Brilliant Defense ...

This is more a question rather than a stated timeline. Lets say that some how some way, the Fooler (Hilter) is convinced that his insane static and inflexible defense isn't going to work and the entire Eastern front adopts a strategy in the East to simply holding ground and bleeding the Soviets dry with miles and miles of planned defenses, withdraws, anti-tank focuses, concentrated strategic counter attacks, calculated retreats ect. Is it feasible to envision Russian manpower bleeding out in a realistic war time frame or could they have kept on feeding men into the grinder til 1990 if they had too? By 45, the Germans were continually outnumbered in manpower like 12-15 to 1. But if adopted early enough, is there any chance Germany manages to cause real problems to the Soviet fighting strength? Obviously the Germans are still going to be facing insane number of planes, guns, and especially tanks but while the German industry was incapable of matching tank for tank they might have have been able to counter the odds with 5 anti-tank guns for every T-34. Just some thoughts about a ATL with German digging in for the long haul in either November 41, Fall 42, or April 43. I've never seen any numbers concerning soviet manpower reserves in 1945.
 
From what I heard the Red Army was on its last legs in terms of manpower reserves by 1945. They were scraping the bottom of the barrel or so to speak (logical with 20 million casualties). So yes it could have happened IMHO.

Note that part of that cane be blamed on Stalin's interference. His "stand or die" order caused millions of casualties in the first six months of the war and Zhukov is also overrated. Sure, his offensives were successful usually but he suffered high casualties (see Stalingrad where the Red Army suffered at least as much casualties as the Germans).
 
This is more a question rather than a stated timeline. Lets say that some how some way, the Fooler (Hilter) is convinced that his insane static and inflexible defense isn't going to work and the entire Eastern front adopts a strategy in the East to simply holding ground and bleeding the Soviets dry with miles and miles of planned defenses, withdraws, anti-tank focuses, concentrated strategic counter attacks, calculated retreats ect. Is it feasible to envision Russian manpower bleeding out in a realistic war time frame or could they have kept on feeding men into the grinder til 1990 if they had too? By 45, the Germans were continually outnumbered in manpower like 12-15 to 1. But if adopted early enough, is there any chance Germany manages to cause real problems to the Soviet fighting strength? Obviously the Germans are still going to be facing insane number of planes, guns, and especially tanks but while the German industry was incapable of matching tank for tank they might have have been able to counter the odds with 5 anti-tank guns for every T-34. Just some thoughts about a ATL with German digging in for the long haul in either November 41, Fall 42, or April 43. I've never seen any numbers concerning soviet manpower reserves in 1945.

There was a good reason the Germans used Blitzkrieg tactics. Knocking out an opponent early was the only way they could be successful since they knew they would be fighting a war on multiple fronts. Truth is, no matter how many weapons the Nazi war machine could manufacture, they still needed people to man them, and even if they did bleed the Soviets dry, the scorched earth policy enacted made a lot of the lebensraum the Germans were going for worthless plots of land. Personally, I think Hitler invading Russia was a stupid idea to begin with. I'm sure Napoleon would vouch for that.
 
Firstly, the Germans were never "outnumbered as 12-15 to 1". Even in mid-April 1945 near Berlin the Red Army had 2,5 million against the Wehrmacht's 1 million, while the Western Allies outnumbered the German armies in France on June 6, 1944 as 3 to 1.
Secondly, Soviet manpower reserves by spring of 1945 were nearing exhaustion. On 25th of October, 1944, the State Committee of Defense had announced draft of men born in 1927, that is, seventeen-year-old boys. It means that all older cohorts eligible to service were drafted earlier and, consequently, there were no manpower reserves left. In May, 1945, the Red Army had 11,4 million of soldiers. It couldn't be enlarged much beyond that number.
Does it mean that the Wehrmacht could bleed the Red Army white by brilliant defense? I doubt it. The Soviets, as a rule, lost more men defending their positions (because of encirclements, loss of morale and so on) than assaulting German trenches. Thus, more defensive German course of action would most likely decrease Soviet losses.
 
Firstly, the Germans were never "outnumbered as 12-15 to 1". Even in mid-April 1945 near Berlin the Red Army had 2,5 million against the Wehrmacht's 1 million, while the Western Allies outnumbered the German armies in France on June 6, 1944 as 3 to 1.
Secondly, Soviet manpower reserves by spring of 1945 were nearing exhaustion. On 25th of October, 1944, the State Committee of Defense had announced draft of men born in 1927, that is, seventeen-year-old boys. It means that all older cohorts eligible to service were drafted earlier and, consequently, there were no manpower reserves left. In May, 1945, the Red Army had 11,4 million of soldiers. It couldn't be enlarged much beyond that number.
Does it mean that the Wehrmacht could bleed the Red Army white by brilliant defense? I doubt it. The Soviets, as a rule, lost more men defending their positions (because of encirclements, loss of morale and so on) than assaulting German trenches. Thus, more defensive German course of action would most likely decrease Soviet losses.

Hmmmm, it must be that I've seen those statistics but in specific battles or parts of the front. That or I've mixed manpower ratios with some of the tank or production figures in certain battles. Still though even that 2.5:1 is a bit unrealistic as the age and quality of the German army by this time probably adds to the soviet advantage. Volkstrum are not included that I'm assuming?

Interesting fact about that 44 draft. That's very telling. I agree that most of the losses were inflicted in the early 'kettle' battles of 41. But, do you think that large part of the reason for the lack of the offensive casualties is that the Hitler refusing any kind of intelligent policies only reversed that trend in favor of the Red Army? If the Germans are allowed to entrap soviet armies and use calculated assaults and counter attacks I think that the German leadership could have lured and destroyed a lot of Russian troops if given the chance. Stalin would have been whipping Russian offensives into rushed gains, particularly early on. Add to that prepared defensive lines, miles of anti tank corridors in strategic locations, and armored reserves numbered and intact enough to create situations for encirclement and it seems that continued wounds could be inflicted. With an economy prepared for such a conflict, the Germans would be the ones to trade territory for time, and only get closer to their logistic centers.

Have a percentage in mind for chance of success if started at earlier opportunity? 20% chance?
 
Volkstrum are not included that I'm assuming?
They are included. So, the Red Army in April 1945 had not only huge quantitative, but also significant qualitative advantage over the Germans.
I agree that most of the losses were inflicted in the early 'kettle' battles of 41. But, do you think that large part of the reason for the lack of the offensive casualties is that the Hitler refusing any kind of intelligent policies only reversed that trend in favor of the Red Army? If the Germans are allowed to entrap soviet armies and use calculated assaults and counter attacks I think that the German leadership could have lured and destroyed a lot of Russian troops if given the chance. Stalin would have been whipping Russian offensives into rushed gains, particularly early on. Add to that prepared defensive lines, miles of anti tank corridors in strategic locations, and armored reserves numbered and intact enough to create situations for encirclement and it seems that continued wounds could be inflicted.
The Germans were allowed to entrap assaulting Soviet armies. They did it near Kharkov in May, 1942, in the Crimea the same month and year, near Kharkov again in March, 1943. However, Hitler did not allow to give much of territory back for the operational advantage, and it made sense: each long-term German retreat meant new grain fields feeding the Soviet Armed Forces, new enterprises rebuilt by the Soviets, new men drafted in the Red Army, new airfields for the Soviet Air Force nearer to German supplies depots - and loss of the manpower, arable land, bases and so on for Germany.
With an economy prepared for such a conflict, the Germans would be the ones to trade territory for time, and only get closer to their logistic centers.
The problem was (for the Wehrmacht) that the Red Army relied not only on the weak Soviet economy, but also on the American and British economies. Consequently, time worked for the Soviets and against the Germans. At the same time, the German economy struggled to find necessary resources, and it was next to impossible to refrain (for reasons of high strategy) from the offensive actions, for example, in the Caucasus area, because Germany needed oil too badly, and even higher reasons of war economy played their role there.
Have a percentage in mind for chance of success if started at earlier opportunity? 20% chance?
What is the success?
More German territory occupied by the Western armies? Yes, it was possible, but it could be done even easier in 1944 by surrendering of the Western front (if only the Western Allies would break their agreements with the USSR, and occupy all Germany).
Soviet defeat? Impossible, at least after 1941. The USSR had more men and more armaments, because the USA were ready to help the Soviets as much as they could. To prevent victory of the Soviets you'd need to change American policy towards their great Communist ally.
In any case, the fate of Germany after early December, 1941 was decided in Washington, Moscow and London, not in Berlin.
 

Bearcat

Banned
IF* Hitler had eschewed Kursk, built proper defensive lines in depth, with lots of mines, behind his front line, then retreated into them, IMO he could have gotten a stalemate on the eastern front, until the Allies land in Normandy. War lasts well into 1945, and Allies meet further east. Americans and Brits and Canadians and French probably liberate Czechs and a few other central European countries.

This requires of course, ASB. Hitler would never agree to any such thing.

And it only buys time. Germany might with difficulty, hold off the Red Army. But it can't hold off them AND the western Allies as well.

The Red Army would be weaker post-war but how much we can only guess.
 
as was said before, this is purely academic, even if the germans manage to establish some kind of stalemate in the east, the western allies are more than capable of arriving in Berlin by late 1945. Even assuming that the Germans also manage to hold off the WAllies too, the A bomb will be ready soon, so eventually you will see a defeated Nazi Germany by the end of '45.

The real interesting question is, what happens in the Pacific. With at least one A-bomb used up, the US only has one war ender which may not be enough. Secondly the Russians are going to be pretty worn out so they may not be able to back up a DoW on Japan. May we see Operation Olympic carried out or is Truman going to wait for a third bomb to be made ready?

Another interesting note is what will Churchill and Truman do with the extra territory in Europe that have gotten in the war? Do they abide by the previously agreed upon borders? or do they throw Tehran out the window and strong arm stalin into accepting a less advantageous position post war.
 

Bearcat

Banned
as was said before, this is purely academic, even if the germans manage to establish some kind of stalemate in the east, the western allies are more than capable of arriving in Berlin by late 1945. Even assuming that the Germans also manage to hold off the WAllies too, the A bomb will be ready soon, so eventually you will see a defeated Nazi Germany by the end of '45.

The real interesting question is, what happens in the Pacific. With at least one A-bomb used up, the US only has one war ender which may not be enough. Secondly the Russians are going to be pretty worn out so they may not be able to back up a DoW on Japan. May we see Operation Olympic carried out or is Truman going to wait for a third bomb to be made ready?

Another interesting note is what will Churchill and Truman do with the extra territory in Europe that have gotten in the war? Do they abide by the previously agreed upon borders? or do they throw Tehran out the window and strong arm stalin into accepting a less advantageous position post war.

Doubtless the borders agreed upon at Teheran and Yalta would reflect the different realities. The likelihood of Western allies getting to Berlin first anyway would change some calculations. Poland has much more chance of a democratic government, and the Czechs are nearly a sure thing.

As for Japan, there was a third bomb available at the end of the war (components just needed to be assembled I believe).

Olympic I think would be delayed as the full likelihood of casualties became apparent and starvation would be allowed to force the Japanese to surrender sooner or later.
 
Probably the shrewdest defensive implement the Germans could have staked themselves to would have been the Wasserfall surface to air missle.

Had the Germans thrown all their initial rocket r&d into the development and production of an effective SAM, there's a good chance that, combined with their already excellent flack guns, they could have inflicted losses on U.S. and British bomber forces so heavy that the air raids on their industrial infrastructure in western Germany would have ground to a halt until the allies developed a heavy bomber capable of flying above the operational ceiling of the Wasserfalls before they could resume bombing operations. This could delay production of the B-29 as the requirements would have to account for SAMs.

Had Germany managed to shutdown U.S. and British air raids against the heart of their industrial complex, the Germans could have developed and more importantly produced in greater quantity, weapons like Panzerfausts, Gewehr 41/43 semi-automatic infantry rifles, Mkb 42(H)/Stg. 44 assault rifles, MG 42 machineguns, and increased tank production to stop the Russian advance at some point short of Germany and perhaps launch a counter-offensive to push the Russian back either to the old Soviet borders at least or perhaps into European Russia not to mention steady development of the Me 262s, an effective long range heavy bomber and advanced "Elektroboot" subs. The E-Boats would be of more use in the Atlantic, obviously, but the Me 262s would serve the defensive perimeter on both fronts (and support an eastern counter offensive) very well and heavy bombers would be leveling Russian industrial bases and killing war production and the ecconomy, allong with millions of Russians.

In the end, the best Germany could play for in the east would be to keep the Russians out of eastern Europe, which, with more shrewd technological development, could probably be accomplished.

Thing is, tactics and technology are meaningless when you consider that Hitler would have fought the war until killed. So long as Hitler and his fanatic core are in power, they'll prosecute the war against the Soviets (which without nukes is unwinnable, and the Germans aren't getting nukes, even with their heavy water plant in tact). With The West, so long as they try to maintain The Reich, (and they continue to occupy western European countries) there cannot be peace.
 

Deleted member 1487

The ultimate bottleneck was resources, not production. In 1944 the Germans went full tilt with production, using up their stockpiles of resources to create enough equipment to stem the tide, meaning that by 1945 production would not be able to maintain even half the output as the previous year.

The best hope would be to slow the Russians in Ukraine, maintaining the resources in the East, especially Romanian oil, for as long as possible.

The worst that the bombing campaign did was to chew up the logistics of the German rail nets. By doing that, important resources and products synthetic oil could not reach the necessary places. Let's not even mention food.

The very best thing that could have been done about the air war was to have an entirely different Luftwaffe leadership before the Battle of Britain. By having an efficient replacement system, ie rotating aces back to training schools to impart combat experience instead of the "fly 'til you die" Goering method, then the airwar could have stayed favorable for much long. That and not fighting the Battle of Britain.

I am convinced that a Mediterranean option in 1940 after the fall of France would have netted the best results: LW forces in Italy and North Africa, taking Malta while it was not very well defended, coordinating with Mussolini better and preventing him from invading Greece, intervening earlier in Africa.

It wouldn't hurt to actually release some LW assets to the navy to help them spot for U-boots.

As the invading Russia, I do think that was the right decision. Stalin did not trust Hitler and was going to attack him when he was strong enough, which is why it was better to do it when Germany was strongest, not Russia. Obviously the campaign could be better conducted, but that would mean changing the generals, many of whom made the bad decisions before 1943.

A breakout attempt at Stalingrad could not have hurt, the first of many bad decisions made by Hitler.

Kursk, the next major one, if launched in May when it was originally supposed to, could have resulted in a much better outcome, leaving the Soviets unable to respond effectively. OTL, with nearly two more months of perparation, when the majority of the defense positions were built, the Russians were still beat up, but able to launch three counter offensives in short order, wrecking the German armored forces. No doubt that similar attacks could be made at other places on the front, but I doubt their effect would be the same if the Kursk salient was properly chopped off.
Also, by having the attack not occur at the same time as the Sicily Italy invasion, forces can be switched around with more ease than was the case OTL especially if the post-Kursk Russian offensives had already occurred by July.

Thereafter, a mobile defense, not necessarily the backhand blow of Manstein, coupled with a more competent Luftwaffe and the war could very well go on until the Soviets are running major manpower deficits. The longer it takes to capture the Ukraine and other occupied Russian territories, means the less manpower the Soviets will have available and the more conscription in their current territories, thus faster reduction of available manpower. It could end up a vicious cycle where the Soviets potentially have enough men, only they are under German control and offensives are launched simply to liberate more manpower for recruiting.

Of course all this presupposes the Germans to make much better decisions than historical, so nothing is certain.
 

Markus

Banned
From what I heard the Red Army was on its last legs in terms of manpower reserves by 1945. They were scraping the bottom of the barrel or so to speak (logical with 20 million casualties). So yes it could have happened IMHO.

I agree. The Red Army was well equipped and experienced but in terms of manpower they were past the point of exhaustion in 1945. Freed forced laborers were drafted right away, the armies of Bulgaria and Romania taken over wholesale, polish units had been raised a long time ago and hungarian ones were in the making.

With a flexible defence the WH could have bled the Red Army white at a much earlier time, not to mention preserved a great deal of it own manpower.

The end result would be several nukes being wasted on Germany and thus pretty bad post war relations between Germany and the USA -especially from the 60´s onwards- but since much of eastern europe would have avoided being "liberated" by the Stalin, Germany would have been less important in a Cold War.
 
The Germans were allowed to entrap assaulting Soviet armies. They did it near Kharkov in May, 1942, in the Crimea the same month and year, near Kharkov again in March, 1943. However, Hitler did not allow to give much of territory back for the operational advantage, and it made sense: each long-term German retreat meant new grain fields feeding the Soviet Armed Forces, new enterprises rebuilt by the Soviets, new men drafted in the Red Army, new airfields for the Soviet Air Force nearer to German supplies depots - and loss of the manpower, arable land, bases and so on for Germany.

Kharkov 42 is actually a good example. Without adopting a purely defensive strategy and working to develop lines of defense, the Germans were still able to use the Soviet offensives and destroy and entrap the armies as you say. On a side note, and almost funny, but it seems that the soviet offensives were so uncoordinated and they misused their armor such that the German commanders did not even acknowledge the moves as planned actions. . The Germans were still capable of taking advantage of that 'operation advantage' as they had the armor and equipment to do so. I think they could have repeated this for a long time ... all the while greatly limiting Soviet success and make any advances very very costly in tanks and troops. While stalling the Soviets from the grain, manpower and enterprises you rightly mentioned. As the OTL Germans grinded away those forces needed for such operations they lost the ability forever. Especially after Kursk the armor forces needed were simply not there. If adopting a purely flexible defense I still think they might have managed a full bleeding of the soviets. I think with proper armor reserves/forces they could check and counter just about any offensive the soviets could have thrown at them. Again this is allowing for the German forces utilizing OTL wasted (as in Kursk) and destroyed (Say in 42/43 Operation Blue II) forces as well as (ATL) newly produced anti-tank forces. [edit] I don't mean hold the entire front but offer a push and shove to the front that enabled the Germans severely punish soviet forces for every gain all while retaining the threat and use of real counter attacks to the flanks of any soviet pushes. Soviet gains in late 43 and throughout the rest of the war went without any real German chance to do this. I think German commanders were begging as late as January 45 for Hitler allow the use of the remaining Panzer forces in just this manner rather than the slow attrition of fighting for every square mile while retreating straight West. I think it was a proper use of forces used later in Operation Solstice. [Edit]

And you are right. I should have been more clear ... I was asking about the chances or possibility of the Germans bleeding the Soviets to the point where manpower became a critical soviet issue or even deciding one on the Eastern Front not total Axis victory. I think if such tactics were decided on (ASB when you keep the Fooler in charge) then you just have a delayed VE Day and much more options for Central Europe. That seems to be where the topic has turned.

Are we certain of a German atomic strike over Japanese one in 45? The Germans might be delaying the European theater but it still seems like the Allied leadership (especially Anglo-American) would be able to see final victory as just a matter of time. Japan probably looked like a cornered animal still very dangerous in the fight and with limited bombs to use, it seems like Japan still might see a couple cities vanish before giving up.
Someone mentioned the possibility that the Soviets might not have the will or manpower to actually finally come through on the agreement to DoW Japan. If they are not able to do this, does that free up the Western Allies to demand democratic Poland, Baltics, ect? Of is that still too far fetched? Was there an actual 'trade' in getting the Soviets to go to war with Japan? I know FDR was obsessed with getting Uncle Joe into the UN ... but was there something else sacrificed for the Red Army pouncing on the Japs? Just thinking of the butterflies and effects a more successful Eastern front has on the legacy of the ending and post-war world in contrast to our Soviet dominated OTL.
 
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Markus

Banned
Are we certain of a German atomic strike over Japanese one in 45? The Germans might be delaying the European theater but it still seems like the Allied leadership (especially Anglo-American) would be able to see final victory as just a matter of time.

Point taken! If they are at the german borders dropping the very few nukes they got on Germany does not make much sense, especially not in light of the situation in the Pacific. And in light of failures and missed opportunities like Falaise, M-G and the BoB, the western allies will be at the border by the time they got nukes, probably even across the border.
 
Someone mentioned the possibility that the Soviets might not have the will or manpower to actually finally come through on the agreement to DoW Japan. If they are not able to do this, does that free up the Western Allies to demand democratic Poland, Baltics, ect? Of is that still too far fetched? Was there an actual 'trade' in getting the Soviets to go to war with Japan? I know FDR was obsessed with getting Uncle Joe into the UN ... but was there something else sacrificed for the Red Army pouncing on the Japs? Just thinking of the butterflies and effects a more successful Eastern front has on the legacy of the ending and post-war world in contrast to our Soviet dominated OTL.
Firstly, the Manchurian operation involved only a fraction of the Red Army's might. So, the USSR would be able to attack Japan even having suffered greater losses in European war.
Secondly, the Baltic states in 1945 had not a single chance to become independent again. Stalin, as well as all Soviet leadership (and majority of the citizenry) intended to restore the Union at least as large as it was on June 22, 1941. To give up three republics only because the USA said to do so, would be impossible. As for Polish question... Well, the USSR was ready to allow some form of multi-party system as long as it didn't obstruct Soviet military and economic interests. So, relatively independent Poland was possible even in OTL. But fully independent Polish state without Soviet army garrisons, with strong ties with the Western powers would be intolerable from the Soviet point of view.
 
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