Britain Never Forgives America for 1776

I'd like to start this WI with an OTL explanation. When I was a child, the schools I went to taught American history in a disjointed way. We learned about the American Revolution and the War of 1812, but no mention was ever made that UK/US relations ever healed. For several years I actually believed that the British were still mad at America over 1776 and that they seethed at our freedom every 4th of July. It wasn't until I took an interest in contemporary politics that I figured out via the news media that that wasn't true.

Obviously, then, the WI of the day is: What if the British stayed permanently mad at America for its successful Revolution against their rule? I can just hear Queen Elizabeth II giving a speech: "Mad at America now, mad at America forever!"
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Britain's great power rivalries

I'd like to start this WI with an OTL explanation. When I was a child, the schools I went to taught American history in a disjointed way. We learned about the American Revolution and the War of 1812, but no mention was ever made that UK/US relations ever healed. For several years I actually believed that the British were still mad at America over 1776 and that they seethed at our freedom every 4th of July. It wasn't until I took an interest in contemporary politics that I figured out via the news media that that wasn't true. Obviously, then, the WI of the day is: What if the British stayed permanently mad at America for its successful Revolution against their rule? I can just hear Queen Elizabeth II giving a speech: "Mad at America now, mad at America forever!"

Britain's great power rivalries with France, Germany, and Russia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries are likely to end poorly for Britain.

Best,
 
If the British stay mad at America then American development is severely retarded due to the loss of investment capital. However the down side for Britain is that America was a useful market for a lot of its goods for a long time.

Mutual conflict between the two is likely exacerbated which is probably worse for America given the Royal Navy can shut down its coast but it would also result in America becoming something of a perpetual scab that constantly needs picking in North America.

America may well be stifled though not so likely killed, in fact given the level of damage that could be inflicted early on in its development likely would be stifled but there is no clear gain for the British other than revenge.

It is worth noting that large segments of the British politically active class were simply never that angered by the American War of Independence during the war let alone after it.
 
There is an oft-cited quip whose exact wording I don't recall, but it runs more or less: "Nations don't have permanent friends or enemies, they have permanent interests".*
Britain and America had (and still have, in many regards) strong common interests (shared language and similar culture also help, but are not really a requirement) that pulled the two together.
Your scenario thus requires a longstanding clash of interests, one which would make episodic conflicts or controversies escalate.
That would create a persistent climate of mutual hostility, but would probably be punctuated by armed conflicts just in order to keep the tension high to this day.
Say, just to note some historical flashpoints, that the Oregon question goes hot, the British intervene in the ACW, the Venezuela Crisis escalates to war. In WWI (ignoring that it won't happen in this scenario) the US won't intervene on the side of the Entente, and won't support the Entente financially. Central Powers chances to win are hugely improved, as TFSmith notes above.
However, a permanently conflictual relationship between the US and Britain would change the whole path of development of both countries massively, a lot before WWI.
To the point that, indeed, they may be not recognizable entities by now (the US may be divided after a ACW analog with British intervention, just to name the most glaring possibility; or Britain balkanize after some horrible defeat/revolution/what you have in some rough analog of the World Wars that, again, don't bide very well for Britain ITTL).

*This is not entirely correct. Interests may change, and nations themselves are not permanent. However, both tend to be stabler than most alliances, except some close and longstanding ones - the ones which are mantained by underlying interests, in general.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yeah, this is extremely overstated

If the British stay mad at America then American development is severely retarded due to the loss of investment capital. However the down side for Britain is that America was a useful market for a lot of its goods for a long time.

- snip -

It is worth noting that large segments of the British politically active class were simply never that angered by the American War of Independence during the war let alone after it.

Yeah, this is extremely overstated. The US was quite capable of raising investment capital internally in the Nineteenth Century - as just one example, when the AT&SF issued $88 million in 4 percent bonds in 1896, 50 percent were sold on the NYSE, 30 percent in London, and 20 percent in Amsterdam.

In 1893, the total value of US railroad stocks sold in London was (depending on the source) 8-11 percent, and railroad stocks were (roughly) 28 percent of all foreign investment, and investment in British territories and (especially) Latin America made up the vast majority of that figure; only 9 percent were in US railroad securities, for example.

The actual numbers for British foreign investment (source year is 1913) were as follows:

45 percent (dominions/empire)
20 percent Latin America
20 percent US
15 percent in Europe.

As an example, US securities were 21 percent of purchases in the period 1886-1913; Argentine issues were 8 percent in 1870-1913, the same percentage as Australian in the same period. Canadian issues in the same period were almost 10 percent in the same period.

In terms of US investment vis a vis foreign, that varied significantly; during the immediate pre-revolutionary war period, "foreign" investment in the US (essentially British) is estimated at less than 5 percent of the aggregate physical wealth of the US, including foreign holdings of US debt.

Percentages ebbed and flowed, but by 1853, foreign investors (not just British) held 46 percent of US federal debt; much higher percentages of US state debts (58 percent) were held abroad, but the states could - and did - default and the European money still came. The payoffs were worth the gamble. The same year, about 26 percent of US railroad bonds were held abroad. Foreign investment peaked in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries, for obvious reasons (there was money to be made) but these securities were widely held, all over Europe.

By the eve of WW I, some $7 billion in foreign investment was present in the US, while exactly half - $3.5 billion - in US investment was present overseas.

So, bottom line, investment - like trade - is a two-way street; no one invests when they don't expect to make more money, or with more security, then they would somewhere else.

Economic warfare against continental autarkies is a losing game.

Best,
 
Yeah British capital raised in the London markets for US investment was some $730 million contemporary in 1896 alone. It gives you an idea of the impact Britain was still having after a hundred and twenty years of the US. Earlier and the effect is greater still. America experienced severe down swings whenever British capital was scarce in the 19th Century.

A point worth addressing is the common "this actually massive proportion looks small to those who have not studied economies" argument is often employed. A simple thought to recall is that a 1% reduction may not seem to make any difference one year on but over 120 years results in an economy around 30% of its potential size without said reduction. There is a reason recessions feel painful even though nominally they might amount to economic contractions of close to zero in terms of the entire economy. There is a reason small dips in the growth rate can matter if they are sustained.
 
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If Britain views the US with hostility, then the War of 1812 will go much worse for the US.

OTL, Britain couldn't be bothered supporting Tecumseh's native state, for instance, because trading with the US (a large and growing customer) was worth far more.

Here, the Treaty of Ghent doesn't happen (not in 1814, anyway), and Wellington brings Napoleonic War armies to North America. 'Canada' expands to take in (much of) the Louisiana purchase, and soldiers (quite possibly with their Spanish and Portuguese 'wives'), are given plots of land on the frontier to defend it against the US.

OT3H, why the HECK is Britain going to do this? Britain was always more interested in trade and commerce than long-lasting hostilities. You'd either have to change Britain to something completely different from OTL, or make the US be the ones bearing the grudge.
 
More militaized US

If the war of 1812 goes worse with the loss of territory, I would speculate that the US is going to view with alarm a hostile Canada to the north. This would mean that it will be easier for a push for a stronger US Army to ensure that the Brits don't just come rolling down from the north. What this means in the long run is that Britain needs to maintain a larger standing army to to ensure that the US doen't get antsy with all the expense that this would entail.

Another thought: If the British are still angry about the revolution, how does this translate to their treatment of the other dominions such as Canada and Australia? Are they going to keep a tighter rein on them causing more strive when the urge toward local government begins in these places? This easily could get nasty for the English.

The implications for Europe in general could get very interesting in the Chinese sense if England in more distracted overseas.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
And your source for $730 million is?

Yeah British capital raised in the London markets for US investment was some $730 million contemporary in 1896 alone. It gives you an idea of the impact Britain was still having after a hundred and twenty years of the US. Earlier and the effect is greater still. America experienced severe down swings whenever British capital was scarce in the 19th Century. A point worth addressing is the common "this actually massive proportion looks small to those who have not studied economies" argument is often employed. A simple thought to recall is that a 1% reduction may not seem to make any difference one year on but over 120 years results in an economy around 30% of its potential size without said reduction. There is a reason recessions feel painful even though nominally they might amount to economic contractions of close to zero in terms of the entire economy. There is a reason small dips in the growth rate can matter if they are sustained.

And your source for $730 million is?

As it was, the US GNP was $12.9 BILLION in 1896, so even if your $730 million figure is correct, that's about 5.6 percent. BFD.

Here's a useful source, Capital in the American Economy by Kuznets and Jenks, published by the NBER (US gov.); Kuznets won the 1971 Nobel for economics, so presumably his data is reliable.;)

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1454.pdf

The GNP figures for the 1890s and turn of the century are in Table R-23, page 557. Low figure in 1891-1900 is $12 billion (1894); high figure in the same decade is $17.9 billion (1900). The same table shows the interesting effect of US neutrality and then involvement in the First World War; GNP drops from $35 billion in 1913 to $34.6 billion in 1914, and then increases to $38.3 billion in 1915, $47.2 billion in 1916, $59.3 billion in 1917, and $65.9 billion in 1918.

One can dig through the tables and sourcing; bottom line, the US was a continental autarky, more than capable of generating its own investment capital and - of course - open to investment from, and in, Europe outside of the UK.

Best,
 
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If the war of 1812 goes worse with the loss of territory, I would speculate that the US is going to view with alarm a hostile Canada to the north. This would mean that it will be easier for a push for a stronger US Army to ensure that the Brits don't just come rolling down from the north. What this means in the long run is that Britain needs to maintain a larger standing army to to ensure that the US doen't get antsy with all the expense that this would entail.

Somewhat doubtful. Unless Britain is keeping the equivalent of the army in Spain in Canada the US will have little reason to maintain an army significantly larger than OTL. Sure IMO there will be a bigger army, but not one significantly so.

One of the reasons for this is that to do so requires higher taxes and overcoming the aversion to standing armies the US had historically. Both are difficult to do without a significant and permanent threat. Getting a larger Navy is easier by far.

Another thought: If the British are still angry about the revolution, how does this translate to their treatment of the other dominions such as Canada and Australia? Are they going to keep a tighter rein on them causing more strive when the urge toward local government begins in these places? This easily could get nasty for the English.

Depends on how restive said colonies could become. Considering the small populations, the dependence on Britain for many items, and their relative distance, I'm inclined to say Britain is no harsher on them than she was historically. Britain was rather eager to establish local governance as the years wore on.
 
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