You know, I stand corrected. Ten years really is a long time. After all, Austria-Hungary will have FJ pass away and likely Karl as well by 1924. Which means a regency for the young Otto. This changes things asolutely in A-H where I think reforms are inevitable. I think it's less likely to fall apart than people think. Remember, it fell iOTL in 1918 after 4 years of mismanaged, multi-front warfare. There will be an Empire as long as the Common Army is still intact and those 10 years are absolutely vital for the Empire. The war really ruined it for then since they had the potential to make things better as the political situation slowly stabilised.

I seriously believe the Hungarian half would collapse first from internal issues before the whole does, which is probably a good thing for the Empire in the long-term as it would let Vienna 'save' Hungary and force much-needed reforms. The war might have saved Hungary's messed up political system for a few more years. Even then, by OTL 1916-7, Hungary was cracking at the seams with demands for political reforms growing louder (and I mean the internal situation, not the Union itself; that was way too beneficial for Hungary by then).

At least, unless Franz Ferdinand survives and becomes Emperor. Then, things are screwed.

Things definitely have time to change in Russia as well. I'm much less knowledgeable about it, but I doubt Russia could continue its militarisation and rapid industrialisation as quickly as the Germans feared. Not until reforms are passed. Again, those ten years are very important and I can see more moderate reformist factions gaining more influenced instead of the radical Revolutionaries.

I wish I knew more about the Ottomans to contribute more about them.
 
Painting with a crude and broad brush I can see the globalization of the world economy taking better root and ensnaring it in a complex weave. Ten years may seem a short period but it might see the world of 1924 both very different and blatantly familiar.

Personally I think the Balkans remain the tinder box that they were and another Balkan war looms. In its way the assassination could merely have set off another round in the ongoing Balkan wars. Assuming it did then the technology as well as doctrine of war still advance but nothing revolutionary. I suspect we see no meaningful development of armored warfare, the machinegun remains a potent but cumbersome weapon suited mostly to defense, aircraft remain oriented to reconnaissance, no poison gas, and so on. But I think civil aviation still progresses as does the motor car and by extension truck. We see improvements in shipping so at least naval hulls and propulsion continue to advance. For example one might see the self-loading rifle adopted just as the ten years lapse as the next step in rifle evolution given no war and no mass arming with mostly turn of the century technology.

I agree that fortification likely looks the prudent path as rapid-fire artillery and machineguns become better understood, the mortar might still see a resurgence as siege warfare gets a new gloss, and industrial nations develop barbwire, hedgehogs, landmines and other defensive hardware from steel and chemistry. Perhaps gas gets a look after all but as an area denial weapon.

Overall I see the trends moving towards deepening the welfare state, increasing the franchise, improving the distribution of wealth, all tensions here that caught fire with the Russian Revolution, but putting great strain on Germany in particular who was catching up to the British not merely economically but democratically. Institutionally Germany was still trapped in the past yet primed for the shift to true constitutional monarchy, genuine parliamentary democracy and the better control of the State by its elected government. Not to say contrary forces still do not rise and without his abdication Wilhelm remains the same bad King until at least 1941.

I foreseen the Liberals holding on in the UK until Irish Home Rule explodes, without war that appears to be a bloodies civil war in the making and something to certainly be ready to alter the British path. In the Ottoman Empire one sees the vast oil potential likely getting better understood such that German and British rivalry heats up, America gets interested, the French increasingly feel left behind and the OE might just get the door opened to a very different if not less difficult future.

Personally I think Russia is beset by woes that may not upend her in a mere ten years but it is possible that the Czar and nobles still unravel the place. I think a big motivator for war was to reinvigorate patriotism in the peasantry who after 1905 were truly losing any loyalty to the Czarist way. Here Russia may re-visit Japan and thus get its in another losing war in Asia. I think Japan still ascends but I think it is closer in orbit with the British and there is a point of tension with the USA as she looks West. The USA likely claws itself to a sort of equality with London as a financial powerhouse, if by ego alone from House Morgan, but that sets the USA to focus into Central America if no war now. And here the trend to be very anti-Imperial and by extension antagonistic with Europe only gets more fuel.

Overall I think a war in the mid-Twenties is fought very much like the Great War, the details are only tweaked, but these economies might shatter faster not by lack of cash but by their deeper interconnection. Rivalry will have built but so will have connectivity, the steamship, the railroad, the telegraph will be opening the way to telephone and airplane and motor car and even more cheaper shipping. The newspaper will be giving way to the radio. Even a small bump in living standards will make war that much more pricey and less attractive, the workers will be more and farmers less, the middle class that much bigger and having that much more to lose to privation, inflation, debt and so on. The butterflies are not so much in the rifles or the trenches but in the markets and the minds.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
Well, motor car and motor ships, as well as telephone and radio would progress, as well as civil aviation. However, the development of naval aviation, as I said, would be slower.

Britain would continue to lag further behind Germany technologically and industrially, especially in metallurgy, chemical and electricity, unless the Progressive Liberals hold power and Keynes' influence begins to rise among them, but I am not sure Keynesian economics would be developed at the sam progress a IOTL due to the absence of a situation like the 1920s postwar slump. If no Keynesian economics, then a protectionist Tory would be a better choice.
 

Driftless

Donor
I think a TL on a delayed war, if done well, would be an AH.com classic. I wish I had the time and expertise to do it and hope someone else will.

So many variables to put into the mix: developmental arcs (without 1914-1918 world war) in politics, technology, economics, and sociology. Tall order, but that could be epic.
 
I want to embark on it pretty badly, as overwhelming as it seems. The only thing is I'd want to include the Russo-American 1912 War as the POD...

Edit: From my other currently active thread, of course.
 
We've had a lot of good ideas surrounding a 1920's Great War, but very little in the way of educated guesses as to the causes and description of it's follow-up conflict: WWII from roughly 1949-1955.

Would anyone like to delve in there? I know it's difficult without going into further detail about the hypothetical 1920's engagement, but we've got some creative and knowledgable thinkers on this thread alone.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
Lets imagine something about this scenario:

World share of manufacturing before ww1 (1923):
US: 37%
Germany: 17%
Britain: 12%
....
 
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