Better Confederate presidents than Jefferson Davis

Saphroneth

Banned
McClellan was not ordered off until after he had been repulsed by Lee.
He'd been repulsed, yes, but he ended up on the James.

There are several differences between 1862 and 1864 that you are ignoring.
The main one, presumably, being that Grant could get himself reinforcements without having to beg for months.

In 1864, Robert E Lee said ""We must destroy this Army of Grant's before he gets to the James River. If he gets there it will become a siege and then it will be a mere question of time."
And why do you think that might be different in 1862? McClellan was a siege specialist.
Lee explained to Davis that McClellan would advance "post by post" and that they would have no way to stop him, which is why they were so happy when McClellan was withdrawn. Basically the same situation - a siege is irresistible when well prosecuted - and highlights the parallels, much like Halleck's letter about how it would be best to withdraw Grant (in the same way they withdrew McClellan):

"Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which is strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be. " - Maj Gen Henry Halleck to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
The Confederates had a presidential election in November 1861; OTL it was uncontested, but could Breckinridge have run theoretically?

Theoretically, yes, but it was tricky. The Confederate Constitution said that any Confederate citizen who was a citizen of the United States prior to December 20, 1860 (the date of the secession of South Carolina) could run. However, Breckinridge was a little bit busy, having just fled from the Union authorities and linked up with the Confederate army. He technically remained a United States Senator until December, so I don't know if he had been able to go to the trouble of obtaining Confederate citizenship by the time the election had been held. Even if he had, how would he then have got on the ballot in the Confederate states. So, probably not.
 
My only quibble with your post--ASJ being unfit. We'll never really know, but he certainly knocked Grant on his ass during the first part of Shiloh. His plan, had it been carried out by Beauregard, was simple and most likely would have been more effective than what actually happened. Seems to me that he showed potential

Johnston proved himself inadequate as a theater commander. Ft Henry should never have been sited where it was. At Ft Donelson, Johnston put Floyd in charge, though Floyd had proven his lack of administrative ability in the Utah Expedition. Johnston put Pillow as second in command at Ft Donelson, even though Pillow had proven his lack of any ability in the Mexican War. Johnston did not order the abandonment of Ft Donelson, nor did he send them enough troops to hold, instead he sent enough reinforcements to add to the number of men who were surrendered. Johnston then fell back, leaving Nashville and the huge amount of supplies there to be almost effortlessly capture by Union troops, and letting the Union occupy one of the best iron producing regions in the Confederacy. The Confederate plan at Shiloh was created and implemented by Beauregard, not Johnston. While Beauregard did Johnston's job, Johnston spent the battle acting as a glorified brigade commander.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
I wonder if anyone could have stopped the forces in Charleston from firing on Fort Sumter?

Just have the telegraph line break.

The reality was that if the north could reinforce Sumter, Pulaski, Pickens, and other coastal forts taking them could have become very problematic for the CSA.

Fort Pulaski had already been taken. And while they could have reinforced Pickens without too much trouble, Sumter would have been much more problematic, for any ships approaching could have come under fire from other batteries.
 
And why do you think that might be different in 1862? McClellan was a siege specialist.
Lee explained to Davis that McClellan would advance "post by post" and that they would have no way to stop him, which is why they were so happy when McClellan was withdrawn. Basically the same situation - a siege is irresistible when well prosecuted - and highlights the parallels, much like Halleck's letter about how it would be best to withdraw Grant (in the same way they withdrew McClellan):

McClellan's actions at Yorktown hardly qualify him as a "siege specialist". You have badly misinterpreted Lee's quote about McClellan. Lee correctly interpreted McClellan's intention to make it a "battle of posts", but that was not a conclusion that they had no way of stopping McClellan, as Lee proved by not just stopping, but repeatedly driving McClellan back in the the Seven Days Battles. The orders for McClellan to withdraw came only after McClellan's repeated failure in the campaign. In contrast, McClellan's evaluation of Lee was ridiculously off the mark - “I prefer Lee to Johnston – the former is too cautious & weak under grave responsibility – personally brave & energetic to a fault, he yet is wanting in moral firmness when pressed by heavy responsibility & is likely to be timid and irresolute in action.”
 

Saphroneth

Banned
McClellan's actions at Yorktown hardly qualify him as a "siege specialist".
He did it inside a month, which is a lot quicker than anyone else managed to put a similar set of works into an untenable position - Yorktown is an incredibly strong defensive position without flanks McClellan could turn, much of which is guarded by a flooded river, and McClellan set up the artillery to batter the enemy out of it in a matter of a couple of weeks. Compare to Petersburg's defences, which it took Grant nine months to turn, or Vicksburg for that matter.

Lee correctly interpreted McClellan's intention to make it a "battle of posts", but that was not a conclusion that they had no way of stopping McClellan, as Lee proved by not just stopping, but repeatedly driving McClellan back in the the Seven Days Battles.
Yes, which was only possible because McClellan had a vulnerable flank. In a direct siege battle McClellan would win, and that's the same thing Lee said of Grant - remember, the reason the line of the James is a good one is because the supplies come up the James and there's no vulnerable rail line to cut.

The orders for McClellan to withdraw came only after McClellan's repeated failure in the campaign.
When you say "repeated failure", what you mean is either (pre Seven Days) the period of time when McClellan is trying to do something with his army when about 40% of what he'd planned for it is missing (and when he's repeatedly promised the lack to be made good and then withdrawn) or (post Seven Days) the period of time when McClellan is asking for reinforcements to make good his casualties, but even without them is still managing to pin most of Lee's army in Richmond.
 
Theoretically, yes, but it was tricky. The Confederate Constitution said that any Confederate citizen who was a citizen of the United States prior to December 20, 1860 (the date of the secession of South Carolina) could run. However, Breckinridge was a little bit busy, having just fled from the Union authorities and linked up with the Confederate army. He technically remained a United States Senator until December, so I don't know if he had been able to go to the trouble of obtaining Confederate citizenship by the time the election had been held. Even if he had, how would he then have got on the ballot in the Confederate states. So, probably not.
Would he have sided with Kentucky if it seceded in the aftermath of Ft. Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops? It'd be too late for him for him to be chosen at the Montgomery convention, but it could give him time to get situated in the Confederacy, and possibly get him his Secretary of War post sooner.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Would he have sided with Kentucky if it seceded in the aftermath of Ft. Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops? It'd be too late for him for him to be chosen at the Montgomery convention, but it could give him time to get situated in the Confederacy, and possibly get him his Secretary of War post sooner.

Yes, he would have gone with Kentucky.
 
He was the candidate the southern states had supported; if he'd moved to the fledgling CSA at once and applied for citizenship - with the clear intention of serving politically "in any way I can" (but obviously understood to mean "as president") - he'd have considerable support from the outset. Of course, Jefferson Davis was unanimously elected president by the provisional congress in Montgomery on February 9, 1861. By that point, none of the Upper South had seceded yet, and it was doubtful if those states would secede at all. So for Breckenridge to cast in his lot with what was at that time purely a Deep South affair... that would be quite a leap of faith for him.

Obviously, there can be little doubt that if he somehow did become president, he'd be far better than Davis.

Other leading candidates, incidentally, had their own failings. On the whole, I don't see men like Toombs or Stephens doing much better than Davis. In fact, the only Confederate cabinet members (other than Breckenridge) that I would consider highly capable men are the two who would never be elected president in a million years: Judah P. Benjamin and John Reagan. (Yes, Reagan, the Postmaster General. He was so administratively capable that in spite of the war, his department still ran a profit. "[T]he only post office department in American history to pay its own way," according to William C. Davis.)

I understand why Benjamin was out but why is Reagan? I remembered he was a Texan and ran the Post Office very competently but what keeps him from being elected (I am missing something)
 

Skallagrim

Banned
I understand why Benjamin was out but why is Reagan? I remembered he was a Texan and ran the Post Office very competently but what keeps him from being elected (I am missing something)

Pretty much the same reason Megan Brennan isn't going to be president of the USA any time soon.

Who on earth is Megan Brennan? She's the current Postmaster General, and as far as I'm aware, virtually no-one's ever heard of her. Reagan was a rather obscure figure in the same way. The function he got wasn't flashy, he was never considered a candidate for what was considered a more 'weighty' position, and he remained where he was. Considering his abilities, I think he could have been more useful in higher office... but I just don't see him ever being elected to such office. There were a lot of less administratively gifted but more politically sly people around.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Davis provoked a wholly unnecessary feud with Joe Johnston.

Though I am an admirer of Joe Johnston, I must acknowledge that Uncle Joe was not wholly free of blame in that dispute.

Confederate law specified that the seniority of full generals in the Confederate army would be determined by the "rank" each individual held in the United States Army. Davis took this to mean "line rank", in which Johnston was fourth behind Cooper, A. S. Johnston, and Lee. Johnston assumed took it to mean "staff rank", in which he would be ranked first, given his position as Quartermaster General in the United States army. The law never specified whether it meant "line rank" or "staff rank" and this was the principal origin of their dispute (although some have suggested that their dispute was personal and may have gone all the way back to their West Point days).

A minor POD with enormous potential consequences would be having the law specify "line rank" or "staff rank".
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
On the whole, I don't see men like Toombs or Stephens doing much better than Davis.

Stephens was actually raised up as a possibility in Montgomery very briefly. He would have had a singular advantage over Davis in that, not being a military man, he would never have imagined himself a strategic genius and would not have interfered with military operations in the manner Davis did. Also, not having been an officer or Secretary of War, he wouldn't have had his favorites and foes among those clamoring for generalships. On the other hand, he certainly lacked the commitment Davis had to the cause. Being a bachelor, a frail physical specimen, and a frankly uninspiring man (albeit an incisive constitutional thinker), he certainly did not have the gravitas that the new Southern republic would have expected of its chief executive.
 
Stephens was actually raised up as a possibility in Montgomery very briefly. He would have had a singular advantage over Davis in that, not being a military man, he would never have imagined himself a strategic genius and would not have interfered with military operations in the manner Davis did. Also, not having been an officer or Secretary of War, he wouldn't have had his favorites and foes among those clamoring for generalships. On the other hand, he certainly lacked the commitment Davis had to the cause. Being a bachelor, a frail physical specimen, and a frankly uninspiring man (albeit an incisive constitutional thinker), he certainly did not have the gravitas that the new Southern republic would have expected of its chief executive.

One potential issue with Stephens is that there is a good chance that Davis would wind up co-ordinating military operations anyway.

Stephens, as you note, did not have military experience himself, so presumably would have tried to find a military supremo, either a strong Secretary of War or an army chief of staff or commander in chief.

Note that the United States took a really long time compared to other countries to get the hang of the "powerful army chief of staff" thing, not really until Marshall and World War 2. With the North, Lincoln, whose military experience was comparable to that of his friend Stephens, took until 1864 and even then Grant often slipped to much into a field commander role. Its really not clear if the Halleck experiment was really that much better than Davis doing everything himself.

And if you are President of the CSA and are going to put someone in that rule, why not the former U.S. Secretary of War, who by all accounts did a good job when running the war department? Jefferson Davis as Secretary of War for Stephens makes a lot of sense. Stephens needs Democrats in his cabinet, and Davis had just done the exact same job in Washington.

Don't assume they would have gone straight to Lee, it would have probably been Davis or A.S. Johnston, with the other getting the Department of the West. And this applies of Toombs or really anyone other than Davis was President.

Where not having Davis as President makes a profit for the nascent CSA is stopping the bombardment of Fort Sumter. And after reading tons of posts about this on this site, I am still in the dark about whether the local forces would have just done this anyway, with Montgomery really having no say in the matter.
 
Though I am an admirer of Joe Johnston, I must acknowledge that Uncle Joe was not wholly free of blame in that dispute.

Confederate law specified that the seniority of full generals in the Confederate army would be determined by the "rank" each individual held in the United States Army. Davis took this to mean "line rank", in which Johnston was fourth behind Cooper, A. S. Johnston, and Lee. Johnston assumed took it to mean "staff rank", in which he would be ranked first, given his position as Quartermaster General in the United States army. The law never specified whether it meant "line rank" or "staff rank" and this was the principal origin of their dispute (although some have suggested that their dispute was personal and may have gone all the way back to their West Point days).

A minor POD with enormous potential consequences would be having the law specify "line rank" or "staff rank".

Davis may have been right to put Johnston behind A. S. Johnston and Lee. And Johnston's letter of protest was over the top in its length and rhetoric.

But If Davis had been the leader Lincoln was, he would have recognized that Johnston was just blowing off steam and ignored it. Instead he responded with a brutal dismissal. He had to know this would forever poison his relationship with Johnston, but his pride required it.
 
What about John Tyler?

I had forgotten that the 1860 election of Davis was provisional.

The POD is that once more states join the Confederacy, there is recognition that an Upper South politician should be either President or Vice President. Not only that but Davis, who really wants a military command, agrees with this and agrees to step aside if given the posts of either Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, or commander of the Department of the West. And so they elect Tyler. With a Virginian installed as President, they may also decide that having the capitol in Virginia is unnecessary.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
What about John Tyler?

Whoever is chosen as Vice President will become President in short order. Tyler died of a stroke after being elected to the Confederate Congress, after all. Suddenly having the responsibilities of the presidency thrust upon him would likely have triggered it even earlier than IOTL.

But your suggestion of having Davis step aside in order to assume a purely military role, thus opening the field for men from the Upper South, presents more opportunities. Senator Robert Hunter is a possibility.
 
Last edited:
Top