Bismarck gets his wish

I already said that German politicians, who were in charge were pragmatists, but the German nationalist movement did consider Alsace-Lorraine to have been 'returned'.
 
I already said that German politicians, who were in charge were pragmatists, but the German nationalist movement did consider Alsace-Lorraine to have been 'returned'.
Returned to who? There was no Germany before 1870. And if you call the HRE Germany how come they did not annex the Italian lands that were part of it or even the low countries? Peoples speaking a germanic dialect doesn't make them german.
 
Your missing the point about internal German politics. The German Confederation had been reformed, on favourable terms for the Southern German states. Later this confederacy would be transformed into a federation with the king of Prussia as German Emperor in the role of hereditary head of the federation.
However a direct border with France would have meant a large presence of troops form other German states. With Alsace-Lorraine they would remain free of those and they could deliver their share in Alsace-Lorraine.
So I can understand the southern German states and I do not find it amusing at all.
IMHO you might be from an ATL: the German Confederation was abolished after the 1866 war and the North German states (= Prussia + others) formed a North German Confederation with its own constitution and under the presidency of the king of Prussia. The southern German states were not included in this NGC. In 1867 Bismarck revived the Zollverein, to which the southern German states were also admitted. This new Zollverein had a parliament too and elections were held in 1868 (the south German states voted mostly for anti-Prussian parties). The Zollverein is completely separated from the NCG: if Bismarck had wanted to co-opt Bavaria and cie. into the NCG he would have done it; he did not want that though, so an unnatural animal (Zollverein cum Parliament) was created. The Reich came later on in December 1870 when Bismarck found himself stuck between a French Provisional government who did not want to accept defeat and a couple of political crisis in Germany (a fiscal one in Prussia and nationalist agitators in the Palatinate - but not so much in Bavaria): his way out was to negotiate with Bavaria, Wurttemberg and so on their entry in the newly concocted German Reich. The settlement was not cheap, in particular toward Bavaria (but then the Bavarians were the first to offer the imperial crown to the king of Prussia on that fateful and weel-staged meeting in the Hall of Mirrors of Versailles.
This said, I still cannot understand while the southern German states would be concerned by a direct border with France considering that the border would be stripped of fortresses on the French side and it would be demilitarized.

Even without the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, France would have been aching for revenge. Certainly with Germany in the ascendancy (but late at the 'European party') and their relative decline.
Why do you think so? The war was initiated by the French (with some help from Bismarck but still..), completely mismanaged and at the end they came out of the storm with a peace treaty which is really not very harsh.

Not to mention that Napoleon III coveted lands belonging to those southern German lands, which what drove them in the arms of their northern brethren (there were still religious differences though).
Once again I apologize for pissing on your parade: Nappy was not "coveting" lands in Wurttemberg or in Bavaria, why should he? He wanted compensations to Prussian aggrandizement in the Prussian Palatinate, one of the bishoprics would have been fine thank you. Certainly he was not going to try and move the border beyond the Rhine. Matter of fact, the only time the French passed the border in this unfortunate war they attacked Saarbrucken in the Prussian Palatinate. As far as the "love" of southern Germans for their Prussian brethren least said is best. Bavarians and Northern Germans never mixed well. In a way a border with the French would have given them better cards to play when negotiating their rights in the German federation or empire.

Austria wasn't in any shape to intervene; and judging by Napoleon III Italian policies, they weren't sympathetic towards France and the German Austrians probably supported their brethren too.
Nappy tried to coopt them from the beginning and Austria wanted to go for another round with the Prussians (another case where there is not a lot of brotherly love) but were stopped by the opposition of the Hungarian chancellor (so soon after Ausgleich it would not have been too smart to go so drastically against Hungarian wishes). Anyway the major Austrian requirement was that Italy would guarantee its neutrality (and Italy did not want to do it) After the string of Prussian victories any idea of Austrian mobilization would have been out of the world.
In any case Bismarck was covered by his secret agreement with Russia: an Austrian mobilization would have been matched by a Russian one.

However Bismarck was worried by the excessive duration of the war, and was afraid that there would have been a British initiative (possibly with Italian backing) to convene a conference of Powers.
 
I do not disagree with you. A German unification is in the cards, but hopefully ITTL it will be not the Reich proclaimed in occupied lands during the siege of Paris. One might also be hopeful that a later German unification might be achieved on more liberal basis.

What do you want? The French had the blody 100 Years war that paved the way for the centralized state. After that they "modernized" in blody civil war that later led to Napoleon...
The Americans too got together in war. And too had a blody civil war. So what is the problem with Germany uniting after trouncing France?


I'm not exactly a believer of etnic maps and census: not nowadays, much less in the 19th century. Same thing for plebiscites, which were in most cases staged and anyway involved only a minority of populations. It's quite obvious that border regions are naturally a mixture of languages, religions and cultures and that it is quite difficult (and certainly thankless) to try and adjudicate which is which and who is who.
Same thing - but with much more emphasis - for the old chestnut that [insert your fav nationality or ethic group] were taken by force by [insert your least fav nationality or ethnic group] one hundred, two hundred or a thousand years ago and since then have been bleeding and praying to be reunited with the motherland. If one starts on this slippery path, where is the cutting point located? Every country and every ruler (with no exception whatsoever) have always been driven by greed and land grabs have been always the norm.

I aggree that such maps are to be used with caution. As everybody knows, never depeand on any material that you did not falsie yourself. But language should be rather accurate. "Shrugs"

So what is the French problem then. When every ruler "does it" and they themself did it, why the sudden massive resentment when the shoe was on the other foot?


The point you look like are missing is that Bismarck was looking for a long-term solution, not just a stop-gap one. He behaved in the same way in the aftermath of the 1866 war with Austria: even then he had to resist to the requests of the king and of the generals who were asking for a punitive peace treaty and land annexations but since the war was quick and there was no delay with the peace negotiations he was able to get his way. Why should he be looking for a different approach in the case of France? Because they are not "bruder"?

Could be, but the Austrians also had a shared history with the HRE and all that. Yes they were faster in the peace department, but also had space to grow into (the Balkans) that was more accesible and weaker held.
Not to mention that a overly harsh treaty would surely alienate the South German States. And if Bismarck planed for a German Unification under Prussia, duping the South would be counterproductive.


As far as neutralization and demilitarized lands, you are quite wrong: they were quite common in the 19th century. Out of the top of my mind there were the demilitarization and neutralization of Savoy (Congress of Vienna), the neutralization and the guarantees to Belgium (1832 and 1839), the neutralization and guarantees of Luxembourg (1868, which included also the demolition of Luxembourg fortress). Obviously the neutralization of Switzerland (Congress of Vienna). I'm quite sure there may have been other instances, but these should be enough.

First, the neutralization (?) as in staying neutral would not mean no army or defensive works. See the Swiss and Belgians. Yes they may not march through Europe. But retain full military sovereignity over their terretory.

So if you could please point out somewhere where I could read about it, I would be realy glad...

But to the question of an demilitariezed zone in France? Would they accept it any more gracefully than they did the OTL loss?


Starting with 1866, there was a war scare every year between France and Prussia: the reasons were different (Luxembourg, Spanish succession, military exercises near the border and so on), but every summer was the same. Funnily enough 1870 looked to be the exception because the Spanish crisis looked to have been defused earlier, and all the major players had gone on summer holiday. Then Bismarck came back, there was the telegram of Ems and so on. The point is that on the French side everyone was eager for a war (which is not the same thing as saying they were prepared for a war...). The regime was starting to show significant problems, even among the country farmers who had always been the Bonapartist mainstay: so the emperor (and even more the empress) were eager for a "short, victorious war" to prop up the regime and to secure the succession (Nappy's health was not good at all and he was looking to abdicate when his son reached majority; Eugenie was also eager to secure her son inheritance but was also incensed by Bismarck's meddling into Spanish affairs). The conservative Bonapartists also wanted a war, to reduce the growing influence of legitimist monarchists and to switch the focus from the promises of liberalization that the regime had been obliged to make. The army was restive and some external war was considered necessary. Even the republicans were all in favor of a war to wash the stain of Prussian arrogance (and since they were usually charges as traitors to France they were even more vocal than all the others). It will not be too easy for Nappy and his advisers to find out some suitable scapegoat but I agree he has to do that and do it soon.

Oh, was just an idea for the country folk. Blame the city dwellers and republicans for wanting a war. Or some such...
Would not realy have to be factual. Just enough to prop up Napoleon III for some time to get the House in order.


The Prince Imperial is just 14 years old in 1870, and will get to major age in 4 more years. Since the health of the emperor is quite poor a regency council is not unlikely: the problem is that it will be a very conservative one, dominated by empress Eugenie (the only liberal Bonaparte is Plon-Plon but he's not well received at court these days).

Ah, conservative could also mean that the masses would be rather glad to get the new modell of ruler... It realy was a thought thrown in to show some possibilitys.
 
I aggree that such maps are to be used with caution. As everybody knows, never depeand on any material that you did not falsie yourself. But language should be rather accurate. "Shrugs"

Language (which is a german as Dutch in the case of Alsatian) does not equate nationality. Especially not in France, a nation built from people speaking different languages (Breton, Oïl, Occitan, Alsatian, Basque, Catalan, Corsican). And also the map isn't accurate. It only show the substrate of the population. In 1870, at least 75% of the population also spoke French, and exclusive French speakers were the plurality in Strasbourg.

So what is the French problem then. When every ruler "does it" and they themself did it, why the sudden massive resentment when the shoe was on the other foot?

Maybe because France even under Napoléon III was a hundred time more democratic than Prussia and the UberPrussia that came after the war ? France was angry because it was a democratic nation that actually cared for the will of it's citizens and it's citizens actually wanted to stay in France (all the Alsatian deputies walked out of the assembly when the monarchist assembly agreed to the term of the treaty, and even in the undemocratic Prussian elections, the worst result the pro french parties got was 55%.
 
Language (which is a german as Dutch in the case of Alsatian) does not equate nationality. Especially not in France, a nation built from people speaking different languages (Breton, Oïl, Occitan, Alsatian, Basque, Catalan, Corsican). And also the map isn't accurate. It only show the substrate of the population. In 1870, at least 75% of the population also spoke French, and exclusive French speakers were the plurality in Strasbourg.

Any map showing such things in any scale will be inacurate. The matter is that there were large swaths of land that spoke in Germanic Dialects.


Maybe because France even under Napoléon III was a hundred time more democratic than Prussia and the UberPrussia that came after the war ? France was angry because it was a democratic nation that actually cared for the will of it's citizens and it's citizens actually wanted to stay in France (all the Alsatian deputies walked out of the assembly when the monarchist assembly agreed to the term of the treaty, and even in the undemocratic Prussian elections, the worst result the pro french parties got was 55%.

Thanks for the Strawman. Yes France may be more or less democratic. But even a short read on Wiki reveals that not all is sunshine and positive votes. Napoleon III's Second Empire was not better or worse than the other systems. And it repressed press and free speach to some degree.
And the later German Empire was a progressive entety in its time. That the Prussian system was less democratic is no reason to blame the whole. As to your points? Well for me they show that the Elsaß-Lothringen Reichsland had the right to vote and express its own views. Hardly the UltraRepressive System you make the German one out to be.
 
IMHO you might be from an ATL: the German Confederation was abolished after the 1866 war and the North German states (= Prussia + others) formed a North German Confederation with its own constitution and under the presidency of the king of Prussia. The southern German states were not included in this NGC. In 1867 Bismarck revived the Zollverein, to which the southern German states were also admitted. This new Zollverein had a parliament too and elections were held in 1868 (the south German states voted mostly for anti-Prussian parties). The Zollverein is completely separated from the NCG: if Bismarck had wanted to co-opt Bavaria and cie. into the NCG he would have done it; he did not want that though, so an unnatural animal (Zollverein cum Parliament) was created. The Reich came later on in December 1870 when Bismarck found himself stuck between a French Provisional government who did not want to accept defeat and a couple of political crisis in Germany (a fiscal one in Prussia and nationalist agitators in the Palatinate - but not so much in Bavaria): his way out was to negotiate with Bavaria, Wurttemberg and so on their entry in the newly concocted German Reich. The settlement was not cheap, in particular toward Bavaria (but then the Bavarians were the first to offer the imperial crown to the king of Prussia on that fateful and weel-staged meeting in the Hall of Mirrors of Versailles.
This said, I still cannot understand while the southern German states would be concerned by a direct border with France considering that the border would be stripped of fortresses on the French side and it would be demilitarized.

:pThen I guess were both from an ATL. I may have written things down a bit unlucky, but those negotiations is what I meant with 'reforming the German Confederation', since at that point the German Empire wasn't a complete certainty yet.
Demilitarized regions can be militarized again. Alsace-Lorraine among other things was also a buffer.

Why do you think so? The war was initiated by the French (with some help from Bismarck but still..), completely mismanaged and at the end they came out of the storm with a peace treaty which is really not very harsh.

Once again I apologize for pissing on your parade: Nappy was not "coveting" lands in Wurttemberg or in Bavaria, why should he? He wanted compensations to Prussian aggrandizement in the Prussian Palatinate, one of the bishoprics would have been fine thank you. Certainly he was not going to try and move the border beyond the Rhine. Matter of fact, the only time the French passed the border in this unfortunate war they attacked Saarbrucken in the Prussian Palatinate. As far as the "love" of southern Germans for their Prussian brethren least said is best. Bavarians and Northern Germans never mixed well. In a way a border with the French would have given them better cards to play when negotiating their rights in the German federation or empire.

It was mostly the French, who wanted the war, in part the Napoleon III needed it too. He had helped brokering peace treaties in 1866 etc., but lately he had failed to make any territorial gains.
Not to mention that gaining Savoy and Nice, relations with a potential ally Italy had cooled down.
Napoleon III wasn't explicitly about that he just wanted Prussian southern lands though. Something Bismark exploited. Don't forget Baden is right across Alsace and the Palatinate was (mostly) a part of Bavaria.

Not to mention that for nationalists having to again* cede German lands to France wasn't acceptable at all.
(*= again depends on your position, but if you include the Holy Roman Empire, then that certainly was true).

So France taking German lands is fine, but the opposite (what happened IOTL) isn't? IMHO a bit of a double standard; again I'm not saying it was a wise move of Germany, but it's not like France had never acted in a similar manner, when the roles were reversed.

Nappy tried to coopt them from the beginning and Austria wanted to go for another round with the Prussians (another case where there is not a lot of brotherly love) but were stopped by the opposition of the Hungarian chancellor (so soon after Ausgleich it would not have been too smart to go so drastically against Hungarian wishes). Anyway the major Austrian requirement was that Italy would guarantee its neutrality (and Italy did not want to do it) After the string of Prussian victories any idea of Austrian mobilization would have been out of the world.
In any case Bismarck was covered by his secret agreement with Russia: an Austrian mobilization would have been matched by a Russian one.

Austria-Hungary wasn't in any shape to intervene, especially when they need guarantees for neutrality.
Italy though unhappy with France, Napoleon III hadn't only gained Savoy and Nice, but he also had actively prevented Italy from conquering the Papal State.
OTOH relations with Austria were even worse. Italy still had irredentist claims on part of Austria-Hungary, Austria-Hungary OTOH used to play a dominant role in Italy and Germany.
Austria-Hungary had lost their role in Germany to Prussia. OTOH there were more German states. Not to mention that Austria-Hungary also had been on the side opposing Napoleon III, for instance in Italy.
In short any cooperation, though possible (under better circumstances) would be completely opportunistic from both sides. IMHO Napoleon III must at least persuade Italy towards neutrality and won't move against his potential Austrian ally.
Then again as you mentioned the Hungarian part wasn't enthusiastic and the Austrian part did take the position of the southern German states into account. IMHO that makes sense, Austria wanted their influence in Germany back, and thus they didn't want alienate every German state.

However Bismarck was worried by the excessive duration of the war, and was afraid that there would have been a British initiative (possibly with Italian backing) to convene a conference of Powers.

Finally something we can agree on!;) A conference might have taken the edges of any treaty, but it would complicate things for the actual belligerents.
 
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RousseauX

Donor
A Germany will most likely emerge of that. If at the time of OTL or somewhat later is open, yes. But the sheer inertia that the War will have losend will see to it.



I can see yout point. But you are Imo ignoring the historical and military implications in not anexing Elsaß-Lothringen. Because at that time there were significant numbers of predominantly German settled regions in it. Taken by the French some time before. So the "overblown" French reaction after OTL 1871 is what Imo is out of whack. Maybe because they were more often than not the aggressor?
And also the indemnity the French are to pay OTL are based on the ones Napoleon got after he trounced Prussia. So there too is a French fueled start.

Your idea of an demilitarized zone is ok for todays thinking. But look at all the Peace treatys before Versails. Imo there seldem is any clause to military limitations. Vasalisation yes, massive indemnitys also but outright demilitarisation not.


And I can aggree that the French situation is probably going to be fluid. But if Napoleon III can somehow leverage the pre war war advocates as the source of the misshap, he could Imo stabelize the Nation for some time. How long is then open to what he does with his time. And how the succession is handeld. Maybe a rigning council to start of his heir?

If Bismarck had it his way A/L does not get annexed, period. Bismarck realized that it was a terrible idea on the long run but got overruled by Motlke.
 
Any map showing such things in any scale will be inacurate. The matter is that there were large swaths of land that spoke in Germanic Dialects.
It should be repeated that Language=/=Nationality (does speaking France mean Haitians are French, for instance, or Americans British?)

National Self-Identification=Nationality


While there was a significant subset of Germanic speakers in the region, French was among the dominant languages. MORE IMPORTANTLY, the people of the region by in large viewed themselves as French; Strasbourg for instance was one of the hotbeds of the Revolution, and was the home city of numerous important figures of the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars (Kellerman, one of the generals at Valmy, for instance).


In addressing the OP question, leaving France Alsace-Lorraine leaves them without any major territorial ambitions or claims against Prussia or Germany, and the main sticking point in Franco-German relations throughout the Belle Epoque. This drastically changes the direction of continental politics for decades, as it leaves France without the burning desire to develop an anti-German alliance with Russia and subsequently Britain.

This also has interesting butterflies in Algeria, as quite a number of the pied-noir were emigres from Alsace-Lorraine in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war.

An Anglo-French rivalry is more likely to re-emerge in such an instance, as the need to have Britain as an ally against Germany to retake Alsace-Lorraine largely evaporates. Fashoda for instance is more likely to ignite into open war, than the utterly remote possibility in OTL (the politicians of both nations were aware of the dangers).


I can't really begin to imagine the alliance system that emerges afterwards. In fact, you may very well have butterflied away World War One if you do, in any recognizable form.

Bismark of course recognized this, but was overruled, and as a result had to set forward a containment policy for France (which crumbled due to Wilhelm II).
 
If Bismarck had it his way A/L does not get annexed, period. Bismarck realized that it was a terrible idea on the long run but got overruled by Motlke.

And Bismarck is not working in a vacuum. So even the "allmighty" Bismarck had to haggle and push for the things he did.

He had to juggle the nationalistc feelings, the military requirements and also the future industrial needs of Germany within the context of the war and impending unification.
So while he personaly may have thought so, he had to react to external stimuli.

Inquisitor Tolkien said:
It should be repeated that Language=/=Nationality (does speaking France mean Haitians are French, for instance, or Americans British?)
National Self-Identification=Nationality

Hello Inquisitor Tolkien,
again I state, that I aggree that language and nation are not the same. But I also will point out that esp. Alsace / Elsass had a long history in germanic hands. So the inclusion into the German Reich is not that far out there. Yes the nationalistic feelings may have played a part but the whole reasons were more warried than the simple generalitys often put out.


While there was a significant subset of Germanic speakers in the region, French was among the dominant languages. MORE IMPORTANTLY, the people of the region by in large viewed themselves as French; Strasbourg for instance was one of the hotbeds of the Revolution, and was the home city of numerous important figures of the Revolution and the Napoleonic wars (Kellerman, one of the generals at Valmy, for instance).

And the French respected those views when they redraw the borders before? Sorry, but they did it before and were happy to do it to suit their ends. But now someone did it to them. And they Imo "flipped out" about it.
Yes the nationalistic feelings of the time were bigger then before and all that.


In addressing the OP question, leaving France Alsace-Lorraine leaves them without any major territorial ambitions or claims against Prussia or Germany, and the main sticking point in Franco-German relations throughout the Belle Epoque. This drastically changes the direction of continental politics for decades, as it leaves France without the burning desire to develop an anti-German alliance with Russia and subsequently Britain.
This also has interesting butterflies in Algeria, as quite a number of the pied-noir were emigres from Alsace-Lorraine in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian war.
An Anglo-French rivalry is more likely to re-emerge in such an instance, as the need to have Britain as an ally against Germany to retake Alsace-Lorraine largely evaporates. Fashoda for instance is more likely to ignite into open war, than the utterly remote possibility in OTL (the politicians of both nations were aware of the dangers).

I can't really begin to imagine the alliance system that emerges afterwards. In fact, you may very well have butterflied away World War One if you do, in any recognizable form.
Bismark of course recognized this, but was overruled, and as a result had to set forward a containment policy for France (which crumbled due to Wilhelm II).

I can aggree that that would have huge implications for Europe and the World later on. But the "no Franco-German rivalry/enity" is Imo too big. The French were proud and would have been trounced as bad (wihout the later humiliation) by Germany. So I can see a new war a decade later. Esp. as they would be stronger against Germany.
What happens towards Britain and Russia will change. In what form is open. Because the German - Russian relations were rather good for a time after the 1870 - 71 war and only later detoriated. Also British - German relations rather cordial till they took the "Boer War" hit. And even after that the Germans tried to get the British into an alliance...


Again some points why I think some border corrections against France are "inevitable", but maybe not in the volume as OTL:
- France was not only beaten, but kicked in a way that was not seen at the time.
- National Pride demanded some indemnities and land to show the victory to the people.
- Alsace and Lorraine had important resources for the industrial growth of Germany.
- The newly unified Reich did not have a real unified military. The Member States had their own armys, esp. the bigger southern states. So a stationing of "northern prussian" troops in Bavaria and such was a big no-no. And the Reichsland as such was the "perfect" way out to secure the border in some way.
 
Alsace-Lorraine was very likely to be annexed, but for reasons that had nothing to do with lower-class German nationalists (who were not, it must be stressed, actually running the country). The reasoning was very different.

Men like Bismarck and Moltke weren't German nationalists; they fought to put down German nationalists. They forged a united Germany for the sake of strengthening Prussia; at that point their interests coincided with liberal German nationalists but that does not mean that they were one and the same.

Later German historiography rather glossed over what the situation was actually like in South Germany. I didn't know that South Germany largely voted for anti-Prussian parties but it wouldn't surprise me at all; when the Franco-Prussian War came along, South German peasants were burning their crops lest the enemy army be able to use them… the enemy being Prussia, not France, which (along with Austria) anticipated being welcomed as liberators by the South Germans and made plans from this basis (they never got a chance to try it out IOTL so we don't know how it would have gone if they had). To pretend that the people of North Germany and South Germany were gloriously united in purpose and considered each other 'brethren' is disingenuous to say the least. Plenty of people in South Germany were prepared to rise up for a liberal pan-Germanist federation; rather fewer were interested in a Germany led by Prussia. Much of the German powers' military misfortune in the Franco-Prussian War came from screw-ups that were due to the refusal of the South German states (Bavaria in particular) to harmonise their armies with the Prussians because they didn't trust the Prussians. (Baden was the odd one out.)

The reason why I say all this is that Alsace-Lorraine was deeply tied into it. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was a political necessity for Prussia for reasons that had nothing whatsoever to do with German nationalism; it was because the South Germans had been restive enough about militarily cooperating with Prussia even when in a war against a Bonapartist France that had recently declared its interest in annexing land along the Rhine, let alone in peacetime. Having to station lots of troops in the South German states (in particular the crucial Bavarian Palatinate) was a political no-no in 1871—hence why Bismarck found his solution. That was far more important to him than any ethnic or linguistic arguments made by the sort of people he had fiercely fought in 1848.

(Bismarck's own memoirs, saying that he orchestrated everything years in advance in order to create a united Germany just like the one that turned out, are an extremely unreliable source for reasons that ought to be obvious.)

This meant that Germany treated Alsace-Lorraine more like a giant barracks than an equal part of Germany. This treatment is why it's unsurprising that the people of Alsace-Lorraine continued to regard themselves as conquered Frenchmen (the electoral record is revealing), were never really resigned to being part of Germany and were quite happy to rejoin France once they got the opportunity to do so. The reason why Germany gained its Reichsland was thus deeply tied to the reason why Germany lost it.
 
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