Incompetence of Iraqi commanders did play a role - nonetheless, the disparity in equipment was so large that even the most briliant military minds in the world wouldn't be able to win battles in the open field.
Competence matters far, far,
far more then equipment. The incompetence of the Iraqi military played a far larger role then their deficiencies in equipment. One of the American staffers who planned Desert Storm acknowledged this, saying that if you flat-out swapped the equipment used the results would have been little different with only marginal heavier Coalition casualties. Equipment is no silver bullet. History is littered with examples (Israel '48, Chad, Congo, Ap Bac) where badly outgunned forces were able to defeat militaries often possessing air superiority and armoured vehicles they could not reliably harm, and they did it by being better soldiers.
The problems the Iraqis have are myriad, but some include; tyrannical leaders with no tolerance for dissent, no initiative in NCOs and junior officers, poor unit cohesion, poor inter unit co-operation, nonexistant inter-service co-operation, poor mechanical aptitude, poor passage of information, poor intelligence analysis, hording of logistics elements and poor support to field units, and limited strategic foresight. To name just a few.
The resulting tactical maladroitness was crippling: units that were flanked would not reposition to defend themselves, they would not conduct recces or post sentries, nor would they use any initiative whatsoever, right up to batallion and brigade level. Equipment was never used to anywhere near its potential, and advanced features such as NVGs or lead computation computers on the newer Russian tanks were often ignored.
Given the above, which are systemic to one degree or another among all Arab armies, the Iraqis really did the best they could.