PART II. – A FIVE-YEAR DEFICIENCY PROGRAMME
15. Recent public criticism of our defensive preparations has been directed mainly against the programmes of the Services. For example, the Admiralty's view is constantly quoted that seventy cruisers is the minimum necessary for the protection of the maritime communications of the Empire, instead of the fifty which formed the basis of the tonnage limitation of the London Naval Treaty. In the case of the Army, the question is often asked why we no longer maintain the six divisions of the pre-war expeditionary force; while other critics demand a larger mechanised force or a large development of the Territorial Force. In the case of the Royal Air Force, the still incomplete programme of fifty-two squadrons for the Home Defence Air Force, adopted in 1923 as a first instalment, is, with increasing insistence, criticised as inadequate to modern needs.
16. While we recognise that, in the abstract and considered by themselves, some of these criticisms are well-founded, yet their authors overlook essential elements in the problem, such as the immense range of our Imperial responsibilities and limitations of finance. In particular, it would not be possible to organise a larger mechanised force than the one we recommend below without upsetting the whole system by which our forces overseas are maintained by the Home Army. In dealing with these matters later in this Report we set forth the situation in greater detail. Our five-year programme is, in fact, confined to the worst deficiencies in existing programmes that have accumulated during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule, abandoned not a moment too soon; in other words, our recommendations all fall within the scope of approved Government policy.
17. Before stating our proposals it may be convenient to set out the general character of the deficiencies in the light of the commitments mentioned in paragraph 12,viz.:—
(i) The Ear East,
(ii) The German Menace,
(iii) The Defence of India.
Although this is a convenient method of testing our defensive situation on a basis of present needs, we would ask the Cabinet to bear in mind the more permanent elements in the situation referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. For all three Defence Services there are certain general requirements irrespective of where they have to operate,
e.g., for the maintenance of our sea communications, which is the first principle of Imperial Defence, a main fleet to provide the shield behind which our cruising forces are able to protect our merchant ships, as well as suitably disposed and adequately defended bases :for our Army and Air Force, a nucleus of strength sufficient to safeguard our responsibilities in any theatre of war until any necessary expansion can be carried out, as well as safe sea communications and ports of embarkation: for all three Services, sufficient supplies, reserves and ancillary services of all kinds. The mutual dependence of: the three Services referred to above involves close co-ordination between them which we have kept steadily in view throughout this Report.
The Test of the Far Eastern Menace
18. In the event of. a war in the Far East, the protection of British territory and communications and of a vast sea-borne commerce requires the establishment as soon as possible of adequate force in the Pacific Ocean, and the power of the Navy to function is the most important element of the problem. While we should not run the risk of repeating the experiences of the Russian fleet, which after a voyage of many months was exterminated at the battle of the Sea of Japan on the 27th May,1905,the Fleet is in the position to-day of being unable to do more than take up a severely limited defensive attitude at Singapore. Since in normal times the Navy cannot, for a number of reasons, be maintained at war strength in the Pacific Ocean, our defensive preparations must fulfil the following conditions:—
(i) A general condition applying to any war is that in time of peace the fleet shall be in all respects at least as well found in personnel, material and reserves as the enemy it will have to meet:
(ii) That, the Fleet shall be in a position in an emergency to move at short notice, and as rapidly as possible, to the Far East, and shall find at intermediate British Ports all the fuel and resources that it requires to facilitate a rapid passage:
(iii) That, after its arrival in the Far East, the fleet shall find intact the means requisite to maintain its fighting efficiency and mobility.
19. The requisite conditions are not at present fulfilled. For example, so far as the first condition is concerned, not only are our existing ships short of aircraft, but the strength of the Fleet Air Arm falls far short of the Treaty ratio and is actually less than that of Japan's to-day. Our aircraft carriers, it must be remembered, will not all be available for the Far East. Japan has begun to modernise her capital ships, and unless we do the same we may some years hence have to encounter, a modernised Japanese battle fleet with out-of-date ships. Japanese personnel for a smaller fleet exceeds our own by 12,000. In our case only on two stations (China and East Indies) is the personnel adequate at the present time. The deficiencies in the other items mentioned in paragraph 18 are serious. Anti-submarine equipment for auxiliary vessels is practically non-existent. The necessary mines and depth charges cannot be safely stored abroad in hot climates owing to the nature of the explosive, and new patterns are essential for operations in the Far East. Unless and until these shortcomings are made good the Fleet (even on the assumption that our naval construction programme has kept pace with that of Japan in the approved proportion) will not be in a proper condition to encounter an enemy fleet after its arrival in the Pacific. Finally, and perhaps the most important of all, it is essential that the deficiency in the reserve of oil fuel should be made good.
20. For the second condition the position is at present unsatisfactory. 'The shortage of personnel and the lack of a proper reserve of victualling stores contribute to this state of affairs. There is also a shortage of fuel reserves, and existing stocks and facilities at the various ports are undefended. Trincomali, for example, is completely undefended, and the important stocks of oil fuel there could be destroyed by a raiding cruiser before the arrival of the main fleet. Additional defences, including aircraft, are also required at Penang (at present undefended), Ceylon ports (Colombo as well as Trincomali) and Aden.
21. The third condition, although falling within the scope of approved Government policy, is at present hardly met at all. At Singapore there is a floating dock and an incomplete graving dock, not yet capable of being used. There are none of the repairing and other facilities of a great dockyard, practically no stocks of ammunition, and no mines or torpedoes. There are no heavy gun defences and the local seaward defences and air defences are incomplete. The floating dock and the stocks of oil fuel at the new base in the Old Strait are exposed to the risk of destruction before the fleet could arrive. After its arrival, therefore, the fleet would be dangerously handicapped for the operations which it would have to undertake. Although the provision of the Base at Singapore and its defence are the first requirements in the Far East, the Fleet will be unable to protect our large interests in the China Seas unless Hong Kong ,the naval base arid all-important centre of British enterprise in China is defended. The provision of a complete defence is not possible under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, but Hong Kong remains an important outpost. There are deficiencies in all three Services, however, which ought to be rectified as soon as possible and which are permissible under the Treaty, in particular the defences can be modernised and some active aerial defence is essential; at present it is non-existent.
The Test of the German Menace
22. In case of a development of the German menace to the point of war, there are as yet (as was the case until about 1908 in pre-war days) a good many uncertain elements in the situation. It is, therefore, less possible than in the case of the Far Eastern menace to foresee the probable course of events in an emergency or to make definite plans. Nevertheless, judging by past history and by such data as are available, it appears probable that the roles of the Defence Services would not differ very much in kind from those that they filled in the last war, though they would differ in degree. The Navy would have the duty of protecting our coasts and sea-borne communications against attack, and of controlling the enemy's sea-borne communications. For many years, at any rate, the forces with which they would have to deal would be much, smaller both actually and relatively than in the late war. The Army must be responsible for the land defences of our naval bases and defended ports, for land defence against seaborne raids, and for anti-aircraft defence from the ground. In addition, the Army would be called on to send an expeditionary force to the Continent. The Air Force would be responsible for defence against air attack (including counter-attack), for various forms of co-operation with the Navy and Army as well as for the provision of the air force to accompany the expeditionary force.
23. In the near future, provided the general naval requirements mentioned in paragraph 18(i) are met and the Navy is thus placed on a sound basis, we shall be able to deal with Germany at sea, particularly if we have the assistance of France. The greatest potential threat lies in the acquisition of submarines and aircraft by Germany. The development of strong air forces by Germany is, of course, a certainty, and she no doubt intends to build up a submarine force. The provision of anti-submarine defences at our Home bases is, therefore, essential, and additional expenditure on the anti-submarine equipment of auxiliary vessels may be necessary.
24. So far as the Army is concerned, there are many deficiencies in the case of a war with Germany. Coast defences at Home are completely out of date, and will have to be revised in proportion as Germany develops her sea-power. At the moment, however, this is not one of our more urgent deficiencies. The land antiaircraft defences of London are at present less than half complete, those of some of our ports have only just been begun, while no provision at all has been made for the others.
25. The most important deficiency, however, for the emergency in question, so far as the Army is concerned, lies in the expeditionary force. Our present resources do not permit us to aim at anything better than to place in the field single divisions in each of the first two months of a war, a third at the end of the fourth month and the remaining two divisions at the end of the sixth month. This is the big deficiency in the Army which it is necessary to make good, if this country is to be in a position to co-operate with others in securing the independence of the Low Countries. For centuries this has been regarded as vital to our safety, and it is certainly not less true to-day in view of developments in modern armaments. We have fought at regular intervals on the Continent in order to prevent any
Power, strong or potentially strong at sea, from obtaining bases on the Dutch and Belgian coasts. To-day the Low Countries are even more important to us in their relation to the air defence of this country. Their integrity is vital to us in order that we may obtain that depth in our defence of London which is so badly needed, and of which our geographical position will otherwise deprive us. If the Low Countries were in the hands of a hostile Power, not only would the frequency and intensity of air attack on London be increased, but the whole of the industrial areas of the Midlands and North of England would be brought within the area of penetration of hostile air attacks.
26. We therefore recommend that we should be capable of putting into the field within one month, and there maintaining in all its essentials, a Regular Expeditionary Force of one Cavalry Division, four Infantry Divisions, two Air Defence Brigades, and one Tank Brigade, together with a full complement of G.H.Q. Corps, and L. of C. Troops. We regard this as an essential first step; the support of this force by contingents from the Territorial Army is a matter which will require consideration when the urgent needs of the Regular Army have been met. We believe that a force organised as above, and supported by appropriate Air Forces, would, as a deterrent to an aggressor, exercise an influence for peace out of all proportion to its size.
27. So far as the Air Force is concerned, it is of first importance that the fifty-two-squadron programme should be completed so as to enable us, in alliance with France, to meet the German menace. This is necessary both from the point of view of Home Defence and of the Expeditionary Force. Although the distance from Germany to London is much greater than from France, the range of aircraft has increased, and is increasing, so much that attacks on a large scale, especially in the early stages of a war, must be anticipated. All that can be said is that air attacks are likely to be less frequent than they would be in a war with France, for the reason that the Germans might be confronted at the same time by the Air Forces of France and perhaps other nations. (This, however, would depend on the power of Germany to inspire caution. It is improbable that such Powers as Belgium or Czechoslovakia could be counted on to act except in self-defence; and others, like Poland, might be immobilised by special agreement.)For the same reason the period during which intensive attacks are likely to be made should be shorter, as in such circumstances the German air forces might be worn down earlier, assuming that other Powers were involved and effective. The German Air Force would, however, have a strong incentive to make heavy air raids on this country, in order to cause alarm and despondency, and, as in the Great War, to create a demand for the retention of large air and anti-air forces in England. There would be a wide choice of targets; for example, London and other great cities, where the moral effect would be greatest, or shipping-in our larger ports outside the defended zone. It is therefore of great importance to complete the first stage of the Home Defence scheme, and the same applies to the ground anti-air defences, for which the War Office are responsible. The provision of a contingent to accompany an Expeditionary Force in accordance with proposals which have not yet been worked out in full detail does not necessitate additional squadrons once the fifty-two squadron programme has been completed, so long as Germany has an air force inferior in strength to ours; but largely increased provision is required in such matters as personnel, training facilities, reserves of aircraft, engines and spares.
28. The increase in aircraft which we recommend to meet our worst deficiencies amounts in the aggregate to 441 machines (88 for the Far East, including 16 Flying Boats, 110 for Home Defence, 243 for the Fleet Air Arm). This is an increase of 50 per cent, in the first line strength to-day, and is equivalent to an increase of 40 squadrons. There still remain, however, certain deficiencies which will have to be made good in due course. For example, no allowance has been included for aircraft necessary to assist in the defence of Home ports, nor for such overseas ports as are not of first importance in a war in the Far East. Again, the air defences of Great Britain are at present only designed to give protection to London, and, incidentally, to most of the South of England and the Southern Midlands. Moreover, only four squadrons of flying boats are at present available to assist in the defence of the United Kingdom against submarine attack, for convoy duties, and reconnaissance in co-operation with the Navy. To meet all these eventual requirements it is estimated that a minimum of twenty-five squadrons would be required, over and above the additional forty squadrons already mentioned. The capital cost may be estimated very approximately at £8,000,000, leading to an eventual maintenance charge of £3,000,000 per annum.
[4] We have anxiously considered whether we ought to include these additional twenty-five squadrons in our five-year plan. An important factor in the decision is our limited power of expansion of the Royal Air Force working under normal peace conditions. In fact, that power of expansion is not even adequate to bring within the five-year programme referred to in paragraph 14 the whole of the equivalent of 40 squadrons mentioned above. The limiting factor is the capacity of the training establishments, other than the Plying Training Schools, and accommodation for squadrons when formed. To resort to emergency conditions would require a large increase in the Air Ministry Staff, especially in Works and Buildings personnel, as well as the additional expense involved in the provision of temporary accommodation which would have to be replaced later by permanent works. In addition, the conditions of recruitment and training of the more highly skilled other-ranks would have to be altered, since it takes seven and a half years, under the existing policy, to make a fully trained aircraftman. Such an alteration in policy would only be accepted by the Air Ministry with great reluctance.
29. In existing conditions we are advised that the additional defects mentioned in paragraph 28 do not quite fall within the category of
“worst deficiencies.” But if Germany carries out a rapid expansion of her air forces they will require immediate consideration, and this is one of the points we have particularly in mind in recommending at the end of this Report that the Defence Requirements Committee should remain in existence in order to review the situation from time to time. In all the circumstances, we have omitted to make provision for these deficiencies in our five-year programme. This is, however, a border-line case on which we would welcome an independent opinion. It also has a political aspect, and we, therefore, invite the Cabinet to give the matter very careful consideration before arriving at a decision.
30. Before leaving the deficiencies to meet the German menace we feel bound to make a brief reference to the question of Air Raids Precautions. These precautions should be developed
pari passu with the anti-aircraft defences. They will require an expenditure which we are not at present able to compute, but which we believe will be very small compared with the totals contemplated in this Report. We suggest that the Home Office should be asked to draw up an estimate, in consultation, if they think fit, with the Air Raids Precautions Sub-Committee. We would observe, also, that the incentive to the German Air Force to deliver attacks will be increased if they are aware that, unlike the peoples of Continental countries, the British population has no knowledge or warning of the precautions to be observed for the purpose of reducing casualties. They will count on panic as a powerful ally. We are aware of the reasons which have deterred the Government from full publicity in the matter of Air Raids Precautions, but we would urge that whenever a new defence programme is launched the opportunity should be taken to remove the ban against full publicity that is preventing us from obtaining full benefit from the years of effort that have been devoted to this matter.
The Test of the Defence of India
31. It is unnecessary to examine the test of the Defence of India, since, if the deficiencies are made good to meet the German menace, the requirements for the Defence of India can be met. But, just as the Navy, in the event of trouble in Europe, has to keep an eye on the Far East, so the Army and Air Force cannot overlook the possibility that their commitments for the Defence of India might materialise. In connection with the Defence of India a recent assurance has been given by the Commander-in-Chief that (on the understanding that the war would be an Imperial commitment in which the forces of Great Britain play the part assigned in the plan), the Army in India is ready to undertake the role assigned to it in the first phase of the Defence of India Plan. The defences of Indian ports, however, are out of date and in need of reconstruction, for which plans have already been drawn up. This is important for the completion of our own arrangements to meet an emergency in the Far East. We recommend that the Government of India should be urged to expedite the work of correcting their worst deficiencies, as a complement to our own efforts.
The Programme
32. The programme which we consider a minimum for meeting the worst of the above deficiencies is summarised in Table A1. Details are contained in Tables B,C and D at the end of this Report, and are explained in Part I II. We have aimed at completing the programme of our worst deficiencies within five years, but several of the items cannot be completed within that space of time. In the final column of Table A1, therefore, we show the residue of expenditure, after the end of five years, required to complete the programme. In the time available it has not been possible to make exact estimates, and
the figures in this Report are only rough approximations and subject to revision in detail; subject to this, the aggregate of
capital costs of the programme is £72,232,000, spread over a term of years varying with each item, but mainly within the next nine years. Of this amount £61,174,600 falls within the first five years of the programme, to which must be added
maintenance costs during that period which, so far as they can now be assessed, amount to a total of £10,148,980. The estimated expenditure over the first five years is, therefore, about £71,323,580. In the aggregate the expenditure in Table A1 amounts to £82,380,980, but this sum does not include any figure for maintenance after the first five years, since the data are insufficient even for an approximate estimate. Table A2 shows the annual increases involved by this programme over and above the sums provided for corresponding services in 1933.
33. Over and above this programme there will be a considerable expenditure in connection with the Naval shipbuilding programme, which we are not in a position to estimate closely, as it depends on the result of the Naval Disarmament Conference, 1935. The Naval construction programme is not, strictly speaking, one of the ''worst deficiencies ''with which we have to deal, but part of our normal annual expenditure. Nevertheless, in order that the Cabinet may realise that large sums are involved, we attach a forecast of this expenditure, prepared by the Admiralty (Appendix I) indicating that in the next five years the annual expenditure may amount on the average to some £13,400,000, as compared with £9,331,000 in 1933 and £10,718,000 in 1934.
34. There is one section of the Naval construction programme, namely, new construction for the Fleet Air Arm, part of which should rightly be included in the "deficiency "programme, since, as mentioned in paragraph 19, we are already inferior to Japan in this respect, and must remain so for some time, even if action is taken at once to balance the Japanese programme. The cost of the proposed programme, which also concerns the Air Ministry, is shown separately in Appendix 1, Table F (2).In the next five years the expenditure will amount to £5,590.000. If the Admiralty's proposals are carried out, the position in 1938, when the Japanese reach their maximum, and in 1940, when the scheme, according to the Admiralty proposals, should be complete, will be as follows:
... ... ... ... ... ... 1938. 1940.
United Kingdom . 321 402
Japan ... ... ... ... 341 341
It is very disquieting, more especially as we must always keep part of the Fleet Air Arm in Home waters, that at the present time we are, and for years must remain, inferior to Japan in the number of aircraft for use from ships. We recommend that the Admiralty and Air Ministry should aim at a programme approximating as closely to the above figures as circumstances permit.
35. We have, in a few cases, been able to include figures to show the increase in the cost of upkeep resulting from the completion of the Deficiency Programme. In the case of most of the items in the naval and military programmes, however, this has not been practicable. For example, we are unable to state the cost of maintenance of the Singapore Naval Base. This base, however, will only be partly in use in peace, and the increased maintenance charges will be inconsiderable. Even where the figure is included it can only be regarded as an approximate and provisional estimate.
36. After the urgent needs of the Expeditionary Force have been met, it will be necessary, if the German menace becomes aggravated, to take further measures for the modernisation of the Territorial Army. This, of course, is over and above certain first steps that are essential to-day if the force is to survive, and which are provided for in the Five-Year Deficiency Programme. As explained in greater detail in Part I II, paragraph 95, the Territorial Army is the only force on which we can rely for expanding the Expeditionary Force, and if it is to provide a reasonably efficient nucleus for this purpose we cannot afford to keep it starved of all the elements of a modern army. We do not attempt, however, an estimate of the cost of these eventual measures. Provision of aircraft to deal with an attack on the parts of the United Kingdom other than London and the South, ports in the Mediterranean and elsewhere West of Aden, as well as aircraft to assist in anti-submarine, convoy work, and for coast defence at Home, will also eventually have to be made.
37. While we have felt it incumbent to mention these matters, which will arise in the future, for the moment we ask the Government to concentrate on the proposals set forth in Table A1 below and explained in detail in Part I II. Owing to the size of the programme we have felt bound to state below our reasons for the inclusion of the various items.
[1] Cabinet 62 (33), Conclusion 5
[2] C.I.D. 236th Meeting, Minute 6
[3] Cabinet 50 (32), Conclusion 9
[4] See Table A (3).