British Air Force Pre-WW2 Improvements (POD 1929)

The Royal Air Force 1929-34 IOTL
  • The RAF on 31st March 1929

    On 31st March 1929 the Royal Air Force had 826 aircraft in the equivalent of 72½ squadrons
    The RAF Proper had 682 aircraft in 61½ squadrons.

    Metropolitan Air Force 434 aircraft in 39 squadrons
    Air Defence of Great Britain Command 342 aircraft in 30 squadrons as follows:
    70 night bombers in 7 squadrons
    128 day bombers in 11 squadrons (10 squadrons of 10 and one squadron of 8)
    144 fighters in 12 squadrons​
    Inland Area 84 aircraft in 7 squadrons
    60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons
    24 day bombers in 2 emergency squadrons​
    Coastal Area
    8 flying boats in 2 coastal reconnaissance squadrons
    Overseas Commands 248 aircraft in 22½ squadrons
    RAF Mediterranean
    12 seaplanes in one coastal reconnaissance squadron​
    RAF Middle East (Egypt and the Sudan) 46 aircraft in 4 squadrons
    24 day bombers in 2 squadrons
    12 army co-operation squadrons in one squadron
    10 bomber-transports in one squadron​
    Palestine Command
    12 day bombers in one squadron​
    Iraq Command 50 aircraft in 5 squadrons
    36 day bombers in 3 squadrons
    10 bomber-transports in one squadron
    4 flying boats in one squadron​
    Aden Command
    12 day bombers in one squadron​
    RAF India 100 aircraft in 8 squadrons and one flight
    48 day bombers in 4 squadrons
    48 army co-operation aircraft in 4 squadrons
    4 bomber-transports in one flight​
    RAF Far East
    4 flying boats in one squadron
    The Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force had 144 aircraft in 24 flights (the equivalent of 12 squadrons)
    48 fleet fighters in 8 flights
    66 fleet spotter reconnaissance aircraft in 11 flights
    30 fleet torpedo aircraft in 5 flights​

    The above doesn't include 2 day bomber squadrons which were part of the Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) in the Inland Area because they only existed on a skeleton basis. It doesn't include No. 24 (Communications) Squadron either.

    Under the Expansion Scheme approved in 1923 the A.D.G.B. Command should have had 594 aircraft in 52 squadrons by 31st March 1928 as follows:
    150 Night Bombers in 15 squadrons of 10
    240 Day Bombers in 20 squadrons of 12
    204 Fighters in 17 squadrons of 12​

    However, on 3rd December 1925 the completion date was put back to 31st March 1935. Then on 11th December 1929 the completion date of the scheme was put back to 31st March 1938 and the 2 emergency squadrons were now counted as part of the Home Defence Force.

    Squadrons formed 1929-34

    Actually added between 1929 and March 1934 were 120 aircraft in the equivalent of 12½ squadrons
    70 aircraft in 6 squadrons were added to the A.D.G.B. Command
    10 night bombers in one squadron
    48 day bombers in 4 squadrons
    12 fighters in one squadron​
    8 flying boats in 2 squadrons were added to the Coastal Area

    24 torpedo bombers in 2 squadrons were added to RAF Far East

    18 aircraft in 3 flights were added to the FAA​
    The RAF on 31st March 1934

    Thus on 31st March 1934 the RAF had 958 aircraft in the equivalent of 86 squadrons as follows:
    524 aircraft in 48 squadrons in the Metropolitan Air Force
    448 aircraft in 39 squadrons in the Air Defence of Great Britain
    80 night bombers in 8 squadrons
    212 day bombers in 18 squadrons (17 of 12 and one of 8) including the 2 emergency squadrons
    156 fighters in 13 squadrons​
    Inland Area
    60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons​
    Coastal Area
    16 flying boats in 4 coastal reconnaissance squadrons​
    272 aircraft in 24½ squadrons in the Overseas Commands
    144 day bombers in 12 squadrons
    24 bomber-transports in 2 squadrons and one flight
    60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons
    24 torpedo bombers in 2 squadrons
    8 flying boats in 2 coastal reconnaissance squadrons
    12 seaplanes in one coastal reconnaissance squadron​
    162 aircraft in the equivalent of 13½ squadrons (actually 12 squadrons, but some under strength and 6 flights)
    36 fleet fighters in 4 squadrons but 2 at half-strength
    54 fleet spotter reconnaissance in 5 squadrons (3 of 12 and 2 of 9)
    36 fleet torpedo aircraft in 3 squadrons
    36 catapult aircraft in 6 flights​

    There was also No. 24 (Communications) Squadron in A.D.G.B. and the 2 skeleton day bomber squadrons attached to the A&AEE in the Inland Area.

    Finance

    The Net Air Estimates over this period were:
    1928-29 £16,250,000
    1929-30 £16,200,000
    1930-31 £17,850,000
    1931-32 £18,100,000
    1932-33 £17,400,000
    1933-34 £17,426,000
    1934-35 £17,561,000​

    Personnel

    Vote A (Numbers) over this period was:
    1928-29 32,500
    1929-30 32,000
    1930-31 32,000
    1931-32 32,000
    1932-33 32,000
    1933-34 31,000
    1934-35 31,000​
     
    FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE - INTRODUCTORY AND PART ONE
  • THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
    TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY


    It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

    MOST SECRET.
    COPY NO.40
    C.P. 64 (34).

    CABINET
    IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY

    REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

    The attached Report, D.R.C. 14, by the Defence Requirements Committee, which was appointed by the Cabinet on the 15th November, 1933 (Cabinet 62 (33; Conclusion 5 (b)), is circulated to the Cabinet on the instructions of the Prime Minister and will be placed on the Agenda Paper for preliminary consideration on Wednesday, March 7th.

    The Prime Minister instructs ma to invite the attention of the Cabinet to the great secrecy of this Report.

    (Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY,

    Secretary to the Cabinet.


    2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

    5th March, 1934.


    THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

    Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1934

    MOST SECRET
    Copy No. 55
    D.R.O. 14

    TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

    It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.


    COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
    DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS SUB-COMMITTEE

    REPORT


    2, Whitehall Gardens; S.W. 1,

    February 28, 1934


    REPORT
    INTRODUCTORY


    ON the 15th November, 1933, the Cabinet[1] approved the following proposals by the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.261st Meeting, Minute 1):—

    "(a)—(i) For the present the expenditure of the Defence Departments should be governed by the Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (CLD .Paper No.1113-B) and the following considerations of priority mentioned therein: the defence of our Possessions and interests in the Far East; European commitments; the Defence of India:

    (ii) No expenditure should for the present be incurred on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States, France or Italy:

    (iii) The above conclusions must be kept under careful observation by the Government Departments concerned, and in any event should be reviewed annually by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

    (b) That on the basis of the above resolutions the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, with representatives of the Treasury and the Foreign Office, and the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, should prepare a programme for meeting our worst deficiencies, for transmission to the Cabinet."

    The latter resolution contains our Terms of Reference.

    2. The first two resolutions quoted above prescribe the conditions by which the expenditure of the Defence Departments is to be governed "for the present." In preparing a long-range programme, however, there are certain more permanent elements in the problem that have to be taken into consideration. Our Imperial and foreign interests are unlike those of any other country. Not only are we responsible for the peace and well-being of many diverse races, widely scattered and living under all sorts of conditions, but also our home population is dependent to the extent of 60 per cent, on overseas trade for the food by which it lives. The structure of British interests overseas, which has been built up over the centuries, could not be sustained without the ships, bases, land and air forces, which we must maintain at all times, in peace as in war. Unless the representative forces so employed are adequately maintained, not only shall we fail abroad, but we shall starve at home. This little-advertised but essential peace commitment of our defence forces, if efficiently carried out, is the best possible deterrent to the ambitions of any potential enemy, and its efficient maintenance is a necessary starting-point for any war. Other considerations of a general order are contained in the Annual Review (1933) by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (CLD .Paper No.1113-B) and need not be repeated here.

    3. Referring to the exclusion for the present of the United States, France and Italy (paragraph 1 (a)(ii)above),we would remark that our long-range policy cannot be founded exclusively on what might prove to be a temporary and shifting basis, and we cannot entirely ignore the possibility of changes in the international situation. Within recent years such changes have sometimes occurred at very short notice. They have arisen sometimes out of the external relations of States, as illustrated by the Far Eastern crisis of 1931-32; sometimes, as in the case of Germany, Italy and Russia, from internal upheavals, which are particularly difficult to foresee. While such possibilities need not, as a rule, be taken into account in immediate defensive plans and preparations, they ought not to be overlooked in providing the basic elements of our defensive system, such as programmes of construction extending over a long-term. In particular, at past Conferences on Naval Disarmament the strength of the navies of the United States and France have had to be taken into account, and at the forthcoming Naval Conference the large French cruiser and submarine forces will require careful consideration, as well as the possibility of the use by the United States of their navy for purposes of weakening our blockade in the event of a war in which we are belligerents and they are neutrals.

    PART I. – GOVERNING CONSIDERATIONS

    4. Within the limits of practical finance it is impossible for a world-wide Empire like our own to be equally secure at every point against every conceivable enemy. Consequently it has always been necessary in testing our defensive preparations to make certain assumptions on such matters as what countries have to be considered as potential enemies, allies or neutrals, and the time limits within which the different dangers are liable to develop. Throughout almost the whole of the post-war period the Estimates of the Defence Departments have been governed substantially by an assumption that no major war was likely to occur for ten years. The form of this assumption has varied from time to time and from Service to Service, but since July 1928[2] until a comparatively recent date the approved formula has been "That it should be assumed for the purpose of framing the Estimates of the Fighting Services, that at any given date there will be no major war for ten years." It was under this assumption, which became gradually untenable, that our present and exceedingly serious deficiencies have accumulated.

    5. In March 1932, in consequence of a menacing situation in the Far East and a general deterioration of the European position, the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.255th Meeting, Minute 4) accepted a recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee that the above assumption should be cancelled, and on the 11th October, 1932, the Cabinet decided[3] to proceed with the completion and defences of the naval base at Singapore. Since then, apart from the Far East, the position has been rather nebulous. Owing to the protracted uncertainties of the Disarmament Conference it has not been found possible to lay down confidently a reasonable basis for a defensive programme of national armaments extending over a term of years. A further deterioration of the international situation, however, has made it possible within the last few months to define the position more clearly.

    6. We do not propose to traverse again the ground covered by the latest Reports of the Foreign Office (C.I.D. Paper No.1112-B) and the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Paper No.1113-B), in which the international position is examined in its political and defensive aspects respectively, since the Committee of Imperial Defence, after considering them, has instructed us to take as the basis of our Report the two assumptions quoted in our first paragraph, viz.:—

    (i) Priority to the Far East; European commitments; and the Defence of India:

    (ii)No expenditure on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States of America, France or Italy.

    7. Referring first to the question of priority, after a study of the Minutes of the 261st Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, our understanding is that the intention of the Committee was not to lay down the three items mentioned above in order of priority, but merely to single them out as contingencies for which our defensive preparations ought at the present time to provide. Since the Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence the trend of events has been rather in the direction of accentuating the dangers of the European situation. This tendency results from the failure of France and Germany to come to terms on disarmament and from increasing evidence of Germany's intention to re-arm, with or without the consent of other Powers. In the meantime, Japan's relations with Russia in the Far East have deteriorated and should incline her to seek improved relations with other Powers generally and ourselves in particular. This inclination is at present confirmed both by letters and despatches from our Embassy at Tokyo and by outward and visible signs, among which may be quoted the successful issue of the Indo-Japanese cotton negotiations and the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Diet on the 23rd January, when he said that "the traditional friendship with Great Britain remains unshaken and the two island empires can by wholehearted collaboration effectively serve the cause of universal peace."

    8. We consider that advantage should be taken of any opportunity to improve our relations with Japan. No student of the Memoranda and Proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence which led up to our Inquiry or of this Report can be under any illusions as to the gravity of the situation which would arise if we were faced with hostility by Japan in the Far East, especially if (as is by no means impossible) it coincided with trouble in Europe and perhaps in India. We cannot over-state the importance we attach to getting back, not to an alliance (since that would not be practical politics), but at least to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan. There should be no insuperable difficulty in such a task, for which conditions are now favourable, though there is already some speculation as to the future extent of Japan's relations with Germany. Success on our part would not only bring us increased security, but might enable us to correct or obviate any unhealthy tendency of this kind in Japanese policy. Japan is more likely, however, to respect and listen to a Power that can defend its interests than to one that is defenceless.

    9. The question of our relations with Japan inevitably carries with it that of our relations with the United States. There is much to be said for the view that our subservience to the United States of America in past years has been one of the principal factors in the deterioration of our former good relations with Japan, and that, before the Naval Disarmament Conference, 1935, we ought thoroughly to reconsider our general attitude. That opens up too large a subject for treatment in this report, but is an aspect of the question which we feel sure the Cabinet will not overlook.

    10. At the present moment, however, pending a further improvement in our relations, we cannot overlook the danger created by our total inability to defend our interests in the Far East. Japan is fully armed, both in a material and moral sense. This is not our position. At the moment we are almost defenceless in the Far East. By the decision to proceed with the defence of Singapore the National Government has recognised that this state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue, but much remains to be done unless our vast interests in the Far East are to remain in considerable jeopardy. We do not consider that there is any immediate danger or any present aggressive design. There remains the risk, against which we must guard, that some unexpected emergency may arise, as in the autumn of 1931, or that Japan might yield to the sudden temptation of a favourable opportunity arising from complications elsewhere. And elsewhere means Europe, and danger to us in Europe will only come from Germany.

    11. Germany, on the other hand, is not yet fully armed. She has considerable elements of force, but her permanent system, with its full complement of armaments and trained reserves, has not yet taken shape, though it is rapidly doing so. Surrounded by armed and suspicious neighbours she is not at present a serious menace to this country, but within, a few years will certainly become so. It will, indeed, be impossible to have any confidence in German gestures to the outside world so long as every German act at home belies them. In her case we have time, though not too much time, to make defensive preparations.

    First Assumption

    12. In these circumstances we have divided the risk of war into three classes. The Far Eastern Commitment, as to which we envisage an ultimate policy of accommodation and friendship with Japan, and an immediate and provisional policy of "showing a tooth "for the purpose of recovering the standing which we have sacrificed of recent years. Secondly, we take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom our "long range "defence policy must be directed. And, thirdly, the defence of India — the largest of our "Empire" commitments.

    Second Assumption

    13. We have also strictly applied the second assumption laid down for us, that we need not incur expenditure on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States of America, France or Italy. But we recommend that this should not be interpreted to rule out the provision in certain localities of a limited amount of modern equipment required to enable personnel to be trained and exercised with modern weapons. For example, we accept the view of the Chiefs of Staff that it should be the aim to provide category "A "defended ports with at least one battery capable of engaging a capital ship. It would also be unsound to allow any of our Naval bases to fall to so low a degree of efficiency that it would be impossible to bring them up to a suitable standard within a reasonable time should changes in the political situation in Europe make this necessary.

    Third Assumption

    14. On a review of the international situation as described in earlier paragraphs, we are of opinion that our present deficiencies ought to be made good within the shortest practicable period. "We have therefore aimed, in principle, at a programme spread over a five-year period, though in practice we have found that for certain items it is not possible, or in some cases essential, to make good within so short a time limit deficiencies accumulated over a long term of years.
     
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    FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE Part III. - THE PLAN IN DETAIL III.-AIR FORCE DEFICIENCIES
  • Part III. - THE PLAN IN DETAIL

    38. In Part II we dealt with our proposals on general lines and from the point of view of the strategical objects that they are designed to fulfil. In this part of the Report we explain them in greater detail and show how the expenditure is apportioned between the three Defence Services.

    39. Part III, therefore, is divided into three Sections, dealing respectively with —

    I. Navy Deficiencies. [not included here]

    II. Army Deficiencies. [not included here]

    III. Air Force Deficiencies.

    At the end of the Report will be found the three Tables summarising the respective requirements of the three Defence Services, which are constantly referred to in the text.


    III.—AIR FORCE DEFICIENCIES

    Completion of the Home Defence Scheme of 52 Squadrons
    Cost: £2,340,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
    (Table D, Item 1.)​

    128. We have already referred in paragraph 27 to the need for the expansion of the Home Defence Air Force to 52 squadrons. Of the many necessary defence measures which we recommend, this is the most certain to receive popular support, since the vulnerability of our capital to attack by air is widely realised.

    129. The costs of completing the Home Defence Scheme to 52[1] squadrons, together with one additional flying-boat squadron for coastal reconnaissance in Home waters, is shown as Item 1 on Table D, which gives the increments caused by this expansion on the cost of all items which are at present charged to the Air Force Vote. The cost has been spread up to the years 1940-41, for the reason that, although the provision of the necessary aircraft is well within the capacity of the industry, it is not feasible to provide the necessary works and buildings within a shorter time, working under the normal peace-time system (see paragraphs 28 and 29).

    130. Apart from their primary duty of Home Defence it will be appreciated that the Air Force stationed at Home constitutes a reserve of force available, if circumstances permit, for employment in the general interests of Empire Defence. It is thus that the air forces required to implement the Defence of India Plan have always been assumed as being made available from the Air Defences of Great Britain. Similarly, the needs of an Air Force contingent to accompany a, British Expeditionary Force (apart from Army Co-operation squadrons which are specifically provided for) will have to be found from the Home Defence Air Force. It would therefore be inaccurate to regard the whole of this force as tied to the country in a fixed and immutable role.

    Fleet Air Arm
    Cost: £260,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
    (Table D, Item 2.)​

    131. Reference has been made in paragraph 40 to the necessity of making good the existing deficiency of 51 aircraft in the Fleet Air Arm. The annual costs to the Air Ministry, additional to that repayable by grant-in-aid from Navy to Air votes, are shown as Item 2 of Table D. The programme required to meet the projected expansion of Air Forces for the Japanese Navy has been dealt with in paragraph 34 (see also Appendix 1 and Table F (2)).

    Air Requirements for Singapore
    Cost: £1,430,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
    (Table D, Item 3.)​

    132. The Air requirements for the defence of Singapore have only been worked out by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee since our Inquiry began, and their Report is not yet before the Committee of Imperial Defence. Pending its consideration their recommendations must be treated as provisional, but as we have no other guide in this important matter we have, for the purpose of considering our worst deficiencies, adopted these proposals as a basis of calculation. The Chiefs of Staff estimate the total air forces required at

    Singapore in war at —
    6 land-plane squadrons,
    3 flying-boat squadrons,
    Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery.​

    It is proposed, however, that the air forces normally located at Singapore in peace should consist of —
    3 land-plane squadrons,
    2 flying-boat squadrons,
    Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery.​
    The reinforcements to bring this force to the total required in war would be drawn at present from India, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. At present there are at Singapore —
    2 land-plane squadrons,
    1 flying-boat squadron.​
    One of the land-plane squadrons, which has recently arrived, is temporarily detached from the Home Defence Air Force and will eventually have to be replaced. There remain to be provided, therefore —
    1 land-plane squadron,
    1 flying-boat squadron,
    Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery, and the necessary operating and maintenance facilities.​

    In accordance with the policy approved by the Cabinet, this programme should be complete in 1936 (Cabinet 27 (33), Conclusion 5, and C.I.D.258th Meeting, Minute 4), but as explained above, this programme has not yet been approved and consequently these additional units cannot be provided before 1937.The above aircraft do not include any provision for the Army needs of spotting for the guns of the defence. The Chief of the Air Staff is examining the possibility of training an auxiliary unit formed from the existing Flying Club at Singapore with a view to its employment in war on spotting duties. If this is not found feasible, and adequate spotting facilities cannot thereby be obtained, it will be necessary to provide an additional regular unit.

    133. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee will show that besides the two landing-grounds already approved, and a civil landing-ground which can be made available in war, a fourth landing-ground will be required to accommodate some of the reinforcing squadrons, Fleet Air Arm, &c, and this must, of course, be prepared in peace to be ready for use in emergency. It is probable that a suitable site could be obtained and prepared at a relatively low cost, which is included in our scheme.

    134. The shore requirements of the Fleet Air Arm have not been taken into consideration in the above proposals it would be possible for them to make use of the new landing-ground proposed above, but we do not include in this Report any proposals for the construction of other shore facilities on their account. This is an important matter which will require later investigation by the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

    Air Requirements for Hong Kong
    Cost: £1,320,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
    (Table D, Item 4.)​

    135. As in the case of Singapore, so for Hong Kong, the air requirements have only been considered by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee since our Inquiry began, and their report is not yet before the Committee of Imperial Defence. For reasons which have already been given in paragraph 21, Hong Kong is second only to Singapore in importance to our strategical position in the Far East. It may happen that the conditions of the Washington Treaty will be amended in 1935, in which case the present restrictions on the defences of Hong Kong may be changed and the whole position will need fresh consideration. Although these restrictions do not apply to Air Forces, we do not make a recommendation for the addition of such forces to the existing defences until after 1935,since it is not possible to deal with it under peace conditions earlier than the dates proposed. Our estimate, as recommended by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, is:—

    In 1938: One flying-boat squadron,
    1939: One land squadron,
    1940: Two land squadrons and a repair depot. One additional aerodrome and one spare landing ground will also be required.​

    Air Requirements at Penang, Ceylon and Aden
    Cost: £1,030,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
    (Table D, Items 5, 6 and 7.)​

    136. The question of the air requirements at Penang, Ceylon and Aden has recently been considered by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, whose report will in due course be before the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Naval Staff has strongly represented that seaward reconnaissance by aircraft is an especially valuable adjunct to other forms of defence, since it extends the area in which hostile raiders, including submarines, may be located and attacked. In this connection we are informed that the Japanese themselves have a highly organised system of air reconnaissance to seaward, and that they will have a force of some 200 aircraft by 1938, supported by a similar number in reserve, based upon the chain of islands from Japan to the south, whose primary duties will be reconnaissance of the sea approaches to Japan and attack of naval forces.

    137. The Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee are still considering the details of the strength and functions of aircraft which will be needed. Provisionally, however, they assess the requirements in order of importance as follows:—
    Penang: One flying-boat squadron.
    Ceylon: One land squadron.
    Aden: One flying-boat squadron.​

    Details of the cobe found in Table D. We are satisfied that if these aircraft are not provided in time of peace there will be an immediate demand for them on the outbreak of war, when it is unlikely that they can be made available.

    138. We recommend that the greater part of this expenditure, including the squadrons themselves, should be provided by 1940.This low priority we have had to accept owing to more urgent needs elsewhere.

    Additional Training Costs for Overseas Air Units
    Cost: £20,000 per annum, rising to £80,000 per annum.
    (Table D, Item 8.)​

    139. Arrangements will be necessary at Home for training the increased number of pilots and technical personnel required to maintain the additional units which, as we recommend, should be provided overseas, i.e., at Singapore, Hong Kong, Penang, Ceylon and Aden. The cost of this, as shown in Table D, rises from £20,000 per annum in 1935 to a maximum of £80,000 in 1940 and subsequent years.

    War Reserves
    Cost: £3,685,000, within the next five years, including personnel costs.
    (Table D, Item 9.)​

    140. The war reserves of all kinds, which have, so far been contemplated, were those estimated to be required for the despatch of a contingent amounting in all to eleven squadrons, to take part with an expeditionary force in a theatre of war outside Europe. No provision has so far been made to enable the remainder of the Air Force to be maintained in personnel and material until such time as the training of recruits and production of material in war overtakes the current requirements.

    141. Under the plan hitherto considered it would not be possible to develop our available strength in the early stages of a campaign; expansion would be slow, and there would be no need to hold in peace such large reserves of equipment or ammunition as are now contemplated, nor to make allowance for high wastage by training personnel in the early stages of a campaign. The proposal to despatch an Expeditionary Force to the Continent complete within the first month, and the necessity to foresee attacks by German aircraft on the United Kingdom, has made it necessary to provide large reserves of equipment and ammunition, and to make arrangements to meet heavy wastage throughout the Air Force from the outbreak of war.

    142. The estimated cost to enable our air forces to operate effectively in these conditions is given in Item 9 of Table D, and amounts to £4,625,000, which, it is suggested, should be spread over six years. The principal constituents of this item are as follows:—

    143. Aircraft.—Reserves are necessary to enable the Home Defence Squadrons and any contingent sent overseas with the Expeditionary Force to be maintained at full strength until war production overtakes current consumption. We consider that these reserves are essential except in the case of heavy bomber squadrons. To maintain reserves for this type would mean the purchase and storage of some 140 of the largest and most expensive aircraft. Without this reserve heavy bomber squadrons will be able to operate, on the average, at only two-thirds of their full efficiency during the first twelve months. This is a position which would, normally, be most unsatisfactory, but in view of the costs involved,* and on the assumption that in a European war we shall have the co-operation of Allies, or at least of France, we do not consider, in present circumstances, that we would be justified in recommending the storage of this material. We consider that the position should be reviewed annually. It might, however, be possible to speed up war production by subsidising firms in peace, as is proposed in the case of the Army ammunition reserves.

    144. Training Aircraft.—A reserve of training aircraft is required in order to enable training organisations to be expanded so as to produce sufficient pilots and observers who, with the pre-war reserves of such personnel, will be required to keep all squadrons up to strength.

    145. Motor Transport.—A sum is included for the purchase of additional motor transport which, with vehicles to be purchased on the outbreak of war, will enable all squadrons to be mobilised with their complement.

    146. General Stores.—Provision is necessary for the spares and general stores required at squadron parks and depots when mobilised.

    147. Bombs.-The estimated requirements of bombs for the first six months of the war is 19,500 tons, on the assumption that the heavy bomber aircraft would only operate at two-thirds of their full efficiency. A sum of £310,000 has been included to bring the authorised reserves up to 8,000 tons, which it is estimated should be sufficient for the first two months of war.

    148. Storage.—A sum has been included to cover the cost of additional storage necessary to hold in reserve the aircraft, motor transport, and bombs referred to above.

    149. Should the investigations of the Principal Supply Officers Committeet show that it is not possible to accelerate post-mobilisation production so as to ensure that the supply of bombs will overtake expenditure after two months of war, then the war reserves will require to be correspondingly increased. As an indication of the financial importance of this subject it may be noted that if war reserves for six months have to be held (19,500 tons) the estimated additional cost would be approximately £3,000,000, exclusive of storage.

    150. No provision is made for the aviation spirit required in war beyond the reserves normally held in peace, which would be sufficient for the first month only. Thereafter the Royal Air Force would have to depend on reserves held in the country, or fuel produced from coal, or imported.

    151. It is significant to note that both the Army and the Royal Air Force have been compelled during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule to hold such small stocks of War Reserves that at the present time they are in the alarming position of being unable to take part in a major war with the prospect of maintaining themselves for more than a few weeks.

    * Initial outlay £1,750,000. Training of additional pilots £700,000. Storage £200,000.

    -f- The question of accelerating post-war production of bombs has not yet been referred to the Principal Supply Officers Committee. We strongly recommend that this should be taken up at the same time as the inquiry referred to in paragraph 90.


    [1] The figure "52" includes one squadron which has been temporarily detached to Singapore. If that is to become a permanent commitment it will be necessary to replace it at Home.
     
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    FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE - SUMMARY
  • SUMMARY

    (1) We have divided the risks of war into three classes. The Far Eastern Commitment, where we envisage an ultimate policy of accommodation with Japan, and an immediate and provisional policy of "showing a tooth" for the purpose of recovering the standing we have sacrificed of recent years. Secondly, we take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom our "long range" defence policy has to be directed. And thirdly, the Defence of India—the largest of our Empire commitments (paragraph 12). In relating our requirements to these commitments we have not overlooked the more permanent elements in the problem of Imperial Defence, or the possibility of further changes in the international situation (paragraphs 2 and 3). We have recognised that there exists a general requirement to enable the Defence Services to fulfil their functions in the general scheme of Imperial Defence (paragraph 17).

    (2) We attach the utmost importance to getting back to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan, in order to strengthen the prospects of peace in the Far East and to bring Japan back to the League of Nations. We believe that our influence with Japan will be greater if we are in a position to protect our vast interests in the Far East. The question of our relations with Japan carries with it that of our relations with the United States of America, an aspect of the problem which we particularly commend to the Cabinet (paragraphs 7-9).

    (3) In view of the existence at this moment of a menace to our position in the Far East, and of the probability that the German menace will grow to formidable proportions within the next few years, we have aimed at a programme to meet our worst deficiencies within the next five years; but in practice there will remain a considerable aftermath at the end of that period (paragraph 14).

    (4) To make good the heavy deficiencies that have accumulated during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule we recommend the adoption of the five-year Deficiency Programme contained in Table A 1, the very approximate cost of which is as follows:—

    Over five years: £71,323,580 (including all personnel charges).

    Remaining to complete after five years: £11,057,400 (excluding maintenance charges) (paragraph 32).

    Total (excluding maintenance after five years): £82,380,980.

    Table A2 shows the annual increases involved by this programme over and above the sums provided for corresponding Services in 1933.

    (5) In addition there will be:—

    (i) The cost of maintenance of various services which we are not in a position to estimate,

    (ii) The Naval Construction Programme, which depends on the Naval Conference, 1935. An Admiralty' sketch estimate (Appendix I, Table F (1)) indicates that in the next five years the annual expenditure may amount on the average to some £13,400,000 as compared with £9,331,000 in 1933 and £10,718,000 in 1934 (paragraph 33).

    (iii) The extension of the Fleet Air Arm as part of the Naval Construction Programme, which is essential if we are not to be outclassed by the Japanese in this branch of the Service. The cost of this is estimated by the Admiralty and Air Ministry at £5,590,000 spread over the next five years (Appendix 1, Table F (2)) (paragraph 34).

    (iv) A possible increase (or decrease) according to the result of the enquiry by the Principal Supply Officers Committee into the possibility of speeding up the manufacture of war material for the Expeditionary Force after the first three months of war (paragraphs 87-92).

    (v) If the German menace becomes aggravated, adoption of measures to modernise, equip and supply the Territorial Army, which (apart from some minor and inexpensive preliminary measures) we have not included in our Deficiency Programme (paragraph 36).

    (vi) Other Royal Air Force requirements, such as the protection of northern ports of the United Kingdom against air attack, the provision of aircraft for anti-submarine convoy work and coast defence at Home, and at such overseas ports as are not of first importance in a war in the Far East, will have to be provided in due course. A minimum of twenty-five Squadrons would be required for these purposes. We have made no provision for these items, which are a border-line case to which we invite the special attention of the Cabinet (paragraphs 28 and 29).

    (vii) A relatively small expenditure on Air Raids Precautions, which will be borne on the Home Office Vote (paragraph 30).

    Details of the Five-Year Deficiency Programme are contained in Part III, pages 13-29.

    (6) Our programme for completing our "worst deficiencies," though perhaps not spectacular from a public point of view, is designed to produce the following results:—

    (a) The Navy will not be increased by any large units, as this is ruled out by the Naval Treaties. But the Fleet will be provided with essential bases and fuelling stations defended on a reasonable, if rather modest, scale, which will put it in a position to fulfil its responsibilities for the protection of our vast Imperial interests. In addition, most of the older capital ships will gradually be modernised, and every year there will be an improvement in the position as to personnel, Fleet Air Arm, fuel supplies, modern equipment, reserve stores and supplies and ancillary services, all of which are of decisive importance to fighting efficiency.

    (b) The Army will be enabled to place and maintain in the field in five years a well-equipped and modern expeditionary force of four divisions, one tank brigade and one cavalry division, which can be mobilised in a month, in place of the existing five divisions and one cavalry division, that require many months to take the field. A small start will also have been made to cope with the great deficiencies that now exist in the Territorial Army. In addition, the War Office will be able to fulfil its responsibilities for the defence of the naval bases and fuelling stations in the Far East and to make a beginning elsewhere in the renovation of our coast defences. Finally, after reconsideration of the general lay-out of air defence to meet the assumption of air attack by Germany, the provision of the Army's share in our scheme of anti-aircraft defences will be put in hand at once.

    (c) The Royal Air Force will complete the 52 Squadrons scheme, which will enable it to provide for Home Defence against Germany, and, in addition, to send an appropriate Air Force abroad with the Army Expeditionary Force. The Air Force will also be enabled to take its share in the defence of Singapore and of other defended ports East of Suez; and the worst deficiencies in the Fleet Air Arm will be made good. Our proposals contemplate the following increases in the Royal Air Force:—

    First Deficiency Report - RAF Programme.jpg


    * Including one squadron to replace squadron loaned to Singapore from the Home Defence Force

    When all these items have been completed, the total first line strength of the Royal Air Force, including India, will be 1,285 aircraft, as compared with 1,671 aircraft which France now possesses.

    (7) We recommend that the Government of India should be urged to expedite the work of correcting their worst deficiencies, as a complement to our own efforts. This should include bringing up to date the defences of Indian ports in accordance with plans already drawn up, which is essential to complete our defensive arrangements in the Far East (paragraph 31).

    (8) The programme recommended will barely bring our Defence Forces to " the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Considered in relation to our world-wide interests, and by comparison with Foreign Powers, it is far from excessive. If it is not carried out we shall become every year even more at the mercy of Japan in the Far East than we are to-day, while in Europe in a few years' time we shall be in grave danger from Germany. Both in the Far East and in Europe our influence for peace will be promoted by making good our present deficiencies (paragraphs 152-154).

    (9) With a view to the presentation of our Defence expenditure in a form more strictly in accordance with the facts than at present, we suggest that the Annual Estimates of the Defence Services should, if' possible, be relieved of the incubus of the non-effective vote. This, indeed, seems essential to a fair presentation of the case. There are some technical difficulties and objections, and we recommend that the whole question should be immediately explored with a view to a satisfactory solution (paragraph 160).

    (10) As changes are liable to occur both in international relationships and in technical developments in all three Defence Services, we recommend that the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee should remain in existence in order to review the scheme, as finally approved by the Cabinet, at appropriate intervals.

    (Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY (Chairman).
    ERNLE CHATFIELD.
    E. L. ELLINGTON.
    N. F. WARREN FISHER.
    A. A. MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD.
    ROBERT VANSITTART.

    (Signed) H. R. POWNALL (Secretary).
    A. W. CLARKE (Assistant Secretary).

    2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
    February 28, 1934.
     
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