That's an interesting suggestion, but considering how the leadership of Britain (and, to the extent that it mattered, the general public here as well) seemed to think in those days I'm not sure how acceptable it would have been considered.
After all, apart from anything else, why would they trust the Maraths to keep their side of any such deal in the long term?
The fact that the loss of foreign trade would be a very serious blow for the Marathas? They depended a lot on their foreign trade to defray their expenses, and all of it is in the hands of the British? They would not be in a position to replace British traders at a moment's notice. But still I take your point. Bombay would be the sticking point. As you say, the British would want some security. The Marathas were not in a position to conquer it by themselves (Bombay is an island, and can be easily defended by the British navy). With the help of the French navy, maybe, but not by themselves, at least not at this point. And, on their side, the Marathas were scared stiff by the prospect of a large British force sitting in an all but invulnerable position scarcely 200km from their capital. They would not be willing to leave it in the hands of the British. In fact, every French Maratha agreement required the French undertaking to reduce Bombay.
Hmm - how about this? The British retain Bombay, but are forced to disband their Indian sepoys, and are forbidden to raise and arm any Indians for any war, either in India or elsewhere? The number of British troops that could be ferried into Bombay from Britain would be abysmally small (at least at this point). And as a further compensation - Northern Circars are returned to the Nizam of Hyderabad (this would go a long way in assuaging the concerns of Bhonsle of Nagpur, who was worried about the British forces on his eastern flank)? The Northern Circars would be impossible for the British to hold, with Bengal gone, anyway. In a European analogy, it would be like Britain trying to hold Hesse-Darmstadt.And if they had seriously considered a deal then I'm fairly sure that Britain/HEIC keeping at least the port of Bombay itself, for trade and as an entry-point for those advisors, would have been a non-negotiable condition as far as the British were concerned.
At this point, the British possessions would be reduced essentially to three ports (forts?) (Madras (Ft. St. George), Calcutta (Ft. William), and Bombay (Bombay Castle-Ft. George)). These areas are easy to hold with just European troops. and are in strategic positions to give the British a chance to implement a full naval blockade of India, should the Marathas renege on their side of the bargain.
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