First, I dislike your allegation that I have been using "sleight of hand" to prove my points. In my limited knowledge of the language, that implies an allegation of bad faith on my part. I don't care if you used smilies; so please be kind and withdraw the allegation.
Now, would the Germans be able to employ proper strategy, new doctrines, a better decision-making in the Seelöwe operation, as they had done in the Blitzkrieg, a kind of warfare which is known by its German name not by chance?
No.
The strategic plan was nothing short of suicide, its only excuse being that Kriegsmarine planners probably were not interested in actually sweating it out because they thought that it would never come to fruition, since either a) the British would be fooled into seeking terms or b) the Luftwaffe would never achieve the air supremacy that was demanded of it.
The doctrine was non-existent. The Kriegsmarine had no standing procedures, no experience, no suitable equipment and no inclination for fighting its way ashore in an opposed landing over an open beach. And before somebody mentions Norway, I'll point out that there a) there was no opposition to speak of, b) it was carried out in ports, not on open beaches, and the British wouldn't be as obliging as the Norwegians in yielding ports without both a fight and extensive demolitions, c) anyway, Norway had cost almost all the ships employed there and d) again it had succeeded against odds.
As to the decision-making, well. This is the kind of operation which requires mutual understanding and close cooperation between the three services. That alone disqualifies the Wehrmacht.
The Royal Navy, on the other hand, would be playing in its own courtyard, doing the thing it had trained for. Even assuming it were restricted only to night fighting, the British destroyers were exactly pretty good at it. And even assuming they had to expend three destroyers every 24 hours, they could afford it.
It is irrelevant that the Luftwaffe scored some good hits in 1941 around Crete. The situation was not comparable. For starters, there were little if any British fighters around, while they would be thick as flies over the Channel. Then, the German pilots had got some serious training at ship-hunting by 1941, which was untrue in 1940. Then, the Germans had managed to deliver some effective anti-armor bombs, which were in great shortage in 1940 (that's why even a direct hit by a Stuka would probably not pierce the Revenge's deck). Then the Luftwaffe had managed to set aside more units for the specific task of anti-shipping, while in 1940 they had one unit for that (they could use bomber units used and trained for land targets, so you're back to the issue with lack of training).