Bolsheviks take initial Brest-Litovsk: what next for the CPs?

[Beefhammer]

So let's say Lenin succeeds in convincing his government and Trotsky to agree to the initial terms of Brest-Litovsk because they're the best terms they're gonna get, instead of the opposing idea of stalling in the hopes a revolution will kick off in Germany. As a result, Russia only loses Congress Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and probably Riga (I remember a previous thread on the matter saying the Bolsheviks might be able to convince the Germans to hand that back, desperate to shift troops away from the Eastern Front as they were).
Question is: what do Germany and Austria-Hungary do with the troops freed up by not having to occupy so much territory (I recall a previous thread on a less harsh Brest-Litovsk saying Germany would free up ~20 divisions this way, not sure if Austro-Hungarian divisions are among that 20)? Do they still send troops to support the Whites in the Finnish Civil War? Do they still prop up the Ukrainian People's Republic in exchange for squeezing it for grain? Can the manpower freed up be used to resolve another European front, freeing up further manpower? Say, can it push the Entente back in Macedonia, or force the Italians to make a separate peace, possibly further incentivized by Austria-Hungary ceding Trentino if Italy makes a separate peace?
For that matter, while Germany can use its freed up divisions for the Kaiserschlacht, what would Austria-Hungary use them for? Or would they demobilize them to relieve pressure on the economy?

 

[Tom_B]

A small number (like 3 or 4) of Austro-Hungarian divisions were sent to the Western Front OTL. They were not used in the offensives but to replace German divisions in inactive sectors.

 

[Beefhammer]

Another thing to consider: what would be going on on the Asia Minor front?

 

[Beefhammer]

Bump

 

[Catspoke]

I wonder how much the Germans can get out of this really, since the divisions left east OTL had poor quality manpower and weak equipment level, not sure if you can really create much extra offensive capable manpower with either Austria or Germanyin this TL.

Since Russia is already at armistice, if this early peace leads to a earlier resumption of trade and early shipments of grain, oil form Russia it may help the Germans that way as well as getting POWs back from Russia earlier. Not sure if that is enough to matter.

Honestly it's probably better for the Germans to just not attack in the west at all in either Italy or France, and remain on the defensive and try to put the east in order in 1918 so then Germany might actually get a decent quantity of supplies out of the east in 1919.

 

[Raferty]

The Germans didn't have a manpower shortage in the west, they had a quality unit shortage because of horrific casualties to junior officers, and a problem generating offensive combat power. The Stormtrooper tactics were in part designed because they also had artillery quantity problems and had to find other ways to generate breakthroughs.

Sending freed up troops west allows them to fill out their line's quieter areas and mass more combat power on their offensive axes - in OTL they tried doing something like this but they ended up not getting enough penetration in the Spring Offensive and denuding themselves of quality reserves in the process. I don't think this changes all that much - a sooner peace in the east means they have more forces from which to generate offensive combat power but the Allies will have reserves and an ability to fight on even if the offensive is more successful, and there is no guarantee that the Germans can keep their additional gains.

Time was against them and they knew it, as other fronts were collapsing and the Western Allies had a lot of new Americans training up in early 1918, so I can't fault the decision to try for a knockout. I do question however the primary target - the BEF was not the weak part of the line nor was it suffering from serious morale issues as the French were. The Germans had to think in terms not of a tactical pinning of forces to the coast and instead thinking of trying to replicate what had happened in Italy at Caporetto or in the East in 1915 - a front wide collapse of morale and combat potential. It's unclear if this was possible in 1918 or not but they didn't try in the right spot for it

 

[Beefhammer]

The Germans didn't have a manpower shortage in the west, they had a quality unit shortage because of horrific casualties to junior officers, and a problem generating offensive combat power. The Stormtrooper tactics were in part designed because they also had artillery quantity problems and had to find other ways to generate breakthroughs.

Sending freed up troops west allows them to fill out their line's quieter areas and mass more combat power on their offensive axes - in OTL they tried doing something like this but they ended up not getting enough penetration in the Spring Offensive and denuding themselves of quality reserves in the process. I don't think this changes all that much - a sooner peace in the east means they have more forces from which to generate offensive combat power but the Allies will have reserves and an ability to fight on even if the offensive is more successful, and there is no guarantee that the Germans can keep their additional gains.

Time was against them and they knew it, as other fronts were collapsing and the Western Allies had a lot of new Americans training up in early 1918, so I can't fault the decision to try for a knockout. I do question however the primary target - the BEF was not the weak part of the line nor was it suffering from serious morale issues as the French were. The Germans had to think in terms not of a tactical pinning of forces to the coast and instead thinking of trying to replicate what had happened in Italy at Caporetto or in the East in 1915 - a front wide collapse of morale and combat potential. It's unclear if this was possible in 1918 or not but they didn't try in the right spot for it

Do you think that tactic would be more successful against Italy?

 

[Raferty]

Do you think that tactic would be more successful against Italy?

Yes, but ultimately, to what end?

Italy at worst could have been driven to the other side of the Po but they'd be able to hold there. I don't think it'd knock them out of the war as France and Britain were backstopping them.

The Germans in 1918 were seeing the collapse of the Ottomans and the Balkan front, Austria-Hungary's internal collapse and starvation, and mounting issues at home as well. They needed either to be able to loot the East enough to save themselves and try for 1919 in the face of American manpower (along with reinforcements from other fronts from the Commonwealth), or to get a knockout blow somewhere. Italy isn't a bad target, it just was not one that would resolve their basic issues, while France would.

Ultimately the biggest issue is German intelligence failed to understand how precarious French morale was in 1917-early 1918. There is little indication they knew of the extent of the mutinies nor did they have a plan for exploiting the situation. Now, the Germans didn't have the ability to go on much of an offensive in 1917, but early 1918 the issues were still there, and could be reignited once the battle reached the counterattack phase.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The better question is what impact this has on the nascent Soviet Union. If Brest-Litovsk is so much smaller, what effect does that have on the Civil War? Does it enhance the Red's position because they didn't give away as much territory? Or does the fact they gave up with less fuss hurt them? How does the theoretical retention of the northern Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine within Russian territory alter the development of the Civil War?

 

[Beefhammer]

The better question is what impact this has on the nascent Soviet Union. If Brest-Litovsk is so much smaller, what effect does that have on the Civil War? Does it enhance the Red's position because they didn't give away as much territory? Or does the fact they gave up with less fuss hurt them? How does the theoretical retention of the northern Baltics, Belarus, and Ukraine within Russian territory alter the development of the Civil War?

I recall an earlier thread on this possibility saying that avoiding the disgrace of giving away so much land would likely take a lot of wind out of the sails of any potential Whites. No idea how true that is, but between having more resources to work with and avoiding the losses of Faustschlag, the Bolsheviks would have an easier, quicker time rolling up armed opposition and winning hearts and minds. More assets to commit to backing the Finnish Reds, possibly preventing the Murmansk Expedition since the Entente would see the Bolsheviks actively preventing a German client state from taking root in Finland. Who knows? Once the Germans shoot their wad out west, we just might see Russia re-enter the war to not only retake Courland and Lithuania but grab eastern Galicia and set up a Red Poland...

 

[Raferty]

I recall an earlier thread on this possibility saying that avoiding the disgrace of giving away so much land would likely take a lot of wind out of the sails of any potential Whites. No idea how true that is, but between having more resources to work with and avoiding the losses of Faustschlag, the Bolsheviks would have an easier, quicker time rolling up armed opposition and winning hearts and minds. More assets to commit to backing the Finnish Reds, possibly preventing the Murmansk Expedition since the Entente would see the Bolsheviks actively preventing a German client state from taking root in Finland. Who knows? Once the Germans shoot their wad out west, we just might see Russia re-enter the war to not only retake Courland and Lithuania but grab eastern Galicia and set up a Red Poland...

The White movement never really had much support in most of European Russia, it had a Cossack following and among former Imperial Army officers in the far East and South, but the northern army was never all that big. That is not to say that the Reds were all that popular either, theirs was a movement of the cities and Russia was a peasant country. Most of the population did not strongly lean to one side or the other - if there was a consensus, it was not for restoring Tsarism nor for approving of War Communism, which in practice was more like banditry than anything else, but rather for approving of the new peasant control of the land and having some kind of "people power" movement in charge, which was never fleshed out in reality. This is why the Green movement was so fragmented, for example. Brest-Litovsk infuriated the Whites that existed, and was unpopular, but did not really drive anyone new into the White camp, which never really attempted mass politics of the kind that would probably be necessary for consolidating military gains - and the Whites really did come close to militarily defeating the Red Army in 1919, but not in a way that would lead to them winning the war.

As for the Red's losses from the final offensive, its unclear to what extent these were significant or not. The army was in a state of disintegration and the prisoners taken were often just sent home. That said, the Imperial Army as it was in 1918 was a breeding ground of radicalization, especially in the northern front, for the Bolsheviks and undoubtedly if it was in a better state, it would have helped them at the time.

I suppose the real question would be regarding the Baltic States - the Red Army in OTL did not end up taking them in the war, but probably could have had there been more interest in doing so on the part of its command, which really put everything on the Polish gambit. I think an earlier peace means its quite likely the Soviet Union would include these areas.