Black Gemini: Two Stories of the Secret Second Life of America's Second Capsule

Post 2: First Story, Black Gemini and the 1980s
Additional declassifications follow...

Post 2: Black Gemini and the 1980s

After a decade of crewed military spaceflight, the United States Air Force faced choices early in the 1980s as they evaluated the next decade’s flight plans. On one hand, they could work to secure early advancement of Air Force interests in the Space Shuttle. This next great advance in spaceflight promised not only the chance to visit satellites, but also to conduct more thorough and routine overhauls with more capable EVA support. However, the work involved in betting harder on Shuttle such as accelerating pad construction at Vandenberg would, due to the nature of bureaucratic tradeoffs, involve putting Black Gemini on a glide path to cancellation. While the 304th Space Wing was putting in invaluable work, USAF was unwilling to risk missing the bus on the next sea change in spaceflight. In 1981, USAF made the decision to defer long-lead production of a new batch of Gemini capsules from McDonnell-Douglas, tentatively scheduling the last flight operations of RO-72 Gemini for 1985.

With Black Gemini beginning to plan for the end, it was even more important to ensure that USAF would have access to the Space Shuttle on schedule. Since 1979, the first USAF-funded Space Shuttle Orbiter (OV-103) had been in final assembly at Rockwell’s Palmdale facility. However, with funds saved by committing to a fixed end for the Black Gemini program, USAF was able to accelerate construction efforts supporting a new Space Shuttle launch site at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This polar launch capability would be critical to ensuring that the Shuttle would be able to access USAF’s satellite constellations with sufficient payload margin to allow launching, servicing, and even return of these critical national assets. The new launch site, designated SLC-7, was to be built at Cypress Ridge [1], south of the active SLC-6 Titan pad used by Black Gemini. Unlike NASA’s Kennedy Space Center operations at LC-39, which USAF would share on an as-needed basis, the Air Force pad on the Western Range would conduct all stacking and assembly operations on the launch pad. During integration, the vehicle would be accessed from and protected by mobile servicing structures, giant buildings on rails which could roll clear of the pad area for launch. This arrangement was incapable of parallel processing flows and thus not capable of operational tempos as fast as Florida’s Saturn-heritage configuration. However, USAF anticipated only half a dozen or so launches annually from Vandenberg as the 304th Space Wing transitioned from a Gemini squadron to a Shuttle operations squadron. For this limited flight rate, the infrastructure would be both sufficient and significantly cheaper.

In addition to the new Vandenberg launch site, USAF was also moving forward with funding for new boosters, critical to allow the Shuttle to deliver its rated payload to the greater inclinations and higher orbits of most polar-launch missions, including both USAF spy satellites and NASA scientific platforms. A new generation of advanced filament-wound composite-case boosters were approved for development, including some incremental improvements to the field joints between the booster segments, which NASA and USAF also considered for equatorial launches out of Florida. Work would advance slower than preferred, but still steadily. The Air Force’s first orbiter, dubbed OV-103 Kitty Hawk, was built to the same blueprints as OV-102 Columbia. Thus, Kitty Hawk would incorporate only minor weight reductions and structural improvements, unlike OV-104 Discovery and onwards. She was rolled out in September 1980, substantially in advance of the readiness of the Vandenberg pad. After extensive negotiations, NASA arranged to “borrow” Kitty Hawk from the Air Force for launches from Cape Canaveral in late 1981. As part of training and transition activities for the 304th Space Wing, a detachment of astronauts under Lt. Col Robert Lawrence would temporarily train alongside NASA’s Shuttle astronaut corps, including some of their own former squadron-mates. They would then fly the orbiter with USAF DoD crews during early Shuttle flights until OV-099 Challenger could complete refit for orbital flight and become NASA’s second civilian orbiter. In actuality, the arrangement would continue until the readiness of Vandenberg’s SLC-7 pad in 1984, since after Challenger’s completion, NASA would return Columbia to Palmdale for a refit. Therefore, NASA would only have two flying orbiters of their own when OV-104 Discovery arrived in February of 1984. Still, with work completing on SLC-7 in March of that year, the delays to West Coast polar Shuttle operations were minimal.

While the 304th Space Wing’s support divisions and some of their pilots were learning alongside NASA at Houston and Kennedy Space Center, the wing’s primary operations with Gemini continued, if increasingly overshadowed by the “next big thing”. The organization was actively counting down, mission by mission, to the day when Gemini’s “tin can” would finally be retired. While some pilots looked forward to the enhanced operational flexibility and comfort of the new Space Shuttle over their current Gemini “tin can,” others were nostalgic for the spacecraft they had flown for the past decade. The hardships of flying Gemini, like those of other difficult postings in the past, created a certain esprit de corps and pride in those able to manage the task flight after flight. Whether anticipated or regretted, every flight to one of USAF’s spy satellites was one closer to the day Gemini would fly no more. Preparations were already underway for the day when the new, larger Shuttle crews would be needed, including recruiting yet more astronaut pilots and--for the first time--dedicated non-pilot payload and EVA specialists. Among these ranks, the 304th Space Wing recruited their first enlisted astronauts, training a group of highly senior Master Sergeants in the tricky business of orbital operations and EVA.

However, Black Gemini’s time could not last forever. By the time OV-103 Kitty Hawk was released from Florida service and flown to her new home at Vandenberg in March 1984, there were only 7 scheduled Gemini flights left. Among these, however, there were still some new records to be set. Blacksky 49 would fly from SLC-6 in July of 1984, even as Kitty Hawk was being used for pad checkouts at SLC-7 next door. Aboard for the first time was a USAF crew consisting of two women: Sam Carter, who had been USAF’s first woman astronaut aboard Winged Gemini and who was now one of the more senior USAF astronauts, and Susan Johnson, one of the program’s newest rookie flyers. The Air Force public affairs machine opened extensive interview opportunities for the crew of the first all-woman multiperson space flight, though neither (as usual) spoke in detail about the precise mission of the Blackskies squadron. Comparisons to Valentina Tereshkova’s flight in 1963 were common, along with observations on the relatively smaller pool of women represented in the modern Soviet cosmonaut corps. Even NASA’s more-male-dominated pilot groups came in for comment, as USAF test pilot pipeline to the 304th Space Wing was the only group routinely training women as astronaut candidates. Aside from the historic makeup of the crew, the visit to KH-9-10 was entirely routine, helping to demonstrate that in the realm of spaceflight, there was less difference between the sexes than prejudice might suggest.

In August 1984, Kitty Hawk lifted off for the first Vandenberg polar Space Shuttle launch. The mission was fairly ambitious: a 7-day flight to track down and rendezvous with one of the same HEXAGONs already visited by Black Gemini. For this flight, Kitty Hawk primarily carried out the tasks of the smaller vehicle - replacing film buckets, refueling orbital maneuvering thrusters, and servicing smaller orbital replacement parts such as gyroscopes. However, the mission also took advantage of the Shuttle’s enhanced EVA support tools and improved robotic arm to carry out more extensive replacement of the Flight III HEXAGON’s onboard systems, which had been redesigned for modular replacement on orbit incorporating similar modules to those being used on the new KH-11 electro-optical satellites. Even here, though, the mark of the Gemini crews remained: opening one of the access panels on the HEXAGON, Shuttle EVA crews discovered a sticker depicting the Gemini capsule’s distinctive “snout” sticking over the limb of the Earth, and bearing the caption “GEMINI WAS HERE”, a reference to the famous Kilroy image, arguably one of the earliest “memes.”


Black Gemini “Kilroy” image created by @NorangePeels

The next flight, in October, would demonstrate even more capabilities of the new system, as for the first time the Space Shuttle conducted a major overhaul of one of the KH-11 satellites, removing the original CCD imager installed at launch and replacing it with a new and significantly higher-resolution sensor system, while retaining the same telescope optics. This 10-day mission would have been beyond the capabilities of Gemini, enabled thanks to coordination between the crew inside the pressurized Shuttle cabin and the EVA specialists working outside. Other missions would continue to demonstrate the superiority of the new Rockwell orbiter over the obsolete Black Gemini like unclassified Landsat launches and, in early 1985, the return of a flown KH-9 Flight II satellite to the ground for inspection, tear-down, and possible reflight. The writing was on the wall, and Gemini’s launch tempo tapered off rapidly over 1984 and 1985, with the last mission flown in early 1986.

During its 15 year service, Black Gemini represented a ground-breaking capability, which served USAF and NRO on more than fifty missions after the end of its NASA career. While less capable than the Space Shuttle which replaced it in service with the 304th Space Wing, it was notably cheaper per launch, at least prior to the introduction of flyback boosters aboard the Space Shuttle in the late 1990s. This enabled some prospective missions which could not justify a full Shuttle launch, such as the Winged Gemini experimental tests. No such small, semi-reusable space vehicle would resume service until the introduction of the European Hermes more than a decade later. Even today, it is tantalizing to consider what might have occurred if the loss of the Space Shuttle Resolution had occurred before the complete wind-down of the RO-72 program, and what might have happened if USAF had not already been fully committed to Space Shuttle operations before the loss. However, for the moment, the story of Black Gemini is preserved only in dusty archives, secret files, and the limited public display of hardware allowed as the program has been declassified. For those interested, a flown RO-72 Gemini and one of the Flight II HEXAGON satellites it serviced, returned aboard Kitty Hawk, are displayed together at the National Museum of the United States Air Force in Dayton, Ohio.

[1] Cypress Ridge was one of the sites considered for SLC-7 in the late 1980s as a new Titan IV launch facility. Instead of a new pad, SLC-4, which had previously launched Titan IIID and 34D was upgraded and used. Information on the site can be found in ADA413951: Environmental Impact Statement: Construction and Operation of Titan IV/Centaur Launch Complex, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Volume 3.
 
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I hope you've all been having a good April Fool's day and thanks for joining Gemini and me on this journey so far! Thanks to @TimothyC for brainstorming a lot of this with me, as well as invaluable assistance with research and copy-editing. Thanks to @Its_Just_Luci , where discussions about a concept for Children of Apollo lead to discussions that inspired this timeline. Thanks for letting me crib the idea for my own use. Thanks to @NorangePeels for the sole piece of art commissioned directly for this project, and to those dedicated and insane Kerbal players who are somehow already making art of Black Gemini! Any questions or comments?
 
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That was really good! I love the way this timeline actually gave a reason for why the USAF should be sending up crews into space at all, and I also enjoyed the inclusion of an all-female crew, which I'm fairly certain still has yet to happen OTL. I can also see the Shuttle, while still flawed, coming into service as a more mature vehicle after the Air Force had spent so many years figuring out exactly what it takes to refurbish a spacecraft in orbit.

Couple questions:
Does Black Gemini really use that white and red color scheme? It seems ironic for "Black" Gemini to be the version that isn't black...
If Winged Gemini was Gemini 15, what was 13?
 
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Really digging the Gemini Kilroy--exactly the kind of image I'd expect from USAF crews. Enlisted astronauts are also an interesting concept, since the US hasn't had enlisted pilots since 1944--I wonder if they got some satisfaction from having a more radical type of flight experience than their officer colleagues did.

I wonder if surplus Gemini capsules might see new life as a TTL Space Station return vehicle--only two seats, but if there's just one crewmember who needs medical attention, that should be enough.
 
I wonder if surplus Gemini capsules might see new life as a TTL Space Station return vehicle--only two seats, but if there's just one crewmember who needs medical attention, that should be enough.
I suspect Gemini would be rejected out of hand as an ACRV due to the cramped conditions and the... difficulty of boarding.
 
Inside Gemini 10 during flight
And yes Frank Borman and James Lovell spent 14 days in Gemini 7 !

I mean, it's not impossibly cramped, obviously but it is still rather lacking in interior maneuverability, and one would not want to have to suit an a debilitated crewmember to EVA into an escape capsule or cram them through a tiny heat shield hatch...
 
Absolutely exceptional work guys, this really made me smile! Gemini Kilroy was absolutely a delight. Thanks for a wonderful story!
 
If Winged Gemini was Gemini 15, what was 13?
Gemini 13 was the uncrewed flight test in 1976. Gemini 14 was the first crewed flight of winged Gemini (and flew in the first half of 1977), and did not involve complex maneuvering, and was uneventful. Gemini 15 was the flight of John Young and Major Carter in September of 1977, with Gemini 16 and 17 being later flights in 1978 and 1979 that validated the changes following the post Gemini 15 adjustments.
 
37 launches x (failure rate) =
Also the next question, does Buzz see the white lodge vision?
....Not clear what either question is here? I'm not familiar with the "white lodge vision".

Great story and the most plausible exploration of military spaceflight on here since Kolyma's Shadow.
Thanks! I figured...well, as "Astrospies" put it (and I seriously recommend watching it) that the question of orbital recon in space was man vs machine, and OTL the machine won. The human could best have a role by enhancing the machine, a combination of both, not by trying to out-do the machine.
 
I wonder if the Soviets responded with their own longer military human spaceflight program?
I think the Soviet program probably isn't a lot different given the differences in electronics reliability between the US and the USSR. Furthermore, the Soviets flew three stations - Salyuts 2, 3, & 5, that were from the Almaz series of modules, complete with cameras. In the late 1970s, they decided to go back to film return, which they didn't abandon until 2015 with the last flight of Yantar-4K2M.
 
I think the Soviet program probably isn't a lot different given the differences in electronics reliability between the US and the USSR. Furthermore, the Soviets flew three stations - Salyuts 2, 3, & 5, that were from the Almaz series of modules, complete with cameras. In the late 1970s, they decided to go back to film return, which they didn't abandon until 2015 with the last flight of Yantar-4K2M.
Yeah, this is basically what we'd discussed in background: the Soviets were flying Almaz in the mid-70s, essentially testing the MOL/DORIAN concept in flight, while also still running film return in parallel. They seem likely to continue that here, and their film return systems aren't as amenable to modification for reload as American systems as I understand it. Incidentally, the "Astrospies" documentary has some cool footage from inside a real, OTL Almaz mockup with some of the actual crew who flew it for recon in space in OTL.

Couple questions:
Does Black Gemini really use that white and red color scheme? It seems ironic for "Black" Gemini to be the version that isn't black...
If Winged Gemini was Gemini 15, what was 13?
@TimothyC addressed the mission numbers-- Gemini 13 is used up for an un-crewed mission, basically. As for color, probably it is actually black like the flown NASA Gemini black, but the base I used for that image was the suborbital paraglider test rig with colors for better contrast in ground/glide testing. Feel free to change your mental image appropriately, or don't. :)
 
....Not clear what either question is here? I'm not familiar with the "white lodge vision".
Wikipedia puts Gemini's failure rate as 2 partial in 12. So in part one we're looking at 4-8 failures. Mostly around the "tile test" failure grade I'd expect. The thing is that failures can be spectacular. (Wiki's crewed Apollo runs at 2 in 12, one catastrophic, one closely averted from catastrophic.)

The other bit was a trite pop culture reference from twin peaks to a military colonel in strategic surveillance experiencing a vision divine. Obviously the question about failures is more cogent and relevant.

yours,
Sam R.
 
Wikipedia puts Gemini's failure rate as 2 partial in 12. So in part one we're looking at 4-8 failures. Mostly around the "tile test" failure grade I'd expect. The thing is that failures can be spectacular. (Wiki's crewed Apollo runs at 2 in 12, one catastrophic, one closely averted from catastrophic.)

If we look at those 'partial failures' we find Gemini 8 with a stuck thruster and Gemini 9A where the intended target failed to be available for docking. The later problem is not likely to occur, given how the system is built and is operated. The former problem of a stuck thruster is also mitigated thanks to the craft being more mature, and being the beneficiary of a very high priority (but also subject to serious oversight) organization inside USAF. Given this combination, it's plausible that there are no public failures in the program.
 
There's also failures and failures. It's seems likely that on at least one mission a film capsule would get jammed and be unable to be swapped or fuel refilling to be incomplete due to pressure issues or whatever. But if the crew makes it up, meets up with the target and makes it down the mission is going to be recorded as a success even if every objective isn't achieved because it's all classified.

On funding I assume all this is covered by launching fewer satellites than OTL but thanks to resupply getting more total film than OTL plus a bit of reallocation within the DoD budget. So one fewer F-16 Squadron, some barracks not getting renovated, some programs getting terminated a bit earlier than OTL etc.
 
I'm not asking for explosions, or fatalities, or total mission failures. I'm just noting that a military / industrial venture involving complex systems (human and material) is going to engage with failure due largely to humans being involved and how complex humans are in systems. Out of the 12 "White" missions, and ~52 "Black" missions, using the white missions and apollo missions as an estimate, there are 8 failures out there. From heatsink tiles failing to perform as expected, or aborts on film replacements, or early aborts. Obviously the hope is that the use of stable vehicles and launch systems, which are made to high standards including inspection and testing standards, should restrict the failures to stuff that would never make the papers in a "White" programme, let alone fatalities.

the loss of the Space Shuttle Resolution had occurred
Which is a very tasteful way to indicate that the following programme did not successfully restrict failures to non-vehicle loss, by referencing a very lovely story about hobbyist love for the historical shuttle programme.

It is also, of course, that failures are an inherently interesting part of historical human programmes and systems.



yours,
Sam R.
 
aborts on film replacements, or early aborts. Obviously the hope is that the use of stable vehicles and launch systems, which are made to high standards including inspection and testing standards, should restrict the failures to stuff that would never make the papers in a "White" programme, let alone fatalities.

You wouldn't abort on film replacement, if you had a jam, you'd swap the other one scheduled for that EVA, use some of your buffer time to try another EVA, refuel, head home and declare a successful mission. The fact that film capsule 3 wasn't replaced will be relegated to a deeply classified file until 2079 by which time no one will care.
 
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