The Elephant at the Crossroads
In February of 1981, two weeks after the inauguration of Hugh Carey,
The Economist released a famous cover issue titled "The Elephant at the Crossroads" with a cartoon elephant pondering what direction to go next, with the article considering what, exactly, the Republican Party of the United States was to do next. This question was indeed very live for the party's grandees and its activists, and the answer would define American politics moving forward, which made its resolution critical. Understandably, this was not a debate that would resolve itself anytime soon, and much of the early 1980s would see intense internecine brawling with most Republican politicians resigned to the fact that it could be as much as a decade before they found their way anywhere close to power again.
The position the party found itself in in the spring of 1981 was dire. While not quite the near-extinction level event that the early New Deal era represented, the GOP in the early 1980s was worse off than it had been after the 1964 LBJ landslide - they were in a superminority in both houses of Congress, had only one-fifth of the Governorships, and were in an even worse position in the state legislatures. While Reagan had kept the results of the 1980 Presidential election somewhat respectable, a few thousand votes going another way in California or the Carolinas would have put him in an embarrassing hole. The road back would be highly difficult, in part because the rift between the increasingly conservative base voters and the needs of the party in a general election were starting to widen.
Comparisons between 1964 and 1980 were inapt. While it was true, as many conservative activists were keen to optimistically point out, that the Goldwater defenestration had been followed by the Nixonian triumph of 1968, that election had come at the back of eight very chaotic years under a Democratic President, and the exhausted and relieved electorate of 1981 seemed unlikely to power such a backlash again by the time 1984 rolled around. It was also very true that the dynamic that Carey had promised - a no-nonsense throwback liberalism and steady hand at the wheel after close to two decades of political chaos and disillusionment - was a world apart from the radical civil rights movement of the 1960s, the anti-war energy of the McGovern insurgency or the moralizing post-politics of Carter, and thus rather than representing the brave new world of New Left impulse it was instead a fundamentally conservative proposition in and of itself.
Understandably, it was William Buckley of the
National Review who stepped into the fray as attempting to corral the thinking of conservative intellectualism in response to the failures of Nixon-Fordism
and Reaganism in tandem. In one of his first essays on the path forward, he penned a treatise he titled "Beyond the Backlash," in which he positioned the Nixon victories as understandable electoral thermostatic reactions to the implied revolutionary energies of the late 1960s but cautioned the Republican Party that "we must represent more than just the rejection of the new social settlement and the New Deal - we must present a positive, forward-thinking agenda that includes and impresses Americans of all faiths, creeds, races, and classes." Particular energy was devoted to noting that the hoped-for Republican breakthrough in the South had been half-baked; while picking off parts of the coastal South had been a success, efforts to penetrate working-class, unemployment-ravaged states like Mississippi and Alabama had fallen flat with the deep Ford recession of 1978-80. Republican strategists had noted that Midwestern conservatives and Southern rural voters had more in common than different as early as 1928 when Hoover made nudging Black voters aside an implicit strategy; despite the successes of 1964-72, they had succeeded less in building a machine in the South than simply creating occasional swing states.
The group who suffered the most from Reagan defeat were politically minded evangelicals, with Jerry Falwell having particularly bet big on organizing Southern Baptist and Pentecostal churches as a united political force. Between the personally evangelical Jimmy Carter having fallen short in 1976, the various anti-feminist, anti-gay and anti-abortion wedge campaigns of 1977-78 failing to make much headway with the electorate
[1], and now the evangelical-friendly Reagan falling short brought into open question to what extent a "Christian Right" could actually have potency. A movement that in the mid-1970s looked to be the leading edge of social conservative organizing had proven in many ways toothless, and Nixon's dismissiveness of them a decade earlier suddenly looked to have been the right bet. By the late 1980s, men like Falwell or his fellow Virginian pastor Pat Robertson had declined remarkably in influence, and though the GOP was in all ways a socially and culturally conservative party then and now, the evangelical politics that had looked nascent in the late 1970s never emerged as much more than a historical curiosity.
That being said, if the reactionary anger of Goldwater and Reagan had proven toxic with the broader electorate even with the creakiness of the New Deal coalition as it entered its sixth decade, one thing the 1960s had proven was that there was even less appetite for Rockefeller Republicanism, whether with base GOP voters or for that matter anyone else. Even moderate creatures of Washington like Howard Baker were staunchly to the right of where the liberal wing of the party had been a decade earlier, and even as early as 1960 the Eastern Establishment had clearly been on borrowed time. What exactly a conservatism for the 1980s should and would look like, then, was an open question.
It was in this nadir of influence and vacuum of powerful, unifying figures that former President Nixon began to rehabilitate himself, at least behind the scenes. Men like Donald Rumsfeld, from retirement as a party grandee in Illinois albeit with an eye towards the future even after the spectacular failure of his 1980 primary campaign, pointed out that Nixon had won a 49-state landslide and his heir, Ford, had scraped out a narrow win in enormously difficult circumstances four years later. "Nixonism without Nixon" was something that perhaps could work, then. This idea found particular credence within the Senate GOP, amongst young, reform-minded Western Senators such as Alan Simpson of Wyoming, Ted Stevens of Alaska and Orrin Hatch of Utah, who all ranged from the center to right wings of the party but got along well with one another and looked upwardly mobile in the Senate leadership hierarchy. They enjoyed close relationships with Midwestern conservatives like Richard Lugar of Indiana or Bob Taft of Ohio, as well as Reagan's close friend Paul Laxalt, who though more libertarian-colored nonetheless kept a close eye on what soon came to be known as the Republican Renewal Project, spearheaded by Simpson. The RRP's program was fairly straightforward - checking the excesses of Democratic patronage politics and clientelism in urban strongholds and appealing to working-class white ethnic voters through shared cultural conservatism (particularly on issues of law and order), budget orthodoxy a la Ford without the obsessive monetarism of his Federal Reserve, and muscular but pragmatic
realpolitik foreign policy abroad that would shift away from the more moralistic regimens of both academic left-wing revisionism in vogue post-1968 and the view of the Cold War as a struggle between God and Satan increasingly popular amongst religious conservatives.
Many conservatives were quick to reject this as simply warming over the failures of the Ford years, but there were important differences. The RRP specifically looked not to traditional conservatism as Ford had but rather sought to build on Nixon's Southern Strategy while marrying working-class union voters whom Democrats depended on in a big tent party and looking to the booming suburbs as the backbone of their coalition. Whether it was workable, of course, was an open question, and so the "Renewalists" who got the quiet acquiescence of the movers-and-shakers in the party and insurgents seeking a full throated "choice, not an echo" of Goldwater's promise of the New Right looked ahead to the 1982 midterms as the ultimate contest of who would ascend in the party and who best knew how to speak to the electorate...
[1] Not helped by it being Ford that cracks down on Bob Jones University rather than Carter, and before the 1978 midterms IOTL most (though certainly not all) evangelicals regarded abortion as more of a Catholic issue anyways