Biggest Lost Opportunity - WWII - Soviets

Following their defense of Moscow (Jan 1942), what single point on the Eastern Front had the most potential to end the war earlier and as decisively for the Allies? BLO
 
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What I thought of immediately is Stalin realizing that the main German attack in 1942 would be in the south and strengthening defenses there, as well as abandoning the disastrous Kharkov offensive.
 
Following their defense of Moscow (Jan 1942), what single point on the Eastern Front had the most potential to end the war earlier and as decisively for the Allies?

Stalin not expanding the December counter-offensive into a front-wide offensive in January and instead concentrating his forces and assets against Army Group Center is a good one. The diffusion of both combat forces and logistical assets from that decision, combined with Hitler's decision to hold fast which prevented a catastrophic rout that would have disintegrated German defenses, meant the Soviets blew their best shot at successfully encircling and destroying a good chunk of AGC. Without that, the Soviets might have gotten their war-turning victory there instead of at Stalingrad.

What I thought of immediately is Stalin realizing that the main German attack in 1942 would be in the south and strengthening defenses there, as well as abandoning the disastrous Kharkov offensive.

This would be immensely helpful as well. Second Kharkov basically cut the southern Army Fronts strength in half both quantitatively and qualitatively. Abandoning the attempted breakout from the Kerch Peninsula and moving onto the defensive there would also lead to much more of a slug-fest for the Germans when they try to crush the beachhead, rather then the easy and rapid German victory that Trappenjagd was.
 
Some good 1942 PoDs here; if the restriction were extended to PoDs following Operation Little Saturn, would there be any good answers? So far as I can tell, the only major military setback the Reds faced in 1943 was the Third Battle of Kharkov; if there's not much potential militarily this year, what about diplomatically (since late 1943 did see the start of high level coordination among all the Allies).
 
Some good 1942 PoDs here; if the restriction were extended to PoDs following Operation Little Saturn, would there be any good answers? So far as I can tell, the only major military setback the Reds faced in 1943 was the Third Battle of Kharkov; if there's not much potential militarily this year, what about diplomatically (since late 1943 did see the start of high level coordination among all the Allies).

There is one more that occurs to me, although it's in early-'44 rather then 1943: the encirclement of Hube's 1st Panzer Army during the Kamenets-Podosly Operation. Historically, Zhukov and Konev believed that Hube would attempt his breakout to the south and organized their forces accordingly, even after the breakout had already begun. Had they recognized this error then they could have blocked the breakout attempt or at least chopped it up badly enough that 1st Panzer Army would have been incapable of any large-scale operations, offensive or defensive (as it was, it was only rendered unfit for large-scale offensive operations and thus was immediately re-utilized in a defensive role). That's 200,000 men that might have been wiped from Army Group South's OOB, which would have been impossible for the Germans to make-up in 1944.

Averting Third Kharkov would require a more severe German screw-up then any Soviet wisdom. Operation Star was already foundering on the logistical and operational challenges the Red Army was facing after covering some ~500 kilometers in the rest of their winter campaign and then trying to transfer an entirely new Army Group (the one which crushed the Stalingrad pocket) on something of just a weeks notice. Basically, what Manstein accomplished was less of a miracle and more him delivering the killing blow to an already dying offensive. Wouldn't be the last time it happened either, but neither it nor the later such successes were going to prevent the Soviets from resuming the advance once the next campaign season rolled around.
 
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Thanks for the answers; there are some massive screwups and lost opportunities made by the Soviets in this time.

Even more so if one includes 1941. Even leaving aside the problems that came with the Soviets being caught by surprise and thus no time to even implement their existing plans, much less draft one which did not envision the use of forces that didn't exist yet, had Konev or Zhukov literally achieved just one more tactical success in their El'nia counter-offensive, they might have dislocated Guderian's drive south and prevented the Kiev encirclement (and, by extension, the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclements) completely. This would have completely altered both the entire course of the Eastern War in the Soviets favor from the winter on. Making the Soviets just a little more competent in their execution or adding just a little more strength to their forces would have done that.
 
Even more so if one includes 1941. Had Konev or Zhukov literally achieved just one more tactical success in their El'nia counter-offensive, they might have dislocated Guderian's drive south and prevented the Kiev encirclement (and, by extension, the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement).
I guess 1943 was kind of an outlier in its absence of massive and costly Soviet blunders? Well, maybe that shouldn't be too surprising...
 
I guess 1943 was kind of an outlier in its absence of massive and costly Soviet blunders? Well, maybe that shouldn't be too surprising...

Well, some of the execution in both Operation Suvorov and Kunetzov could have been better but those weren't bad enough blunders to undermine the operation and prevent ultimate success. 1945 didn't see any Soviet blunders that really cost them any victories but then again the Soviets were so powerful and the Germans so weak by that point that there really was no way for the Soviets to not end up in Berlin before the end of Spring. You have stuff that might have boosted German losses a bit here or reduced Soviet losses a bit there, but nothing that fundamentally alters the course of operations or the entire war.
 
Well, some of the execution in both Operations Suvorov and Kunetzov could have been better but those weren't bad enough blunders to undermine the operation and prevent ultimate success.
And nothing that cost Soviets at the same level as the Nazi withdrawal from the Kamenets Podolsky Pocket, much less the astonisg blunders of Barbarossa or 1942.
 
I guess I'd observe that technically trying to attempt Operation Star, given that it led directly to Third Kharkov, would count as a big and costly Soviet blunder but not really one you can quite argue prolonged the war. Nor is it one that was easily avoided as after the massive victory at Stalingrad the Soviets caught a whiff of the victory disease that gave Manstein the opportunity to disabuse them of.
 
1. Concentrating on AGC on 1941 Winter offensive.
2. Cancelling the disastrous offensive against Karkhov in 1942
3. Reducing Mars to a real secondary attack and using the forces wasted there to complete Saturn, reaching Rostov after encircling Stalingrad. This would allow them to liquidate both army group A and B, and would probably avoid the new failure at Karkhov (the place must have been jinxed)

Earlier options of course cancel the need for the later ones.
 
So, just to list what we have thus far:
... had Konev or Zhukov literally achieved just one more tactical success in their El'nia counter-offensive, they might have dislocated Guderian's drive south and prevented the Kiev encirclement (and, by extension, the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclements) completely. This would have completely altered both the entire course of the Eastern War in the Soviets favor from the winter on. Making the Soviets just a little more competent in their execution or adding just a little more strength to their forces would have done that.
PoD can be anytime in latter 1941, I suppose.
Stalin not expanding the December counter-offensive into a front-wide offensive in January and instead concentrating his forces and assets against Army Group Center is a good one. The diffusion of both combat forces and logistical assets from that decision, combined with Hitler's decision to hold fast which prevented a catastrophic rout that would have disintegrated German defenses, meant the Soviets blew their best shot at successfully encircling and destroying a good chunk of AGC. Without that, the Soviets might have gotten their war-turning victory there instead of at Stalingrad.
PoD -- January 5, 1942
Abandoning the attempted breakout from the Kerch Peninsula and moving onto the defensive there would also lead to much more of a slug-fest for the Germans when they try to crush the beachhead, rather then the easy and rapid German victory that Trappenjagd was.
Attempts at breaking out started February 1942, right? Then again, the big German breakthrough was May, so maybe the PoD can be latter...
... as well as abandoning the disastrous Kharkov offensive.
This would be immensely helpful as well. Second Kharkov basically cut the southern Army Fronts strength in half both quantitatively and qualitatively.
PoD -- May 1942
What I thought of immediately is Stalin realizing that the main German attack in 1942 would be in the south and strengthening defenses there...
This is referring to Case Blue, right? So prior to June 1942.
Reducing Mars to a real secondary attack and using the forces wasted there to complete Saturn, reaching Rostov after encircling Stalingrad. This would allow them to liquidate both army group A and B, and would probably avoid the new failure at Karkhov (the place must have been jinxed)
PoD - before November 1942
I guess I'd observe that technically trying to attempt Operation Star, given that it led directly to Third Kharkov, would count as a big and costly Soviet blunder but not really one you can quite argue prolonged the war. Nor is it one that was easily avoided as after the massive victory at Stalingrad the Soviets caught a whiff of the victory disease that gave Manstein the opportunity to disabuse them of.
So far as I can tell, the only major military setback the Reds faced in 1943 was the Third Battle of Kharkov...
Well, some of the execution in both Operation Suvorov and Kunetzov could have been better but those weren't bad enough blunders to undermine the operation and prevent ultimate success.
These 1943 PoDs aren't as much compared to the other PoDs we're talking about.
There is one more that occurs to me, although it's in early-'44 rather then 1943: the encirclement of Hube's 1st Panzer Army during the Kamenets-Podosly Operation. Historically, Zhukov and Konev believed that Hube would attempt his breakout to the south and organized their forces accordingly, even after the breakout had already begun. Had they recognized this error then they could have blocked the breakout attempt or at least chopped it up badly enough that 1st Panzer Army would have been incapable of any large-scale operations, offensive or defensive (as it was, it was only rendered unfit for large-scale offensive operations and thus was immediately re-utilized in a defensive role). That's 200,000 men that might have been wiped from Army Group South's OOB, which would have been impossible for the Germans to make-up in 1944.
Another good one, February or March 1944
1945 didn't see any Soviet blunders that really cost them any victories but then again the Soviets were so powerful and the Germans so weak by that point that there really was no way for the Soviets to not end up in Berlin before the end of Spring. You have stuff that might have boosted German losses a bit here or reduced Soviet losses a bit there, but nothing that fundamentally alters the course of operations or the entire war.
And there we are.

So looking the whole thing over, I'd say the best PoD would either be one of these:
  • averting Stalin's disastrous January 5, 1942 decision
  • a PoD in late Spring that year either preventing the disaster at Kerch or where the Second Kharkov Offensive is avoided, or both
  • Stalin accepts his intelligence, and the Russians are better prepared for Case Blue
Maybe (b) could have been achieved with better intelligence? The Brits had already cracked Enigma by this point, but I have no idea if they were already sharing with the Russians or how much. Then again, Stalin had intelligence for (c), but ignored it; I'd say the easier PoD.

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Actually, now I'm curious -- if the choice is between these two scenarios, which one has more potential to help the Soviets more throughout the war?
  • the disasters of May 1942 (that is, the German breakthrough on the Kerch Peninsula and the Second Kharkov Offensive) are both avoided, but the Russians are caught just as unaware for Case Blue as they were OTL
  • the May disasters happen as OTL, only here leading Stalin to snap into reality sooner; may mean that Zhukov is promoted deputy commander in chief three months earlier; at the least, leadership now believes the intelligence of German plans to invade the south, leading to better preparations, preventing Stalingrad, etc
And here's something else I wonder -- going with the better of these scenarios, how much more successful can the Soviets be long term? If "Manstein's miracles" in 1943 were the result of Soviet forces and supply lines being overstretched, as ON says, then it stands to reason Russia suffering fewer losses and losing less territory in 1942 would mean these delays are less likely, no? Could this mean that the Soviets reach Berlin as much as a year earlier, possibly even before the WAllies get a chance to invade France?
 
Actually, now I'm curious -- if the choice is between these two scenarios, which one has more potential to help the Soviets more throughout the war?
  • the disasters of May 1942 (that is, the German breakthrough on the Kerch Peninsula and the Second Kharkov Offensive) are both avoided, but the Russians are caught just as unaware for Case Blue as they were OTL
  • the May disasters happen as OTL, only here leading Stalin to snap into reality sooner; may mean that Zhukov is promoted deputy commander in chief three months earlier; at the least, leadership now believes the intelligence of German plans to invade the south, leading to better preparations, preventing Stalingrad, etc
And here's something else I wonder -- going with the better of these scenarios, how much more successful can the Soviets be long term? If "Manstein's miracles" in 1943 were the result of Soviet forces and supply lines being overstretched, as ON says, then it stands to reason Russia suffering fewer losses and losing less territory in 1942 would mean these delays are less likely, no? Could this mean that the Soviets reach Berlin as much as a year earlier, possibly even before the WAllies get a chance to invade France?

While both ultimately would be an improvement over OTL, averting 2nd Kharkov would do it easily. It allows the southern Army Fronts to retain their full strength while also giving them powerful mobile reserves to counter any German assault even before the movement of any of STAVKA's strategic reserve. Even with the Germans achieving surprise, it means they'll face a much tougher fight to breakthrough the Soviets tactical and operational defenses then OTL with correspondingly heavier casualties. They'll probably still succeed in this, the Soviets simply didn't demonstrate the ability to hold the Germans at the tactical-operational level in such open terrain as found in Eastern Ukraine until 1943, but they'll be much more exhausted and the Soviets would have vastly more time to identify the offensive, withdraw in good order, set-up a new defense line, and redeploy their strategic reserves accordingly. Conceivably the Soviets would be able to halt the German advance on a line running roughly from from Voronezh to Rostov.

The latter option two would essentially be a weaker version of the above. While the months delay between the end of 2nd Kharkov and the opening of Blau would give time to redeploy some of the strategic reserves, the Southwestern and Southern Fronts would still suffer from the destruction of the bulk of their combat power at 2nd Kharkov. They might still be able to halt the Germans at the Don and prevent them from breaking into the Caucasus...

As for the amount of time this would shave off: getting a Soviet victory before the WAllies land in June 1944* would probably require the "averting Kiev" or "encirclement of AGC" PoDs we've already touched upon. You might see the Soviets enter Berlin in summer of '44... but it would be late summer.

*This assuming that an accelerated Eastern Front does not necessarily alter the timetable for the Western Front, which is far from a given.
 
The reason I think the WAllies invade around the same time as otl is (AIR from Max Hastings) it took them that long to build up the industrial capacity, supplies, and forces necessary for such an invasion.
 
The reason I think the WAllies invade around the same time as otl is (AIR from Max Hastings) it took them that long to build up the industrial capacity, supplies, and forces necessary for such an invasion.

There is some debate about that, naturally, and it's as dependent on what the Germans keep in the West in response to the faster-collapsing Eastern Front. After all, one sides offensive capability is going to be inversely proportional to the opposing sides combat power (and vice-versa).
 
There is some debate about that, naturally, and it's as dependent on what the Germans keep in the West in response to the faster-collapsing Eastern Front. After all, one sides offensive capability is going to be inversely proportional to the opposing sides combat power (and vice-versa).
Another thought on that though -- our PoD would likely prevent the Italian Front as OTL knows it, due to either (a) the WAllies deciding against it, or (b) Hitler sticking with his original plan of holding defenses in the far north. Either way, this means the WAllies are without some very key learning experiences (ie disasterous blunders) when it comes to beach landings, which means an attempted D-Day TTL, especially if it's earlier, might go badly, preventing any kind of second front.
 
Another thought on that though -- our PoD would likely prevent the Italian Front as OTL knows it, due to either (a) the WAllies deciding against it, or (b) Hitler sticking with his original plan of holding defenses in the far north. Either way, this means the WAllies are without some very key learning experiences (ie disasterous blunders) when it comes to beach landings, which means an attempted D-Day TTL, especially if it's earlier, might go badly, preventing any kind of second front.

This is all quite true. However in such a timeline where the Soviets are enjoying extra success, no second front doesn't really matter to the Red Army in a military... even if Stalin would swing it's failure for all the political points it is worth. In a indirect way it would probably be even more of a disaster for Germany then it would the WAllies, since the main thing D-Day (even IOTL) determined is how much of Germany the Soviets got rather then if they would get any at all.
 
This is all quite true. However in such a timeline where the Soviets are enjoying extra success, no second front doesn't really matter to the Red Army in a military... even if Stalin would swing it's failure for all the political points it is worth. In a indirect way it would probably be even more of a disaster for Germany then it would the WAllies, since the main thing D-Day (even IOTL) determined is how much of Germany the Soviets got rather then if they would get any at all.
My thoughts exactly -- in short, what we have here is a Soviet Wank.
 
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