Better use of RAF bombers in 1940/41

Sbiper

Sbiper

Better use of RAF Bombers?

How about better bombs to start with?

RAF Bombs of the GP series (the main type of bombs available at this time) were dreadful - far too low charge weights, rubbish fillings and crap fuzes, and don't get me started on incendiaries, the situation was even worse.....

TBH, in this time period there is very, VERY little you could do to make BC more effective, even concentrating on the Invasion ports and trying to sink more barges would have been unlikely to have given a better than OTL return.

About the only thing BC was worthwhile for was mining, but even then the number of mines BC could have laid were not going to have much of an impact.

About the only thing that would have made any sort of a difference would have been the wholesale reallocation of all Whitley's to Coastal Command.
 

Cryhavoc101

Carl Schwamberger said:
& having more VLR bombers with Coastal Command hopefully accelerates the improvement of use. If the senior leaders care enough to increase the VLR bombers for Coastal Command the perhaps they will put priority on other items.
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Yes quite.

No 120 squadron RAF was the sole Coastal Command unit operating the VLR liberator in barely double figures of operational airframes until March 1943 when 50 more were provided/prised from bomber command.
 

Carl Schwamberger

Cryhavoc101 said:
Yes quite.

No 120 squadron RAF was the sole Coastal Command unit operating the VLR liberator in barely double figures of operational airframes until March 1943 when 50 more were provided/prised from bomber command.
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Early on there were some B17s provided. perhaps two dozen in 1941. My memory is those were worn out and not operational in 1943.
 

Riain

Banned
Whatever the targets are they could have done with better navigation. In 1940 Chain Home had a single station accuracy of about 5 miles, but using 'range cutting' triangulation of 2 or more stations they could get this down to less than a mile. I'd like CH to use range cutting to give BC sqns navigational fixes when in range to send them on their way with greater accuracy than their standard navigational methods. CH had enough range that it could track German aircraft forming up over their airfields in France, so surely they could guide RAF bombers to those same airfields, or ports or whatever.
 
Sbiper

Sbiper

Part of the problem with VLR conversions of bombers is that they never went far enough IMHO.

VLR conversions of the B-17 should have removed all guns except the tail guns, ditto for the Liberators.

There is also the issue of doctrine at this time, CC's doctrine was flawed, its weapons next to useless and its crews poorly trained.

And the overall RAF doctrine was fatally flawed on a wider, strategic level. The only reason Fighter Command even existed was because of Politicians and the Treasury, the RAF's senior leadership tried on numerous occasions to strangle Fighter Command to death pre war.

It was only because FC was so unloved and demeaned by RAF senior leadership that the s insists were allowed to create the systems that turned radar from a technical marvel into an integrated air defense system.
 

Riain

Banned
Sbiper said:
And the overall RAF doctrine was fatally flawed on a wider, strategic level. The only reason Fighter Command even existed was because of Politicians and the Treasury, the RAF's senior leadership tried on numerous occasions to strangle Fighter Command to death pre war.
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This lasted for decades after the war. The 60s RAF was extremely bomber heavy starting from the late 50s; 14 Strategic V bomber sqns, 3 Tactical V bomber sqns and 9 light bomber sqns whereas it only had 11 fighter sqns and 9 fighter ground attack/fighter recce sqns after Sandys had slashed the size of the RAF from 1957. Even RAFG in 1989 had 8 Tornado GR1 sqns but only 2 Phantom and 2 Harrier sqns.
 

Reggieperrin

I’ve occasionally pondered how an ATL BoB would turn out if the RAF were allowed to prepare completely unhindered by interference from know-nothing politicians and Air Ministry folk.

There would certainly have been a decent number of single-seat fighters around, but likely significantly fewer than OTL. Some more turret fighters instead? Even more bombers. Probably still some radar but perhaps less organised and coordinated.
So when the Luftwaffe come waddling into the Interception Zone and then Fighting Zone (or whatever the terms were) its a much heavier lift for the defending fighters, but Bomber Command come to the rescue as per doctrine, fighting their way through to bomb the enemy airfields in France. Hmmmmm……

I doubt very much whether the Germans would manage anything recognisable as a successful outcome but it would presumably be a miserable experience for the brits, on a par with the relentless attrition of the RFC days.
 

Carl Schwamberger

I recall some criticisms of the German air defense 1939-1942. Need to reread those, but assuming they were valid. Would a better prepared German night defense 1940-1941 have discouraged the Brits leaders into thinking theHarris school the wrong tree. So, Bomber Command tests other strategies?
 

steamboy

Carl Schwamberger said:
42. Need to reread those, but assuming they were valid. Would a better prepared German night defense 1940-1941 have discouraged the Brits leaders into thinking theHarris school t
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Problem is that the RAF had been in that mindset well before the war and was well and truly in The Bomber Will Always Get through mindset and were obcessed with the Bomber Dream of the Knock Out Blow. You'd need Trenchard to remember that the army exists and that he wrote some very very good combined arms stuff for use in the 1919 offensive rather than going "BOOMMMMMMMMMBERRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!!"
 

Carl Schwamberger

steamboy said:
Problem is that the RAF had been in that mindset well before the war and was well and truly in The Bomber Will Always Get through mindset and were obcessed with the Bomber Dream of the Knock Out Blow. You'd need Trenchard to remember that the army exists and that he wrote some very very good combined arms stuff for use in the 1919 offensive rather than going "BOOMMMMMMMMMBERRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!!"
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Am aware of it, but its ultimately on the Cabinet & not the Air Marshals. Churchill replaced Ironside and Dill, Harris & any number of others were just as replaceable if the mood strikes. When the Admirals demonstrated their lack of interest in signals intelligence they were hammered by their masters. Harris managed to convince people he was succeeding, but if the losses are too high early on in the night bombing he won't have as strong a argument.
 

steamboy

Carl Schwamberger said:
Am aware of it, but its ultimately on the Cabinet & not the Air Marshals. Churchill replaced Ironside and Dill, Harris & any number of others were just as replaceable if the mood strikes. When the Admirals demonstrated their lack of interest in signals intelligence they were hammered by their masters. Harris managed to convince people he was succeeding, but if the losses are too high early on in the night bombing he won't have as strong a argument.
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Bomber Command survived the Butt Report, barely, because Harris managed to convince the PM that it could be useful. Harris, his boss (Portal) and many under them were staunch Trenchardians though, you'd need to stop that from taking root before.
 

ArtosStark

steamboy said:
Problem is that the RAF had been in that mindset well before the war and was well and truly in The Bomber Will Always Get through mindset and were obcessed with the Bomber Dream of the Knock Out Blow. You'd need Trenchard to remember that the army exists and that he wrote some very very good combined arms stuff for use in the 1919 offensive rather than going "BOOMMMMMMMMMBERRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!!"
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To be fair to the RAF, the bomber paradigm was a big part of their reason for existence in the Interwar. They very nearly lost control of naval air assets to the RN several times in the Interwar (and yes, it would likely have been better for Britain if they had). And the Army wanted its own control back as well. So it was in the RAF's interest to focus on the things that they could do better than the other arms, in the 20's and early 30's that was colonial policing (the army could do it too, but with a greater cost) and strategic bombing in the 30's.
 

Carl Schwamberger

steamboy said:
Bomber Command survived the Butt Report, barely, because Harris managed to convince the PM that it could be useful. Harris, his boss (Portal) and many under them were staunch Trenchardians though, you'd need to stop that from taking root before.
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"Barely" is the operable word there. If the early efforts at night bombing Germany in 1940 suffer severe losses the bomber proponents will lose their remaining argument. Day bombing had already proved prohibitively expensive. Unsustainable losses would do the same for night bombing. That of course spends on a German PoD in being much better prepared than OTL. If that is possible is another matter.
 

muskeg13

1. Although this practice may have largely been abandoned by 40-41, Do Not squander bombing resources in delivering useless propaganda leaflets. Bombers are meant to deliver HE, not comic book political satire to be used as toilet paper. While much of the blame should be levied on the appeasment prone Chamberlain administration in insisting on dropping leaflets rather than HE, and the total avoidance of accepting any level of civillian collateral damage whatsoever, Bomber Command gave up any degree of surprise by not executing a serious bombing campaign from the very start. Whatever long range bombers were available should have been airborne and on their way to hit pre-selected military targets (with HE) even before Neville Chamberlain's voice declaring that "Consequently, this country is at war with Germany" had faded from the radio.

2. In the first years of the war, wasn't the established procedure for bombing missions that aircraft assigned a particular mission took off, navigated and attacked the target individually, leaving the exact route planning, bombing altitude and time of attack largely up to the aircrews? Attacking targets piecemeal cannot have been very effective, afforded no "massing" of shock and destructive power, and permitted air defenses to be fully alert to savage bombers who arrived long after the initial bombs were dropped.
 

sonofpegasus

Point 2, above is correct. Raid planning with defined streams of bombers and 'time on target' coordination did not come in until Bomber Harris took over.
 
Leander

Leander

Carl Schwamberger said:
"Barely" is the operable word there. If the early efforts at night bombing Germany in 1940 suffer severe losses the bomber proponents will lose their remaining argument. Day bombing had already proved prohibitively expensive. Unsustainable losses would do the same for night bombing. That of course spends on a German PoD in being much better prepared than OTL. If that is possible is another matter.
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Im not sure by how much you can improve early war night defenses without going ASB. Before the war and without actual expierience nobody had any good idea on how to do it properly, especially when it comes to the interceptor and target aquisiton components.
You might get a better performance out of german defences by increasing the general density of their ground based air defences (which would be quite expensive if covering the neccessary areas) and somehow improve their radar development, but I dont think that would sufficently increase british losses to rethink their whole strategy.
I cant realy see anyone try to build a proper nightfighter before the war, maybe with seriously improved radars but without those its bascially pointless.
 

Cryhavoc101

steamboy said:
Problem is that the RAF had been in that mindset well before the war and was well and truly in The Bomber Will Always Get through mindset and were obcessed with the Bomber Dream of the Knock Out Blow. You'd need Trenchard to remember that the army exists and that he wrote some very very good combined arms stuff for use in the 1919 offensive rather than going "BOOMMMMMMMMMBERRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR!!!"
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The Analogy I heard was that political leaders honestly believed that bombers would cause such vast losses that cities would be depopulated bringing nations to their knees

It was viewed in the same way that nuclear war was viewed in the cold war

It turned out to be not quite as devastating of course and the 'Bomber will always get through' was to some extent disproven - although German and Japanese cities were smashed!

Now what confuses me is that 51 Zeppelin raids and 52 Gotha raids caused some casualties (557 people were killed and 1,358 injured and killing 857 people, injuring 2,058 respectively) and very little damage to UK industry.

Other than the shock to the population the 'direct' impact was negligible

This resulted in the creation of the RAF in 1918

Now compare this to the uboat campaign which sunk over 5000 ships, over 12 million tons!

The USW campaign of 1917 was the closest the Germans got to knocking Britain out of the war and yet in WW2 we do not see the obvious reaction to this threat (large numbers of coastal command aircraft) that we see verses the bomber campaign
 
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