Britain Expands Royal Marines into a Expeditionary/Amphibious Force

At the risk of derailing the thread these are the sizes of the UK's and USMC's in 1980 taken from Dunnigan's 'How to Make War'

UK 7,200
US 185,000

How would a RM Expeditionary Force look like?

Would you be able to equip one with the limited manpower available especially aircraft and helicopters?

How would this effect the RN in relation to LPD's & LSL's commissioned?

How would the operation to retake the Falklands pan out with a full RMEF in service? . . . possibly no need for the Para's?

Regards filers

Have you read Amphibious Assault Falklands by Michael Clapp? From it I gather the plan was to use the RM Brigade reinforced with Paras and some Army such as the light tanks to secure a beach and reinforce with a second Army Brigade moving ashore to conduct the full retaking of the Falklands. Thus it appears that the minimum size force would be one complete RM Brigade and a second out-of-area capable Army Brigade (if not two RM Brigades). I am thinking you are needing @10,000 men to send in two fairly well equipped Brigades, possessing light armor, light artillery, helicopters, Air Defense, logistics, etc., not just a truly light infantry force.

In my tinkering with no WWII I had to assume no Commandos are devised and the RMs remain what we might call "medium" infantry, leg mobile (or trucks attached as needed) with regular heavy weapons and light artillery but not mechanized nor truly light like Paras. This may still look more like a mountain infantry unit than a heavier infantry outfit but if the RMs can hold a sea mobile reinforcing mission for distant garrisons long enough then it should be at least a Brigade sized and decently equipped force to demand some specialist shipping, rather than just fall back to "raiding" craft and be a specialist bunch to hold on to the Dieppe mission legacy. And the Army might evolve into Armoured/Mechanized and light (i.e. Para) formations, leaving the RMs to hold on to traditional infantry in the middle. Here the Marines can pair with a "heavy" Army formation or be reinforced by the paras who are disciplined enough to conduct a movement by boat and offer good infantry ashore. The LSLs were Army budgeted to move its equipment so I think you need more to give our Marines better logistics lift and likely three LPDs to move two Battalions with the reinforcing stuff. But one might substitute a true Commando Carrier with Helicopters for the third Battalion that still needs sea lift or you could still use something like SS Canberra and forgo vertical lift the way the USMC sees it. I think you need some LSDs to move more landing craft and one might also use them to move some troops and add deck space for helicopters. All this is a bigger budget slice that competes with the Army and if you want OOA then you have at least the Paras vying and the RAF promising air lift instead that demands money. If you screw the Army and let the Paras go extinct then I think you might stretch out to two Brigades worth once all reservists are called in, that makes the RN the foremost defender of the Empire so I am guessing more of it remains to defend? Army fades to local Battalions? The RAF concedes everything but V-force bombers and home air defense?
 
Actually the Marines were working on doctrine for Amphibious Warfare in the 20s, although the the commitments in the Banana Wars and China meant there wasn't much money or personnel available. Likewise the USN was doing some very preliminary work on landing craft, none of which worked out. It was the early 1930s when all of this took off. While there was some preliminary design work on the LST, not much else was done. More than the equipment, there was the issue of doctrine which is what the Marines spent several years working on in the early 30s - combat loading, fire support, air support, medical etc. None of this was on the radar for the UK during the 20s and 30s. The experience of Gallipoli had right and truly poisoned the idea of amphibious assault (as opposed to raids) and the UK forces did not want to touch this with a 10 foot pole.
 
None of this was on the radar for the UK during the 20s and 30s. The experience of Gallipoli had right and truly poisoned the idea of amphibious assault (as opposed to raids) and the UK forces did not want to touch this with a 10 foot pole.

Apart from the brigade sized amphibious exercises in 1936 and 1938...

The plans for the exercise were meticulous and included a 15-foot model of the Slapton shoreline. The men were brought ashore in cutters and whalers and in lifeboats. Guns, tanks and lorries were landed from flat-bottomed craft. Tracks of heavy canvass with a heavy wire mesh were laid on the shingle to the water’s edge and these proved sufficient to get machinery across the beach. (Source for this paragraph – clicking on this brings up a pdf of an Information Display from Slapton Village.)

https://tumblestoneblog.wordpress.c...ce-of-a-shingle-beach-the-1943-44-evacuation/
 
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