Better D-Day for West?

I dont think the mine clearers were crap:D

I believe there were DD tanks at Omaha but they were launched too far off shore into a current that was a lot stronger than expected. Omaha would have been a lot less bloody with DD tanks but still a stiff battle. I have walked along the beach and wondered why that beach was chosen it seems a lot less suitable than the others.

Why would you send the infantry first instead of the armor... why would they attack Salerno where the only German panzer division in Italy was... a lot of things the allies did made no sense
 
Assuming good luck and good weather how well could the Western Allies have done in 1944?

For instance if the weather allowed the landings two weeks earlier, and there had been better intelligence avoiding bloody Omaha.

I also heard that in OTL there was a point around the time that Brussells fell when the German defence of the Netherlands was very weak and it might have fallen.

Could Anglo/American forces have been in Germany by November 1944?

How much difference does this make to the carve up of Europe with Stalin?

Going back to the OP, how come no one has mentioned Monty tripping and breaking his neck going down a flight of stairs around February 1944? That alone should put the Allies well ahead of schedule...

Before Anglophiles jump in, note who failed to take Caen on time, who interfered in fully closing the Falaise pocket, who decided Antwerp wasn't important, and who masterminded Market-Garden.

Another divergence point I didn't see mentioned was additional pre-invasion planning to rapidly rebuild France's rail lines; by early fall of 1944 there were plenty of supplies in Normandy but not so much on the front lines. If the rail infrastructure could have been rapidly rebuilt, the Allies could probably have kept pushing another month or so before troop exhaustion and weather forced a halt, probably just inside Germany. Plans were made and executed, but only based on a slower advance across France than actually happened. This led to the Red Ball convoys and supply shortages.

So, yes, if things had gone a little better the Allies could have gotten into Germany by November 1944.

I'd expect minimal shifting of the Inner German Border for most of the divergence points discussed, with the exception of Monty dying and being replaced by a good general.
 
Even if the Allies had done better on D-Day and had pushed very hard in the autumn of 1944 and Roosevelt had been willing to deny the Soviets the gains agreed at Yalta, nothing short of overwhelming overwhelming nuclear dominance would have changed the postwar settlement. The Soviets would simply have taken what they were promised and possibly all of continental Europe if they were feeling up for a challenge...
 
4. Equip all tanks with bulldozer blades before they embark so they can bust through the bocage

Talking of the bocage, from Carlo D'Este's 'Decision in Normandy' - P87

'Sir Alan Brooke had been extremely pessimistic at all times about our prospect of fighting through the bocage country...'

This was apparently from an Eisenhower interview.
 
Another divergence point I didn't see mentioned was additional pre-invasion planning to rapidly rebuild France's rail lines; by early fall of 1944 there were plenty of supplies in Normandy but not so much on the front lines. If the rail infrastructure could have been rapidly rebuilt, the Allies could probably have kept pushing another month or so before troop exhaustion and weather forced a halt, probably just inside Germany. Plans were made and executed, but only based on a slower advance across France than actually happened. This led to the Red Ball convoys and supply shortages.

.

Rail lines are one thing, having the rolling stock is another and later on Patton's forces apparently had a good time shooting up rolling stock......
 
Why would you send the infantry first instead of the armor...

Because contrary to what many tankers would like to believe, unsupported tanks die horribly and quickly?

Ideally you want your tanks and infantry to go alongside each other to capitalize on each other's strengths. Both sides had trouble getting this to work in practice even when it was part of their theory.
 
Because contrary to what many tankers would like to believe, unsupported tanks die horribly and quickly?

Ideally you want your tanks and infantry to go alongside each other to capitalize on each other's strengths. Both sides had trouble getting this to work in practice even when it was part of their theory.

In the first wave of a beachhead assault I would disagree... too many automatic weapons about... they need the armor to knock out all the pill boxes that are right on the beaches first then the infantry can land and tag along
 
In the first wave of a beachhead assault I would disagree... too many automatic weapons about... they need the armor to knock out all the pill boxes that are right on the beaches first then the infantry can land and tag along

And they need infantry to shoot people with Panzerfausts and mortars to suppress AT guns and engineers to remove obstacles and...

IIRC wasn't the first wave of DD tanks supposed to launch at T-5 minutes? I sure wouldn't want them any further ahead then that.
 
And they need infantry to shoot people with Panzerfausts and mortars to suppress AT guns and engineers to remove obstacles and...

IIRC wasn't the first wave of DD tanks supposed to launch at T-5 minutes? I sure wouldn't want them any further ahead then that.

Beevin Alexander writes that the American's sent the infantry first and the British sent the armor first... albeit this is oversimplified... theres not really much risk of panzershreks on the beach itself (too short ranged... the Germans where occupying high ground where it was possible)
 
Beevin Alexander writes that the American's sent the infantry first and the British sent the armor first... albeit this is oversimplified...

Agreed it is oversimplified... but who got further off their beaches on D-Day; the Commonwealth or the Americans? :)

In any case, I think we're agreed that you need both (really, you need a little of everything), and the one should never be far behind the other.
 

Sior

Banned
Going back to the OP, how come no one has mentioned Monty tripping and breaking his neck going down a flight of stairs around February 1944? That alone should put the Allies well ahead of schedule...

Before Anglophiles jump in, note who failed to take Caen on time, who interfered in fully closing the Falaise pocket, who decided Antwerp wasn't important, and who masterminded Market-Garden.

The reason Caen too so long was the British were fighting the majority of the German armour, whilst the americans faffed around in the bocage.
Monty was afraid that if the Polish and Canadian Divisions closed on the Americans too quickly at Falaise that the trigger happy Yanks would fire on them (not an unfounded worry).
If Market Garden had gone in when Planned 1 week before the actual it would have worked (no SS), American tardyness resulted in the delay.


Another divergence point I didn't see mentioned was additional pre-invasion planning to rapidly rebuild France's rail lines; by early fall of 1944 there were plenty of supplies in Normandy but not so much on the front lines. If the rail infrastructure could have been rapidly rebuilt, the Allies could probably have kept pushing another month or so before troop exhaustion and weather forced a halt, probably just inside Germany. Plans were made and executed, but only based on a slower advance across France than actually happened. This led to the Red Ball convoys and supply shortages.

So, yes, if things had gone a little better the Allies could have gotten into Germany by November 1944.

I'd expect minimal shifting of the Inner German Border for most of the divergence points discussed, with the exception of Monty dying and being replaced by a good general.

Patton not being an ass would have made a big difference as well.
 
Going back to the OP, how come no one has mentioned Monty tripping and breaking his neck going down a flight of stairs around February 1944? That alone should put the Allies well ahead of schedule...

Before Anglophiles jump in, note who failed to take Caen on time, who interfered in fully closing the Falaise pocket, who decided Antwerp wasn't important, and who masterminded Market-Garden.

Caen wasn't taken on time, sure, but were the other objectives Montgomery made for that portion of the campaign met? Were the majority of German troops drawn to, held down and written off in that area? Were the Allies across the seine by Day 90? The answer to those two questions is yes. I have never understood why one tactical failure is so repeated held against Montgomery when his strategical objectives were all met.

Bradley was the man who prevented the closing of the Falaise Gap. It was Bradley who, with any consultation with Montgomery, explicitly ordered Patton to go no further north than Argentan. Patton wanted to further north and Montgomery had set Chambois as the meeting place of the Allied pincers. But Bradley was afraid that there would be friendly fire if he allowed Patton to go north and also thought that Patton wasn't cut out to face a proper German army. Bradley said he prefered a strong shoulder at Argentan to a broken neck at Chambois.

In addition, once Patton recieved his orders from Bradley not to go any furthern North than Argentan he suddenly decided that finishing off the Germans wasn't worth his time and he was going to go for Paris.

Two weeks before submitting the MARKET GARDEN plan Montgomery submitted a plan to SHEAF which would see First Allied Airbourn Army used in the clearing of the Scheldt. This was vetoed by Browning and Brereton who saw their Army as an advanced tactical strike force, not something to be used in work to the rear. In addition Eisenhower never gave the clearing of the Scheldt any priority whatsoever, so it was hardly just Monty's mistake.

The planning of MARKET GARDEN was primarilly done by Browning and Brereton. Montgomery supported it and came up with the initial concept but didn't have a massive part in the actual planning of the operation. That was one of the reasons for its failure.

Considering that Eisenhower said something along the lines of "no matter what they say against him, Monty got us there" in regards to Operation OVERLORD, and Walter Bedel Smtih echoes similar sentiments and Bradley - a great Monty-Basher in his own right - also praised Montgomery as being essential to the victory in Normandy, I dont think his death would make the operation go any smoother.
 
Agreed it is oversimplified... but who got further off their beaches on D-Day; the Commonwealth or the Americans? :)

In any case, I think we're agreed that you need both (really, you need a little of everything), and the one should never be far behind the other.

In early 1944 Montgomery arranged for Hobart's 79th Armd to show the US top brass just what they had, including mine clearance, flamethrower and obstacle clearing tanks. Ike was enthusiatic about what he witnessed and accepted Monty's offer of half the British inventory. His big mistake was delegating just what specialist armour the Americans would use on D-Day to his subordinates who with a "not invented here" attitude only agreed to accept a few of the DD tanks.

Every time I watch the Longest Day where those American Engineers are being gunned down as they attempt to blow that concrete roadblock I can't help thinking how much better it would have been if they'd had a few Churchill AVRE present lobbing HE dustbins in support.
 
This may have already been mentioned, though I didn't see it in my quick skim:

If the storm about two weeks after D-Day had been delayed a few weeks it would have helped the Allied buildup a lot. And, yeah messing up the French rail system as much as the Allies did was a bad move in the medium term, though in the short-term it really helped keep the Germans off balance.
 
For instance if the weather allowed the landings two weeks earlier, and there had been better intelligence avoiding bloody Omaha.
Not having most of the first wave of DD amphibious tanks sink would probably be a good start, IIRC they were launched too far out and the current meant that to keep on course they ended up having to travel almost parallel to the waves coming in and got swamped. Having the pre-landing naval bombardment and aerial bombings hit their targets a bit more accurately can only have improved things. Did the US forces use Hobart's Funnies, I have memories of them not being very interested in the, which might have helped as well.


The reason Caen too so long was the British were fighting the majority of the German armour, whilst the Americans faffed around in the bocage.
Don't think they were quite faffing about. I could be be wrong but I thought the whole strategy was that the British purposely pushed forward to pin down the Germans, which as Nytram01 mentions seems to have been done quite effectively, to allow the Americans to build up their forces in number before moving forward so that they'd be more effective?
 
I'm anxious to see how we solve this. Plenty of mistakes were made. Rockets missed, DD's sank, poor navigation, that damned MG42, Bocage, lots of little things, some big things. My father-in-law would like to know too, I'm sure. He landed D plus 18.
 
Not having most of the first wave of DD amphibious tanks sink would probably be a good start, IIRC they were launched too far out and the current meant that to keep on course they ended up having to travel almost parallel to the waves coming in and got swamped. Having the pre-landing naval bombardment and aerial bombings hit their targets a bit more accurately can only have improved things. Did the US forces use Hobart's Funnies, I have memories of them not being very interested in the, which might have helped as well.



Don't think they were quite faffing about. I could be be wrong but I thought the whole strategy was that the British purposely pushed forward to pin down the Germans, which as Nytram01 mentions seems to have been done quite effectively, to allow the Americans to build up their forces in number before moving forward so that they'd be more effective?

The British before Cobra, where facing 9 mobile divisions and 2.5ish infantry divisions

The Americans where facing 5ish mobile divisions and 6ish infantry divisions

The British where engaging the majority of the German armor, but this was more terrain based than anything else. The American sector wasn't conducive to armored advances, and the Germans found they could just fortify infantry battle groups and a few assault guns in the bocage and keep American rates of advance managable... the British sector was more open and more dangerous to the whole front and required tanks to contain

The nail in the coffin of the German army in the west was when Hitler ordered the Mortain offensive which drew off all the armor for an attempt to cut off patton, not only did it fail miserably, but it allowed the allies to break out (sacrificing 2 successful months of boxing the allies in, which they had fought tooth and nail for)... Kluge when getting the order described it as a "ratfuck" and this was one of his interactions about it with Jodl

Kluge: It can't succeed, I would only be able to mass 120 tanks at Mortain, half of the strength of a single American armored division, and it would recklessly endanger my flanks, the entire front will collapse
Jodl: sullenly Plan approved
Kluge: Plan hopeless Kluge hangs up on him
 
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