Britain makes peace after Dunkirk impact on Barbarossa

@wiking : Lebensraum, the Slavic Untermenschen menace, the threat of communism...all levers Hitler can use to energize the Volk for the attack on Russia. The German people (not necessarily senior generals) went along quite nicely with Barbarossa at the same time they were fighting the UK/empire, attacking Yugoslavia/Greece, fighting with their Italian allies in North Africa, etc. In this scenario the same Nazi ideology that has entranced the german people is free to go after the main enemy (Soviet Judeo-Bolshevism) without distractions.
 

Deleted member 1487

@wiking : Lebensraum, the Slavic Untermenschen menace, the threat of communism...all levers Hitler can use to energize the Volk for the attack on Russia. The German people (not necessarily senior generals) went along quite nicely with Barbarossa at the same time they were fighting the UK/empire, attacking Yugoslavia/Greece, fighting with their Italian allies in North Africa, etc.
Not really. After all the German people were appalled by the attack on Poland and there was considerably more desire and reason for that war than there was for war with the USSR; Hitler's popularity plummeted as a result until the victory over France, something noted with glee by the quite anti-German William Shirer when he was a reporter in Germany in 1939-40. IOTL the war with the USSR was the beginning of the end of Hitler's popularity, which started dropping after the initial victories and never recovered. The OTL war with the USSR was something assembled in secret in the context of the existing war with the UK and presented as a fait accompli, which would be very different from the situation ITTL 1941.

In this scenario the same Nazi ideology that has entranced the german people is free to go after the main enemy (Soviet Judeo-Bolshevism) without distractions.
Yeah I think you're vastly overestimating how much Nazi ideology (such as there as a coherent one) or war was actually popular with the vast majority of Germans. Hitler's personal popularity (one of the few popular Nazis) was largely based on his overturning of the Treaty of Versailles, ending the political chaos that existed in the early 1930s in Germany, and job creation. Later the victory over France and the resulting flood of luxury goods into Germany, looted from the rest of Europe, massively boosted his popularity temporarily. By 1941 that was starting to fade as the war wasn't over and seemed to be escalating again.

Now that said Britain dropping out of the war in 1940 would have increased Hitler's already massive temporary popularity in 1940 because it would mean the war was over and won on the cheap with vast gains. Further war would be extremely unpopular and the build up to it without tipping Hitler's hand in terms of warning Stalin the invasion was coming would be noticeable in a way it wasn't IOTL due to the existing war with Britain. Hitler would pretty much have to do what he did IOTL to increase tensions to the point of war in 1939: create some issue to pick a fight with the USSR. He could claim the Soviets were building up to attack Germany or violating some agreements, but that would signal what was coming and Stalin would likely start actually preparing for war rather than be caught by surprise per OTL (actually that appears to be what Stalin and his general staff thought IOTL, that Hitler would create some pretext or incident and escalate to mobilization and war before invading rather than just sneak attacking all at once). So that is plausible that he would do that, but it would likely be unpopular and of course no surprise to the Soviets what was coming.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
They did of course. Production increased for a variety of reasons over the course of the war until peaking in some categories in 1944 despite the bombing.
wiking, unfortunately it seems that you still don't understand my meaning, maybe I should reframe: Was it possible for Germany to mobilize her economy to a total war economy sooner, if not, why?
 

Deleted member 1487

wiking, unfortunately it seems that you still don't understand my meaning, maybe I should reframe: Was it possible for Germany to mobilize her economy to a total war economy sooner, if not, why?
Define 'total war economy' and how it differed from the situation in Germany in 1940.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Define 'total war economy' and how it differed from the situation in Germany in 1940.
I assume he means something like the economy in 1943/1944, after Speer had ... "finalized" the economic reforms already begun by Todt as Minister responsible for armaments and ammunition.

Something like all-goods-embracing rationing-cards system, full 24/7 2-shift working system, not the 2-shifts-system with 'special-shifts' at weekends as still employed in 1940.


And my 2 cents about Hitler and popularity ...
As far as I read it Hitler was quite pissed in 1939 about the lacking war-enthusiasm the german people showed, though hje also was kinda 'surprized', that the wallies - esp. Britain - actually went to war for Poland ... though not very decisively or with much of a 'threatening' potential.
After a defeat of the wallies and a peace treaty with them he might be even more pissed about his raising popularity as "The Leader To And Lord Of PEAAAACE" - beside being a war monger by his heart - since his 'true' goals, extinction of the jewish race as well as by other human/subhuman beings emptied 'Lebensraum' would be far from realized with such a peace.


With these goals burning in his mind I would assume he and/or his 'underlings' would be able to manage some crisis similar as in late August/September with Stalins SU, ... like disputes about the trading agreements, like IOTL the 'uneasy' diplomatics due to non-consulting the other before between germany and the SU after the latter grab of the northern Bukowina or rhe 2nd Vianna award managed by Hitler and Mussolini.
Not to forget, that in about years time there might many opportunities to gather some international (US) support against the 'Red Scare'.

... What about some manufactured 'polish risings' causing the germans to station more 'security forces' in Poland and then - as a war cause - it is to be 'discovered' that there are/were polish 'insurgent troops' comming from the SU territory, sent by Stalin ?
Not to forget, that in about years time there might many opportunities to gather some international (US) support against the 'Red Scare'.


However, what I wonder is if Hitler - maniac he was - after a victory in the west would actually be able to wait until spring/summer 1941, his 'reputation' (not at least in his self-perception) as GRÖFAZ (Greatest Commander of all times) even more boosted ITTL.
 
IMO there is a huge difference in the level of tactical and operational surprise the Germans have.

AIUI: Stalin believed two things, neither entirely ridiculous, but committed so strongly to them (and their intersection) that he rejected all counter-evidence. The two things were:

1) It would be foolish, even irrational for Germany to attack the USSR in 1941, while still engaged with Britain, and deliberately walk into a two-front war. the Germans, even Hitler, were not fools or lunatics.

I think many today would agree that the first part of this was true; but Stalin misunderstood German thinking.

2) Britain wanted war between the USSR and Germany, and was conspiring to provoke it.

Stalin regarded imperialist, capitalist, monarchist Britain as an enemy, assumed Britain felt the same about the USSR, and therefore that Britain would be happy to see its two enemies fighting each other. He also looked at Britain's historical record of alliances in European wars, as it was often portrayed. Britain, opposing a Continental power, would seek out a Continental ally to do the heavy lifting, Britain would support that ally until Britain had achieved its own ends (such as colonial conquests), then make its own peace to its own advantage. "Perfidious Albion" would then abandon its erstwhile ally.

Stalin was absolutely determined not to be Britain's sucker. So he took steps to insure that no war with Germany could break out by accident or British provocation. One thing he feared was that Soviet troops would mistake some accidental exchange of fire on the German-Soviet border as a German attack, and respond with full-bore counterfire or a local counterattack. The Germans would take that as a Soviet attack, escalate their own combat actions, and the cycle would continue to a full war.

Therefore, he ordered troops along the German-Soviet to stand down from combat readiness. If they were prepared to fight, they were more likely to fight in reaction. If they weren't they couldn't.

.... more coming, Must sleep now... finish this post later.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
However, what I wonder is if Hitler - maniac he was - after a victory in the west would actually be able to wait until spring/summer 1941, his 'reputation' (not at least in his self-perception) as GRÖFAZ (Greatest Commander of all times) even more boosted ITTL.
Let me put some flesh to this bone ...

With the armistice of midth June with France as well as Britain and the expectation of a peace-treaty putting Britain on his side - as Hitler would most likely perceive it - the plans and preparations for Sealion until then become moot.

Instead, as Hitler mentioned IOTL towards Runstedt on 2nd June 1940, now Hitler has his "hands free" for his "great and true task/mission : to fight the Bolshevism." he orders - lets say around 20th June, a month earlier than IOTL (21st July after the british 'cold shoulder' became more n' more apparent) - a plan to invade the SU still this year ...

There WILL be quite some screaming, howling, pants-pissing-panicking. A major campaing still this years ?? ... when the summer has already almost endet ?? .. against and into bottomless, abysmal Russia ??
In a way he takes - once again - the militaries by surprize ... not only in having no plan at hands (as in 1939) but also regarding building up a possible reisitance political, as 1938 and lesser 1939 (Oster-group), as well as professional, as IOTL on several occasions. They will be pleading for a delay.

As it actually is rather late into the 'war-season' and the armed forces despite their flashing victory need some replentishing and recreation (not at least the industry as the army plan of 18th June to deminish the 'Heer' from 165 to 120 division was designed for) Hitler might be talked into kinda 'compromise' :
A two-stage-campaign with 'lesser' operations still this year but the 'finishing' move on full scale german operational strength in 1941 for the full campaign season of this year.

First :
A 'short' wintercampaign on hard, frozen soil that facilitates tank-operations (compared to rather unfavorable 'rasputiza'-conditions the germans knew of) from beginning of freezy weather end of November, beginning December.
(Don't forget : IOTL Brauchitsch claimed in front of Hitler, that it would take 80-100 division to defeat the Red Army in 4 - 6 weeks ...)
Second :
After reaching a line from the Gulf of Finnland Leningrad (besieged at least)-Smolensk-west of Kiew-Dnjepr-knee to the Sea of Azov (something like Gulf of Finnland-Narwa-Lake Peipus-Beresina-Kiew-Nikolajew-Black Sea might be more ... 'realistic', maybe also envisaged so by the generals but ... you know ... Hitler ... and his 'overconfidence' have to be 'served'...) there would be some digging-in for the time of the spring-rasputitza to be followed by an all-out attack on the maybe still existing remnants of the Red Army and SU after a thorough bombing campaign ... If the russians wouldn't have folded already due to the latter.

And on this preliminaries planning into more details might start 1st to 2nd week of July, parallel to the treaty-negotiations with the wallies.

Industry will be 'informed', winter clothing and long(er) range planes will be ordered (Russia is ... deeep), as for the "First strike" not the whole of the army as IOTL is needed it might actually stay on the 135 or even less divisional strenght ordered by Hitler on 13th July IOTL. Industry might also start to 'florish' in a way by access to the world markets on raw materials ... and trade with the US.

Hitler will ofc also do kinda 'Grand Tour' (Franco, Petain, Mussolini) as IOTL to gather support. Most likely also with the rest of the lot also, at least on diplomatic channels, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgary, probably also Yugoslavia and Greece, which ITTL will be part of the 'German Sphere' as negotiated with the Brits. Maybe there will also be some advances towards Turkey about some 'caucasian questions' they might have with the SU ... ofc only in the backrooms. Maybe less might be some advances in the Near East ... as IOTL also but ITTL more ... intense.

With and after the 2nd Vienna Award late August relations ... deteriorate further. Due to some 'favorable' deals on the world market the germans get reluctant and uncomfortable - for the SU - about its prolongation after February 1941 during their negotiations in Oktober.Maybe then also some ... 'tensions' in the polish territories also beginn ... finally culminating in some 'border problems', polish insurgents comming from the SU etc. and actually first week of December after the first 4-6 days of temperatures below freezing point (as IOTL, check weather charts available on the web) the german attack due to 'ongoing border violations supported by the SU begins.

Now : what would/could the SU aka Stalin have done with propably getting an idea at beginning August (at best) himself ? ... less than 4 month for whatever preparation ?
 
Top