How would the leaders of Fighter Command react if critical losses had occured during the BoB?


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In my opinion this would not be possible with a withdrawal north of London whether it is as far as Debden or as an interim withdrawal to North Weald.

There are a few things people seem to forget, ignore or are unaware of regarding the 'Dowding System'
  • Each sector, due to technical reasons, could only control a maximum of 4 squadrons at a time. 11 Group with 7 sectors could operate a maximum of 28 squadrons at any one time. In reality there were only ever 23 squadrons at most so there was always going to be some redundancy. If, however, Biggin, Kenley and Honchurch were abandoned you are automatically reducing the number of squadrons by at least 7 that can be operated by 11 Group. If you withdraw further then this number reduces significantly. There are probably workarounds to this but would add complications that would undoubtedly reduce the effectiveness of the system.
  • The HF R/T's used to stay in contact with the squadrons had an effective range of 60 miles meaning that control beyond 60 miles from the operations room was not always possible. VHF sets were being fitted that increased this range to 100 miles but these were few and far between.
  • Typical first response of Fighter Command was to put squadrons in the air once it was obvious a raid was inbound. This meant scrambling squadrons and setting patrol lines for those squadrons to fly to until it became more obvious where the Luftwaffe were targeting. Patrol lines included Maidstone to Canterbury or Tonbridge to Ashford. In this way a Spitfire Squadron from Kenley, for example, could be in the Maidstone area at 20,000ft within 17 minutes waiting to be given their final vector (A Hurricane squadron would take a little longer). If all went well such a squadron would be in the area just before the approaching enemy formation. Other squadrons would be vectored when ready whilst further squadrons would be sent to patrol airfields. In this way 31% of scrambles resulted in contact with the enemy, this was compared to only 10% contact rates for standing patrols.
  • As mentioned above a Spitfire squadron at immediate readiness (i.e. Pilots in the cockpit ready to go) took 17 minutes to start-up, taxi, take off, assemble and climb to 20,000ft. The distance covered during this time would be approximately 35 miles. A Hurricane squadron would take 20 minutes to climb to the same height and would cover a distance of 40 miles (the Spitfires would now be at 50 miles). Within 20 minutes a bomber formation of He111s could reach Ashford or Canterbury, a formation of Ju88s a little further, easy enough to intercept from Kenley, Biggin Hill or Hornchurch and their satellites and forward bases. From North Weald a Spitfire squadron would get to Ashford just in time, a Hurricane Squadron would not, and neither would be able to counter a raid further south of Ashford. From Debden the Germans would be able to roam freely anywhere south of Maidstone.
So in summary if you continue without a withdrawal Fighter Command would still be able to counter most raids in the south and south east although the strength of 11 Group would degrade and it may take many months to recover. If you withdraw to Debden/Duxford/Middle Wallop you can no longer counter all raids and those that you do intercept you will have a much small force available. In my opinion you will have given the Luftwaffe air supremacy over the critical invasion area in the south and south east of England and in doing that you're inviting invasion.

The idea that Fighter Command can swoop down from the north en-masse, I believe, isn't realistic. The Luftwaffe can get in and out of the area unmolested, Fighter Command don't have the communication range or technical ability to control such formations so reliance would be on luck and standing patrols only.

A most succinct and well reasoned explanation of why Fighter Command could not retreat. I think several of us were groping towards that point. Great post!!
 
A most succinct and well reasoned explanation of why Fighter Command could not retreat. I think several of us were groping towards that point. Great post!!
And yet still 73% of people think withdrawal to Debden, Duxford and Middle Wallop is a viable option.
 
The problem here is that the civilian population won't be aware that the RAF has withdrawn: it's not like it'll be announced on the radio. Also, the RAF will continue to use forward landing-grounds, and there's nothing the Luftwaffe can do about it because, as Alfred Price pointed out in The Hardest Day, almost any grassy field could be used to base fighters, and the Germans can't bomb every field in SE England.
 
The problem here is that the civilian population won't be aware that the RAF has withdrawn: it's not like it'll be announced on the radio. Also, the RAF will continue to use forward landing-grounds, and there's nothing the Luftwaffe can do about it because, as Alfred Price pointed out in The Hardest Day, almost any grassy field could be used to base fighters, and the Germans can't bomb every field in SE England.
This is a valid point regarding forward bases although "any field" might be going a little far as most open spaces were purposely obstructed as part of anti-invasion measures so you may as well utilise existing landing grounds; Kenley, Biggin Hill, Croydon, West Malling, Detling, Gravesend and Eastchurch are all within radio range of Detling. That's still the problem though, once you get beyond 60 miles (in most cases) you no longer have the ability to control and vector squadrons from the ground. Add to this the limits of 4 Squadrons per sector you're reducing the number of squadrons that can be controlled to about a 50%. Without use of extensive standing patrols the skies along the coast from Brighton to Margate will be dominated by the Luftwaffe.
 
Because critical losses.

If the Dowding system has failed then why continue to reinforce failure?
In which case you may as well withdraw even further if the aim is to preserve the forces you have and recover; Debden, Duxford and Middle Wallop were all raided during the BoB and were within range (just) of the Bf109.
 
Ian, the problem is context. How and why were critical losses inflicted. And how long til the follow up thread which outlines how Sea lion could have worked
 
Ian, the problem is context. How and why were critical losses inflicted. And how long til the follow up thread which outlines how Sea lion could have worked
No follow up thread ... I don't really have more than a passing interest in Sealion. My own personal vote and view is that Fighter Commands best hope of preventing an attempted invasion is to remain as far forward as possible and show as much strength to the enemy as possible.
 

hipper

Banned
if the s
This is a valid point regarding forward bases although "any field" might be going a little far as most open spaces were purposely obstructed as part of anti-invasion measures so you may as well utilise existing landing grounds; Kenley, Biggin Hill, Croydon, West Malling, Detling, Gravesend and Eastchurch are all within radio range of Detling. That's still the problem though, once you get beyond 60 miles (in most cases) you no longer have the ability to control and vector squadrons from the ground. Add to this the limits of 4 Squadrons per sector you're reducing the number of squadrons that can be controlled to about a 50%. Without use of extensive standing patrols the skies along the coast from Brighton to Margate will be dominated by the Luftwaffe.

If the Squadrons moved, there would be no need to move the operations rooms at the sector airfields. This was the historical solution where squadrons dispersed to smaller airfields from the main sector airfields, there would be no reduction in the command and control facilities available unless they were themselves damaged. In which case there were local backups to the operations rooms.
 
if the s


If the Squadrons moved, there would be no need to move the operations rooms at the sector airfields. This was the historical solution where squadrons dispersed to smaller airfields from the main sector airfields, there would be no reduction in the command and control facilities available unless they were themselves damaged. In which case there were local backups to the operations rooms.
Okay, think I may not have been as clear as I should have been in my initial posts. By withdraw I don't just mean squadrons pulling back but the airfields and associated operations rooms being abandoned as well.
 

hipper

Banned
Okay, think I may not have been as clear as I should have been in my initial posts. By withdraw I don't just mean squadrons pulling back but the airfields and associated operations rooms being abandoned as well.

I'm curious why you think operations rooms would be abandoned other than of course direct damage to the buildings themselves. (There were plans to replace damaged operations room with back up sites) IE why would the RAF voluntarily give up control over the south east of England.

the only real answer I can think of is that Fighter command fell under control of someone who does not understand the Dowding system. There is an interesting ATL to be written in which Dowding and Park have an encounter with the Clappham Omnibus and Leigh Malory takes control of Fighter command.

cheers Hipper
 
Okay, think I may not have been as clear as I should have been in my initial posts. By withdraw I don't just mean squadrons pulling back but the airfields and associated operations rooms being abandoned as well.

Hmmm this seems a little bit of a contrivance to make the RAF's job more difficult if I'm honest. Why would anything useful be abandoned unless it's been knocked out?
 
APMEP unless the Luftwaffe successfully targets and destroys the C3 capability of at least 11 group then there would be no reason or need to withdraw. If the 11 Group C3 system is compromised to the point that their squadrons are always being caught before they can engage the attacking bombers then the Dowding system has been crippled. The Dowding Systems greatest advantage was that it permitted Parks not only to husband his resources but to commit his Squadrons in a timely manor and with as much positional advantage as possible, lose that advantage and you might just lose the battle and that was the trick the Germans never understood the system and therefore never exploited or attacked it's vulnerabilities.
 
In which case you may as well withdraw even further if the aim is to preserve the forces you have and recover; Debden, Duxford and Middle Wallop were all raided during the BoB and were within range (just) of the Bf109.

Just within range but no linger time and double the warning for the defenders to get airborne. Dog fight for ten minutes and some 109s raiding may well have to ditch in the channel.

As I said on page 1 any withdrawal would most likely be phased. If a withdrawal to Debden Duuxford and Middle wallop works it is sufficient.
 
Why would the sector control rooms be withdrawn north with the fighters. As is obvious by the experience of Biggin Hill all you needed was a room a telephone exchange and enough crew to staff it. If they wanted a bombproof control room I am sure they could set one up in a railway tunnel at a pinch.
 
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