Better Iraq War

How could the Iraq War gone better from the start? Especially what if the Iraqi Army has been dissolved and more occupation troops had been sent?
 
How could the Iraq War gone better from the start? Especially what if the Iraqi Army has been dissolved and more occupation troops had been sent?

If there was genuine popular support within Iraq from dissidents for a US invasion.
If the USA had started a few years beforehand to recruit/train people that could speak Arabic.
If Britain had supplied more troops.
If Saddams neighbours had helped the US.
 
If Turkey allowed the US to invade from Turkey.
If the Iraqi army were paid and kept intact after a new loyalty oath. Purges could have been gradual and based upon present loyalty, not past membership.
Immediate establishment of law and order by the occupation forces, aided by the old Iraqi army.
 
How could the Iraq War gone better from the start? Especially what if the Iraqi Army has been dissolved and more occupation troops had been sent?

Where to start? There were sooo many screw ups...

Best of all would have been to have had proper intelligence assets in place that could have told us that after ODF, Iraq had no WMDs.

The next big step would have been for the Bush administration to have avoided listening to Chalabi and the INC's self-serving agitprop.

Those two, especially if taken together, may well have headed off OIF altogether. But the basal assumption is that even with those, Bush was gunning for OIF.

So, as you said, more troops. Shinseki's estimate of 600,000 would have been the minimum needed, IMO. (Look up James T. Quinlivan's research into force ratios in successful stability operations for back up on those numbers.)

However, simply adding more troops to the invasion wouldn't have helped. They were needed for the post-invasion period - OIF wasn't lost in March-April, it was lost in the next four months.

Not tossing out the lessons from Anthony Zinni's Desert Crossing would have been a start on the proper planning side.

Rummy, Cheney, and Bush's back seat planning of the war was a huge mistake. General Franks' and the JCS' not standing up to them was woeful.

The discontinuity/disunity of command was harmful. General Franks planned the thing, then retired in July. General Jay Garner was replaced with Paul Bremer because he didn't toe the party line. General Rick Sanchez's takeover from Franks was botched. Sanchez and Bremer did not work well together.

Also, the utter non-planning for the aftermath was simply criminal. The majority of forces dealing with the incipient insurgency were combat units, not the sorts of units that should have been there. (Yes, combat units were needed, but in a much smaller ratio than were there.)

Also, not dismissing the Iraqi army would have been a major improvement.

That's just off the top of my head...
 
Planning for an insurgency, having additional troops ready for the occupation. Finding something productive to do with the disarmed Iraqi military.
 

Hyperion

Banned
Aside from Britain and Australia, try to get at least one other country right off the bat to agree to provide more than just token military support during the invasion, with an agreement to leave a good sized force to provide for reconstruction and security services in post-invasion Iraq. It would require a somewhat brouder change in global politics some time before the war but it is not impossible.

Several countries besides Britain actually did provide more than a token sized force of ground troops for peacekeeping purposes after the "war", among them Italy and S. Korea, which contributed at or over 3,000 troops.
 
Iraq had no WMDs.
Incorrect about that, however all the bioweapons were past their exp date.
The only other they had were missiles with ranges that qualifed as WMDs that were used to attack our troops, though I'm quite certain Bush didn't mean those when he was runnin' off at the jaw
Everything else I can more or less agree with
 
Aside from Britain and Australia, try to get at least one other country right off the bat to agree to provide more than just token military support during the invasion, with an agreement to leave a good sized force to provide for reconstruction and security services in post-invasion Iraq. It would require a somewhat brouder change in global politics some time before the war but it is not impossible.

Several countries besides Britain actually did provide more than a token sized force of ground troops for peacekeeping purposes after the "war", among them Italy and S. Korea, which contributed at or over 3,000 troops.

Indeed more than the token forces of the "coalition iof the willing" would have been needed to get the needed force levels.

Incorrect about that, however all the bioweapons were past their exp date.
The only other they had were missiles with ranges that qualifed as WMDs that were used to attack our troops, though I'm quite certain Bush didn't mean those when he was runnin' off at the jaw
Everything else I can more or less agree with

Admitted sloppiness on my part - insert "effectively" into that sentence.
 
Incorrect about that, however all the bioweapons were past their exp date.
The only other they had were missiles with ranges that qualifed as WMDs that were used to attack our troops, though I'm quite certain Bush didn't mean those when he was runnin' off at the jaw
Everything else I can more or less agree with

No, Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, even the inspectors said that.
 

King Thomas

Banned
Let's see......

1-Enough troops to secure Saddam's arms dumps, maintain law and order, stop looting ect.
2-Don't bomb non military water and power supplies
3-Keep the Iraqi Army
4-Let the Iraqis know how long US troops will be there...

And I could go on and on.
 

burmafrd

Banned
The UN Inspectors said they did not know for certain whether Saddam was hiding them. GIven his track record, you would have to err on the side of caution and say he did. Every intelligence service in the world thought SAdam had a fair amount of WMD.

Personally I think that he never had as much as so many thought he did.
Partly because of decisions made, and partly because he probably thought he had more and those under him were afraid to tell him he did not (Not exactly a guy you want to make angry or disapoint).

And above all its now clear that Sadam intended to wait out sanctions then rebuild his WMD program.

Now as regards the war Rummy was right that we did not need the forces the generals said they did to beat the Iraqi army and take the country. He was totally wrong about how many was needed to properly hold the country. By the way that 600,000 number is a total joke and anyone thinking that was valid is totally a moron. Half that number would probably be the most one could imagine. We finally beat the insurgency with 135,000. Of course that is with the help of many who finally turned against the militants. I think around 200,000 would have been the max needed to keep things calm after the the fall of Baghdad.
 
I challange the prevailing wisedom, that a more troops earlier would fix things. What made things better wasn't the surge, it was the ability to make a deal with the local population. More people mean more targets and I'm cynical enough to belive that westerners mean the dead US soldiers mean the war is a failure, not the dead Iraqis.

Afganistan further show that you could do a good job with a small number of troops if it has the capabilites of the US special forces, capable to interact with the local population.In fact, I belive Afganistan would have been a failure with a larger force because it would imply more targets for the insurgents. And especially in the logistics.
 
I challange the prevailing wisedom, that a more troops earlier would fix things. What made things better wasn't the surge, it was the ability to make a deal with the local population. More people mean more targets and I'm cynical enough to belive that westerners mean the dead US soldiers mean the war is a failure, not the dead Iraqis.

Afganistan further show that you could do a good job with a small number of troops if it has the capabilites of the US special forces, capable to interact with the local population.In fact, I belive Afganistan would have been a failure with a larger force because it would imply more targets for the insurgents. And especially in the logistics.

Maybe true, but that may only be possible with the current army and tactics.

Don't forget the minor fact that Iraq also had a conventional (hollow) army to deal with. Just special forces and bombing won't do against that.
More support from countries in the region would also have helped. ;)
If Iran were for example convinced to stop supporting the insurgency in Iraq, would that help immensely.
 
No, Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction, even the inspectors said that.

That's not what one of the main investigators - David Kelly - thought.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/aug/31/huttonreport.iraq

Here we reprint Dr David Kelly's article, written days before the Iraq war, in which he assessed the threat from Saddam

In the past week, Iraq has begun destroying its stock of al-Samoud II missiles, missiles that have a range greater than the UN-mandated limit of 150 kilometres. This is presented to the international community as evidence of President Saddam Hussein's compliance with United Nations weapons inspectors.



But Iraq always gave up materials once it was in its interest to do so. Iraq has spent the past 30 years building up an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although the current threat presented by Iraq militarily is modest, both in terms of conventional and unconventional weapons, it has never given up its intent to develop and stockpile such weapons for both military and terrorist use.



Today Iraq shows superficial co-operation with the inspectorates. Weapons such as 122mm rockets specific for chemical and biological use have been discovered and the destruction of proscribed missiles and associated engines, components and gyroscopes has begun.



Iraq has established two commissions to search for documents and weapons under the direction of Rashid Amer, a former head of Iraq's concealment activities, and a commission has started to recover weapons from Iraq's unilateral destruction sites. (These sites, dating back to 1991, were destroyed by Iraq, illegally, without UN supervision and as part of Iraq's concealment of programmes.) Amer al-Saadi - formerly responsible for conserving Iraq's WMD, now its principal spokesman on its weapons - continues to mislead the international community.



It is difficult to imagine co-operation being properly established unless credible Iraqi officials are put into place by a changed Saddam.



Yet some argue that inspections are working and that more time is required; that increasing the numbers of inspectors would enhance their effectiveness. Others argue that the process is inherently flawed and that disarmament by regime change is the only realistic way forward.



The UN has been attempting to disarm Iraq ever since 1991 and has failed to do so. It is an abject failure of diplomacy with the split between France, China and Russia on the one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other, creating a lack of 'permanent five' unity and resolve. More recently Germany, a temporary yet powerful member of the Security Council, has exacerbated the diplomatic split. The threat of credible military force has forced Saddam Hussein to admit, but not co-operate with, the UN inspectorate. So-called concessions - U2 overflights, the right to interview - were all routine between 1991 and 1998. After 12 unsuccessful years of UN supervision of disarmament, military force regrettably appears to be the only way of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq.



In the years since 1991, during which Unscom and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) destroyed or rendered harmless all known weapons and capability under UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq established an effective concealment and deception organisation which protected many undisclosed assets. In October 2002, Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to disclose his arsenal within 30 days. He admitted inspectors and, with characteristic guile, provided some concessions, but still refuses to acknowledge the extent of his chemical and biological weapons and associated military and industrial support organisations - 8,500 litres of anthrax VX, 2,160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, 6,500 chemical bombs and 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents remained unaccounted for from activities up to 1991. (Even these figures, it should be noted, are based in no small part on data fabricated by Iraq.)



Less easy to determine is the extent of activity undertaken since 1991. In its 12,000-page 'disclosure' submitted to the inspectors in December 2002, Iraq failed to declare any proscribed activities. Today the truly important issues are declaring the extent and scope of the programmes in 1991 and the personalities, 'committees' and organisations involved.
There are indications that the programmes continue.



Iraq continues to develop missile technology, especially fuel propellents and guidance systems for long-range missiles. Iraq has recovered chemical reactors destroyed prior to 1998 for allegedly civilian activity, built biological fermenters and agent dryers, and created transportable production units for biological and chemical agents and the filling of weapons. Key nuclear research and design teams remain in place, even though it is assessed that Iraq is unable to manufacture nuclear weapons unless fissile material is available.



War may now be inevitable. The proportionality and intensity of the conflict will depend on whether regime change or disarmament is the true objective. The US, and whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force, strength and strategy used is appropriate to the modest threat that Iraq now poses.



Since some WMD sites have not been unambiguously identified, and may not be neutralised until war is over, a substantial hazard may be encountered. Sites with manufacturing or storage capabilities for chemical or biological weapons may present a danger and much will depend on the way that those facilities are militarily cancelled and subsequently treated.



Some of the chemical and biological weapons deployed in 1991 are still available, albeit on a reduced scale. Aerial bombs and rockets are readily available to be filled with sarin, VX and mustard or botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and smallpox. More sophisticated weaponry, such as spray devices associated with drones or missiles with separating warheads, may be limited in numbers, but would be far more devastating if used.



The threat from Iraq's chemical and biological weapons is, however, unlikely to substantially affect the operational capabilities of US and British troops. Nor is it likely to create massive casualties in adjacent countries. Perhaps the real threat from Iraq today comes from covert use of such weapons against troops or by terrorists against civilian targets worldwide. The link with al-Qaeda is disputed, but is, in any case, not the principal terrorist link of concern. Iraq has long trained and supported terrorist activities and is quite capable of initiating such activity using its security services.



The long-term threat, however, remains Iraq's development to military maturity of weapons of mass destruction - something that only regime change will avert.




Now for those outside the UK, David Kelly was the UK's chief investigator who committed suicide after being named as the guy who was questioning the governments dossier on Iraq (the so called dodgey dossier), what got obscured in all the media hype around that suicide was the fact that he wasn't so much questioning the possible existence of WMD's, he was questioning the ridiculous 45 minutes to launch from the order to fire claim in the dossier. The 45 minutes claim is totally irrelevant, it could be 45 hours, 45 days, it didn't matter, the knowledge in the Iraqi scientists heads and files was under the control of a lunatic who hadn't shown much hesitation in using WMD's in the past and had one hell of a grudge.


Another story about David Kelly



http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/iraq/article3549448.ece

From The Times
March 14, 2008

James Bone in New York
David Kelly thought there was a 15 per cent chance that Iraq had a continuing biological warfare programme, a fellow weapons inspector has told The Times.



The British bio-weapons expert, whose death sparked the Hutton inquiry, made the remark to an Australian colleague in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq war during a visit to UN headquarters in May 2003.



Peter Prosser disclosed the conversation after completing his service as a bio-weapons inspector when the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission on Iraq was wound up this month.



“He said, ‘Before the war, what was your assessment?’. I said there may be a 15 per cent chance they may have something,” Dr Prosser recalled. “He said, ‘I think about the same. I think about 15 per cent’ – which really means there is an 85 per cent chance there wasn’t anything. We didn’t think we were going to find truckloads of missiles. It was really: have they kept something?”



Dr Kelly killed himself on July 17, 2003, after being named as the alleged source of a story blaming Britain’s decision to go to war on “sexed-up” intelligence reports. There is one tantalising document hidden in the UN archive that raises some question about Dr Kelly’s position, sources say.



The single page of “Closing Remarks” was handwritten by him at the end of a bio-weapons inspection in July 1998. It was so favourable to the Iraqis that they presented it to Hans Blix, the Unmovic chairman, in crisis meetings in February 2003. “It’s a completely different assessment than anyone would think of the programme,” a former UN inspector said.



Even after writing the document, Dr Kelly often repeated his suspicions of Iraq in private UN meetings. The one-page document was not mentioned in Unmovic’s “Compendium” of its work because officials discounted its significance.



“One thing Iraq used to say after you did an inspection was, ‘We really want [to establish our] cooperation’, another former inspector said. “David at one stage was obliged to say we have found nothing inconsistent and we have checked up on all facilites and we found nothing remaining. That was done out of a courtesy.



“They were always badgering us, saying, ‘We have cooperated, we need a tick in the box’. It was at the end of this mission. We went to all of these places and there was nothing inconsistent with what Iraq had told us. For that inspection, that may have been his own experience. But I do not believe if we could resurrect David he would give them a clean bill of health. There were always inconsistencies.”




And another quote from David Kelly regarding Iraqi BW capability in ‘Plague Wars’ by Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg

'Iraq denies working on Plague, but I find its absence conspicuous. There’s some intelligence evidence showing that they imported the correct growth medium to grow the Plague bacteria. We came across some of the medium at their Al-Hakam facility, and as usual, the Iraqis couldn’t account for it. At first they said they had imported it (together with Plague vaccine, in the late 1980’s) as a contingency in case the Iranians used bacteria on them. But if that had been true, the growth medium should have been stored at their Food Examination and Analysis Laboratory in Baghdad, and not at their weapons plant in the desert. I remain deeply suspicious.'

This inability to account for items was quite a common occurrence for the inspectors.

Another line from David Kelly

‘Current Iraqi biological warfare capability? They could send a couple of Scuds with anthrax warheads against Israel or Kuwait today. The Israelis would certainly shoot them out of the sky. The Kuwaitis – not sure. There are about eight missiles missing, and the bio warheads can be made in any foundry. They can easily produce the 30 gallons of anthrax per warhead; we know they’ve hidden the growth medium. In a crude operation, they could use this stuff internally by spraying it from a helicopter. I believe they now have a dormant biological weapons programme. Remember, it was a programme always destined to mature in the late 1990’s and it would have done so, but for the Gulf War. Even after our inspections began, they continued their research and development right up till 1995, when I think, the defection of Hussein Kamel and the discovery of the chicken farm documents did put an end to the active programme. But it won’t take much to reignite the whole thing.’
 
Let's see......

1-Enough troops to secure Saddam's arms dumps, maintain law and order, stop looting ect.
2-Don't bomb non military water and power supplies
3-Keep the Iraqi Army
4-Let the Iraqis know how long US troops will be there...

And I could go on and on.

As as far as keeping the Iraqi army, there wasn't one to keep it had largely disbanded itself and gone home......
 
I challange the prevailing wisedom, that a more troops earlier would fix things. What made things better wasn't the surge, it was the ability to make a deal with the local population. More people mean more targets and I'm cynical enough to belive that westerners mean the dead US soldiers mean the war is a failure, not the dead Iraqis.

I'd have to disagree. How can you quickly establish relations with the local population if the power structure was already rapidly receding? If Saddam and other higher ups were still at large? At the very least a large presence of boots on the ground initially would be able to secure ammo dumps and establish order. This in turn would prevent weapons from falling into the wrong hands and preserving critical infrastructure.

In addition, we're not talking about adding a surge level amount of troops. We're talking the half a million soldiers that Shinseki suggested.

I'd also like to throw in that a lot of troop numbers being used don't add in the numbers of private military contractors . Though there are about 135,000 soldiers in the country, there's at least another 100,000 contractors who fulfill various functions from logistics to security. Wikipedia claims there are 182,000, but I don't know where they got that number. This to me shows that there were insufficient numbers to effectively occupy and run the country.
 
Don't forget the minor fact that Iraq also had a conventional (hollow) army to deal with. Just special forces and bombing won't do against that.

But that was within the capabilities of the units already in place. What I'm challange is that we need even more troops in the post war era. What was lacking was some kind of deal with local power groups, clans, clerics and community organizers. That would be helped by units and individuals with some understanding of the local culture and language. The US special forces beeing one such group (the US army have some other units like that).

That would require pre-war intelligence and throwing money at the three C's (four counting corrupt), not boots on the ground.
 
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