Bomber Harris fired after Battle of Berlin, area bombing cancelled

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

Continuing with the idea of stopping the waste of resources on area/city bombing, what if after the Battle of Berlin the calls to quit city bombing won out and the area bombing campaign stopped? Harris would be removed from command and a new campaign focusing on German production specifically (POL, transport, factories in combo with USAAF target selections) using the latest in guidance technologies to find targets. That means for much of 1944 then city attacks don't happen, especially the major firestorms like Dresden:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II#The_British_later_in_the_war
The effects of the massive raids using a combination of blockbuster bombs (to blow off roofs) and incendiaries (to start fires in the exposed buildings) created firestorms in some cities. The most extreme examples of which were caused by Operation Gomorrah, the attack on Hamburg, (45,000 dead), attack on Kassel (10,000 dead), the attack on Darmstadt (12,500 dead), the attack on Pforzheim (21,200 dead), the attack on Swinemuende (23,000 dead) and the attack on Dresden (25,000 dead).

These three would be after the POD:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Darmstadt_in_World_War_II#Main_raid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Pforzheim_in_World_War_II#Main_raid
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_Dresden

What impact would this have on the war and post-war?
 
So April of '44? Given the long times times it takes for concentrated strat bombing to do it's work, it'd be a bit late for such a change to have a large-scale impact by then.
 

Deleted member 1487

So April of '44? Given the long times times it takes for concentrated strat bombing to do it's work, it'd be a bit late for such a change to have a large-scale impact by then.
Given that at that point BC moved to bombing in preparation for D-day, plus then moving to oil targets and some anti-V-1 work, they'd just stick to that. That was exactly at the point that the CBO was finding the 'kill switches' in the German economy with oil and transport, so having them shift to that in April will actually hasten that end, as city bombing in the last 12 months of the war was largely a waste in terms of breaking resistance.
 
Given that at that point BC moved to bombing in preparation for D-day, plus then moving to oil targets and some anti-V-1 work, they'd just stick to that. That was exactly at the point that the CBO was finding the 'kill switches' in the German economy with oil and transport, so having them shift to that in April will actually hasten that end, as city bombing in the last 12 months of the war was largely a waste in terms of breaking resistance.

Don't see it. Again, the lead time on this effects of this stuff actually being on the battlefield felt is quite long. Not only do you have to drive German production below demand but you also have to keep it there while Germany finishes running through their stocks. All told, we're talking something like a half-year. By the point it starts being felt on the battlefield, it'll be autumn of 1944 and by then the German army in the field, both in the West and East, will already have been effectively shattered. From there it becomes a matter for the Allies in both the East and West to get their logistics in order for the final drive into Germany. That's why even the OTL CBO finding the German "kill switch" targets is usually regarded as being too late to matter.

If you want to see a real effect, ya gotta get rid of Harris in 1943 and replace him with someone who advicates tag-teaming with the USAAC on their strategy.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Don't see it. Again, the lead time on this effects of this stuff actually being on the battlefield felt is quite long. Not only do you have to drive German production below demand but you also have to keep it there while Germany finishes running through their stocks. All told, we're talking something like a half-year. By the point it starts being felt on the battlefield, it'll be autumn of 1944 and by then the German army in the field, both in the West and East, will already have been effectively shattered. From there it becomes a matter for the Allies in both the East and West to get their logistics in order for the final drive into Germany. That's why even the OTL CBO finding the German "kill switch" targets is usually regarded as being too late to matter.

If you want to see a real effect, ya gotta get rid of Harris in 1943 and replace him with someone who advicates tag-teaming with the USAAC on their strategy.
Clearly you're of the opinion that this doesn't speed up the end of the war. What then does it mean for the post-war if area bombing by the RAF spots in the last 12 months?
 
Clearly you're of the opinion that this doesn't speed up the end of the war. What then does it mean for the post-war if area bombing by the RAF spots in the last 12 months?

Well, probably some less dead German civies, numbering by the thousands to tens of thousands. The effect of that becomes extremely unpredictable in the long-term, because you simply don't know what those people might have gone on to do. Lessened physical destruction too, which means less resources having to go into rebuilding stuff and more can go into building new things, but that possibly won't be quite as noticeable given that on bad days, the USAAC's accuracy OTL could be as bad as the RAF.
 
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Unfortunately LeMay will probably still firebomb Japanese cities. Thousands of Japanese civilians are still going to die. The USAAF could not copy the results of the bombing Germany over Japan OTL so I think they will take the easy way out and turn to area bombing.
 
Not only do you have to drive German production below demand but you also have to keep it there while Germany finishes running through their stocks.
Well, OTL fighter production actually increased, but to no avail for the Germans. The attacks on the Bergius hydrogenation plants had reduced the supply of Aviation fuel to the point where they could not be used. The training of pilots was also cut, so the novice pilots who did actually manage to get airborne were easy(er?) targets for Aliied fighters. So, even though production and stocks of materials were not run through, a significant effect was observed.
Whether full co-operation by Bomber Command would have added much to this, given the policy's OTL success anyway, is debateable, but it would not have contributed any less than the area bombing, which had little point by this time.
 
Without going in to arguments about the morality of bombing urban areas, there were a few good reasons why LeMay went to the strategy he used. Because of the winds over Japan, not well understood at the time, high altitude bombing simply was not doable or effective. The Japanese industrial system was not as concentrated as the German system - lots of little mom and pop machine shops spread out all over the place producing components.
 
Well, OTL fighter production actually increased, but to no avail for the Germans. The attacks on the Bergius hydrogenation plants had reduced the supply of Aviation fuel to the point where they could not be used. The training of pilots was also cut, so the novice pilots who did actually manage to get airborne were easy(er?) targets for Aliied fighters. So, even though production and stocks of materials were not run through, a significant effect was observed.
Whether full co-operation by Bomber Command would have added much to this, given the policy's OTL success anyway, is debateable, but it would not have contributed any less than the area bombing, which had little point by this time.

The stocks I'm referring too were fuel stocks, not aircraft stocks. But the oil campaign actually didn't have that much effect on the air war as by April '44 the Luftwaffe had already been broken. The attrition inflicted on all fronts during the course of 1943 set them up for "Big Week" in February of 1944, which was the final blow. The Luftwaffe never recovered from this and the air war was effectively won from then on. The issue wasn't one of aircraft or fuel but that of pilots and this had plagued the Germans since 1940, well before any sort of concerted strategic bombing program began against their fuel stocks.

Without going in to arguments about the morality of bombing urban areas, there were a few good reasons why LeMay went to the strategy he used. Because of the winds over Japan, not well understood at the time, high altitude bombing simply was not doable or effective. The Japanese industrial system was not as concentrated as the German system - lots of little mom and pop machine shops spread out all over the place producing components.

The effect of the firebombing campaign upon Japanese industry is hard to judge, because by the time it happened the Japanese war economy was already collapsing from the effect of the submarine blockade.
 
"Big Week" in February of 1944, which was the final blow. The Luftwaffe never recovered from this
Not so -
German aircraft production -
1942 - 15,409
1943 - 24,807
1944 - 40,593

Fuelled and piloted, this would not look like a force that "never recovered".

Pilot training, although (as you say) it was always a problem, only became a critical problem when lack of fuel caused the Luftwaffe to drastically curtail training from 240+ hours to 112 .... and as little as 8 hrs by 1945

The stocks I'm referring too were fuel stocks, not aircraft stocks

well, in that case the facts count very strongly against your contention. As you said, it took 6+ months to blow through the stocks - but the effects were immediate.

Monthly Consumption of Aviation Fuel 1944
May - 195,000 tons
Dec - 44,000 tons

Total stocks of Aviation Fuel 1944
May - 574,000 tons
Dec - 114,000 tons
 
Not so -
German aircraft production -
1942 - 15,409
1943 - 24,807
1944 - 40,593

Fuelled and piloted, this would not look like a force that "never recovered".

Except they weren't ever appropriately piloted, even when stocked and fueled... which is my point. Citing aircraft production in 1944 does nothing to change the fact that the Luftwaffe was given a shattering blow by Big Week and showed no signs of being able to do so even before the fuel shortages weighed in.

Pilot training, although (as you say) it was always a problem, only became a critical problem when lack of fuel caused the Luftwaffe to drastically curtail training from 240+ hours to112 .... and as little as 8 hrs by 1945

German pilot training caused the Luftwaffe to be in continuous decline from mid-1940 onwards, so I'd call it a critical problem from then on. The fact it was a critical problem in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943 despite fuel not being as short as it would be in 1944 then indicates it was a systemic issue with the Luftwaffes organization, rather then a function of fuel availability.

well, in that case the facts count very strongly against your contention. As you said, it took 6+ months to blow through the stocks - but the effects were immediate.

I don't see how. As the dates you posted clearly show, the decline in fuel came quite a number of months after Big Week, and yet the Luftwaffe showed zero signs of recovery even in those intervening months. Indeed, quite the opposite: it kept suffering disastrous losses and kept declining further and further into ruin.
 
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Deleted member 1487

German pilot training caused the Luftwaffe to be in continuous decline from mid-1940 onwards, so I'd call it a critical problem from then on. The fact it was a critical problem in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943 despite fuel not being as short as it would be in 1944 then indicates it was a systemic issue with the Luftwaffes organization, rather then a function of fuel availability.
The fuel cuts came in 1942, the cuts in hours were largely to what was considered unnecessary training in wartime. It really was in 1942 that recruit training fell off in a big way.
http://allworldwars.com/The Defeat of the German Air Force.html
 
Except they weren't ever appropriately piloted, even when stocked and fueled... which is my point. Citing aircraft production in 1944 does nothing to change the fact that the Luftwaffe was given a shattering blow by Big Week and showed no signs of being able to do so even before the fuel shortages weighed in.

err....the FACT that aircraft production nearly doubled really does show that your OPINION (not fact) that the attacks on aircraft production, culminating in Big Week, were the key to killing the Luftwaffe is wrong. The attacks on the Bergius plants was the thing that killed the Luftwaffe

so I'd call it a critical problem from then on.
You can randomly call it anything you want, that's still opinion , not fact.

The fact it was a critical problem in 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943 despite fuel not being as short as it would be in 1944 then indicates it was a systemic issue with the Luftwaffes organization, rather then a function of fuel availability.
Yet again, you mean opinion, not fact. The facts do not back your case.


the decline in fuel came quite a number of months after Big Week, and yet the Luftwaffe showed zero signs of recovery even in those intervening months.

can you please for once back that with actual FACTS, and not just your opinion?

I'm really not interested in discussing someone's opinion, especially when they ignore facts and figures. Unless you supply some actual FACTS, I will just ignore your post.
 
An air force is not just aircraft, and vice-versa.
Someone needs to fly the aircraft, preferably to fly it so the mission is scomplished. The LW could not do it in 1944. They could not do it against escorted bombing raids already in 1943, when there was some experienced pilots around.
The aircraft need fuel in their tanks, and by 1944 the situation was dire fo the LW. There is no matter how many fighters Germany produced in 1944, no fuel means no use.

So yes, by some time of Spring 1944 LW was beaten between Atlantic and Berlin, and whatever they did east of Berlin was not enough to stem Operation Bagration once it started.
 
err....the FACT that aircraft production nearly doubled really does show that your OPINION (not fact) that the attacks on aircraft production, culminating in Big Week, were the key to killing the Luftwaffe is wrong. The attacks on the Bergius plants was the thing that killed the Luftwaffe

Except now your strawmanning. I never claimed that Big Week succeeded in breaking German aircraft production. I stated that Big Week succeeded in breaking the Luftwaffe. It did this the same way the air campaigns, both strategic and tactical, east and west, of 1943 had whittled the Luftwaffe down to the point it was on the verge of cracking by the time Big Week started: by drawing the Luftwaffe into direct air battle and shooting them down in numbers the Germans could not cope with. Whether it succeeded against German aircraft production or not, and obviously it did not, didn't actually matter.

You can randomly call it anything you want, that's still opinion , not fact.

No, it's fact. That German training programs in 1940 and 1941 could not make up for the pilot losses in the Battle of Britain and Barbarossa, which meant that the Luftwaffe was correspondingly weaker in each year thereafter, is well-established by historians.

Yet again, you mean opinion, not fact. The facts do not back your case.




can you please for once back that with actual FACTS, and not just your opinion?

I'm really not interested in discussing someone's opinion, especially when they ignore facts and figures. Unless you supply some actual FACTS, I will just ignore your post.

That Big Week inflicted such losses upon the Luftwaffe that it was no longer able to successfully challenge Allied air superiority anywhere, even over the heart of Germany itself, is a well-established historical fact. That it came months before the oil bombing campaign even began, much less had the effect of driving down German aviation fuel, is also a well-established historical fact. That the Luftwaffe showed zero signs of recovery, and in fact continued to decline in this period, is also a well-established historical fact. You can deny them all you want, but reality is that which when you cease to believe in it does not go away.
 
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No, there's no point in me continuing with this when you can't tell the difference between opinion and fact. Very disappointing, as you clearly have a good knowledge.

Ah well....
 
No, there's no point in me continuing with this when you can't tell the difference between opinion and fact. Very disappointing, as you clearly have a good knowledge.

Ah well....

Your attempts at projection in order to cover for you failing to even understand your opponents arguement, much less effectively argue against it, is noted. I'll take that concession, thank you.

The fuel cuts came in 1942, the cuts in hours were largely to what was considered unnecessary training in wartime. It really was in 1942 that recruit training fell off in a big way.
http://allworldwars.com/The Defeat of the German Air Force.html

The failure of the German training program to keep pace with losses didn't begin in 1942 though. It began in 1940. It all goes back to the fact that, unlike the Allies, then Germans tended to keep pilots in the field until they died rather than rotating aces back into training establishments. So they ultimately got caught in the same sort of death spiral the Japanese did. they had to keep robbing their training cadres of instructors to bulk up combat strength, which meant they could train fewer pilots total and had to put less time into each one, which meant they didn't have enough new pilots which meant more raiding of training cadres which caused even fewer pilots and so on, while at the same time the reduced flight hours meant that the pilots they didtrain progressively declined in quality. It wasn't something that manifested in a single operation, in the BoB, the Luftwaffe simply didn't replace its pilot losses, hence why it shrunk fairly significantly over the course of the battle rather than growing like Fighter Command, but was something that occurred over an extended period of time. And it all came home to roost in February of '44 with Big Week.

Ultimately, it comes down to the fact that the German's pilot training system was qualitatively inferior to that of its enemies.
 
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