If the British and French signed an armistice, the Germans wouldn’t get all the plunder from the West that they got IOTL. Plus no millions of POW laborers in the German economy. Even if the blockade is lifted, what do the Germans have to pay for imports? Keeping the UK in the war was an overall benefit to an expansionist Germany.
Sorry to highjack, but with no Crete, what would axis airborne operations be like in the USSR in 41/42
In the USAAF monographs written by Luftwaffe officers about the war in Russia said officers said that a division level airborne drop to help close the pockets in Belarus would have been a perfect mission for the FJs. The Minsk and especially the Smolensk pocket badly needed infantry to close and hold closed the pockets from the east as the motorized/panzer divisions lacked sufficient infantry for that role, especially as the campaign went on.Sorry to highjack, but with no Crete, what would axis airborne operations be like in the USSR in 41/42
2550 more airplanes that Luftwaffe can add to the blitzkrieg. Troops in the west not needed to occupy France and the low countries since there is Peace there now and those troops can be used in the Ukraine. Rommel and his Africa corps are now in Russia.
Where is that chart from?
The English translation of Bekkers 'Angriffeeshohe 3000' - 'Luftwaffe War Diaries' in English
Thanks, I'll check my copy of Brute Force, but based on other Luftwaffe books I have in english I can't find anything to back up those figures. I know there were serious production shortfalls caused by issues around the winding down of the Bf110 to phase in the Me210 and then the switch back, which also cost Bf109 production for some reason (about 2000 total aircraft according to Daniel Uziel's book "Arming the Luftwaffe") which happened in 1941-42. Similar issues happened with the He177 phase in around 1941-42 and also with the Ju288 project cancellation, which was a late 1941-42 issues as well.The English translation of Bekkers 'Angriffeeshohe 3000' - 'Luftwaffe War Diaries' in English. The numbers in the chart are lifted from Luftwaffe records, tho its not clear to me if Bekker drew directly from those or through another authors work. There is a extensive Bibliography, but along the way the citations of source for the numerous charts and other items disappeared. So, its difficult to tell what in the text connects to the sources in the back pages. My copy is a 1994 reprint and my brothers 1968 edition is long gone. Neither do I have a German version to cross check with. Alfred Price makes a similar point in his history of the Luftwaffe, tho I don't recall any slick charts on that specific subject. John Ellis in Brute Force may have made the same observation, but my copy was not returned, so i can't check his text.
Yet in 1941 phase in efforts for the He177, Ju288, and Me210 were made and then cancelled due to the technical failures of those aircraft. I haven't seen any thing in the history of those aircraft that they were cancelled or stopped development in 1940; I think Goering/Udet may have cancelled long term research projects in general, but probably exempted new aircraft models due in 1941-42 as it seems development work on them continued uninterrupted in 1940-42, as they were all supposed to be ready in 1941-42.The accompanying text in Beakers narrative talks about Udets decision in the spring of 1940 to cancel all long term projects. Anything not expected to be operational in 1940 was postponed or canceled for production. That seemed to be in response to Goering instruction to conserve materials. The text does not indicate when production for the new models was revived.
...So either Ellis or Udet/Bekker's numbers or off by a month.
Per your attachment the author claimed that "The arrogant assumption of the German leaders from time to time that the war was as good as won found eloquent expression in the ups and downs of the aircraft production graph. After each successful campaign it dropped."I don't see any of this as contradicting Bekkers narrative. It actually ties in. With limits on resources there would be a limit on the operational strength of the air force, or target strength & therefore overproduction above that goal would be necessarily avoided.