British Navy Pre-WW2 Improvements

hipper

Banned
I was simply sharing Adm Burnetts Critique and he was a subject matter expert and he was there ;)

There was a lot of escorting warships with PQ18 (not to mention all of the Freighters would have been armed) - and more experianced RN ones at that and most of the second stage 'fighting' escort DDs had some of the most modern Fire control systems and radar then available - so I would not think that the AAA of the convoy could be considered ineffective at all in fact there would have been significantly more AAA than at Coral Sea or Midway.

And an HE-111 is a larger target than a Kate! !

I'm really making the point that contrary to what is usually claimed the RN's AA was probably the best in the world in 1942 certainly competitive with anyone else's. As to the amount of AA present the USN had 3 carriers 8 cruisers and 15 destroyers present at Midway
compared with 22 destroyers one light Cruiser two auxiliary AA ships and one escort carrier on PQ 18. Certainly the US dispersed tactics did not help their AA concentrations. The He 111 and Ju 88 were more resilient than any Japanese aircraft with more engines and would be considered harder to shoot down.

if you have any link to Adm Burnetts Critique I would be very interested

regards
Hipper
 

hipper

Banned
Hmm. if I might point out, that the reason that so few IJN aircraft fell to US AAA at Coral Sea, Midway and Eastern Solomons was because so few IJN aircraft survived the American CAP to get within the AAA coverage zone? As was remarked (^^^^) fighter intercepts were the best air defense. And the Germans were pushing their luck with masthead height attacks.


Or there was something else going on that rendered their AA systems practically ineffective, perhaps the lack of radar or Gyro guidance had something to do with it, or just the lags inherent in the mk 1 AA computer and the difficulties with feedback in the power operated guns ...

just of the top of my head.
 
I'm really making the point that contrary to what is usually claimed the RN's AA was probably the best in the world in 1942 certainly competitive with anyone else's. As to the amount of AA present the USN had 3 carriers 8 cruisers and 15 destroyers present at Midway

The one force that was attacked had one carrier, two cruisers and six destroyers in its wagon wheel defense.
 
Or there was something else going on that rendered their AA systems practically ineffective, perhaps the lack of radar or Gyro guidance had something to do with it, or just the lags inherent in the mk 1 AA computer and the difficulties with feedback in the power operated guns ...

just of the top of my head.

Present, but not as important as the few ships really there around Yorktown (compared to PQ-18). Some of Flertcher's ships did have radar, (even for the AAA, i.e. Astoria ) or the CAP would never have slaughtered as much of Yamaguchi's strikes as they did. 10 of 18 dive bombers. And even for all of that; the US AAA still killed about half the Kate droppers (6 of 10) who evaded the cap and released fish, so I guess we'll have to disagree on interpretation of effectiveness?
 
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Well, that's really faulty doctrine then... The RN was running carrier task forces with 3 carriers in August 1942


It was successful doctrine. The Japanese concentrated all their First Air Fleet flattops during that battle and Nagumo was bounced and slaughtered in two goes. The US spread out (this was wargamed and proven in Fleet Problems) and the Japanese missed (did not find) Hornet and Enterprise until it was too late. By the time they did, Kurita had been hit too and Yamamoto ran for it. He knew he was beaten by a better navy. I think he lost his nerve, but that is only my opinion.

The US was technologically overmatched, but their carrier tactics for that battle and that era were solid and practical, well thought out and produced incredible results.
 
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Why not a gun based on the 4.7 " Mark VIII? This was conceived as a High Angle weapon. Maybe instead of putting a new gun in an old mount as they did with the abortive 5.1" project, they put an old gun in a new mount.

The 4.5 and 5.25 inch guns are never conceived, and the RN have effective dual purpose gun in mass production long before the war starts.

Ship ideas:
Tribal class with 6 guns in dual mounts on more or less the same hull. The extra space is used for AA equipment.

The KGV has 3 quad turrets as intended thanks to the weight savings of lighter secondary armament. For the RN the escalator clause comes in the form of revising the Anson and Howe into a separate class with triple 16" turrets and hull improvements for greater speed.
The Mark VIII has the dual problems of fixed ammunition (thus higher crew fatigue and lower rates of fire) and lower velocity (and thus lower AA performance) than the Mark IX. You want the Mark X if you use the 40-caliber series; that had separated ammo.

I do like the KGV idea, though.
 
The Mark VIII has the dual problems of fixed ammunition (thus higher crew fatigue and lower rates of fire) and lower velocity (and thus lower AA performance) than the Mark IX. You want the Mark X if you use the 40-caliber series; that had separated ammo.

I do like the KGV idea, though.

I think the simplest thing to do is to cheat - look at what actually happened in the end via our crystal ball - what was the point of arrival - and apply that - then shoot it full of holes ;)

So twin 4.5" with an understanding from the failed earlier 5.1" gun project that one peice ammo is too heavy and start the Mk1 QF 4.5 with split ammo (ie don't make the learning that single piece is too tiring for the crews - introduce a slightly lighter shell and repeat the mistake!) with single piece ammo being reintroduced in the later automatic turrets and have this as the primaries for the late 30 DD designs as well as the Carriers and escort cruisers - I know there was good reasoning for the 5.25 but the 4.5 had similar performance in range and altitude - trained and elevated faster and had a much higher ROF that was depending on the turret etc at least half the weight.

Keep the twin and single 4" for war emergency Destroyers and Corvettes respectively as well as the secondaries for the 'Light' Crusiers as this was another great war time gun system

I too like the 12 gun KGV as well.

On the subject of the derided 14" - it did not matter what gun calibre the British would have used there would still have been teething issues due to the complexity of the gun system and safety features and the 14" did not fail to damage anything it came up against

Personally spam out 6 KGVs with 12 x 14" guns in 3 quads and with 12 x 2 - QF 4.5 BDs and 8 x 8 Pom Pom mounts - season with additional 20mm cannon leave to simmer for 3 years

Then Spam out 4-6 Lions

As for the Towns and follow on types of 'light' Cruiser - how about reducing the turrets to 3 triples and increasing the number of secondaries and AAA etc?
 
RAF is going to get its 52 Home Defence squadrons by 1934. There will also be more squadrons for the Far East because that is where Japan is and at the time Japan was seen as the only major threat at the time. There would also be more naval co-operation squadrons. That is more coastal reconnaissance and torpedo bombers ashore and enough aircraft to bring the FAA up to the capacity of the Royal Navy's aircraft carriers, seaplane carriers, capital ships and cruisers.
I like the additional strength. It probably won't make a big difference in defense of Singapore, since the pilots will be trained to dogfight, & A6Ms will simply shoot them to pieces...:eek::eek:

Is that 52 squadrons before a "BEF contingent"? Or is it, much as OTL, the number from which a "Continent AF" would be drawn?

On *Sea Hurricane, I wonder if more $ doesn't have RN/FAA looking overseas for better types, or design advice. I doubt they'd buy the F4F outright, but might borrow ideas. And when war starts, they might be more inclined to order the F4U, & get it in service sooner...:cool:

Edit:
each of the 14 ships would have to displace 9,642.857 tons ...ironically they would be exempt from the tonnage quota because before it was closed in the OTL 1930 LNT aircraft carriers displacing less than 10,000 tons weren't counted
That has me wondering.

Given there's meant to be a group of "commerce protection" CVs, what about AO- or bulk freighter-based ships, like the OTL MAC ships? Yes, they only operate something like 4 TSRs, but they're under the tonnage limit (aren't they?), & they don't sacrifice a lot of their cargo capacity in the conversion.

The idea was mooted several years before it was executed, & sat on a shelf in the Admiralty. So why not push it into '35-6 & build them? There's a Depression on, don't forget, & merchant shipyards can use the work. Also, brand new oilers or bulk carriers won't be amiss for British trade, then or later--especially if the cost of the ship is subsidized (whole or part) by HMG.

Edit 2:
Sir Humphrey Appleby said:
It was a matter of admiralty policy.
It was a security matter and security forbids its disclosure.
It was a matter of admiralty administration.
It was one of a wide variety of schemes being tested by the government.
It was a matter of the administration of admiralty policy.
It was a worthwhile experiment which provided considerable data and employment.
It was a matter of the policy of administration.
It occurred before certain facts were known, but couldn't happen again.
It was a matter of the policy of the administration of policy.
It was an unfortunate lapse by an individual which has been dealt with by internal procedures.
Thank you, Humphrey.

Edit 3:
Drive down and KILL is better than drive down to fight two days later.
In a perfect world, maybe. The goal isn't to kill U-boats, it's to get the convoy through & deliver the supplies.
 
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In his book Night Fighters, Bill Gunston has a section entitled, "Notable Riddles of the Sky."

He wrote that the Kriegsmarine (strictly speaking still the Reichsmarine) began development of radar in 1933 after deciding if it worked underwater with sonar it could work above water with what became radar. His Majesty King George V suggested it in 1931 after hearing a lecture on asdic at an Admiralty lecture, however thought it was not possible. He also wrote that the Royal Navy's Signals Establishment had suggested a 50cm radar in 1931. Meanwhile the Germans had developed a naval gunnery radar and was fitting it to large warships, but the Royal Navy did not get any until 1941. Seekat was joined by Freya an Early Warning set. It was mobile, had 360 degree coverage and a range of 75 miles. They also had Würzburg a Gun Laying set for flak. These 50cm radars were the best mass produced sets in the world before World War II. By comparison British radar development did not begin until 1935 and IIRC the Royal Navy did not begin development of the proposed 50cm radar first proposed in 1931 until 1936.

So what if ITTL the lecturer's reply to KGV's question was, "That's a very good idea Your Majesty! I'll look into it." He has a word with the CO of the Signals Establishment who replied, "Funny you should mention that! Because..." and with the aid of TTL's larger Navy Estimates 1929-30 to 1935-36 that gets the ball rolling?

As there is less sense of urgency (and less money) in the first half of the 1930s than the second (even in this TL) beginning the development of 50cm radar in 1931-32 instead of 1935-36 only pushes the state of the art forward by 2 rather than 4 years in 1939. That's still good enough to have British warships fitted with 1941-42-OTL standard 50cm radars in 1939-40-TTL.

IMHO it's a dead cert that the Army will buy 50cm Gun Laying (GL) and Search Light Control (SLC) radars derived from the Admiralty's research than the GL Mk I, GL Mk II and SLC radars developed IOTL by the Army cell at Orfordness. These 50cm sets aught to be far more effective than the sets available to AA Command in the Battle of Britain and Blitz. I also think that the TTL GL and SLC sets would come into service a year sooner than the OTL sets and therefore be available in much greater numbers during the Battle of Britain and Blitz.

I think a 50cm Airborne Interception (AI) radar for night fighters would be far more effective than the OTL AI Mk I to IV systems of OTL which IIRC used the 1.5 metre wavelength. I also think that it would be available in large numbers a year earlier than the AI Mk IV. Now we need to bring the Beaufighter forward a year or find an equally effective substitute which can be in large scale service by June 1940.

OTL the British night defences didn't shoot down Luftwaffe aircraft in significant numbers until the last 6 weeks of the Blitz (April and the first half of May 1941). TTL the RAF and AA Command would be doing so from day one of the Blitz.
How would that effect the naval battles of 1939-41.

Would Harwood's cruisers have scored a significantly larger number of hits on Graff Spee in December 1939 if they were fitted with 1941-OTL standard radar?

How would Renown have done in her encounter with The Twins of Norway in April 1940 had she been fitted with late 1941-OTL standard gunnery and search radars. The other things is that IOTL it wouldn't have been Renown, it would have been one or two the modified KGV class fast battleships each armed with nine 15-inch guns so theoretically three times the gun power and hopefully more accurate too so at least 3 times as many hits in the same time.

More accurate AA gunnery might help the RN off Norway in 1940 and against the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean in 1941.
 
The Mark VIII has the dual problems of fixed ammunition (thus higher crew fatigue and lower rates of fire) and lower velocity (and thus lower AA performance) than the Mark IX. You want the Mark X if you use the 40-caliber series; that had separated ammo.

There was only 1 Mark X ever used and that was on a submarine commissioned in 1931, also with an experimental mount.

This was IIRC, the same year as the test for the abortive 5.1" gun. So if they build another prototype in a similarly modified mount then you have a gun with better elevation than most of OTL's mounts for the Mk XI.

Of course, neither the gun, the ammo, or mount are perfect, but they're a good starting point for further development. Perhaps introduce a new mark of 4.7 inch for twin mounts in the Tribals, Dido's & KGVs, while most destroyers continue to use the Mark X mountings, with a universal switchover to the twin mount gun in the 40s.
 
In his book Night Fighters, Bill Gunston has a section entitled, "Notable Riddles of the Sky."

He wrote that the Kriegsmarine (strictly speaking still the Reichsmarine) began development of radar in 1933 after deciding if it worked underwater with sonar it could work above water with what became radar. His Majesty King George V suggested it in 1931 after hearing a lecture on asdic at an Admiralty lecture, however thought it was not possible. He also wrote that the Royal Navy's Signals Establishment had suggested a 50cm radar in 1931. Meanwhile the Germans had developed a naval gunnery radar and was fitting it to large warships, but the Royal Navy did not get any until 1941. Seekat was joined by Freya an Early Warning set. It was mobile, had 360 degree coverage and a range of 75 miles. They also had Würzburg a Gun Laying set for flak. These 50cm radars were the best mass produced sets in the world before World War II. By comparison British radar development did not begin until 1935 and IIRC the Royal Navy did not begin development of the proposed 50cm radar first proposed in 1931 until 1936.

So what if ITTL the lecturer's reply to KGV's question was, "That's a very good idea Your Majesty! I'll look into it." He has a word with the CO of the Signals Establishment who replied, "Funny you should mention that! Because..." and with the aid of TTL's larger Navy Estimates 1929-30 to 1935-36 that gets the ball rolling?

As there is less sense of urgency (and less money) in the first half of the 1930s than the second (even in this TL) beginning the development of 50cm radar in 1931-32 instead of 1935-36 only pushes the state of the art forward by 2 rather than 4 years in 1939. That's still good enough to have British warships fitted with 1941-42-OTL standard 50cm radars in 1939-40-TTL.

IMHO it's a dead cert that the Army will buy 50cm Gun Laying (GL) and Search Light Control (SLC) radars derived from the Admiralty's research than the GL Mk I, GL Mk II and SLC radars developed IOTL by the Army cell at Orfordness. These 50cm sets aught to be far more effective than the sets available to AA Command in the Battle of Britain and Blitz. I also think that the TTL GL and SLC sets would come into service a year sooner than the OTL sets and therefore be available in much greater numbers during the Battle of Britain and Blitz.

I think a 50cm Airborne Interception (AI) radar for night fighters would be far more effective than the OTL AI Mk I to IV systems of OTL which IIRC used the 1.5 metre wavelength. I also think that it would be available in large numbers a year earlier than the AI Mk IV. Now we need to bring the Beaufighter forward a year or find an equally effective substitute which can be in large scale service by June 1940.

OTL the British night defences didn't shoot down Luftwaffe aircraft in significant numbers until the last 6 weeks of the Blitz (April and the first half of May 1941). TTL the RAF and AA Command would be doing so from day one of the Blitz.
What is the likelihood of the cavity magnetron invented sooner if the British began radar research in 1931 instead of 1935? It wasn't related to the Admiralty's radar research IOTL, but starting the Admiralty's programme earlier should have the knock-on effect of the other branches of the British defence establishment starting their programmes sooner as well.

In the above post I suggested that starting the Admiralty's radar programme in 1931 instead of 1935 would put the state of the art in 1939 ITTL to the level of 1941 IOTL On that basis is it reasonable to suggest that the cavity magnetron would be invented 1938 instead of 1940? If it is reasonable how much earlier could proximity fuses have entered service?
 
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