Better Soviet Planning for Uranus

Operation Uranus, at least in its initial stages, was by all accounts a resounding success. In just under a week 250,000 German and Rumanian soldiers were encircled by strong Soviet forces, and the entire German front in the region stood on the verge of collapse. However, the Soviet exploitation of this encirclement reveals a number of flaws in STAVKA's planning. The most glaring is the underestimation of the size and strength of German forces within the pocket; attempts to reduce the pocket east of the Don were frustrated and suffered heavy losses. Because of this forces guarding the outer ring of the pocket were dangerously weak, and soon found themselves hard pressed to maintain the encirclement. Only the timely deployment of 2nd Guards Army from the reserve prevented a German breakthrough. However, the transfer of 2nd Guards Army weakened Operation Saturn and delayed it, giving German, Rumanian, and Italian forces in the region vital time. The final result of this was that while the relief attempt failed, Operation Saturn failed to fufill its full potential and German forces in the pocket were only destroyed over the course of the next month, tying down several Soviet armies.

So my question is, what would be the result if the STAVKA, recognizing the strength of 6th Army, focused on containing the pocket and defeating relief efforts rather than the quick destruction of the pocket? I believe would allow the transfer of 66th Army and parts of the 24th from the Kotluban region, a now defunct sector, to act as a second echelon south of the pocket. This would allow them to backstop 51st and 5th Tank Armies, and frustrate German relief efforts without the need to comit 2nd Guards Army. This in turn leads to an earlier and stronger Operation Saturn, with potentially disastrous consequences.
 
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