Better Chance of German Success Tunisia or Italy?

Better Chance of German Success Tunisia or Italy?

  • Tunisia

    Votes: 4 13.3%
  • Italy

    Votes: 26 86.7%

  • Total voters
    30
Better Chance of German Success Tunisia or Italy?

Where did the Germans have more a chance at success in Tunisia or Italy? By success I mean doing the most damage to the Allies and delaying their efforts.

I wrote up two mini scenarios for it enjoy. Feel free to bring up your own POD's.

Scenario 1: Rommel withdrawals from El Alamein earlier and arrives back in Tunisia with far greater strength, Rommel in OTL lost over 100 tanks because of the delay. He then fights a brilliant campaign even more costly for the Allies then OTL.

Scenario 2: The Germans cancel Operation Steinbock and concentrate air power in the Mediterranean Theater. With extra Luftwaffe support the Germans are able to crush the allies landings at Anzio.

Tunisia:

In late October, 1942 the Battle of El Alamein had turned sharply in the Allies favor. The German Panzer Armee Afrika no longer possessed the strength to pierce the British defense and was being slowly grounded into dust. The army was running low on almost everything. Fuel and ammunition still had to be trek the long distance from the Libyan ports to the army.

With the situation worsening, German Field Marshal Rommel now contemplated a withdrawal from the El Alamein position to Fuka roughly fifty miles in the rear. On the 29th of October, with this on his mind, Rommel held a meeting with his two most trusted officers Colonels Fritz Baylerian and Siegfried Westphal. All three men agreed that if pressured further the army should pull back to the Fuka Line and then into Libya if necessary.

Over the next few days Allied attacks continued in great strength. On November 1st, the British XXX and X Corps launched hundreds of tanks forward along the coast road breaking through German positions. Rommel reacted to the British attack by denuding the southern sector and launching all available reserves in a spirited counter attack. With great effort the assault was halted, the British tanks limped away having lost 87 tanks. Rommel's men had survived this latest battering but their strength had been spent. Now was the time to withdraw while the British paused to regroup.

Rommel, taking advantage of the momentary break in action informed high command of his decision and ordered the Italian XX Corps and the 90th Light Division to begin pulling back first to El Daba and then Fuka. On the morning of November 3rd, Rommel received the infamous "victory or death" order from Hitler and halted his planned withdrawal.

The Field Marshal quickly changed his mind when a new Italian intelligence report, later thought to be false, arrived stating that the British had managed to push through the Qattara Depression. Rommel immediately sped to met Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, who was touring the front. Rommel explained how the British could soon be in the German rear, and that the situation was critical. Kesselring, agreed with Rommel's logic and gave his support to any pull back, despite Hitler's orders to the contrary.

Having gained Kesselring's approval Rommel began the withdrawal with all haste. Over the quiet night of November 3rd, Panzer Armee Afrika withdrew to the Fuka line undetected. The next morning, the British opened up a huge artillery barrage against the largely empty Axis positions. This was then followed by a massive armoured assault which overwhelmed the remaining Axis forces. The British scored a great victory at the Battle of El Alamien, but Rommel's illusive Panzer Army lived to fight another day.

Anzio:

By November 1943, the Allied invasion of Fortress Europe was in full sway. The seizure of Sicily over the summer was followed shortly after by American and British landings in Italy itself. The Allies seemingly unstoppable slowly worked their way up the peninsula. Only a brilliant defense by CiC Italy Field Marshall Albert Kesselring had succeeded in halting the Allies just south of Rome.

It was at this moment that the German High Command was faced with a choice to either commit more forces to the Italian theater or risk losing Rome. Kesselring and Luftwaffe commander Wolfram von Richthofen had long pressed for more air assets to be given to their beleaguered Mediterranean forces. Goring however had other plans he had long contemplated an air offensive to avenge Hamburg. Code named Operation Steinbock, Goring was preparing to unleash the Luftwaffes remaining strategic air reserve, roughly 500 aircraft including the new He 177 heavy bomber, against London. Richthofen fiercely objected to Steinbock stating that the operation, like all the other bombing raids on London, would accomplish little. Goring however was unmoved and declared the operation would go forward as planned. It was only the timely intervention of Hitler that salvaged the situation.

Hitler having just read a new Abwehr report stating that the Allies were likely to attempt a landing near Rome sometime in February, he suddenly feared for his southern flank. In response he order Steinbock cancelled and for its air assets to be put at Richthofen's disposal. The German commander spent much of December organizing his new forces most of which were based in north Italy and southern France, out of the immediate danger zone. At the months end Richthofen retired to his hunting lodge, for some much need rest.

On the morning of the 22nd to Richthofen's total shock a report was rushed to him of an Allies landing in the Anzio sector just south of Rome. Richthofen, cursing Admiral Carnais with every breath, speed south to asses the situation. Meanwhile Kesselering's head quarters was in a state of panic few assets were available to meet the initial Allies landings The Allies established themselves firm beachhead. The German Field Marshall gathered what forces he could ordering his only available reserves to contain the landing. It was only American General Lucas hesitance that saved the Germans from a greater crisis.

The Furher demanded a counter offensive to drive the Allies into the sea. Some favored an earlier assault, but Kesslering held off waiting for the maximum of his forces to arrive. By the onset of February the Germans had amassed 10 divisions and over 700 aircraft. In early February, the Luftwaffe had begun a series of heavy raids in attempt to repeat their success at Bari months prior, strafing Allied troops, attacking shipping and dropping naval mining. The Fritz X missile proved to be particularly accurate and effective weapon, sinking a number of Allied warships. During the daytime attacks were conducted by Fw-190s, Me 410s and Bf 110s. At night Ju-88 and He 111 and He 177 bombers led the way. Richthofen and the Luftwaffe would do everything in their power to help crush the Allied beachhead.
 

Deleted member 1487

No question, Italy. I mean we've got the historical record that showed how quickly they lost in Tunisia and how long they held out in Italy. Had they spared their Tunisian forces for the Italian campaign they would have done even better in Italy.
 
No question, Italy. I mean we've got the historical record that showed how quickly they lost in Tunisia and how long they held out in Italy. Had they spared their Tunisian forces for the Italian campaign they would have done even better in Italy.

True but wouldn't delaying the war in Africa longer help? Frontal defense might be the best, could keep Mussolini's position afloat. I remember your thread form a while back and I think they had some good opportunities in Tunisia: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=357323
 

Deleted member 1487

True but wouldn't delaying the war in Africa longer help? Frontal defense might be the best, could keep Mussolini's position afloat. I remember your thread form a while back and I think they had some good opportunities in Tunisia: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=357323
Thanks to Malta you can't hold in Tunisia. Rommel didn't have enough men to make any difference in Tunisia before El Alamein even and he still had to defend against the 8th army.
 
Thanks to Malta you can't hold in Tunisia. Rommel didn't have enough men to make any difference in Tunisia before El Alamein even and he still had to defend against the 8th army.

Moving on then to Anzio. Do you think it was possible for the Germans to destroy the Allies bridgehead with some added Luftwaffe support and better managed counter attack?
 

Deleted member 1487

Moving on then to Anzio. Do you think it was possible for the Germans to destroy the Allies bridgehead with some added Luftwaffe support and better managed counter attack?
Maybe? But my point is that they have a better chance of doing that than holding in Tunisia.
 
Moving on then to Anzio. Do you think it was possible for the Germans to destroy the Allies bridgehead with some added Luftwaffe support and better managed counter attack?

I don't have close numbers at hand for the Allies in the Med in early 1944. The Germans averaged globally around 5,500 operational frontline aircraft each month from January through March. Tho their interceptor strength over Germany declined due to the appearance of the US long range fighters. Depending on the week their strength in range of central Italy varied from around 1,000 to 1,500 Very roughly the Allies had a daily operational strength in the UK of over 8,000 combat aircraft in january 1944, over 4,000 in the Med & able to fight over Italy. Some sources I've read place over 6,000 in the Med that spring. Op Steinbock concentrated a little over 400 bombers & a smaller reserve/replacement pool. Given the Allied air strength over Italy its unlikely adding 400, or even 800 bombers to the 1200+ German aircraft already in range would have had a large long term effect @ Anzio.

The bomber force used in Op Steinbock was swiftly attritted away. Not only were combat losses bad, but the noncombat loss rate from accidents and mechanical malfunctions was pushing up over 40% of the total losses. Op Steinbock never had a high enough number of sorties to cause much damage to the mass of Allied material in the UK. The loss rates prohibited a maximum effort & fairly early on the number or sorties per attack fell off dramatically. While the Anzio lodgment had some important vulnerabilities a sustained air attack would have driven bomber losses far above the ability to continue until significant damage occurred.

Worst case for the Allies is such a air offensive be well synchronized with the ground attacks. The damage inflicted 'may', no guarantee here, set back the Spring break out from the beached.
 
The Allies tied up in Tunisia does keep the Allies tied up away from Europe and their bomber bases further away and Italy in the war. Tunisia did keep the Allies tied up for several months OTL.

But maybe best case Hitler agrees to Rommel's request for a withdraw in late March. Withdrawl would be hard but instead of committing more into Tunisia at that point, it would be best to withdraw at night via Ju52 and Italian destroyer runs and via the Siebel Ferries and MFPs which could largely get through to the end. Tens of thousands could be evacuated this way and Tunisia probably falls only a couple weeks earlier.

Hitler doesn't know what might cause the Mussolini regime to tip but was concerned that losing North Africa would cause Italy to exit and Turkey to enter so I don't know if he can give up on Africa in November 1942.

An interesting POD may be that Paulus or Seylditz just withdraws from Stalingrad so there is no Stalingrad airlift so that effort is used to build up a supply reserve in Tunisia.

Another POD would be that Leningrad falls in 1941 so the MFPs used on lake Ladoga are used on the supply run to North Africa (bringing supplies to the beach close to the front). Maybe add the Tigers used on the Leningrad front in 1942 and the Germans hold in Egypt in November 1942.
 
I don't have close numbers at hand for the Allies in the Med in early 1944. The Germans averaged globally around 5,500 operational frontline aircraft each month from January through March. Tho their interceptor strength over Germany declined due to the appearance of the US long range fighters. Depending on the week their strength in range of central Italy varied from around 1,000 to 1,500 Very roughly the Allies had a daily operational strength in the UK of over 8,000 combat aircraft in january 1944, over 4,000 in the Med & able to fight over Italy. Some sources I've read place over 6,000 in the Med that spring. Op Steinbock concentrated a little over 400 bombers & a smaller reserve/replacement pool. Given the Allied air strength over Italy its unlikely adding 400, or even 800 bombers to the 1200+ German aircraft already in range would have had a large long term effect @ Anzio.

The bomber force used in Op Steinbock was swiftly attritted away. Not only were combat losses bad, but the noncombat loss rate from accidents and mechanical malfunctions was pushing up over 40% of the total losses. Op Steinbock never had a high enough number of sorties to cause much damage to the mass of Allied material in the UK. The loss rates prohibited a maximum effort & fairly early on the number or sorties per attack fell off dramatically. While the Anzio lodgment had some important vulnerabilities a sustained air attack would have driven bomber losses far above the ability to continue until significant damage occurred.

Worst case for the Allies is such a air offensive be well synchronized with the ground attacks. The damage inflicted 'may', no guarantee here, set back the Spring break out from the beached.

Its always a long shot for the Germans they probably don't have a chance. For the debate however the Allies do seem to have a weakness at night. Maybe the Germans can keep the attrition rates down and deal maximum damage at night?

Some keys to German victory would be boosting the sortie rate at the high point of the German attack. Attacking shipping and dropping more mines could have an impact, the Anzio bridgehead does need alot of shipping maybe it could weaken the Allied forces? Also equipping all the bombers with guided bombs would add to the damage, not sure how many are available.

One factor that made the German night attacks so effective was the
Luftwaffe’s large radar installation at Cape Circe that overlooked the Anzio beachhead. Despite many attempts by the Allies to destroy the site, the
radar kept operating throughout the campaign and gave the Luftwaffe a clear picture of the Allied air activity over the sector.

The German bombers normally employed ‘Window’ against the
Allied air defenses, which proved effective in jamming the Allied air defense radars. The Allied commanders noted that Anzio saw the toughest
German air opposition in the whole Mediterranean campaign.

Massed Luftwaffe fighter-bombers provided close air
support for the German panzer units advancing on the Allies and bombers struck Allied depots and logistics. The Germans flew more than 150 sorties
on 16, 17 and 19 February in a desperate attempt to break the Allied defense.

Through the campaign, the German bombers also dropped mines in the shipping lanes at night and between January and April 1944 more than 600 mines were dropped by the Luftwaffe near Anzio.

Night bomber attacks continued with a Liberty Ship and LCT hit by guided bombs and sunk on 15 February and the destroyer HMS Inglefield sunk by a guided bomb on 25 February with heavy loss.
http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/497AFC72_1143_EC82_2E2229178FBF3228.pdf
 
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