Firstly, Welcome to the Forum!
Are you suggest the AFEF actually conquers / re-conquers (depending on your point of view) all of Egypt or just that Eisenhower doesn't force them to withdraw?
The former point seems fairly unlikely: at best Britain and France hold down the populus for a few years before things degenerate into guerilla tactics. Perhaps they might try to install a new regime but that would probably entail severe repression.
Whatever the outcome of the former question, the issue of American intervention is key. OTL, I'd date the European recognition, particularly British, the Empire is doomed to 1956. (Eden wrote a nice note that basically acknowledges that it's not worth holding anymore when he went to the Bahamas to recover after the crisis). Eisenhower was fairly adamant in his opposition because of traditional American anti-colonialism (when practiced by other powers). I'm not sure, but I have to imagine that he thought that a continued attempt by Great Britain and France to hold their colonial possessions would distract both from European security concerns and foment potentially Soviet-sympathising rebels. He already had the budding problem of French Indochina. Plus, there's a chance that aggression against Egypt fans wider anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world, which threatens oil access for Europe (though not yet for the US).
However, it might be argued that freeing all the colonies on the scale and at the pace of OTL was too fast and left much of Africa and SE Asia without tested political institutions or developed infrastructures. But that's not necessarily a reason to let France and Britain steal parts of small countries.
As to your other questions, Britain can try to maintain more of its colonies, but I think it's pretty much a losing proposition. The scenario that most resembles this is that Britian pursues a longer exit strategy that involves ensuring stable regimes when it leaves. This has geo-political upsides, but costs a lot of money, which Britain doesn't have in the mid-20th century. The EU's development has already begun, but much of it's progress will be contingent on the outcome of latter events (and thereby subject to 'butterfly effects'). The EU, or something like it, is likely given US policy over the course of the Cold War (i.e. to get Europe to cooperate to thwart the Soviets and to prevent another European war, forever). An Iranian revolution is probably substantively altered / victim of two decades of butterflies.