La Rouge Beret
Donor
An Australian version of Unicorn seems like a good choice. Very interesting POD, perhaps a successor to Argus?
Therefore the starting point has to be that the Australian Government wants to increase per capita defence spending to British levels and the Australian electorate has to accept the increases in taxation and/or cuts to other forms of spending required to do that.
I have already done some work on that.Of course. Let us work under that assumption.
Licence build the Gloster unnamed F5/34 - "a fighter using an air-cooled engine armed with eight machine guns suitable for hot climate use."
And licence build the Bristol Mercury to power it.
That gives a lever to build the Perseus, a Mercury re-designed for sleeve-valves.
Which leads to the Hercules, a 2-row engine based on Perseus cylinders.
If they are licence building Bristol engines, how about the Bristol aircraft to use them?
Blenheim, Beaufort, Beaufighter (especially the latter).
Also the Miles Master as a trainer, to soak up surplus Mercurys.
And the de Havilland Flamingo as a transport, also with Mercurys.
I agree with the first paragraph, but as Australia already have a relationship with P & W, I think they will power the fighter with the R1830 engine. Though, both for the RAF & Australia it will need an earlier prototype first flight.
Undecided, about the Beaufort, or whether the Aussies would prefer something with longer range, Bristol P.13/36 though timing may be tight.
CAC built P&W Wasp engines before they built the Twin Wasp. Also, CAC was a privately funded enterprise, so their decisions had to be thought out based on a business model of what they could actually do, and what they could afford, and what was the best way to do it, and so on. Building sleeve-valve engines for production was something that Bristol hadn't developed all that quickly, and, in fact, a decision had been made in England to substitute the Twin Wasp for the Taurus and DAP used actual Bristol drawings to produce their Beaufort/Twin Wasp aircraft.About P&W, I found this:
The Twin Wasp was licence-built in Australia during World War Two by the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC) at Lidcombe, NSW.The Lidcombe factory had to rapidly tool up for the Twin Wasp in 1940 after supply of Bristol Taurus engines from the UK intended for the Australian-built twin-engine Beaufort bomber failed to eventuate.
If the Twin Wasp was only licence built because Bristol engines didn't turn up, then licence building Bristol engines starting earlier than 1940 butterflies this away.
Unless the P&W story starts earlier still?
BTW it looks like Beauforts were licence built in Aus in OTL.
I agree something longer range would have been better, but they are better than nothing.
A prototype Gloster isn't completely essential, it wouldn't be the first time an aircraft was ordered off the drawing board. Say mid 37 the RAAF talk to RAF about their requirements and are pointed in Glosters direction. During discussions Gloster say they are commited to Gladiator production with the Hurricane to follow but would licence production in Australia. After some discussion this is agreed but Gloster are asked to alter the design to take the American Twin Wasp which they are also looking to have produced locally. The prototype flies in Britain in mid 1938 and production starts in Australia a year later. An Australian squadron arrives in the desert in time for operation Battleaxe in June 1941 and is redeployed to Singapore in November where it swaps half it's pilots with those of a newly formed squadron arriving at the same time.I agree with the first paragraph, but as Australia already have a relationship with P & W, I think they will power the fighter with the R1830 engine. Though, both for the RAF & Australia it will need an earlier prototype first flight.
Undecided, about the Beaufort, or whether the Aussies would prefer something with longer range, Bristol P.13/36 though timing may be tight.
My plan wasn't very well developed, but the intention was to concentrate the extra money on expanding the pitifully small RAAF first, the RAN second and the Australian Army would be a poor third.So the largest increase in in 1937, which would fit in with my suggestion of the Sino - Japanese war prompting an increase in defence spending. Perhaps an attack on the international quarter in Shanghai with a battle being fought with the garrison.
All a terrible mistake you understand, the officer responsible died in the fighting. Yes we're terribly sorry, we'll even provide ships to take everyone home as compensation. No the situations too dangerous for your people to return. The Emperor would be most distressed if any other westerners were harmed so we can't permit that.
I think in 1937 the thing most people would say when the RAAF was brought up would be "What R.A.A.F?"My plan wasn't very well developed, but the intention was to concentrate the extra money on expanding the pitifully small RAAF first, the RAN second and the Australian Army would be a poor third.
On the document from the AWM website that I am currently working on the personnel of HM Australian Forces in 1928 were:I think in 1937 the thing most people would say when the RAAF was brought up would be "What R.A.A.F?"
In 1920-21, the first year after demobilisation, the Hughes Government reduced the navy to a strength of about 4,500, 1,000 more than in 1914, but with twenty more vessels than it possessed in that year. The militia numbered 100,000 compulsorily enlisted men of the 1899, 1900 and 1901 classes, practically untrained, and was equipped with the weapons which the A.I.F. had brought home. Under the Defence Act these men could be obliged to fight only within Australia. There was a cadre of 3,150 permanent officers and men, which was about 150 more than in 1914. Hughes pointed out that such forces would cost each Australian 12s 4d for the army and 12s 6d for the navy, compared with £2 13s 9d and £1 16s 3d in the United Kingdom.
While the Washington Conference was still in session Hughes had promised Parliament that, if the naval reductions were agreed upon, the defence vote would be substantially reduced. Consequently, in the following year, nearly half of the ships of the Australian Navy were put out of commission, and it was decided to reduce the permanent staff of the arm to 1,600, to maintain the seven militia divisions (five of infantry and two of cavalry) at a strength of about 31,000 men—only 25 per cent of their war strength—and to reduce training to six days in camp and four days at the local centres a year. Seventy-two regular officers out of a meagre total of some 300 would be retired, and compensated at a cost of £300,000.
In 1925-26 (as Mr Bruce pointed out) each British citizen was paying 51s 1d for defence, each Australian only 27s 2d. But the per capita cost of defence in Canada (which could rely on the protection of the United States) was only 5s 10d, in New Zealand 12s l1d and in South Africa 2s 6d. Of the Australian's 27s 2d the navy received 17s 2d, the army 5s 2d, the air force 2s 8d and munitions supply 2s 2d.
Gains in equipment were microscopic: in 1926 the army obtained its first motor vehicles—five 30-cwt lorries, one for each military district except the Sixth (Tasmania), and eight tractors for the artillery; in 1927 four light tanks arrived.
In 1901, when the population of Australia was 3,824,000, the permanent forces aggregated 1,544, the partly-paid militia and unpaid volunteers 27,400. In June 1930, when the population was 6,500,000, the permanent forces totalled 1,669, the militia 25,785.
For the army the three-year plan (for the years 1934-35 to 1936-37) included the purchase of motor vehicles on a limited scale, increased stocks of ammunition, and "an instalment of modern technical equipment" a phrase whose modesty was justified, because the £127,743 that was allotted to the army for its development program in the first year and the £ 1,005,792 for the second was merely a token in view of the fact that the army was and always had been incompletely equipped by 1918 standards. It could not mobilise even a brigade without commandeering civil vehicles, and now had to base its plans on the assumption that it would be engaged, if war came, against armies (such as the German ) whose weapons belonged to a new epoch.
It was seen that the accomplishment of even such a modest plan of military defence would take years to achieve despite the larger funds that the Government was then allotting. The sum of £1,811,000 was spent on the army in 1935-36, £2,232,000 in 1936-37, £2,182,000 in 1937-38; but one battery of 9.2-inch coast defence guns with its essential equipment cost £ 300,000, a battery of anti-aircraft guns with its gear and ammunition cost £150,000. In fact, until the crises of 1938, the army, which had been placed on short rations in 1930, received only enough nourishment to enable it to restore a little of the weight it had lost since the depression and to repair some of the deficiencies it had suffered since 1918. Nor can it be doubted that the army leaders, in whom the years of parsimony had produced a distrust of politicians, were resolved to spend such funds as they received on something that the politician could not take away from them if the crisis seemed to have passed and the army's income could be cut again. Thus there was this additional reason for giving priority to guns and concrete rather than men and training: that if the vote was again reduced, the guns and concrete would remain. In the early years of rearmament at any rate, while some leaders on the liberal side in Parliament favoured a return to compulsory training, the army staff was happy enough about the retention of voluntary service while it spent its limited funds chiefly on that equipment without which a larger army would be of small value.
As Squires' staff officer—an important post because the newcomer would inevitably be greatly dependent on his advice—was chosen Lieut-Colonel Rowell, a highly-qualified soldier twelve years Squires' junior who was considered one of the ablest of the early Duntroon graduates and had spent more than five of the previous thirteen years at British schools or with the British Army. Squires presented to the Government a report on the development of the army, and in March 1939 this report was presented to Parliament, although in an expurgated form. It confirmed the wisdom of the policy of giving priority to equipment and to measures intended to defend vital areas against attack, and made two radical proposals. The first was that the existing district bases (each coinciding more or less with one or other of the States) and the infantry and cavalry divisions be regrouped into four "commands"—Northern (Queensland), Eastern (New South Wales), Southern (Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia), and Western, with an independent garrison at Darwin—each of which would be responsible for the training and, in war, for the operations of the formations in its area. Under this system, which required an amendment of the Defence Act and was not brought into operation until October 1939, Army Headquarters would deal with these commands only, whereas hitherto it had controlled separately the various divisions and brigade groups of the militia and the six military districts. His second important proposal was that a regular force of two brigades with a peacetime establishment of 7,500 be formed. These, he pointed out, would be immediately available at all times, and "would also furnish a new and much-needed source of supply of permanent instructors for the militia, and afford the officers of the Staff Corps more opportunities for gaining experience in the command of troops than they can have at present". The fact that the Ministry at first "approved in principle" this proposal for the creation of a miniature regular army, a measure which would again demand a radical amendment of the Defence Act, was a sign of the times.