisfactory.

Doesn't really say why but they look to have been based on the Albatross.
 
Does anyone know if the RAE studies in 1935 for a Speed Bomber mentioned in Goulding and Moyes RAF Bomber Command and its Aircraft 1936-1940 actually produced any drawings?
 
The only design to receive a company number was the DH-97, a recce/bomber/transport (B-17/38) which didn't receive a second glance. Proposals to meet P-13/36 were based on Albatross with 2 or 4 Merlins, and defensive armament. They were declined because De havilland wasn't a regular military aircraft supplier, and mostly because they were built from wood, but also didn't meet performance specs. They don't really need a reason, but the collapse of one Albatross probably didn't help, and in reality, the graceful Albatross wasn't a very good airplane. The company then refined their designing to DH.98, as a private venture, with Freeman coming to the rescue. They designed it at Salisbury Hall so nobody would make a fuss.
 
The De Havilland Flamingo/Herefordshire.
That way the RAF would have a passable purpose built transport aircraft in production and service before the shooting starts.

This would make the UK less dependent on Lend Lease, and would butterfly away the American insistence on not making transport aircraft if our own. It would also give Britain a small advantage compared to OTL re: Commercial air travel.
 
The De Havilland Flamingo/Herefordshire.
That way the RAF would have a passable purpose built transport aircraft in production and service before the shooting starts.

This would make the UK less dependent on Lend Lease, and would butterfly away the American insistence on not making transport aircraft if our own. It would also give Britain a small advantage compared to OTL re: Commercial air travel.
Problem is that at the time DH were making on aircraft that was absolutely critical to the war effort (the Tiger Moth) and had just been getting in serious trouble with the DH-86 because it was utter garbage due to being too lightly built. In those circumstances, without ASB levels of foresight you aren't going to give a future airliner contract to De Havilland.
 
The De Havilland Flamingo/Herefordshire.
That way the RAF would have a passable purpose built transport aircraft in production and service before the shooting starts.

This would make the UK less dependent on Lend Lease, and would butterfly away the American insistence on not making transport aircraft if our own. It would also give Britain a small advantage compared to OTL re: Commercial air travel.

I'm not clear on the nature of American insistence that Britain not make transports. The "passable" description seems apt enough, and Wiki describes it as unpopular, due to crashes and lack of spare parts, but the Hertfordshire was so forgettable that some can't be bothered to spell it right. It didn't make the cut for post-war production against the Vickers Viking/Valetta/Varsity competition. The Americans failed to produce a direct competitor in quantity in the DC-5 due to war priorities and the acceptance of DC-3 suitability and proven superiority.
 
Cynically from the American point of view, no more than a handful of British transports built, an even less R&D means much less competition for post war airliner sales.

(Cynic, who me?:angel:)
 
Okay. So Bristol's Britain First aircraft had flown in 1935, and had proven faster than the RAF's very latest fighter prototype, so the head of OR branch decides to go with a paper airplane and a totally unproven engine instead. That's a bold move.
Nevertheless the OTL RAF did order several paper aeroplanes with totally unproven engines into production. However, (as we both know) the results were mixed.

Prior to 1935-36 Air Ministry policy was to:
  1. Issue a specification;
  2. Order prototypes of the most promising designs;
  3. Evaluate them at the A&AEE or MAEE and based on the results select one or two designs for further development;
  4. Order a small pre-production batch for service trials, and;
  5. Finally order the winning design in quantity.
From 1935-36 it adopted a policy of ordering aircraft into production "off the drawing board." That is aircraft were ordered into production before waiting for the prototypes to fly and the results of their evaluation by the A&AEE or MAEE. The intention was that this would get new types into service faster by cutting out two stages of the previous procurement policy. This was a high-risk policy and AFAIK the Cabinet and Air Ministry were very well aware of that. AFAIK is why they usually ordered two types into production instead of one as there was a good chance that one of them would fail, for example the Avro Manchester and Handley Page Halifax.

Another example is the Battle and Blenheim which were ordered into production in the summer of 1935. At that time the Battle was a paper aeroplane with an unproven engine and the Blenheim was a paper plane based on an airliner, albeit with proven engines. The prototypes of these aircraft did not fly until 10th March 1936 and 25th June 1936 respectively. (You have counted Britain First as the Blenheim prototype. I have not.)

The first contract for 155 Battles was placed in the summer of 1935. I don't have the exact date, but going by the contract numbers (424738/35 and 435061/35) and the production specification numbers (23/35 and 28/35) it was before the first 150 Blenheims were ordered (22nd August 1935). The prototype K4303 did not fly until 10th March 1936 and according to Bowyer underwent brief trials at the A&AEE in July 1936. K7558 the first production aircraft made its first flight on 14th April 1937 and the first 155 production aircraft were delivered between May 1937 and May 1938. The Battle entered RAF service with No. 63 Squadron in May 1937.

Under the old system the Air Ministry would have waited until the prototype completed its trials at the A&AEE before placing a pre-production order in August 1936 and the first quantity production contract a year after that.

Britain First (the sole Bristol 142 airliner) made its first flight on 12th April 1935. This became K7557 under Contract number 419009/35 when it was taken over by the RAF and sent to the A&AEE for trials. The Bristol 142M bomber was built to Specification 28/35. The first 150 aircraft (K7033 to K7182) were ordered on 22nd August 1935. The first of these K7033 flew on 25th June 1936. According to Thetford this was the prototype Blenheim bomber and according to Bowyer in Aircraft of the Few it was the closest the Blenheim had to a proper prototype. Bowyer says that its A&AEE trials lasted from November 1936 to February 1937. According to Thetford the first production aircraft was K7034 which left the factory in November 1936 and according to him the Blenheim entered RAF service with No. 114 Squadron in March 1937. My copy of Air Britain's RAF Serials K1000-K9999 says the first 150 Blenheims were delivered from January 1937 to January 1938. Bowyer says that deliveries to the RAF began in March 1937 and that even one year later aircraft were being delivered incomplete. For example no turrets were fitted until nearly 200 hundred Blenheims had been delivered.

The Battle prototype was built to Specification P.27/32 was issued in April 1933 and was ordered on 11th June 1934. Its competitor the Armstrong Whitworth A.W.27 flew on 6th December 1936. According to the British Aircraft Specifications File priority was given to the Whitley bomber which is why the A.W.27 made its first flight so long after the Battle's prototype.

I suggested in Post 190 that De Havilland proposed a twin-Merlin powered aircraft to Specification B.9/32 (which produced the Hampden and Wellington) or P.27/32. In the latter case a single prototype of the twin-Merlin De Havilland aircraft would be ordered in place of the Armstrong-Whitworth aircraft of OTL and like the Battle (and the Spitfire) fly in March 1936. It was a paper aeroplane with an untried engine in the TTL summer of 1935 but so was the Fairey Battle in the OTL summer of 1935 and that didn't stop the Air Ministry ordering 155 of them.
 
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