Bourbon Restoration question

So I've been doing research on the last years of the Bourbon restoration and the July revolution for a while now and some things I've come across doesn't add up. Everyone always says that the Bourbons were highly unpopular and would have been overthrown eventually but what I found makes this seem wrong. The July revolution was a Parisian affair, not a nation wide uprising or protest like the 1789 revolution. So if Charles X had stuck to his guns and ordered the army (I found them to be surprisingly loyal from my research) into the capital to breakup the uprising, would this lead to the Bourbons keeping the throne or would it cause a real nation-wide revolt?
 
It was more than just Paris, there was also opposition in some of the other towns but basically yes. The Army was basically loyal and this was still the era when a whiff of grapeshot could do the job.
 
It was more than just Paris, there was also opposition in some of the other towns but basically yes. The Army was basically loyal and this was still the era when a whiff of grapeshot could do the job.

Yeah that's what I was thinking as well. Most of the revolts seemed to be limited to the Île-de-France.
 

Razgriz 2K9

Banned
So I've been doing research on the last years of the Bourbon restoration and the July revolution for a while now and some things I've come across doesn't add up. Everyone always says that the Bourbons were highly unpopular and would have been overthrown eventually but what I found makes this seem wrong. The July revolution was a Parisian affair, not a nation wide uprising or protest like the 1789 revolution. So if Charles X had stuck to his guns and ordered the army (I found them to be surprisingly loyal from my research) into the capital to breakup the uprising, would this lead to the Bourbons keeping the throne or would it cause a real nation-wide revolt?

That's actually a good question, and one I can't really give a definitive answer to. I question whether or not the army would be able to break up the uprising, because while the army was generally loyal, some of its members probably had deserted to join the uprising, plus the unpopularity was actually a nation-wide affair rather than restricted to Paris or Ile-de-France in general, so it is quite likely there would be a nation-wide revolt.

I feel Charles X probably should not have bothered with a foreign expedition, and focused on building up the army to well...do like dictators do, clamp down on the liberals and revolutionaries and end this silly democracy.
 
Everyone always says that the Bourbons were highly unpopular and would have been overthrown eventually but what I found makes this seem wrong
You're somewhat right : while present, the anti-Bourbon feeling is toned down by the return of the peace (critically with the end of coalised occupation). Louis XVIII manages, by a moderate right-wing policy, to avoid a counter-revolutionnary policy.
But while saying they were "highly unpopular" is an huge exaggeration, you had a resentment towards the dynasty.
First, depsite the tentative of Charles X, the king is no longer considered as a sacred ruler : the persona forming the unity of the three orders of french society died with them. As the king became a "secular" ruler, he eventually was taken as responsible of events. (Something not really true before 1789, where kings were depicted as victims of the court or ministers for what went wrong).

Second, the occupation and the loss of power in Restauration certainly played : all the efforts made by french during more than twenty-six years were void. Of course the desire of peace compensated that at first, but it eventually had an impact at least on intelligentia : I won't limit the influence there, tough, would it be only for the "demi-soldes" the former napoleonian army officers that are considered as suspects (and therefore must go trough operations of police for any public act and for recieve half of a pension).

Eventually, Charles X reign is at least in urban France (that if still minoritary is growing and boiling, being really active political centers) unpopular : tenant of what we could call a far-right conception of the Charte and with a fierce anti-liberal stance (while liberal influence is precisely growing fast) made him unpopular (the suppression of Garde Nationale is another exemple)
Would have he stop his policy soon enough, tough, (and while I don't think he would have plausibly), he probably wouldn't have been overthrown at least as quickly.

The July revolution was a Parisian affair, not a nation wide uprising or protest like the 1789 revolution.
Mostly because things didn't escalated and were resolved quickly : you can't expect a three-day urban revolt to turn into a nationwide revolution.
In fact, you really have to wait for that the parisians uprisings' effects on other towns and province.
The schema is relativly similar : a preparation for revolutionnary changes by royal power (while this preparation was willing for pre-1789 situation), urban policies hostile to far-right reaction.

So if Charles X had stuck to his guns and ordered the army (I found them to be surprisingly loyal from my research) into the capital to breakup the uprising, would this lead to the Bourbons keeping the throne or would it cause a real nation-wide revolt?
Well, Charles X did declared Paris in siege OTL but as the army was sent for the Algiers Expedition, there were 8 000 men in the military region of the capital. The royal orders were explicitly to "hold firm".
I don't see what he could have done, except trying a brutal slaughter that giving his forces were likely to be short and giving liberals support of other towns (while possibly the support of Saint Alliance)
In the second day of the revolt, the army was loyal but already asked Charles X to give up the ordonnances and his policy if he wanted to keep the throne. So loyal, but desabused.
 
That's actually a good question, and one I can't really give a definitive answer to. I question whether or not the army would be able to break up the uprising, because while the army was generally loyal, some of its members probably had deserted to join the uprising, plus the unpopularity was actually a nation-wide affair rather than restricted to Paris or Ile-de-France in general, so it is quite likely there would be a nation-wide revolt.

I feel Charles X probably should not have bothered with a foreign expedition, and focused on building up the army to well...do like dictators do, clamp down on the liberals and revolutionaries and end this silly democracy.

This is the link to what I found about the army in 1815-1830, it give great info :http://www.reenactor.ru/ARH/PDF/Holroyd.pdf

From what I've read the army was highly loyal to the King, with the new cadets being taught to respect the King and his power. Not to mention the army disliked the bourgeoisie and their claims to power. Remember the Napoleonic empire was just as absolute as the ancien regime and the Bourbon restoration so I can't see that many Napoleonic officers siding with the mobs.

And I agree, the unpopularity of Charles X was nationwide but the only uprisings were in Paris and the areas around it. I get the feeling that for the most part the French people were apathetic toward the various governments of the 19th century, not really caring either way. Most of the revolutions and uprisings, like the July revolution, the June days, the February revolution or the Paris commune, were solely the work the Parisian mobs and didn't have any full-scale support in the provinces. So I'm unsure if a crackdown in the capital would trigger a nationwide uprising or not.

And to Algeria, your both right and wrong. I can see why the Bourbon government would want to invade, using a foreign victory to distract the population from the problems at home.It has worked before and I can see why they would think it would work again. But sending away loyalist troops in a time of crisis probably wasn't the wisest thing to do. It would have been better to do both. Send regiments of questionable loyalty to invade and occupy Algeria while keeping the Loyalists at home. Really from what I read the Royal Guard (created in 1815 to replace the Military Household as the main guards of the Crown) should have been strong enough to put down the revolts.
 
This is the link to what I found about the army in 1815-1830, it give great info :http://www.reenactor.ru/ARH/PDF/Holroyd.pdf

According this document, the army was still largely defiant towards the king, at least during the first half of Louis XVIII's reign. The identification of king as chief of armies certainly managed to tone down the imperial nostalgias (and the epuration of army probably helped as well).

"The army was no longer a national institution but a privilegied minority", a refuge for provincial elites, but at the cost of non-politicized stance, and to have a self-reference.

I would wonder how much their behavior in 1830 isn't more a stance for their social place rather than the blind devotion that the author depict. Once his role confirmed by Louis-Philippe, who made of this army a symbol of union between revolutionnaries and monarchist legacies, they didn't adopted a legitimist stance or helped them politically.

I can't see that many Napoleonic officers siding with the mobs.
I disagree : many napoleonic officers were taken from rank, and as they representated a possible link between mobs and army, most of them were fired with half a pension and forced to regitred regularly to authorities (while it was admittedly diversly enforced). As I said in my previous post, the imperial memory knew at the same time (with the rise of french Romantism) its first growth.

And I agree, the unpopularity of Charles X was nationwide but the only uprisings were in Paris and the areas around it..
Again, as I posted above, three or four days of uprising are not likely to launch a nation-wide revolt.

Most of the revolutions and uprisings, like the July revolution, the June days, the February revolution or the Paris commune, were solely the work the Parisian mobs and didn't have any full-scale support in the provinces.
I can't stress it enough : French Revolution of 1789 had nation-wide revolts because it was a longer process. You can't seriously expect revolts taking place and resolved in mere days to have this impact.
June Days happen only in Paris because it's about the closure of Ateliers Nationaux that existed only in Paris. It's like wondering why Scots didn't revolted in 1916, if you pardon me the comparison.

Finally, you're wrong on your last exemple. The communal movement wasn't limited to Paris and you have a serie of, while short-lived, many provincial Communes. The most famous is Marseille's but we could quote Toulouse, St-Etienne, Le Creusot, Narbonne.

But sending away loyalist troops in a time of crisis probably wasn't the wisest thing to do. It would have been better to do both. Send regiments of questionable loyalty to invade and occupy Algeria while keeping the Loyalists at home.
Giving the situation in France then, it was taking the risk of a mutiny that would have definitly weakened the royal power.

Really from what I read the Royal Guard (created in 1815 to replace the Military Household as the main guards of the Crown) should have been strong enough to put down the revolts.
I don't think so : when Charles X dissolved the National Guard, it created a group of still armed angry lower classes in Paris. Giving its impopularity in the capital at this time, he could have enforced a bloody repression but the troops would have been eventually taken down by mere numbers.
 
According this document, the army was still largely defiant towards the king, at least during the first half of Louis XVIII's reign. The identification of king as chief of armies certainly managed to tone down the imperial nostalgias (and the epuration of army probably helped as well).

"The army was no longer a national institution but a privilegied minority", a refuge for provincial elites, but at the cost of non-politicized stance, and to have a self-reference.

I would wonder how much their behavior in 1830 isn't more a stance for their social place rather than the blind devotion that the author depict. Once his role confirmed by Louis-Philippe, who made of this army a symbol of union between revolutionnaries and monarchist legacies, they didn't adopted a legitimist stance or helped them politically.


I disagree : many napoleonic officers were taken from rank, and as they representated a possible link between mobs and army, most of them were fired with half a pension and forced to regitred regularly to authorities (while it was admittedly diversly enforced). As I said in my previous post, the imperial memory knew at the same time (with the rise of french Romantism) its first growth.


Again, as I posted above, three or four days of uprising are not likely to launch a nation-wide revolt.


I can't stress it enough : French Revolution of 1789 had nation-wide revolts because it was a longer process. You can't seriously expect revolts taking place and resolved in mere days to have this impact.
June Days happen only in Paris because it's about the closure of Ateliers Nationaux that existed only in Paris. It's like wondering why Scots didn't revolted in 1916, if you pardon me the comparison.

Finally, you're wrong on your last exemple. The communal movement wasn't limited to Paris and you have a serie of, while short-lived, many provincial Communes. The most famous is Marseille's but we could quote Toulouse, St-Etienne, Le Creusot, Narbonne.


Giving the situation in France then, it was taking the risk of a mutiny that would have definitly weakened the royal power.


I don't think so : when Charles X dissolved the National Guard, it created a group of still armed angry lower classes in Paris. Giving its impopularity in the capital at this time, he could have enforced a bloody repression but the troops would have been eventually taken down by mere numbers.


Well there's a big difference between the mid 1810s and late 1820s. Remember the Bourbons did manage to lead the army into Spain to put down the revolutionary uprisings there, so the French army was willing act against popular rebellions. And yes the army saw themselves as a privileged class, so they would be more willing to side with the present regime that would support their rights over a new one that might not. And that they didn't support a Legitimist coup isn't real evidence. Every time the army at least tried to stay loyal to the government, not openly siding with the people or popular risings. So that in itself is partial proof that the Army would be willing to support the Government against the mobs.

And your both right and wrong. Many of the Napoleonic officers were dismissed yes, but not all the rank and file soldiers. Those are the ones you have to watch out for.

And yes 4 days isn't enough for a nation-wide revolt but at the same time the fact that there was no major disturbance's period proves my point. The people were apathetic. As to the commune, your right my bad. I forgot about those. But it wasn't a revolution to be compared to the 1789 one. Really there was no risings in the last years of the Bourbon restoration or in the July monarchy. The only ones that happened were in Paris. One could argue that the commune was the acceptation rather then the rule. And I meant the June rebellion in 1832, not the one in 1848. And really the 1916 Irish Easter rising was COMPLETELY different. France was a homogenous nation that had one large religion, not several different nationalities and religious denominations, like the UK.

And to the army situation, it might not. Keep the Royalist units at home and the regiments with questionable loyalty would be sent to Algeria. It deals with two birds with stone. You get rid of a potential threat and gain a foreign victory.

As to the National guard, really that was one of the stupidest moments in Charles's reign. He should have disarmed the guard but not dissolve it. Or done both, disarm and dissolve. But leaving a potential threat fully armed was very short-sited and dumb. But I disagree. The army has smashed barricades before and could do it again. It might take a while but it is possible. Or they could launch an actual siege of Paris, like in the Franco-Prussian war. Also, if it drags on we could see an intervention by the Concert of Europe. I think Austria and Prussia would be willing to send troops to aid the French rather then risk a revolutionary regime.
 
Every time the army at least tried to stay loyal to the government, not openly siding with the people or popular risings.
So that in itself is partial proof that the Army would be willing to support the Government against the mobs.
It's a proof that they held their privilegied position firmly, and that they were ready to fight for anyone granting them. As the people responsible of the uprising in first place, a mix between liberal intelligentia and popular classes, had as an unclear objective the set up of a republican government, it was a threat for them.
But with Louis-Philippe arrival, I should say planned arrival, they recieved guarantees.

So loyal to government, yes. Loyal to the dynasty and the king, far less.

And that is for the faithful elements. If the best we can say about is "At least they didn't joined the revolutionnaries", it's not what I could call "a blind devotion".

And yes 4 days isn't enough for a nation-wide revolt but at the same time the fact that there was no major disturbance's period proves my point.
No major disturbance during the period?
-1817 : Affaire Fualdès in Aveyron.
-1819 : Vienne uprising
-1820 : Duc of Berry murder, riots in Paris, tenative of plot within the Paris garrison
-1822 : Berton Plot, Troubles of Ecole de Droit, Quatre Sergents de La Rochelle Affair
-1824 : Ordinance of 7 December that put out the army ancient officers almost all from Napoleonic period, troubling the army
-1825 : "Loi du Milliard" that mark defavorably the public opinion
-1827 : Political struggle against the reinforcement of censorship, Funeral of Manuel with 10 000 persons following the corpse, Dissolution of Garde Nationale
-1830 : July Revolution
-1831 : Riots of Febuary, Canut Revolt
-1832 : Riots during Lamarque funeral
-1834 : Canut Revolt, republican riots in Lyon and Paris, Fieschi attentat
-1836 : Plot of Bonaparte to realise an uprising of Strasbourg garrison.

And that's only for the ponctual events.

I can only advise you the "Histoire de la restauration et des causes qui ont amené la chute de la branche ainée des Bourbons" that is a contemporary and relativly faithful account of the situation (being legitimist himself, there's little suspicion about a negative bias)

Now, yes urban centers and Paris especially had an important political role. There's many reasons : a huge centralisation that meant that any tentative to throw away a government had to happen there.
The population expected by some habit, and maybe because of what was called "contagion de l'obéissance" (obeyment epidemic) that was basically the result of recent political experiences (on this order of idea : tone down such idea or you'll be in real trouble) that explain a certain wait-and-see policy reinforced by said hypercentralisation.

"The Parisian insurrection is the climax of a more diffuse and deep crisis [...] going from [...] institutions for defense of censive freedoms, to see the people and the republicans of the town hall uprising with barricades covering street and parts of Paris"

Even saying that province is apathic in 1830 is wrong :

"The crisis isn't only a Parisian affair. French episode of 1830 revolutions, it is also economical and social, as provincial troubles demonstrate. The industrial crisis of 1825, then a livelihood crisis in harvest's year 1827-1828 increase the difficulties and frustrations that, in province, explode at news of Parisian riots : hunger riots, winemaker riots against tax agents, "rats de cave", foresty troubles, destruction of mission crosses, municipal revolutions, are as much answer to power's vacancy"

From "Les dernières monachies en France (1815-1848)" in "Le XIX° siècle", under the direction of J.L. Robert.

And of course, I repeat myself, 4 days of uprising aren't going to launch a united nation-wide revolt. That's novel stuff, not History. It does not show an "apathic" population but it is at contrary totally normal : how French Revolution happened in first place is the exception.

And to the army situation, it might not. Keep the Royalist units at home and the regiments with questionable loyalty would be sent to Algeria. It deals with two birds with stone. You get rid of a potential threat and gain a foreign victory.
When the decision was made to send an expedition in Algiers, the situation was already really tense. Sending the bad elements in Algiers meant having the possible risk of a mutiny and the refusal to fight.
You just can't give an army the possibility of doing that if you value your power.

As to the National guard, really that was one of the stupidest moments in Charles's reign. He should have disarmed the guard but not dissolve it. Or done both, disarm and dissolve. But leaving a potential threat fully armed was very short-sited and dumb.

He could have tried to disarm, but not without dissolving : the whole point of Garde Nationale was to be armed.
Now, he could have successfully disarmed it, but it would have a cost politically : at this point the liberal and republican influence was already strong and you had an entiere campaign to disnounce the reduction then dissolve of the guard. As it was really limited in numbers and training, it was calculated that letting weapons on the loose (and honestly, after the Napoleonic wars, you had already plenty on the loose even if of less quality) was not worth the risk of a possible uprising of part the guard (a limited part, of course, but disastrous politically).

Or they could launch an actual siege of Paris, like in the Franco-Prussian war
Not possible in this context : "La Garde Nationale : une force politique ambigüe"(p 246) summarize it well

"Ordinances having been preparated in the greatest secret, no real mesure for maintain order was planned. Only the 27 July, the Maréchal Marmont, major-general of the Royal Guard, recieved the supreme command of the 1st military region. Disposing then of 13 000 men including 750 cavalerymen : five uncomplete regiments of Garde Royale, including two swiss, and four line infantry. Gendarmerie regiment was still under the Police prefect authority.
Began in improvisation, a timid and loose defense encouraged the insurgents. Laws on mobs dispersion were obsolete, and the ordinance of the 28 july putting Paris in siege made them useless. It had for results to slow the repression forces, then to exacerbate their reactions."

The page 247 is lacking there, but it's saying the line infantry was spared by insurgents (that took the advantage of action) and that it eventually passed to insurgent side, forcing Marmont to plug the holes where it's most needed, but eventually stripped whole zones of needed forces.

To resume it : the whole thing was poorly planned (if planned at all) from the beggining, as a consequences of Charles X policy (and not something accidental he could have easily removed by wandhaveing), and given the centralisation of France, the likely loss of Paris meant the loss of the state eventually.

The comparison with the siege of Paris doesn't really works there. First, if you're arguing that the situation is too different between 1810's and 1820's, what to say about this chronological difference?
Second, we're talking of a defeated, occupied country with urban uprisings while the mass of population wants most of all peace; compared to a situation of a political, social and economical disorder without invading army and with an army that actually showed that it could pass to insurgents.

Also, if it drags on we could see an intervention by the Concert of Europe. I think Austria and Prussia would be willing to send troops to aid the French rather then risk a revolutionary regime.
It's possible, but they recognized quickly Louis-Philippe takeover (his takeover being pretexted precisely for this reason).

I would point, however that they didn't acted against Belgian Revolution, while Austria and Prussia were favourable to maintain Belgium into the Kingdom of Netherlands, mainly because the United Kingdom didn't wanted so.
I think that an intervention on France, that didn't seem to have been really envisioned even during the immediate aftermath, would have encountered the same issues : London wasn't too keen about a revolutionnary regime in France for sure (while I think it would have turned quickly as the OTL Second Republic) but clearly wanted to preserve the balance of forces.
 
Of course even if he survives 1830 Charles X has only six years to live. Any info on what policies his nephew, the Duc d'Angouleme, is likely to have followed?
 
Of course even if he survives 1830 Charles X has only six years to live. Any info on what policies his nephew, the Duc d'Angouleme, is likely to have followed?

the Duc d'Angouleme was his son, not nephew. I think your thinking of the Comte de Chambord, who was Angouleme's nephew. And from what I read "Louis XIX" was actually fairly liberal. He deeply admired the British Parliamentary government from his time in exile there, was disgusted by Fernando VII's actions after France intervened in Spain (refusing any honors) and was opposed to his father's more extreme policies. I think he would be similar to Louis XVIII.
 

Razgriz 2K9

Banned
But by the time of the Bourbon Restoration, the liberals wanted an American-styled Republic. Also, when was "Louis XIX" exiled to have admired the British Parliamentary system, if it's after 1830, then, while I would see him as a second-generation Louis XVIII, I doubt he would make the move to a British styled Constitutional Monarchy...at most I see him as a Prussian-style Constitutionalism that was theoretically in place with Napoleonic and Bourbon Restoration France.
 
while I would see him as a second-generation Louis XVIII.

Duc d'Angloulême didn't seem to have displayed a great or firm political stance and actually, more or less passivly, supported his father's policy. While he could have personal preferences and a somewhat liberal leaning, he gives a really dweeb impression.
Being a decent commander isn't enough of a skill for the challenges of post-revolutionnary France (as it ceased to be a governing skill at this moment for almost all Europe). He morally looks more like his uncle Louis XVI, on the regard of possible good intentions but with a lack of a strength of character.
 

Razgriz 2K9

Banned
Duc d'Angloulême didn't seem to have displayed a great or firm political stance and actually, more or less passivly, supported his father's policy. While he could have personal preferences and a somewhat liberal leaning, he gives a really dweeb impression.
Being a decent commander isn't enough of a skill for the challenges of post-revolutionnary France (as it ceased to be a governing skill at this moment for almost all Europe). He morally looks more like his uncle Louis XVI, on the regard of possible good intentions but with a lack of a strength of character.

Then that leaves the Count of Chambourd, among legitimist circles, Henri V...at least he's impressionable enough to be made liberal...right?
 
Then that leaves the Count of Chambourd, among legitimist circles, Henri V...at least he's impressionable enough to be made liberal...right?

Guess again.

More seriously, Henri d'Artois was raised since the beggining as the "salvation" of the dynasty (even by Charles X, that had a...let say bad opinion of his son). The death of his father even before his death clearly influenced his life : raised in a really religious (if not borderline providentialist), it didn't began well for making it benevolent towards liberalism.

Now, if Charles X suddenly changes his policy (but it would need a really good PoD) before 1826-1828 period, what happen after 1830 could be modified, and Henri d'Artois *could* be more liberal leaned by the grace of butterflies (seeing the legitimist court circles, not gonna happen easily).

After that, it's dead meat. Raised by legitimist circles themselves, including the surviving daughter of Louis XVI, it basically made him seeing all progressism that wasn't issued from a straight catholicism or royal initiative as irreconciliable with the throne.
It's what made him definitely crush the hopes of a monarchic restauration in France after the fall of Second Empire : he was the guardian of monarchy, he didn't have to compromise it critically with liberalism (that was really tied with Orléanism, a movement he didn't liked *at*all*), while the Assembly (whom you can ask about its legitimacy at this time to debate about the nature of a regime) monarchist majority was practically begging him to take the power.
 

Razgriz 2K9

Banned
I don't see Charles X as the kind of person who would change his reactionary policy. I see him more as the French Metternich, one who is ground on the idea that the French Revolution didn't exist...

...So with that logic, the Bourbons are f'ed.
 
I don't see Charles X as the kind of person who would change his reactionary policy. I see him more as the French Metternich, one who is ground on the idea that the French Revolution didn't exist...
Well, it's a bit more nuanced than that. Charles X is more along the idea of a continuation of monarchic principles within the Charte context rather than an outright return to pre-1789 situation. Politically, it means more that he consider the legacy of Revolutionnary France as void than trying to delete it entierly.

...So with that logic, the Bourbons are f'ed.
But, yeah, pretty much that.

The main problem was that the kings or their heirs were at the same time the leader of ultra factions in a first time. And when Charles X tries to do a compromise, he hilarously fail at that, pissing ultras as liberals, forcing him to return to his political base.
It clearly prevented the long-term acknowledgment of the king as an unifying figure, while they could have lasted more long than OTL, with a constitutional executive monarchy.
 
So I've been doing research on the last years of the Bourbon restoration and the July revolution for a while now and some things I've come across doesn't add up. Everyone always says that the Bourbons were highly unpopular and would have been overthrown eventually but what I found makes this seem wrong. The July revolution was a Parisian affair, not a nation wide uprising or protest like the 1789 revolution. So if Charles X had stuck to his guns and ordered the army (I found them to be surprisingly loyal from my research) into the capital to breakup the uprising, would this lead to the Bourbons keeping the throne or would it cause a real nation-wide revolt?

The problem is that then Charles X might be regarded as ruling by "the points of a bayonet" by the more liberal monarchies, as well as by the French. I think if he could hold out long enough to die on the throne (maybe kill him off earlier), that the more liberally inclined Louis XIX can succeed him (and not be overly-dominated by his wife) we might have a shot
 
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