RAF is going to get its 52 Home Defence squadrons by 1934. There will also be more squadrons for the Far East because that is where Japan is and at the time Japan was seen as the only major threat at the time. There would also be more naval co-operation squadrons. That is more coastal reconnaissance and torpedo bombers ashore and enough aircraft to bring the FAA up to the capacity of the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers, seaplane carriers, capital ships and cruisers.
I like the additional strength. It probably won't make a big difference in defense of Singapore, since the pilots will be trained to dogfight, & A6Ms will simply shoot them to pieces...

Is that 52 squadrons before a "BEF contingent"? Or is it, much as OTL, the number from which a "Continent AF" would be drawn?
On *Sea Hurricane, I wonder if more $ doesn't have RN/FAA looking overseas for better types, or design advice. I doubt they'd buy the F4F outright, but might borrow ideas. And when war starts, they might be more inclined to order the F4U, & get it in service sooner...
Edit:
each of the 14 ships would have to displace 9,642.857 tons ...ironically they would be exempt from the tonnage quota because before it was closed in the OTL 1930 LNT aircraft carriers displacing less than 10,000 tons weren't counted
That has me wondering.
Given there's meant to be a group of "commerce protection" CVs, what about AO- or bulk freighter-based ships, like the OTL MAC ships? Yes, they only operate something like 4 TSRs, but they're under the tonnage limit (aren't they?), & they don't sacrifice a lot of their cargo capacity in the conversion.
The idea was mooted several years before it was executed, & sat on a shelf in the Admiralty. So why not push it into '35-6 & build them? There's a Depression on, don't forget, & merchant shipyards can use the work. Also, brand new oilers or bulk carriers won't be amiss for British trade, then or later--especially if the cost of the ship is subsidized (whole or part) by HMG.
Edit 2:
Sir Humphrey Appleby said:
It was a matter of admiralty policy.
It was a security matter and security forbids its disclosure.
It was a matter of admiralty administration.
It was one of a wide variety of schemes being tested by the government.
It was a matter of the administration of admiralty policy.
It was a worthwhile experiment which provided considerable data and employment.
It was a matter of the policy of administration.
It occurred before certain facts were known, but couldn't happen again.
It was a matter of the policy of the administration of policy.
It was an unfortunate lapse by an individual which has been dealt with by internal procedures.
Thank you,
Humphrey.
Edit 3:
Drive down and KILL is better than drive down to fight two days later.
In a perfect world, maybe. The goal isn't to kill U-boats, it's to get the convoy through & deliver the supplies.