British Air Force Pre-WW2 Improvements (POD 1929)

This thread (and a third thread about the British Army) compliment the British Navy Pre-WW2 Improvements thread begun by @Joshuapooleanox. This is because if the British Government is going to spend more money on the Royal Navy between 1929 and 1934 it is also going to spend more on the RAF and British Army.

Let's say Britain had the funding or moved funding over to improve its navy. Say if a more interventionist leader came to power who was willing to increase taxes and raise more money for the navy.

What would be the most efficient ways to do this with extra funding in the 1930's?

And how powerful could it be when improved compared to other navies at the time?

Start date for improvements can be 1934.

Let's say Japan, America, France, Italy and Germany for fleet comparisons.

That's only a year or two before large scale naval building resumed anyway. You really need to go back to 1929 before the 1st LNT was negotiated and have a British Prime Minister and US President that aren't pro-disarmament.

Let's try that then.

Thoughts in 1929?

How much extra are we allowed to spend? This is the OTL expenditure from the Navy Estimates 1939-40 - Royal Navy Museum, Portsmouth copy.

View attachment 371730

Let's say Britain partially mobilises in 1929. Churchill is able to lead a Conservative government, and due to instability around the world partially mobilises, state intervention, higher taxation, give yourself a pretty decent increase.
 
The Royal Air Force 1929-34 IOTL
The RAF on 31st March 1929

On 31st March 1929 the Royal Air Force had 826 aircraft in the equivalent of 72½ squadrons
The RAF Proper had 682 aircraft in 61½ squadrons.

Metropolitan Air Force 434 aircraft in 39 squadrons
Air Defence of Great Britain Command 342 aircraft in 30 squadrons as follows:
70 night bombers in 7 squadrons
128 day bombers in 11 squadrons (10 squadrons of 10 and one squadron of 8)
144 fighters in 12 squadrons​
Inland Area 84 aircraft in 7 squadrons
60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons
24 day bombers in 2 emergency squadrons​
Coastal Area
8 flying boats in 2 coastal reconnaissance squadrons
Overseas Commands 248 aircraft in 22½ squadrons
RAF Mediterranean
12 seaplanes in one coastal reconnaissance squadron​
RAF Middle East (Egypt and the Sudan) 46 aircraft in 4 squadrons
24 day bombers in 2 squadrons
12 army co-operation squadrons in one squadron
10 bomber-transports in one squadron​
Palestine Command
12 day bombers in one squadron​
Iraq Command 50 aircraft in 5 squadrons
36 day bombers in 3 squadrons
10 bomber-transports in one squadron
4 flying boats in one squadron​
Aden Command
12 day bombers in one squadron​
RAF India 100 aircraft in 8 squadrons and one flight
48 day bombers in 4 squadrons
48 army co-operation aircraft in 4 squadrons
4 bomber-transports in one flight​
RAF Far East
4 flying boats in one squadron
The Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Air Force had 144 aircraft in 24 flights (the equivalent of 12 squadrons)
48 fleet fighters in 8 flights
66 fleet spotter reconnaissance aircraft in 11 flights
30 fleet torpedo aircraft in 5 flights​

The above doesn't include 2 day bomber squadrons which were part of the Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) in the Inland Area because they only existed on a skeleton basis. It doesn't include No. 24 (Communications) Squadron either.

Under the Expansion Scheme approved in 1923 the A.D.G.B. Command should have had 594 aircraft in 52 squadrons by 31st March 1928 as follows:
150 Night Bombers in 15 squadrons of 10
240 Day Bombers in 20 squadrons of 12
204 Fighters in 17 squadrons of 12​

However, on 3rd December 1925 the completion date was put back to 31st March 1935. Then on 11th December 1929 the completion date of the scheme was put back to 31st March 1938 and the 2 emergency squadrons were now counted as part of the Home Defence Force.

Squadrons formed 1929-34

Actually added between 1929 and March 1934 were 120 aircraft in the equivalent of 12½ squadrons
70 aircraft in 6 squadrons were added to the A.D.G.B. Command
10 night bombers in one squadron
48 day bombers in 4 squadrons
12 fighters in one squadron​
8 flying boats in 2 squadrons were added to the Coastal Area

24 torpedo bombers in 2 squadrons were added to RAF Far East

18 aircraft in 3 flights were added to the FAA​
The RAF on 31st March 1934

Thus on 31st March 1934 the RAF had 958 aircraft in the equivalent of 86 squadrons as follows:
524 aircraft in 48 squadrons in the Metropolitan Air Force
448 aircraft in 39 squadrons in the Air Defence of Great Britain
80 night bombers in 8 squadrons
212 day bombers in 18 squadrons (17 of 12 and one of 8) including the 2 emergency squadrons
156 fighters in 13 squadrons​
Inland Area
60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons​
Coastal Area
16 flying boats in 4 coastal reconnaissance squadrons​
272 aircraft in 24½ squadrons in the Overseas Commands
144 day bombers in 12 squadrons
24 bomber-transports in 2 squadrons and one flight
60 army co-operation aircraft in 5 squadrons
24 torpedo bombers in 2 squadrons
8 flying boats in 2 coastal reconnaissance squadrons
12 seaplanes in one coastal reconnaissance squadron​
162 aircraft in the equivalent of 13½ squadrons (actually 12 squadrons, but some under strength and 6 flights)
36 fleet fighters in 4 squadrons but 2 at half-strength
54 fleet spotter reconnaissance in 5 squadrons (3 of 12 and 2 of 9)
36 fleet torpedo aircraft in 3 squadrons
36 catapult aircraft in 6 flights​

There was also No. 24 (Communications) Squadron in A.D.G.B. and the 2 skeleton day bomber squadrons attached to the A&AEE in the Inland Area.

Finance

The Net Air Estimates over this period were:
1928-29 £16,250,000
1929-30 £16,200,000
1930-31 £17,850,000
1931-32 £18,100,000
1932-33 £17,400,000
1933-34 £17,426,000
1934-35 £17,561,000​

Personnel

Vote A (Numbers) over this period was:
1928-29 32,500
1929-30 32,000
1930-31 32,000
1931-32 32,000
1932-33 32,000
1933-34 31,000
1934-35 31,000​
 
FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE - INTRODUCTORY AND PART ONE
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY


It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

MOST SECRET.
COPY NO.40
C.P. 64 (34).

CABINET
IMPERIAL DEFENCE POLICY

REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE

The attached Report, D.R.C. 14, by the Defence Requirements Committee, which was appointed by the Cabinet on the 15th November, 1933 (Cabinet 62 (33; Conclusion 5 (b)), is circulated to the Cabinet on the instructions of the Prime Minister and will be placed on the Agenda Paper for preliminary consideration on Wednesday, March 7th.

The Prime Minister instructs ma to invite the attention of the Cabinet to the great secrecy of this Report.

(Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY,

Secretary to the Cabinet.


2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1,

5th March, 1934.


THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF H I S BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence, February 1934

MOST SECRET
Copy No. 55
D.R.O. 14

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY.

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.


COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE
DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS SUB-COMMITTEE

REPORT


2, Whitehall Gardens; S.W. 1,

February 28, 1934


REPORT
INTRODUCTORY


ON the 15th November, 1933, the Cabinet[1] approved the following proposals by the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.261st Meeting, Minute 1):—

"(a)—(i) For the present the expenditure of the Defence Departments should be governed by the Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (CLD .Paper No.1113-B) and the following considerations of priority mentioned therein: the defence of our Possessions and interests in the Far East; European commitments; the Defence of India:

(ii) No expenditure should for the present be incurred on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States, France or Italy:

(iii) The above conclusions must be kept under careful observation by the Government Departments concerned, and in any event should be reviewed annually by the Committee of Imperial Defence.

(b) That on the basis of the above resolutions the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, with representatives of the Treasury and the Foreign Office, and the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, should prepare a programme for meeting our worst deficiencies, for transmission to the Cabinet."

The latter resolution contains our Terms of Reference.

2. The first two resolutions quoted above prescribe the conditions by which the expenditure of the Defence Departments is to be governed "for the present." In preparing a long-range programme, however, there are certain more permanent elements in the problem that have to be taken into consideration. Our Imperial and foreign interests are unlike those of any other country. Not only are we responsible for the peace and well-being of many diverse races, widely scattered and living under all sorts of conditions, but also our home population is dependent to the extent of 60 per cent, on overseas trade for the food by which it lives. The structure of British interests overseas, which has been built up over the centuries, could not be sustained without the ships, bases, land and air forces, which we must maintain at all times, in peace as in war. Unless the representative forces so employed are adequately maintained, not only shall we fail abroad, but we shall starve at home. This little-advertised but essential peace commitment of our defence forces, if efficiently carried out, is the best possible deterrent to the ambitions of any potential enemy, and its efficient maintenance is a necessary starting-point for any war. Other considerations of a general order are contained in the Annual Review (1933) by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (CLD .Paper No.1113-B) and need not be repeated here.

3. Referring to the exclusion for the present of the United States, France and Italy (paragraph 1 (a)(ii)above),we would remark that our long-range policy cannot be founded exclusively on what might prove to be a temporary and shifting basis, and we cannot entirely ignore the possibility of changes in the international situation. Within recent years such changes have sometimes occurred at very short notice. They have arisen sometimes out of the external relations of States, as illustrated by the Far Eastern crisis of 1931-32; sometimes, as in the case of Germany, Italy and Russia, from internal upheavals, which are particularly difficult to foresee. While such possibilities need not, as a rule, be taken into account in immediate defensive plans and preparations, they ought not to be overlooked in providing the basic elements of our defensive system, such as programmes of construction extending over a long-term. In particular, at past Conferences on Naval Disarmament the strength of the navies of the United States and France have had to be taken into account, and at the forthcoming Naval Conference the large French cruiser and submarine forces will require careful consideration, as well as the possibility of the use by the United States of their navy for purposes of weakening our blockade in the event of a war in which we are belligerents and they are neutrals.

PART I. – GOVERNING CONSIDERATIONS

4. Within the limits of practical finance it is impossible for a world-wide Empire like our own to be equally secure at every point against every conceivable enemy. Consequently it has always been necessary in testing our defensive preparations to make certain assumptions on such matters as what countries have to be considered as potential enemies, allies or neutrals, and the time limits within which the different dangers are liable to develop. Throughout almost the whole of the post-war period the Estimates of the Defence Departments have been governed substantially by an assumption that no major war was likely to occur for ten years. The form of this assumption has varied from time to time and from Service to Service, but since July 1928[2] until a comparatively recent date the approved formula has been "That it should be assumed for the purpose of framing the Estimates of the Fighting Services, that at any given date there will be no major war for ten years." It was under this assumption, which became gradually untenable, that our present and exceedingly serious deficiencies have accumulated.

5. In March 1932, in consequence of a menacing situation in the Far East and a general deterioration of the European position, the Committee of Imperial Defence (C.I.D.255th Meeting, Minute 4) accepted a recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee that the above assumption should be cancelled, and on the 11th October, 1932, the Cabinet decided[3] to proceed with the completion and defences of the naval base at Singapore. Since then, apart from the Far East, the position has been rather nebulous. Owing to the protracted uncertainties of the Disarmament Conference it has not been found possible to lay down confidently a reasonable basis for a defensive programme of national armaments extending over a term of years. A further deterioration of the international situation, however, has made it possible within the last few months to define the position more clearly.

6. We do not propose to traverse again the ground covered by the latest Reports of the Foreign Office (C.I.D. Paper No.1112-B) and the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Paper No.1113-B), in which the international position is examined in its political and defensive aspects respectively, since the Committee of Imperial Defence, after considering them, has instructed us to take as the basis of our Report the two assumptions quoted in our first paragraph, viz.:—

(i) Priority to the Far East; European commitments; and the Defence of India:

(ii)No expenditure on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States of America, France or Italy.

7. Referring first to the question of priority, after a study of the Minutes of the 261st Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, our understanding is that the intention of the Committee was not to lay down the three items mentioned above in order of priority, but merely to single them out as contingencies for which our defensive preparations ought at the present time to provide. Since the Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence the trend of events has been rather in the direction of accentuating the dangers of the European situation. This tendency results from the failure of France and Germany to come to terms on disarmament and from increasing evidence of Germany's intention to re-arm, with or without the consent of other Powers. In the meantime, Japan's relations with Russia in the Far East have deteriorated and should incline her to seek improved relations with other Powers generally and ourselves in particular. This inclination is at present confirmed both by letters and despatches from our Embassy at Tokyo and by outward and visible signs, among which may be quoted the successful issue of the Indo-Japanese cotton negotiations and the speech of the Japanese Foreign Minister in the Diet on the 23rd January, when he said that "the traditional friendship with Great Britain remains unshaken and the two island empires can by wholehearted collaboration effectively serve the cause of universal peace."

8. We consider that advantage should be taken of any opportunity to improve our relations with Japan. No student of the Memoranda and Proceedings of the Committee of Imperial Defence which led up to our Inquiry or of this Report can be under any illusions as to the gravity of the situation which would arise if we were faced with hostility by Japan in the Far East, especially if (as is by no means impossible) it coincided with trouble in Europe and perhaps in India. We cannot over-state the importance we attach to getting back, not to an alliance (since that would not be practical politics), but at least to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan. There should be no insuperable difficulty in such a task, for which conditions are now favourable, though there is already some speculation as to the future extent of Japan's relations with Germany. Success on our part would not only bring us increased security, but might enable us to correct or obviate any unhealthy tendency of this kind in Japanese policy. Japan is more likely, however, to respect and listen to a Power that can defend its interests than to one that is defenceless.

9. The question of our relations with Japan inevitably carries with it that of our relations with the United States. There is much to be said for the view that our subservience to the United States of America in past years has been one of the principal factors in the deterioration of our former good relations with Japan, and that, before the Naval Disarmament Conference, 1935, we ought thoroughly to reconsider our general attitude. That opens up too large a subject for treatment in this report, but is an aspect of the question which we feel sure the Cabinet will not overlook.

10. At the present moment, however, pending a further improvement in our relations, we cannot overlook the danger created by our total inability to defend our interests in the Far East. Japan is fully armed, both in a material and moral sense. This is not our position. At the moment we are almost defenceless in the Far East. By the decision to proceed with the defence of Singapore the National Government has recognised that this state of affairs cannot be allowed to continue, but much remains to be done unless our vast interests in the Far East are to remain in considerable jeopardy. We do not consider that there is any immediate danger or any present aggressive design. There remains the risk, against which we must guard, that some unexpected emergency may arise, as in the autumn of 1931, or that Japan might yield to the sudden temptation of a favourable opportunity arising from complications elsewhere. And elsewhere means Europe, and danger to us in Europe will only come from Germany.

11. Germany, on the other hand, is not yet fully armed. She has considerable elements of force, but her permanent system, with its full complement of armaments and trained reserves, has not yet taken shape, though it is rapidly doing so. Surrounded by armed and suspicious neighbours she is not at present a serious menace to this country, but within, a few years will certainly become so. It will, indeed, be impossible to have any confidence in German gestures to the outside world so long as every German act at home belies them. In her case we have time, though not too much time, to make defensive preparations.

First Assumption

12. In these circumstances we have divided the risk of war into three classes. The Far Eastern Commitment, as to which we envisage an ultimate policy of accommodation and friendship with Japan, and an immediate and provisional policy of "showing a tooth "for the purpose of recovering the standing which we have sacrificed of recent years. Secondly, we take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom our "long range "defence policy must be directed. And, thirdly, the defence of India — the largest of our "Empire" commitments.

Second Assumption

13. We have also strictly applied the second assumption laid down for us, that we need not incur expenditure on measures of defence required to provide exclusively against attack by the United States of America, France or Italy. But we recommend that this should not be interpreted to rule out the provision in certain localities of a limited amount of modern equipment required to enable personnel to be trained and exercised with modern weapons. For example, we accept the view of the Chiefs of Staff that it should be the aim to provide category "A "defended ports with at least one battery capable of engaging a capital ship. It would also be unsound to allow any of our Naval bases to fall to so low a degree of efficiency that it would be impossible to bring them up to a suitable standard within a reasonable time should changes in the political situation in Europe make this necessary.

Third Assumption

14. On a review of the international situation as described in earlier paragraphs, we are of opinion that our present deficiencies ought to be made good within the shortest practicable period. "We have therefore aimed, in principle, at a programme spread over a five-year period, though in practice we have found that for certain items it is not possible, or in some cases essential, to make good within so short a time limit deficiencies accumulated over a long term of years.
 
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PART II. – A FIVE-YEAR DEFICIENCY PROGRAMME

15. Recent public criticism of our defensive preparations has been directed mainly against the programmes of the Services. For example, the Admiralty's view is constantly quoted that seventy cruisers is the minimum necessary for the protection of the maritime communications of the Empire, instead of the fifty which formed the basis of the tonnage limitation of the London Naval Treaty. In the case of the Army, the question is often asked why we no longer maintain the six divisions of the pre-war expeditionary force; while other critics demand a larger mechanised force or a large development of the Territorial Force. In the case of the Royal Air Force, the still incomplete programme of fifty-two squadrons for the Home Defence Air Force, adopted in 1923 as a first instalment, is, with increasing insistence, criticised as inadequate to modern needs.

16. While we recognise that, in the abstract and considered by themselves, some of these criticisms are well-founded, yet their authors overlook essential elements in the problem, such as the immense range of our Imperial responsibilities and limitations of finance. In particular, it would not be possible to organise a larger mechanised force than the one we recommend below without upsetting the whole system by which our forces overseas are maintained by the Home Army. In dealing with these matters later in this Report we set forth the situation in greater detail. Our five-year programme is, in fact, confined to the worst deficiencies in existing programmes that have accumulated during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule, abandoned not a moment too soon; in other words, our recommendations all fall within the scope of approved Government policy.

17. Before stating our proposals it may be convenient to set out the general character of the deficiencies in the light of the commitments mentioned in paragraph 12,viz.:—
(i) The Ear East,
(ii) The German Menace,
(iii) The Defence of India.​

Although this is a convenient method of testing our defensive situation on a basis of present needs, we would ask the Cabinet to bear in mind the more permanent elements in the situation referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. For all three Defence Services there are certain general requirements irrespective of where they have to operate, e.g., for the maintenance of our sea communications, which is the first principle of Imperial Defence, a main fleet to provide the shield behind which our cruising forces are able to protect our merchant ships, as well as suitably disposed and adequately defended bases :for our Army and Air Force, a nucleus of strength sufficient to safeguard our responsibilities in any theatre of war until any necessary expansion can be carried out, as well as safe sea communications and ports of embarkation: for all three Services, sufficient supplies, reserves and ancillary services of all kinds. The mutual dependence of: the three Services referred to above involves close co-ordination between them which we have kept steadily in view throughout this Report.

The Test of the Far Eastern Menace

18. In the event of. a war in the Far East, the protection of British territory and communications and of a vast sea-borne commerce requires the establishment as soon as possible of adequate force in the Pacific Ocean, and the power of the Navy to function is the most important element of the problem. While we should not run the risk of repeating the experiences of the Russian fleet, which after a voyage of many months was exterminated at the battle of the Sea of Japan on the 27th May,1905,the Fleet is in the position to-day of being unable to do more than take up a severely limited defensive attitude at Singapore. Since in normal times the Navy cannot, for a number of reasons, be maintained at war strength in the Pacific Ocean, our defensive preparations must fulfil the following conditions:—

(i) A general condition applying to any war is that in time of peace the fleet shall be in all respects at least as well found in personnel, material and reserves as the enemy it will have to meet:

(ii) That, the Fleet shall be in a position in an emergency to move at short notice, and as rapidly as possible, to the Far East, and shall find at intermediate British Ports all the fuel and resources that it requires to facilitate a rapid passage:

(iii) That, after its arrival in the Far East, the fleet shall find intact the means requisite to maintain its fighting efficiency and mobility.

19. The requisite conditions are not at present fulfilled. For example, so far as the first condition is concerned, not only are our existing ships short of aircraft, but the strength of the Fleet Air Arm falls far short of the Treaty ratio and is actually less than that of Japan's to-day. Our aircraft carriers, it must be remembered, will not all be available for the Far East. Japan has begun to modernise her capital ships, and unless we do the same we may some years hence have to encounter, a modernised Japanese battle fleet with out-of-date ships. Japanese personnel for a smaller fleet exceeds our own by 12,000. In our case only on two stations (China and East Indies) is the personnel adequate at the present time. The deficiencies in the other items mentioned in paragraph 18 are serious. Anti-submarine equipment for auxiliary vessels is practically non-existent. The necessary mines and depth charges cannot be safely stored abroad in hot climates owing to the nature of the explosive, and new patterns are essential for operations in the Far East. Unless and until these shortcomings are made good the Fleet (even on the assumption that our naval construction programme has kept pace with that of Japan in the approved proportion) will not be in a proper condition to encounter an enemy fleet after its arrival in the Pacific. Finally, and perhaps the most important of all, it is essential that the deficiency in the reserve of oil fuel should be made good.

20. For the second condition the position is at present unsatisfactory. 'The shortage of personnel and the lack of a proper reserve of victualling stores contribute to this state of affairs. There is also a shortage of fuel reserves, and existing stocks and facilities at the various ports are undefended. Trincomali, for example, is completely undefended, and the important stocks of oil fuel there could be destroyed by a raiding cruiser before the arrival of the main fleet. Additional defences, including aircraft, are also required at Penang (at present undefended), Ceylon ports (Colombo as well as Trincomali) and Aden.

21. The third condition, although falling within the scope of approved Government policy, is at present hardly met at all. At Singapore there is a floating dock and an incomplete graving dock, not yet capable of being used. There are none of the repairing and other facilities of a great dockyard, practically no stocks of ammunition, and no mines or torpedoes. There are no heavy gun defences and the local seaward defences and air defences are incomplete. The floating dock and the stocks of oil fuel at the new base in the Old Strait are exposed to the risk of destruction before the fleet could arrive. After its arrival, therefore, the fleet would be dangerously handicapped for the operations which it would have to undertake. Although the provision of the Base at Singapore and its defence are the first requirements in the Far East, the Fleet will be unable to protect our large interests in the China Seas unless Hong Kong ,the naval base arid all-important centre of British enterprise in China is defended. The provision of a complete defence is not possible under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, but Hong Kong remains an important outpost. There are deficiencies in all three Services, however, which ought to be rectified as soon as possible and which are permissible under the Treaty, in particular the defences can be modernised and some active aerial defence is essential; at present it is non-existent.

The Test of the German Menace

22. In case of a development of the German menace to the point of war, there are as yet (as was the case until about 1908 in pre-war days) a good many uncertain elements in the situation. It is, therefore, less possible than in the case of the Far Eastern menace to foresee the probable course of events in an emergency or to make definite plans. Nevertheless, judging by past history and by such data as are available, it appears probable that the roles of the Defence Services would not differ very much in kind from those that they filled in the last war, though they would differ in degree. The Navy would have the duty of protecting our coasts and sea-borne communications against attack, and of controlling the enemy's sea-borne communications. For many years, at any rate, the forces with which they would have to deal would be much, smaller both actually and relatively than in the late war. The Army must be responsible for the land defences of our naval bases and defended ports, for land defence against seaborne raids, and for anti-aircraft defence from the ground. In addition, the Army would be called on to send an expeditionary force to the Continent. The Air Force would be responsible for defence against air attack (including counter-attack), for various forms of co-operation with the Navy and Army as well as for the provision of the air force to accompany the expeditionary force.

23. In the near future, provided the general naval requirements mentioned in paragraph 18(i) are met and the Navy is thus placed on a sound basis, we shall be able to deal with Germany at sea, particularly if we have the assistance of France. The greatest potential threat lies in the acquisition of submarines and aircraft by Germany. The development of strong air forces by Germany is, of course, a certainty, and she no doubt intends to build up a submarine force. The provision of anti-submarine defences at our Home bases is, therefore, essential, and additional expenditure on the anti-submarine equipment of auxiliary vessels may be necessary.

24. So far as the Army is concerned, there are many deficiencies in the case of a war with Germany. Coast defences at Home are completely out of date, and will have to be revised in proportion as Germany develops her sea-power. At the moment, however, this is not one of our more urgent deficiencies. The land antiaircraft defences of London are at present less than half complete, those of some of our ports have only just been begun, while no provision at all has been made for the others.

25. The most important deficiency, however, for the emergency in question, so far as the Army is concerned, lies in the expeditionary force. Our present resources do not permit us to aim at anything better than to place in the field single divisions in each of the first two months of a war, a third at the end of the fourth month and the remaining two divisions at the end of the sixth month. This is the big deficiency in the Army which it is necessary to make good, if this country is to be in a position to co-operate with others in securing the independence of the Low Countries. For centuries this has been regarded as vital to our safety, and it is certainly not less true to-day in view of developments in modern armaments. We have fought at regular intervals on the Continent in order to prevent any

Power, strong or potentially strong at sea, from obtaining bases on the Dutch and Belgian coasts. To-day the Low Countries are even more important to us in their relation to the air defence of this country. Their integrity is vital to us in order that we may obtain that depth in our defence of London which is so badly needed, and of which our geographical position will otherwise deprive us. If the Low Countries were in the hands of a hostile Power, not only would the frequency and intensity of air attack on London be increased, but the whole of the industrial areas of the Midlands and North of England would be brought within the area of penetration of hostile air attacks.

26. We therefore recommend that we should be capable of putting into the field within one month, and there maintaining in all its essentials, a Regular Expeditionary Force of one Cavalry Division, four Infantry Divisions, two Air Defence Brigades, and one Tank Brigade, together with a full complement of G.H.Q. Corps, and L. of C. Troops. We regard this as an essential first step; the support of this force by contingents from the Territorial Army is a matter which will require consideration when the urgent needs of the Regular Army have been met. We believe that a force organised as above, and supported by appropriate Air Forces, would, as a deterrent to an aggressor, exercise an influence for peace out of all proportion to its size.

27. So far as the Air Force is concerned, it is of first importance that the fifty-two-squadron programme should be completed so as to enable us, in alliance with France, to meet the German menace. This is necessary both from the point of view of Home Defence and of the Expeditionary Force. Although the distance from Germany to London is much greater than from France, the range of aircraft has increased, and is increasing, so much that attacks on a large scale, especially in the early stages of a war, must be anticipated. All that can be said is that air attacks are likely to be less frequent than they would be in a war with France, for the reason that the Germans might be confronted at the same time by the Air Forces of France and perhaps other nations. (This, however, would depend on the power of Germany to inspire caution. It is improbable that such Powers as Belgium or Czechoslovakia could be counted on to act except in self-defence; and others, like Poland, might be immobilised by special agreement.)For the same reason the period during which intensive attacks are likely to be made should be shorter, as in such circumstances the German air forces might be worn down earlier, assuming that other Powers were involved and effective. The German Air Force would, however, have a strong incentive to make heavy air raids on this country, in order to cause alarm and despondency, and, as in the Great War, to create a demand for the retention of large air and anti-air forces in England. There would be a wide choice of targets; for example, London and other great cities, where the moral effect would be greatest, or shipping-in our larger ports outside the defended zone. It is therefore of great importance to complete the first stage of the Home Defence scheme, and the same applies to the ground anti-air defences, for which the War Office are responsible. The provision of a contingent to accompany an Expeditionary Force in accordance with proposals which have not yet been worked out in full detail does not necessitate additional squadrons once the fifty-two squadron programme has been completed, so long as Germany has an air force inferior in strength to ours; but largely increased provision is required in such matters as personnel, training facilities, reserves of aircraft, engines and spares.

28. The increase in aircraft which we recommend to meet our worst deficiencies amounts in the aggregate to 441 machines (88 for the Far East, including 16 Flying Boats, 110 for Home Defence, 243 for the Fleet Air Arm). This is an increase of 50 per cent, in the first line strength to-day, and is equivalent to an increase of 40 squadrons. There still remain, however, certain deficiencies which will have to be made good in due course. For example, no allowance has been included for aircraft necessary to assist in the defence of Home ports, nor for such overseas ports as are not of first importance in a war in the Far East. Again, the air defences of Great Britain are at present only designed to give protection to London, and, incidentally, to most of the South of England and the Southern Midlands. Moreover, only four squadrons of flying boats are at present available to assist in the defence of the United Kingdom against submarine attack, for convoy duties, and reconnaissance in co-operation with the Navy. To meet all these eventual requirements it is estimated that a minimum of twenty-five squadrons would be required, over and above the additional forty squadrons already mentioned. The capital cost may be estimated very approximately at £8,000,000, leading to an eventual maintenance charge of £3,000,000 per annum.[4] We have anxiously considered whether we ought to include these additional twenty-five squadrons in our five-year plan. An important factor in the decision is our limited power of expansion of the Royal Air Force working under normal peace conditions. In fact, that power of expansion is not even adequate to bring within the five-year programme referred to in paragraph 14 the whole of the equivalent of 40 squadrons mentioned above. The limiting factor is the capacity of the training establishments, other than the Plying Training Schools, and accommodation for squadrons when formed. To resort to emergency conditions would require a large increase in the Air Ministry Staff, especially in Works and Buildings personnel, as well as the additional expense involved in the provision of temporary accommodation which would have to be replaced later by permanent works. In addition, the conditions of recruitment and training of the more highly skilled other-ranks would have to be altered, since it takes seven and a half years, under the existing policy, to make a fully trained aircraftman. Such an alteration in policy would only be accepted by the Air Ministry with great reluctance.

29. In existing conditions we are advised that the additional defects mentioned in paragraph 28 do not quite fall within the category of

“worst deficiencies.” But if Germany carries out a rapid expansion of her air forces they will require immediate consideration, and this is one of the points we have particularly in mind in recommending at the end of this Report that the Defence Requirements Committee should remain in existence in order to review the situation from time to time. In all the circumstances, we have omitted to make provision for these deficiencies in our five-year programme. This is, however, a border-line case on which we would welcome an independent opinion. It also has a political aspect, and we, therefore, invite the Cabinet to give the matter very careful consideration before arriving at a decision.

30. Before leaving the deficiencies to meet the German menace we feel bound to make a brief reference to the question of Air Raids Precautions. These precautions should be developed pari passu with the anti-aircraft defences. They will require an expenditure which we are not at present able to compute, but which we believe will be very small compared with the totals contemplated in this Report. We suggest that the Home Office should be asked to draw up an estimate, in consultation, if they think fit, with the Air Raids Precautions Sub-Committee. We would observe, also, that the incentive to the German Air Force to deliver attacks will be increased if they are aware that, unlike the peoples of Continental countries, the British population has no knowledge or warning of the precautions to be observed for the purpose of reducing casualties. They will count on panic as a powerful ally. We are aware of the reasons which have deterred the Government from full publicity in the matter of Air Raids Precautions, but we would urge that whenever a new defence programme is launched the opportunity should be taken to remove the ban against full publicity that is preventing us from obtaining full benefit from the years of effort that have been devoted to this matter.

The Test of the Defence of India

31. It is unnecessary to examine the test of the Defence of India, since, if the deficiencies are made good to meet the German menace, the requirements for the Defence of India can be met. But, just as the Navy, in the event of trouble in Europe, has to keep an eye on the Far East, so the Army and Air Force cannot overlook the possibility that their commitments for the Defence of India might materialise. In connection with the Defence of India a recent assurance has been given by the Commander-in-Chief that (on the understanding that the war would be an Imperial commitment in which the forces of Great Britain play the part assigned in the plan), the Army in India is ready to undertake the role assigned to it in the first phase of the Defence of India Plan. The defences of Indian ports, however, are out of date and in need of reconstruction, for which plans have already been drawn up. This is important for the completion of our own arrangements to meet an emergency in the Far East. We recommend that the Government of India should be urged to expedite the work of correcting their worst deficiencies, as a complement to our own efforts.

The Programme

32. The programme which we consider a minimum for meeting the worst of the above deficiencies is summarised in Table A1. Details are contained in Tables B,C and D at the end of this Report, and are explained in Part I II. We have aimed at completing the programme of our worst deficiencies within five years, but several of the items cannot be completed within that space of time. In the final column of Table A1, therefore, we show the residue of expenditure, after the end of five years, required to complete the programme. In the time available it has not been possible to make exact estimates, and the figures in this Report are only rough approximations and subject to revision in detail; subject to this, the aggregate of capital costs of the programme is £72,232,000, spread over a term of years varying with each item, but mainly within the next nine years. Of this amount £61,174,600 falls within the first five years of the programme, to which must be added maintenance costs during that period which, so far as they can now be assessed, amount to a total of £10,148,980. The estimated expenditure over the first five years is, therefore, about £71,323,580. In the aggregate the expenditure in Table A1 amounts to £82,380,980, but this sum does not include any figure for maintenance after the first five years, since the data are insufficient even for an approximate estimate. Table A2 shows the annual increases involved by this programme over and above the sums provided for corresponding services in 1933.

33. Over and above this programme there will be a considerable expenditure in connection with the Naval shipbuilding programme, which we are not in a position to estimate closely, as it depends on the result of the Naval Disarmament Conference, 1935. The Naval construction programme is not, strictly speaking, one of the ''worst deficiencies ''with which we have to deal, but part of our normal annual expenditure. Nevertheless, in order that the Cabinet may realise that large sums are involved, we attach a forecast of this expenditure, prepared by the Admiralty (Appendix I) indicating that in the next five years the annual expenditure may amount on the average to some £13,400,000, as compared with £9,331,000 in 1933 and £10,718,000 in 1934.

34. There is one section of the Naval construction programme, namely, new construction for the Fleet Air Arm, part of which should rightly be included in the "deficiency "programme, since, as mentioned in paragraph 19, we are already inferior to Japan in this respect, and must remain so for some time, even if action is taken at once to balance the Japanese programme. The cost of the proposed programme, which also concerns the Air Ministry, is shown separately in Appendix 1, Table F (2).In the next five years the expenditure will amount to £5,590.000. If the Admiralty's proposals are carried out, the position in 1938, when the Japanese reach their maximum, and in 1940, when the scheme, according to the Admiralty proposals, should be complete, will be as follows:

... ... ... ... ... ... 1938. 1940.

United Kingdom . 321 402

Japan ... ... ... ... 341 341

It is very disquieting, more especially as we must always keep part of the Fleet Air Arm in Home waters, that at the present time we are, and for years must remain, inferior to Japan in the number of aircraft for use from ships. We recommend that the Admiralty and Air Ministry should aim at a programme approximating as closely to the above figures as circumstances permit.

35. We have, in a few cases, been able to include figures to show the increase in the cost of upkeep resulting from the completion of the Deficiency Programme. In the case of most of the items in the naval and military programmes, however, this has not been practicable. For example, we are unable to state the cost of maintenance of the Singapore Naval Base. This base, however, will only be partly in use in peace, and the increased maintenance charges will be inconsiderable. Even where the figure is included it can only be regarded as an approximate and provisional estimate.

36. After the urgent needs of the Expeditionary Force have been met, it will be necessary, if the German menace becomes aggravated, to take further measures for the modernisation of the Territorial Army. This, of course, is over and above certain first steps that are essential to-day if the force is to survive, and which are provided for in the Five-Year Deficiency Programme. As explained in greater detail in Part I II, paragraph 95, the Territorial Army is the only force on which we can rely for expanding the Expeditionary Force, and if it is to provide a reasonably efficient nucleus for this purpose we cannot afford to keep it starved of all the elements of a modern army. We do not attempt, however, an estimate of the cost of these eventual measures. Provision of aircraft to deal with an attack on the parts of the United Kingdom other than London and the South, ports in the Mediterranean and elsewhere West of Aden, as well as aircraft to assist in anti-submarine, convoy work, and for coast defence at Home, will also eventually have to be made.

37. While we have felt it incumbent to mention these matters, which will arise in the future, for the moment we ask the Government to concentrate on the proposals set forth in Table A1 below and explained in detail in Part I II. Owing to the size of the programme we have felt bound to state below our reasons for the inclusion of the various items.

[1] Cabinet 62 (33), Conclusion 5

[2] C.I.D. 236th Meeting, Minute 6

[3] Cabinet 50 (32), Conclusion 9

[4] See Table A (3).
 
FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE Part III. - THE PLAN IN DETAIL III.-AIR FORCE DEFICIENCIES
Part III. - THE PLAN IN DETAIL

38. In Part II we dealt with our proposals on general lines and from the point of view of the strategical objects that they are designed to fulfil. In this part of the Report we explain them in greater detail and show how the expenditure is apportioned between the three Defence Services.

39. Part III, therefore, is divided into three Sections, dealing respectively with —

I. Navy Deficiencies. [not included here]

II. Army Deficiencies. [not included here]

III. Air Force Deficiencies.

At the end of the Report will be found the three Tables summarising the respective requirements of the three Defence Services, which are constantly referred to in the text.


III.—AIR FORCE DEFICIENCIES

Completion of the Home Defence Scheme of 52 Squadrons
Cost: £2,340,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 1.)​

128. We have already referred in paragraph 27 to the need for the expansion of the Home Defence Air Force to 52 squadrons. Of the many necessary defence measures which we recommend, this is the most certain to receive popular support, since the vulnerability of our capital to attack by air is widely realised.

129. The costs of completing the Home Defence Scheme to 52[1] squadrons, together with one additional flying-boat squadron for coastal reconnaissance in Home waters, is shown as Item 1 on Table D, which gives the increments caused by this expansion on the cost of all items which are at present charged to the Air Force Vote. The cost has been spread up to the years 1940-41, for the reason that, although the provision of the necessary aircraft is well within the capacity of the industry, it is not feasible to provide the necessary works and buildings within a shorter time, working under the normal peace-time system (see paragraphs 28 and 29).

130. Apart from their primary duty of Home Defence it will be appreciated that the Air Force stationed at Home constitutes a reserve of force available, if circumstances permit, for employment in the general interests of Empire Defence. It is thus that the air forces required to implement the Defence of India Plan have always been assumed as being made available from the Air Defences of Great Britain. Similarly, the needs of an Air Force contingent to accompany a, British Expeditionary Force (apart from Army Co-operation squadrons which are specifically provided for) will have to be found from the Home Defence Air Force. It would therefore be inaccurate to regard the whole of this force as tied to the country in a fixed and immutable role.

Fleet Air Arm
Cost: £260,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 2.)​

131. Reference has been made in paragraph 40 to the necessity of making good the existing deficiency of 51 aircraft in the Fleet Air Arm. The annual costs to the Air Ministry, additional to that repayable by grant-in-aid from Navy to Air votes, are shown as Item 2 of Table D. The programme required to meet the projected expansion of Air Forces for the Japanese Navy has been dealt with in paragraph 34 (see also Appendix 1 and Table F (2)).

Air Requirements for Singapore
Cost: £1,430,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 3.)​

132. The Air requirements for the defence of Singapore have only been worked out by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee since our Inquiry began, and their Report is not yet before the Committee of Imperial Defence. Pending its consideration their recommendations must be treated as provisional, but as we have no other guide in this important matter we have, for the purpose of considering our worst deficiencies, adopted these proposals as a basis of calculation. The Chiefs of Staff estimate the total air forces required at

Singapore in war at —
6 land-plane squadrons,
3 flying-boat squadrons,
Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery.​

It is proposed, however, that the air forces normally located at Singapore in peace should consist of —
3 land-plane squadrons,
2 flying-boat squadrons,
Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery.​
The reinforcements to bring this force to the total required in war would be drawn at present from India, Iraq and the Persian Gulf. At present there are at Singapore —
2 land-plane squadrons,
1 flying-boat squadron.​
One of the land-plane squadrons, which has recently arrived, is temporarily detached from the Home Defence Air Force and will eventually have to be replaced. There remain to be provided, therefore —
1 land-plane squadron,
1 flying-boat squadron,
Aircraft for spotting duties with coast defence artillery, and the necessary operating and maintenance facilities.​

In accordance with the policy approved by the Cabinet, this programme should be complete in 1936 (Cabinet 27 (33), Conclusion 5, and C.I.D.258th Meeting, Minute 4), but as explained above, this programme has not yet been approved and consequently these additional units cannot be provided before 1937.The above aircraft do not include any provision for the Army needs of spotting for the guns of the defence. The Chief of the Air Staff is examining the possibility of training an auxiliary unit formed from the existing Flying Club at Singapore with a view to its employment in war on spotting duties. If this is not found feasible, and adequate spotting facilities cannot thereby be obtained, it will be necessary to provide an additional regular unit.

133. The Report of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee will show that besides the two landing-grounds already approved, and a civil landing-ground which can be made available in war, a fourth landing-ground will be required to accommodate some of the reinforcing squadrons, Fleet Air Arm, &c, and this must, of course, be prepared in peace to be ready for use in emergency. It is probable that a suitable site could be obtained and prepared at a relatively low cost, which is included in our scheme.

134. The shore requirements of the Fleet Air Arm have not been taken into consideration in the above proposals it would be possible for them to make use of the new landing-ground proposed above, but we do not include in this Report any proposals for the construction of other shore facilities on their account. This is an important matter which will require later investigation by the Admiralty and Air Ministry.

Air Requirements for Hong Kong
Cost: £1,320,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Item 4.)​

135. As in the case of Singapore, so for Hong Kong, the air requirements have only been considered by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee since our Inquiry began, and their report is not yet before the Committee of Imperial Defence. For reasons which have already been given in paragraph 21, Hong Kong is second only to Singapore in importance to our strategical position in the Far East. It may happen that the conditions of the Washington Treaty will be amended in 1935, in which case the present restrictions on the defences of Hong Kong may be changed and the whole position will need fresh consideration. Although these restrictions do not apply to Air Forces, we do not make a recommendation for the addition of such forces to the existing defences until after 1935,since it is not possible to deal with it under peace conditions earlier than the dates proposed. Our estimate, as recommended by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, is:—

In 1938: One flying-boat squadron,
1939: One land squadron,
1940: Two land squadrons and a repair depot. One additional aerodrome and one spare landing ground will also be required.​

Air Requirements at Penang, Ceylon and Aden
Cost: £1,030,000, within the next five years, including maintenance charges.
(Table D, Items 5, 6 and 7.)​

136. The question of the air requirements at Penang, Ceylon and Aden has recently been considered by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee, whose report will in due course be before the Committee of Imperial Defence. The Naval Staff has strongly represented that seaward reconnaissance by aircraft is an especially valuable adjunct to other forms of defence, since it extends the area in which hostile raiders, including submarines, may be located and attacked. In this connection we are informed that the Japanese themselves have a highly organised system of air reconnaissance to seaward, and that they will have a force of some 200 aircraft by 1938, supported by a similar number in reserve, based upon the chain of islands from Japan to the south, whose primary duties will be reconnaissance of the sea approaches to Japan and attack of naval forces.

137. The Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee are still considering the details of the strength and functions of aircraft which will be needed. Provisionally, however, they assess the requirements in order of importance as follows:—
Penang: One flying-boat squadron.
Ceylon: One land squadron.
Aden: One flying-boat squadron.​

Details of the cobe found in Table D. We are satisfied that if these aircraft are not provided in time of peace there will be an immediate demand for them on the outbreak of war, when it is unlikely that they can be made available.

138. We recommend that the greater part of this expenditure, including the squadrons themselves, should be provided by 1940.This low priority we have had to accept owing to more urgent needs elsewhere.

Additional Training Costs for Overseas Air Units
Cost: £20,000 per annum, rising to £80,000 per annum.
(Table D, Item 8.)​

139. Arrangements will be necessary at Home for training the increased number of pilots and technical personnel required to maintain the additional units which, as we recommend, should be provided overseas, i.e., at Singapore, Hong Kong, Penang, Ceylon and Aden. The cost of this, as shown in Table D, rises from £20,000 per annum in 1935 to a maximum of £80,000 in 1940 and subsequent years.

War Reserves
Cost: £3,685,000, within the next five years, including personnel costs.
(Table D, Item 9.)​

140. The war reserves of all kinds, which have, so far been contemplated, were those estimated to be required for the despatch of a contingent amounting in all to eleven squadrons, to take part with an expeditionary force in a theatre of war outside Europe. No provision has so far been made to enable the remainder of the Air Force to be maintained in personnel and material until such time as the training of recruits and production of material in war overtakes the current requirements.

141. Under the plan hitherto considered it would not be possible to develop our available strength in the early stages of a campaign; expansion would be slow, and there would be no need to hold in peace such large reserves of equipment or ammunition as are now contemplated, nor to make allowance for high wastage by training personnel in the early stages of a campaign. The proposal to despatch an Expeditionary Force to the Continent complete within the first month, and the necessity to foresee attacks by German aircraft on the United Kingdom, has made it necessary to provide large reserves of equipment and ammunition, and to make arrangements to meet heavy wastage throughout the Air Force from the outbreak of war.

142. The estimated cost to enable our air forces to operate effectively in these conditions is given in Item 9 of Table D, and amounts to £4,625,000, which, it is suggested, should be spread over six years. The principal constituents of this item are as follows:—

143. Aircraft.—Reserves are necessary to enable the Home Defence Squadrons and any contingent sent overseas with the Expeditionary Force to be maintained at full strength until war production overtakes current consumption. We consider that these reserves are essential except in the case of heavy bomber squadrons. To maintain reserves for this type would mean the purchase and storage of some 140 of the largest and most expensive aircraft. Without this reserve heavy bomber squadrons will be able to operate, on the average, at only two-thirds of their full efficiency during the first twelve months. This is a position which would, normally, be most unsatisfactory, but in view of the costs involved,* and on the assumption that in a European war we shall have the co-operation of Allies, or at least of France, we do not consider, in present circumstances, that we would be justified in recommending the storage of this material. We consider that the position should be reviewed annually. It might, however, be possible to speed up war production by subsidising firms in peace, as is proposed in the case of the Army ammunition reserves.

144. Training Aircraft.—A reserve of training aircraft is required in order to enable training organisations to be expanded so as to produce sufficient pilots and observers who, with the pre-war reserves of such personnel, will be required to keep all squadrons up to strength.

145. Motor Transport.—A sum is included for the purchase of additional motor transport which, with vehicles to be purchased on the outbreak of war, will enable all squadrons to be mobilised with their complement.

146. General Stores.—Provision is necessary for the spares and general stores required at squadron parks and depots when mobilised.

147. Bombs.-The estimated requirements of bombs for the first six months of the war is 19,500 tons, on the assumption that the heavy bomber aircraft would only operate at two-thirds of their full efficiency. A sum of £310,000 has been included to bring the authorised reserves up to 8,000 tons, which it is estimated should be sufficient for the first two months of war.

148. Storage.—A sum has been included to cover the cost of additional storage necessary to hold in reserve the aircraft, motor transport, and bombs referred to above.

149. Should the investigations of the Principal Supply Officers Committeet show that it is not possible to accelerate post-mobilisation production so as to ensure that the supply of bombs will overtake expenditure after two months of war, then the war reserves will require to be correspondingly increased. As an indication of the financial importance of this subject it may be noted that if war reserves for six months have to be held (19,500 tons) the estimated additional cost would be approximately £3,000,000, exclusive of storage.

150. No provision is made for the aviation spirit required in war beyond the reserves normally held in peace, which would be sufficient for the first month only. Thereafter the Royal Air Force would have to depend on reserves held in the country, or fuel produced from coal, or imported.

151. It is significant to note that both the Army and the Royal Air Force have been compelled during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule to hold such small stocks of War Reserves that at the present time they are in the alarming position of being unable to take part in a major war with the prospect of maintaining themselves for more than a few weeks.

* Initial outlay £1,750,000. Training of additional pilots £700,000. Storage £200,000.

-f- The question of accelerating post-war production of bombs has not yet been referred to the Principal Supply Officers Committee. We strongly recommend that this should be taken up at the same time as the inquiry referred to in paragraph 90.


[1] The figure "52" includes one squadron which has been temporarily detached to Singapore. If that is to become a permanent commitment it will be necessary to replace it at Home.
 
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PART IV.—OBSERVATIONS AND SUMMARY

152. The Covenant of the League of Nations (Article 8) lays down that—"The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." At present our national armaments fall far short of the above standard, to which our proposals are directed.

153. In the Far East, if our proposals are not carried out we shall remain so weak as to invite attack. If they are carried out, and the naval construction programme is adequate to our needs, our position within five years will become reasonably secure. At any rate, they should suffice to deter Japan from any idea of attacking us. We believe also that the unprovocative measures we propose will help the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and the promotion of those improved relations with Japan which we advocate.

154. So far as Europe is concerned, if our proposals are not carried out, this country will probably within a few years become seriously menaced by Germany. If carried out, our proposals should contribute to secure this country against the dangers of German rearmament during the next few years—provided that financial stress keeps these within predictable bounds—and enable us to take a reasonable share in "the enforcement by common action of international obligations." They will, however, require reconsideration from time to time as the international situation develops. Here, also, the fact that we are putting our defences in order should, in our opinion, contribute to the maintenance of peace in Europe.

155. The high cost is due mainly to the accumulation of deficiencies during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule, which had outlived its validity before it was withdrawn. No smaller programme would be consistent with our Terms of Reference, and we believe that the Cabinet wish to know the actual facts of the situation. If, instead of cutting down the Estimates of the Defence Services year by year, it had been possible to maintain them at the figure of 1928-29, an additional sum of £27,500,000 would have been available for Imperial Defence and some of our worst deficiencies would be non-existent. In Appendix 3 we attach a graph comparing the fall in expenditure of the Defence Departments since the War with the increased cost of our proposals.

156. Unfortunately we are the only Great Power that has been steadily reducing its expenditure. Table E, based on information from the Armaments Year Book, 1933, published by the League of Nations, and from published Estimates, gives the following results:—

Increase or Decrease of Total Defence Expenditure since 1925.
- 19.6% (to 1932-33) The United Kingdom
+ 197.0% (to 1933-34) U.S.S.R.
+ 110.8% (to 1934-35) Japan*
+ 100.9% (to 1933-34) France†
+ 12.3% (to 1933-34) Germany
+ 10.3% (to 1933-34) U.S.A.
+ 9.7% (to 1933-34) Italy​

* Does not include additional expenditure on Manchuria.
† Does not take into account the special expenditure on frontier defences.

We realise that there are many factors, such as changes in the value of money, which make it impossible to regard such figures as giving an accurate guide to the resulting changes in the strength of the armaments of the several countries. They only indicate in a rough and ready fashion the general trend of their military preparations. For the above reasons these percentages should not be quoted in public.

157. Information of a later date accentuates the tendencies shown in the table.

United States.—A sum of $365,765,929 for Defence purposes ($274,765,924 for the Navy, and $91,000,000 for the Army, including their respective Air Services) has been included in President Roosevelt’s N.I.R.A. scheme. This includes $238,000,000 for new ship construction, $7,500,000 for the naval air service; an equal sum for the purchase of new military aeroplanes; $29,265,924 for naval bases and other works; $7,000,000 for sea coast defence; and $10,000,000 for purchase of motor vehicles. A further sum of $77,000,000 has been asked for by the Navy Department for the modernisation of five battleships. As recently as the 30th January last, a Bill was passed by the American House of Representatives authorising the President to increase the establishment of serviceable naval aircraft from 1,000 to 2,184 and to build new ships to bring the United States Navy up to Treaty strength in under-age vessels. This has still to pass the Senate. Further proposals are under consideration by their Military Affairs Committee, which, if approved, will raise the strength of the Army Air Corps within the next five years from 1,800 to 3,800 or alternatively to 4,834 aircraft.

The U.S.S.R.—In the case of the Soviet Union the estimated expenditure for the Defence Forces for 1934 will show an increase of 375,000,000 roubles in comparison with 1931.The U.S.S.R. has made no secret of the fact that she intends to increase her air forces until they exceed those of any other Power. Rising from a total of 637 first-line aircraft in 1930,a conservative estimate now places the estimate at a figure of 1,670,and evidence is not wanting to show that a still further increase is contemplated and is, in fact, taking place.

Japan.—Japan has increased her total Defence expenditure from 407,000,000 yen in 1931-32 to 936,000,000 yen in 1934-35, not including her expenditure in Manchuria. The naval estimates have increased from 261,000,000 yen in 1929-30 to 487,000,000 yen (proposed) in 1934-35.Everything points to the present high figure in the naval estimates being maintained for several years.

Japan is building her Fleet up to full Treaty figures in under-age vessels. All Japanese battleships will be modernised by the end of 1937, whereas the present British intention is not to complete our partial modernisation programme until 1940. The question of the strength of her naval aircraft has already been dealt with in paragraphs 19,34 and 40,but increases have also been agreed to in both landbased naval units and Army air units, where a general scheme of reorganisation is about to take place. This will result in the addition of 128 land-based naval aircraft and 100 aircraft for Army air units in terms of first-line strength, giving totals of 208 and 367 respectively. Japan will then possess a first-line strength of 915 aircraft. There are also indications showing that the strategic mobility of land-based squadrons is being closely studied. Reports tend to confirm the view that a chain of landing-grounds is being constructed to enable land-based squadrons to fly from Japan to Formosa via the Lu Chu Islands. This in itself constitutes a serious threat to the security of our interests in Hong Kong.

Germany.—In Germany also, despite the Paris Air Agreement, progress is undoubtedly being made in the construction of aircraft of military types. At present a conservative estimate places the total number at 276 built and 62 building. In addition, reports, which at present require confirmation, indicate that a programme of 300 aircraft of a heavy-bomber type may be embarked upon in the near future.

France.
—As regards France, on the 20th December last, the Minister of War stated in the Chamber that he intended shortly to ask the necessary credits to extend to the North Sea the French scheme of frontier fortification, on which more than £30,000,000 has already been spent. Other additions are also contemplated.

Belgium.—The Belgians have adopted a complementary scheme for which 759,000,000 francs (£6,400,000 at current rates) have been voted, to be spread over two years.

Among the Great Powers the United Kingdom alone is taking no adequate steps to strengthen its armaments, which have admittedly been reduced to the edge of risk, and beyond if, as seems probable, the political horizon should be further darkened.

158. After a long war, during which social services had been starved, it was of course essential from many points of view, and as an insurance against social dangers, to make every effort to overtake lost ground. Although this had to be done partly at the expense of the Defence Services, no immediate risk was run so long as the international outlook was secure. The following figures compare the fall in expenditure in the Defence Services with the rise in the cost of certain Social Services during the post-war period:—

First Deficiency Report - Defence v Social Spending.jpg


Now that the international outlook has again become clouded it seems right to make some readjustment in our insurances and to spend more on Imperial Defence. In this connection it must be borne in mind that Expenditure on Armaments has a labour value which is high in comparison with, many of the unemployment relief works to which the State has contributed. In addition, it is of value in providing “experience and opportunity for the designers, technicians and craftsmen in a very wide range of industry”

159. This brings us to another of the "worst deficiencies" in our Imperial Defence arrangements, namely, the decay of our Private" Arms Industry, which, in modern conditions, is an element in Imperial Defence second in importance only to the Defence Services. We include no suggestions on this subject, as the adoption of our proposals would of themselves go far to revive the industry, and the subject has recently been ventilated in other Papers (C.I.D. Paper No. 1109-B) and decisions taken. The same remarks apply mutatis mutandis to the shipping and shipbuilding industries.

160. We are under no illusions as to the difficulties which the Government will encounter in presenting any adequate programme for completing our deficiencies. There is one technical innovation which we strongly suggest would be of assistance in this matter and of permanent advantage, namely, a separation from the Estimates of the Defence Services of all non-effective charges. At present these tend to give a false impression of the cost of the Defence Services. In 1933 they represented £17f millions out of a total of nearly £109 millions provided in the Estimates of the three Services. For the three years to 1933 non-effective Votes accounted for £70 millions out of a total of £433 millions. We believe it would be of assistance to the Government in carrying a deficiency programme if the Estimates of the Defence Services could in some way be relieved of these non-effective charges. Preliminary investigation of this proposal reveals technical difficulties and objections, but these are not insurmountable, and we urge that the question should be explored with a view to a satisfactory solution.

161. Another technical point that is worthy of mention is that, owing to the world-wide extent of our territory and trade, we have to spend much larger amounts than other nations on the provision of defended bases and fuelling stations.

162. Nevertheless, if our heavy deficiencies are to be remedied, the main point is that we must view this form of expenditure in a new perspective, as other Great Powers have already done. The insurance premiums must bear a higher ratio to the property insured—namely, the incalculable estate known as the British Empire. Unless our people can be induced to make the same sacrifices as other nations, we cannot expect to retain our influence in the world or even to survive at all as a world Empire. For this reason, the last, though far from the least, of our ''worst deficiencies'' to which we desire to call attention is the state of moral disarmament of the population, which, as the result of persistent and almost unopposed propaganda has fallen below "the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations,” and even to the point of affecting recruiting for the Army and the Territorial Force. In these circumstances there is no doubt that the revelation Lord Weir's letter to The Times, November 17, 1933, of what is required to place our defences on a reasonably secure footing will come as a severe shock to public opinion, and the greatest care will be necessary to educate the nation as to the reasons for the heavy financial outlay involved. We invite the earnest attention of the Cabinet to this problem, as one on the solution of which not only the rehabilitation of our Defence Services but the future safety of the Empire depends.
 
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FIRST REPORT OF THE DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS COMMITTEE - SUMMARY
SUMMARY

(1) We have divided the risks of war into three classes. The Far Eastern Commitment, where we envisage an ultimate policy of accommodation with Japan, and an immediate and provisional policy of "showing a tooth" for the purpose of recovering the standing we have sacrificed of recent years. Secondly, we take Germany as the ultimate potential enemy against whom our "long range" defence policy has to be directed. And thirdly, the Defence of India—the largest of our Empire commitments (paragraph 12). In relating our requirements to these commitments we have not overlooked the more permanent elements in the problem of Imperial Defence, or the possibility of further changes in the international situation (paragraphs 2 and 3). We have recognised that there exists a general requirement to enable the Defence Services to fulfil their functions in the general scheme of Imperial Defence (paragraph 17).

(2) We attach the utmost importance to getting back to our old terms of cordiality and mutual respect with Japan, in order to strengthen the prospects of peace in the Far East and to bring Japan back to the League of Nations. We believe that our influence with Japan will be greater if we are in a position to protect our vast interests in the Far East. The question of our relations with Japan carries with it that of our relations with the United States of America, an aspect of the problem which we particularly commend to the Cabinet (paragraphs 7-9).

(3) In view of the existence at this moment of a menace to our position in the Far East, and of the probability that the German menace will grow to formidable proportions within the next few years, we have aimed at a programme to meet our worst deficiencies within the next five years; but in practice there will remain a considerable aftermath at the end of that period (paragraph 14).

(4) To make good the heavy deficiencies that have accumulated during the regime of the Ten-Year Rule we recommend the adoption of the five-year Deficiency Programme contained in Table A 1, the very approximate cost of which is as follows:—

Over five years: £71,323,580 (including all personnel charges).

Remaining to complete after five years: £11,057,400 (excluding maintenance charges) (paragraph 32).

Total (excluding maintenance after five years): £82,380,980.

Table A2 shows the annual increases involved by this programme over and above the sums provided for corresponding Services in 1933.

(5) In addition there will be:—

(i) The cost of maintenance of various services which we are not in a position to estimate,

(ii) The Naval Construction Programme, which depends on the Naval Conference, 1935. An Admiralty' sketch estimate (Appendix I, Table F (1)) indicates that in the next five years the annual expenditure may amount on the average to some £13,400,000 as compared with £9,331,000 in 1933 and £10,718,000 in 1934 (paragraph 33).

(iii) The extension of the Fleet Air Arm as part of the Naval Construction Programme, which is essential if we are not to be outclassed by the Japanese in this branch of the Service. The cost of this is estimated by the Admiralty and Air Ministry at £5,590,000 spread over the next five years (Appendix 1, Table F (2)) (paragraph 34).

(iv) A possible increase (or decrease) according to the result of the enquiry by the Principal Supply Officers Committee into the possibility of speeding up the manufacture of war material for the Expeditionary Force after the first three months of war (paragraphs 87-92).

(v) If the German menace becomes aggravated, adoption of measures to modernise, equip and supply the Territorial Army, which (apart from some minor and inexpensive preliminary measures) we have not included in our Deficiency Programme (paragraph 36).

(vi) Other Royal Air Force requirements, such as the protection of northern ports of the United Kingdom against air attack, the provision of aircraft for anti-submarine convoy work and coast defence at Home, and at such overseas ports as are not of first importance in a war in the Far East, will have to be provided in due course. A minimum of twenty-five Squadrons would be required for these purposes. We have made no provision for these items, which are a border-line case to which we invite the special attention of the Cabinet (paragraphs 28 and 29).

(vii) A relatively small expenditure on Air Raids Precautions, which will be borne on the Home Office Vote (paragraph 30).

Details of the Five-Year Deficiency Programme are contained in Part III, pages 13-29.

(6) Our programme for completing our "worst deficiencies," though perhaps not spectacular from a public point of view, is designed to produce the following results:—

(a) The Navy will not be increased by any large units, as this is ruled out by the Naval Treaties. But the Fleet will be provided with essential bases and fuelling stations defended on a reasonable, if rather modest, scale, which will put it in a position to fulfil its responsibilities for the protection of our vast Imperial interests. In addition, most of the older capital ships will gradually be modernised, and every year there will be an improvement in the position as to personnel, Fleet Air Arm, fuel supplies, modern equipment, reserve stores and supplies and ancillary services, all of which are of decisive importance to fighting efficiency.

(b) The Army will be enabled to place and maintain in the field in five years a well-equipped and modern expeditionary force of four divisions, one tank brigade and one cavalry division, which can be mobilised in a month, in place of the existing five divisions and one cavalry division, that require many months to take the field. A small start will also have been made to cope with the great deficiencies that now exist in the Territorial Army. In addition, the War Office will be able to fulfil its responsibilities for the defence of the naval bases and fuelling stations in the Far East and to make a beginning elsewhere in the renovation of our coast defences. Finally, after reconsideration of the general lay-out of air defence to meet the assumption of air attack by Germany, the provision of the Army's share in our scheme of anti-aircraft defences will be put in hand at once.

(c) The Royal Air Force will complete the 52 Squadrons scheme, which will enable it to provide for Home Defence against Germany, and, in addition, to send an appropriate Air Force abroad with the Army Expeditionary Force. The Air Force will also be enabled to take its share in the defence of Singapore and of other defended ports East of Suez; and the worst deficiencies in the Fleet Air Arm will be made good. Our proposals contemplate the following increases in the Royal Air Force:—

First Deficiency Report - RAF Programme.jpg


* Including one squadron to replace squadron loaned to Singapore from the Home Defence Force

When all these items have been completed, the total first line strength of the Royal Air Force, including India, will be 1,285 aircraft, as compared with 1,671 aircraft which France now possesses.

(7) We recommend that the Government of India should be urged to expedite the work of correcting their worst deficiencies, as a complement to our own efforts. This should include bringing up to date the defences of Indian ports in accordance with plans already drawn up, which is essential to complete our defensive arrangements in the Far East (paragraph 31).

(8) The programme recommended will barely bring our Defence Forces to " the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." Considered in relation to our world-wide interests, and by comparison with Foreign Powers, it is far from excessive. If it is not carried out we shall become every year even more at the mercy of Japan in the Far East than we are to-day, while in Europe in a few years' time we shall be in grave danger from Germany. Both in the Far East and in Europe our influence for peace will be promoted by making good our present deficiencies (paragraphs 152-154).

(9) With a view to the presentation of our Defence expenditure in a form more strictly in accordance with the facts than at present, we suggest that the Annual Estimates of the Defence Services should, if' possible, be relieved of the incubus of the non-effective vote. This, indeed, seems essential to a fair presentation of the case. There are some technical difficulties and objections, and we recommend that the whole question should be immediately explored with a view to a satisfactory solution (paragraph 160).

(10) As changes are liable to occur both in international relationships and in technical developments in all three Defence Services, we recommend that the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee should remain in existence in order to review the scheme, as finally approved by the Cabinet, at appropriate intervals.

(Signed) M. P. A. HANKEY (Chairman).
ERNLE CHATFIELD.
E. L. ELLINGTON.
N. F. WARREN FISHER.
A. A. MONTGOMERY-MASSINGBERD.
ROBERT VANSITTART.

(Signed) H. R. POWNALL (Secretary).
A. W. CLARKE (Assistant Secretary).

2, Whitehall Gardens, S. W. 1,
February 28, 1934.
 
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Some bloke, not necessarily me personally, loans Frank Whittle the fiver necessary to renew his jet patent, Interest free, to be collected in five years time.
 
In the early 1930's there was a political battle in Parliament over the appointment of a single Minister for the armed forces, in that period the RAF, Army and Navy, operated as completely separate entities. This proposed amalgamation of control under a minister of Defense was fought against by all three services and was eventually fudged by the creation of the post 'Minister for the Coordination of Defense" in 1936. This was done partly to dilute the power and influence of Sir Maurice Hankey as Cabinet sectary. Have either a Minister of Defence or for the Coordination of Defence in place years earlier and the defence procurement and questions such as who controls the FAA might be sorted earlier causing the Butterflies to take off.
 
After the Vickers Jockey test plane is lost in 1932, a replacement is built, this time with a Bristol Mercury engine. Most of the production is parcelled out to Blackburn and TTL's Venom enjoys some success as a colonial/export fighter, Norway being a notable foreign customer.

Later models feature a Perseus engine (as do later Swordfish in the interest of simplifying logistics) and cannons. So begins the Royal Navy of TTL's love affair with light fighters.
 
The Bristol aeroplane company takes an interest in the PZL 11 with Bristol Mercury engine and decides to put it in to licence production. The RAF buys the Bristol version from 1934 on and Bristol and PZL co-operate on modified versions over the next few years such as the PZL24 and ultimately the Bristol-PZL50 which is developed earlier and in limited service with the Polish air force before the invasion.
 
One thing that immediately occurs is that this kind of expansion and refit could have some Rule 34 (Star Trek) implications for the general economy.
 
The Bristol aeroplane company takes an interest in the PZL 11 with Bristol Mercury engine and decides to put it in to licence production. The RAF buys the Bristol version from 1934 on and Bristol and PZL co-operate on modified versions over the next few years such as the PZL24 ......
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What about an IAR 80?
Bonus points if you can install an arrester hook and make it compatible with RN aircraft carriers.
 
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