The
Afrika Korps was down to 40 tanks ready to be committed and Rommel ordered the relief of the frontier garrisons.
[51] On 24 November the
Afrika Korps and
Ariete division headed for Sidi Omar, causing chaos and scattering the mainly rear echelon support units in their path, splitting XXX Corps and almost cutting off XIII Corps. Rommel hoped to relieve the siege of Bardia and pose a large enough threat to the British rear echelon to complete the defeat of Operation Crusader.
[note 17] On 25 November, 15th Panzer set off north-east for Sidi Azeiz and found the area empty and were constantly attacked by the Desert Air Force. South of the border the 5th Panzer Regiment of the 21st Panzer attacked the 7th Indian Brigade at Sidi Omar and were repulsed by the 1st Field Regt RA, firing over open sights at a range of 500 metres (547 yd); a second attack left the 5th Panzer Regiment with few operational tanks.
[53] The rest of 21st Panzer had headed north east, south of the border, to Halfaya.
17) His decision was based on the fact that the 7th Armoured Division had been defeated, but he ignored intelligence reports of British supply dumps lying on his path on the border and this was to cost him the battle. As Oberstleutnant Fritz Bayerlein, the chief of staff of the Afrika Korps said after the war, "If we had known about those dumps we could have won the battle."
[52]