British Trade Convoys From 1915 Instead Of 1917

IIRC the main reason given for not introducing convoys was the total number of arrivals & departures from British ports compared to earlier wars and the impossibility of providing sufficient escorts. However, this figure was for ALL sailings the bulk of which were coastal Once the oceanic only sailings were extracted the figures became much more manageable.

Exactly the comment I was going to make. One of the posts above suggests that the majority of British tonnage was oceanic - this may well have been the case but if so those ships would have spent a considerable portion of their time in port or away from the British isles. The extremely large number of sailings and arrivals that apparently daunted the admiralty was made up in large part of coasters pottering back and forth carrying small cargoes from port to port .Escorting them was not practical but also not necessary.

I believe in WW2 convoying was started from day 1 - which does suggest that the negatives to convoying are not so overwhelming.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yes and no; convoys were introduced as the threat

I believe in WW2 convoying was started from day 1 - which does suggest that the negatives to convoying are not so overwhelming.

Yes and no; merchant convoys were introduced as the threat presented itself in various theaters. In British home waters, first; then the eastern Atlantic/Western Approaches generally; then the Med and South Atlantic and Indian Ocean waters, etc.

The Canadians didn't institute convoys in their waters until the German u-boat offensive into the Western Hemisphere in early 1942, and it took them several months to get an effective system in place. Same thing for Australia when the IJN mounted submarine offensives into their waters in 1942-43. Same thing for the waters the US was reponsible for; the ICS was put into place (operationally) in the spring of 1942 off the US east coast (same timeframe as the RCN did it in the Northwestern Atlantic area, by the way) and it was extended south into the Gulf, Caribbean, and South Atlantic as resources became available and the threat presented itself.

Merchant convoys were rarely used in the Pacific for the simple reason there was no IJN threat in much of the theater for most of the war.

The above is all in reference to merchantile convoys, of course; troop and amphibious convoys were escorted from Day One by the USN and USCG (even in "peacetime") and were regarded as priority operations, to the extent that capital ships and very strong escort groups were routinely assigned to USN-managed troop convoys, even those carrying Allied forces; the US troopships that carried the British 18th Infantry Division from the Atlantic to Singapore in 1941-42 (HS-124) were escorted in the Atlantic by a task group made up of the fleet carrier USS Ranger, two heavy cruisers, and full destroyer division.

Best,
 
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Errolwi

Monthly Donor
The telegrams between the UK, Australian, and NZ governments regarding the escort for AU/NZ troop convoys to Egypt in early 1940 are an interesting study in the relationship with the Dominions.
 
One the subject of the perceived lack of escorts the Royal Navy had about 330 surface torpedo craft in August 1914. That is about 110 old destroyers of classes A to E, 110 modern destroyers of classes F to L and 110 first class torpedo boats. There was also a nucleus force of minesweepers, which was made up of torpedo catchers and gun boats that had survived Fisher's scrapping programme.

After the war broke out in addition to a large programme of destroyer construction it also built many sloops, large minesweepers, Admiralty trawlers and created a huge Auxiliary Patrol of requisitioned trawlers and drifters.

As far as I can remember the destroyers were organised into 9 flotillas of about 20 TBDs each at the outbreak of World War One. Two flotillas were assigned to the Grand Fleet, one to the Mediterranean Fleet, one to the Harwich Force and the 5 remaining flotillas were patrol flotillas under the Admiral of Patrols, who later became the Admiral Commanding The East Coast of England. There were also a number of Local Defence Flotillas under the C-in-Cs Nore, Portsmouth and Devonport with the dregs of the destroyers and sea going torpedo boats.

Therefore I think the resources for a convoy system for the East Coast, English Channel and Western Approaches in 1915 were there.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Interesting; are they in the NZETC site somewhere?

The telegrams between the UK, Australian, and NZ governments regarding the escort for AU/NZ troop convoys to Egypt in early 1940 are an interesting study in the relationship with the Dominions.

Interesting; are they in the NZETC site somewhere?

Best,
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
Yes, in Documents Relating...
I can see the ToC currently, but the site is baulking at actually bringing up the documents.
http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-1Doc.html
Mainly in "Second Echelon: Diversion to United Kingdom, Command and Employment" from memory (including issues arising from possible/actual entry of Italy), also "Formation and Despatch of First Echelon and Arrival in Egypt" I think.
 
On how to have a convoy system introduced sooner, my bet is to have an effective naval staff sooner. AFAIK it was first proposed in 1886 by Fisher's rival Beresford and when Churchill finally had it created in 1912 he thought it would be 13 years [IIRC] before it would be effective.

For what its worth here is an extract from my Royal Navy in World War One essay (which is an uber Britwank)
Within the Royal Navy the main problem was the lack of an effective War Staff. Its formation was first proposed in 1886 in the real world, but not implemented until 1912 and even then it did not become effective until the last year of the war. This was partly because there were no properly trained staff officers; the Staff College to train them was not formed until after the First World War ended. In B1 it was formed in 1887 with the First Sea Lord as its chief and the Staff College opened in 1895. The result of this was that the quality of HM ships, naval equipment, and how they were employed was much improved.
 
On how to have a convoy system introduced sooner, my bet is to have an effective naval staff sooner. AFAIK it was first proposed in 1886 by Fisher's rival Beresford and when Churchill finally had it created in 1912 he thought it would be 13 years [IIRC] before it would be effective.

For what its worth here is an extract from my Royal Navy in World War One essay (which is an uber Britwank)


That might work. A simpler solution would be to have some First Lord instruct the Naval Intelligence Department who handled such war planning as went on to look into the matter of convoys. Unlike a proper Naval Staff they had no authority to initiate such research so they would need a specific instruction but they were quite diligent in testing all the variables when so instructed.

War planning and strategic development in the Royal Navy, 1887-1918 by Shawn Grimes

That might be a useful read for some though it does not deal with convoys per see but rather the process by which the Royal Navy went about its planning.
 
From the replies received so far I'm getting the impression that trade convoys were introduced at exactly the correct time and an earlier introduction would do more harm than good.

Is that correct?

No, earlier convoys would have been beneficial in many respects, but instant, heavily guarded trans-Atlantic convoys in 1915 as a result of USW would have been an overreaction. The coastal convoys and those in the North Sea would have been good candidates to learn lessons and hone the practice. It's probabaly the naval equivalent to trench warfare, preconceptions have to be overcome, tools and tactics developed and the like and legitimate fears like surface attack and productivity have to be addressed.
 
No, earlier convoys would have been beneficial in many respects, but instant, heavily guarded trans-Atlantic convoys in 1915 as a result of USW would have been an overreaction. The coastal convoys and those in the North Sea would have been good candidates to learn lessons and hone the practice. It's probabaly the naval equivalent to trench warfare, preconceptions have to be overcome, tools and tactics developed and the like and legitimate fears like surface attack and productivity have to be addressed.
If it had been done as you suggested what would the effects on the war have been? That is apart from the British Isles avoiding being nearly starved into surrendering. For example:

1) If more cargoes were reaching their destinations, what could British industry do with the extra raw materials?
2) Reduced merchant shipping losses means HMG has to pay out less compensation to the shipping lines and he owners of the lost cargoes. How significant would the financial saving be?
3) Reduced shipping losses means that merchant shipbuilding does not have to be stepped up as much. What could have been done with the steel that had been saved?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
May I add a lil' legal point of view including :
Paris Declarations Respecting Maritime Law,
the Hague Conventions as well as the
London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War

Even though esp. the last wasn't ratified and therefore purely juridical not binding, it was internationally rendered as valid customary law.
At the beginning of WW I, when Britain published its own definitions of contraband and how it will conduct blockade, that were not in line with the mentioned declaration, it caused an awfull lot of upheaveal of the neutral countries, even in the rows of their own shipowners.

A convoy and any merchants ship within, esp. if guarded by navy ships would have been - in that respect - a legal target for Kill On Sight !

Keep in mind, that the merchant ships were NOT owned by the goverment(s) but by privat shipowner ... How 'willing' would they be early in the war to make their ships such KOS targets ?
 
A convoy and any merchants ship within, esp. if guarded by navy ships would have been - in that respect - a legal target for Kill On Sight !

Nope.

There is not one word in any of the declarations or conventions that makes this so.

There are a great many words that make merchant ships invalid targets for kill on sight.

To be valid a blockade must be enforceable, so the presence of belligerent warships does not invalidate blockade rules provided you can successfully engage said warships, if you cannot then of course your blockade is illegal.

Commerce warfare is however legal without blockade but again merchant shipping enjoy the protections of the Paris declaration and thus must be seized prior to destruction unless they, themselves and not an escorting warship, resist.

Kill on sight is simply not legal against merchant ships.
 
May I add a lil' legal point of view including :
Paris Declarations Respecting Maritime Law,
the Hague Conventions as well as the
London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War

Even though esp. the last wasn't ratified and therefore purely juridical not binding, it was internationally rendered as valid customary law.
At the beginning of WW I, when Britain published its own definitions of contraband and how it will conduct blockade, that were not in line with the mentioned declaration, it caused an awfull lot of upheaveal of the neutral countries, even in the rows of their own shipowners.

A convoy and any merchants ship within, esp. if guarded by navy ships would have been - in that respect - a legal target for Kill On Sight !

Keep in mind, that the merchant ships were NOT owned by the goverment(s) but by privat shipowner ... How 'willing' would they be early in the war to make their ships such KOS targets ?
Then the neutrals could sail independently of the convoys at their own risk if they wanted to. The British flagged ships would have to follow the Admiralty and Board of Trade regulations because that was the law.

Furthermore:
1) The Germans discovered that a convoy wasn't any easier to spot than an independently sailing merchant ship from a U-boat;
2) Independently sailing merchant ships provided the U-boats with a constant stream of undefended targets. Introducing convoys meant the targets came along at longer intervals and were defended by warships, aeroplane and in World War One airships.

However, we have already established that convoys won't be introduced on a large scale in 1915, but at a more timely (which means not too late, but not too early either). So I repeat the question I asked in the OP and my previous post, what would its effect on the war be?
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
Nope.

There is not one word in any of the declarations or conventions that makes this so.

There are a great many words that make merchant ships invalid targets for kill on sight.

To be valid a blockade must be enforceable, so the presence of belligerent warships does not invalidate blockade rules provided you can successfully engage said warships, if you cannot then of course your blockade is illegal.

Commerce warfare is however legal without blockade but again merchant shipping enjoy the protections of the Paris declaration and thus must be seized prior to destruction unless they, themselves and not an escorting warship, resist.

Kill on sight is simply not legal against merchant ships.
Sry, you're right.

I revocate and claim the opposite. :D

Got it mixed up with interwar and later regulations on that topic.
 
Convoying immediately reduces imports by 1/3 due to inefficiencies, so rationing of food and raw materials will have to occur much sooner or much more drastically than OTL. Were losses in 1915 such that a 1/3 reduction in seaborne trade is required?

This is a rough estimate of the initial effect of hastly or abruptly establishing convoys. Halting departures for X number of weeks effectively ceases deliveries of those cargos. There would be residual deliveries of the ships at sea, departed before the convoys started forming. When the convoys arrive you get a surge of deliveries that can exceed the discharge capacity of the port for a few days or weeks, which effectively delays deliveries.

In January/Feb 1942 there was a fear among those responsible for the US industrial mobilization that a abrupt emergency implimentation of convoys on the US east coast would halt deliveries 100% for up to 30 days and deliveries would recover to only some fraction of those in January. This led to claims the US industrial mobilization would be crippled for up to a year by a emergency start up of east coast convoys.

What the actual effect might be there was such a perception that was only set aside when replaced by the perception the entire Allied cargo fleet was at risk off Miami Beach or New Jersey.

British records as summarized by John Ellis indicate the actual loss of cargo embarked to the UK & sunk by submarine was:

1941....6%

1942...10.5%

1943....4.5%

This may look odd, but the real problem was not in cargo lost but in cargo that could not be embarked because the submarines were sinking cargo ships faster than they could be replaced. The shortfall between requirements and embarked was a higher %.

This effect can be greatly reduced through a gradual and well organized implimentation of convoys
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The British used convoys in the War of 1812 and before, and they worked very effectively - the belief was that a fast ship could get in/engage convoy/run before the escorts could catch up, though, and in the mid 1860s convoy was abandoned because faster merchant ships supposedly made it obsolete.


DK Brown has shown that this doctrine was incorrect - there were not enough fast merchant ships to make a key assumption valid. As such I think that a historically minded officer could have brought back the convoy from the War of 1812 (which worked very well.)

As to making it happen - Lloyds do it. Insurance rebates are a very powerful financial incentive.
 
From the Official History of the War, Seaborne Trade, Volume III

Table I(a) Gross Tonnage of Merchant Shipping Lost Through Enemy Action to November, 11th, 1918

1914
241,000 British
313,000 World Total

1915
856,000 British
1,308,000 World Total

1916
1,238,000 British
2,327,000 World Total

1917
3,730,000 British
6,236,000 World Total

1918
1,695,000 British
2,667,000 World Total

Total
7,759,000 British
12,851,000 World Total
 
Table I(b) Summary Showing Cause of Loss and Nationality of Foreign Vessels

Surface Warships
443,000 British
569,000 World Total

Submarines
6,693,000 British
11,154,000 World Total

Mines
682,000 British
1,121,000 World Total

By Aircraft
8,000 British
8,000 World Total
 
I have a vision of Churchill in 1915 smoking his cigar chatting to Fisher, complaining that the anti submarine patrols in the North Sea are rather ineffective. Fisher responds that it's quite like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Churchill then takes a long drink of brandy and suddenly a wide smile spreads across his face and says "if we can't find them then lets make them come to us"!

As soon as convoys get painted as an aggressive measure to get the Germans to come out and fight Churchill is going to be all over it (I remember reading Churchill making the same argument in his the history of WW2 regarding the US putting its faith in patrols during operation Drumbeat). As to the surface ships if they come out to attack the convoys all the better as the GF will know where to find them giving the Admiralty the big fleet action they so ardently desire.

Further if memory serves most U-boat attacks happened in the North Sea, Channel and close to the British Isles. This was largely due to the limited range of U-boats of WW1 and also due to the target rich environments these areas presented. A convoy system that focused on protecting ships in these areas wouldn't be as painfully inefficient as the 30% noted above or even to the same levels as WW2 where convoys needed to be escorted much further.

The benefits of lower merchant shipping losses and higher u-boat losses do increase the goodwill of the now better protected neutrals like the US and reduce British debt beyond the war. Also the material not sitting at the bottom of the sea actually being used to further the war effort increases British production by reducing bottlenecks in the supply chain as new replacement goods don't have to be reordered and reshipped.

Would the US still enter the war? I think the by 1917 the Entente was so in debt to the US that defeat and subsequent default would have derailed the entire US economy so to protect their investment a reason would have been found for US entry.
 
I have a vision of Churchill in 1915 smoking his cigar chatting to Fisher, complaining that the anti submarine patrols in the North Sea are rather ineffective. Fisher responds that it's quite like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Churchill then takes a long drink of brandy and suddenly a wide smile spreads across his face and says "if we can't find them then lets make them come to us"!

As soon as convoys get painted as an aggressive measure to get the Germans to come out and fight Churchill is going to be all over it (I remember reading Churchill making the same argument in his the history of WW2 regarding the US putting its faith in patrols during operation Drumbeat). As to the surface ships if they come out to attack the convoys all the better as the GF will know where to find them giving the Admiralty the big fleet action they so ardently desire.

Further if memory serves most U-boat attacks happened in the North Sea, Channel and close to the British Isles. This was largely due to the limited range of U-boats of WW1 and also due to the target rich environments these areas presented. A convoy system that focused on protecting ships in these areas wouldn't be as painfully inefficient as the 30% noted above or even to the same levels as WW2 where convoys needed to be escorted much further.

The benefits of lower merchant shipping losses and higher u-boat losses do increase the goodwill of the now better protected neutrals like the US and reduce British debt beyond the war. Also the material not sitting at the bottom of the sea actually being used to further the war effort increases British production by reducing bottlenecks in the supply chain as new replacement goods don't have to be reordered and reshipped.

Would the US still enter the war? I think the by 1917 the Entente was so in debt to the US that defeat and subsequent default would have derailed the entire US economy so to protect their investment a reason would have been found for US entry.
Interesting idea.

However, my how is still forming the Naval Staff in 1887 and getting its organisation right first time, e.g. making the First Sea Lord the Chief of the Naval Staff from the start. In addition to deciding that convoys were still the most effective way to defend trade, I think more effort would have been put into the development of anti-submarine weapons and submarine detection devices before 1914.

It would also have helped if the Dover mine barrage had been made effective in 1915 instead of 1918. And with hindsight the British troops on the Belgian coast in 1914 should have blown up the locks on the canals from Bruges to Zeebrugge and Ostend before they withdrew.
 
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