Better British Aviation 1918-39

So there is the basis for expansion during the war in terms of infrastructure, but at the very start the main difference
compred to OTL is quality rather than quantity.
 
If the RN insists on a two seat reconnaissance fighter there's another Bristol aircraft that could possibly be the basis for one. The Bristol 148B. Designed as an Army Co-operation aircraft it lost out to the Lysander mainly because it was a low wing monoplane. The high wing Lysander gave the crew better vision of the ground. The 148B built to compare the Taurus engine to the Perseus the 148A was powered by had a very respectable performance when compared to the Fulmar. I've played about a bit with the design as you can see below but the one on the left's fairly close to the actual aircraft as all I did was add carrier equipment and quesstimate the effect on its performance. Believe it or not the actual aircraft could reach 290mph, and could carry 500lb of bombs, it could also match the Lysander's landing and takeoff speed and runs. When Bristol built it they did it right.

View attachment 296211

Given the differences in engine development, I can see the prototype getting the Twin Perseus right from the off rather than farting
around waiting for the second prototype to test the Taurus. It would also be in keeping with the general theme of modest improvements
over OTL in prewar military developments. Delete the rear gun turret in favour of more forward guns perhaps.
 
What ever brings a V12 1500 HP engine for 1939.
I can make you an X24 engine more powerful than that by joining 4 Buzzard cylinder blocks to a common crank case.

Sticking the cylinder blocks of proven V-12 engines together around a common crank case to produce an X-24, seems to be an obvious and sensible way to get more power. Having said that the Daimler Benz coupled engines seemed like a good idea in theory, but didn't work in practice.

IIRC the first Rolls Royce X engine was an experimental X-24 version of the Eagle, which could produce 1,000hp. If they had continued with that and built a few experimental X-24 Kestrels they would have designed a better Vulture.
 
V12 and X24? Letters and numbers a reference to the rough shape and number of cylinders respectively, right?

Perhaps a successful vulture leads to development of other X24 engines? Maybe the Eagle is designed as an X engine rather than an H.
 
Given that the Exe was a sleeve valve engine, which Britain doesn't built ITTL, perhaps the Vulture's
development is broight forward by a year and an "X Eagle" (a Twin Merlin like OTL's Vulture was aTwin Kestrel/Perigine) enter service mid to late war.
 
Are there any advantages on the production side to building X engines using the same type of cylinders as V engines that are already in production? E.g. if instead of the OTL Merlin there was an X-24 Kestrel, which in addition to being about 35% more powerful than the early Merlins could be built with some of the same production tooling as the Kestrel, which IIRC was kept in production for advanced trainers.
 
While A-H Motors Co. Ltd. engines always perform perfectly, R-R motors did not. Peregrine or Kestrel-based X engines result in Vulture, one of the did-nots, although the Exe X performed with great adequacy, but was a sleeve-valve and was not proceeded with because it was for the navy. The Pennine was developed with great heaping piles of disinterest, so nobody knows or cares. R-R did finally come up with a brilliant idea, an H-24, like the Sabre, and they called it the Eagle. They didn't even bother to come up with a fresh name, because turbines were in the wings.
Funny thing about the 24 cyl X engine was that it was theoretically supposed to out-perform a V-12, like the Griffon, which was deemed as large as a V-12 could get. The cost would be complexity and maintenance woes. In the end, the Griffon was a moderate winner.
 
While A-H Motors Co. Ltd. engines always perform perfectly, R-R motors did not. Peregrine or Kestrel-based X engines result in Vulture, one of the did-nots, although the Exe X performed with great adequacy, but was a sleeve-valve and was not proceeded with because it was for the navy. The Pennine was developed with great heaping piles of disinterest, so nobody knows or cares. R-R did finally come up with a brilliant idea, an H-24, like the Sabre, and they called it the Eagle. They didn't even bother to come up with a fresh name, because turbines were in the wings.
Funny thing about the 24 cyl X engine was that it was theoretically supposed to out-perform a V-12, like the Griffon, which was deemed as large as a V-12 could get. The cost would be complexity and maintenance woes. In the end, the Griffon was a moderate winner.
Once again the Armstrong-Siddeley Anaconda rears it's ugly, adequately reliable and high-powered for its time head.
 
I can make you an X24 engine more powerful than that by joining 4 Buzzard cylinder blocks to a common crank case.

Sticking the cylinder blocks of proven V-12 engines together around a common crank case to produce an X-24, seems to be an obvious and sensible way to get more power. Having said that the Daimler Benz coupled engines seemed like a good idea in theory, but didn't work in practice.

IIRC the first Rolls Royce X engine was an experimental X-24 version of the Eagle, which could produce 1,000hp. If they had continued with that and built a few experimental X-24 Kestrels they would have designed a better Vulture.

X engines were buckets of trouble, Just Leo's posts above are right on the money. This (1930s) is the time to go conservative.
RR knows well how to produce a decent V12, with background in design & production of such engines for civil/racing and military, and in the Buzzard and R engines they have a good base to churn out the military-grade 1500 HP V12 before 1940.

BTW- Vulture was not produced using Peregrine blocks.
 
To Flesh Out Post 43...
Phase 4 - The Domestic Airlines 1919-39
Part 2 -1919-24 IOTL Wheat separated and chaff kept


On April 26th, 1917 the Government announced its intention to form the Civil Air Transport Committee, which was appointed in May 1917 and completed its report in February 1918. Lord Northcliffe was appointed chairman of the group which was composed of representatives from the Government departments, the services, manufacturers and designers, Parliament, and representatives of the Dominions, India, and Newfoundland. The Committee was empowered to consider the likely post-war uses and control over Civil Aviation and what role the services could play in helping to develop this form of transportation.

This report made two mistakes...

The first mistake was that Great Britain should continue to stand for the sovereignty of the air above their territories, which had been British Government policy since 1910 when the first Air Navigation Act declared that the air above His Majesty's dominions was inviolable. The main dissenter was Frank Pick the Managing Director of the London Underground, who according to Higham, my main source for this argued...
That both commercially and strategically Great Britain was in an entirely different position form that which she enjoyed as a maritime power. He further pointed out that France, Italy, and Spain could effectively block the expansion of British air routes along the natural avenues of aerial commerce to the Empire and South America. Under these circumstances it was essential that Britain try as soon as possible to get the international questions settled in order to get freedom of passage for her aircraft. Since in 1918 the range of the average aircraft which could be used for air transport was only about 250 miles, there was at that time no possibility of an all-British route.
Mr Pick's prediction soon turned became true, because: Germany blocked the route to Prague; France and Italy managed to prevent the Imperial air service from becoming fully airborne until the late 1930s; Persian obstinacy caused the long-delayed route to India to be moved to the south side of the Persian Gulf. By the late 1920s Britain was arguing for freedom of passage at the I.C.A.N. meetings.

The other mistake was that Civil Aviation should be under the control of the Air Ministry. Once again it was Pick that dissented. He argued that the Merchant Marine was under the Board of Trade and not the Admiralty and that Civil Aviation should be under the Board of Trade too. IOTL it was not until the end of the Second World War that a Ministry of Civil Aviation was created.

However on three other subjects the Committee gave the British Government some sound advice, which it ignored. To quote Higham again...
1. Interesting observations were made on a number of routes of commercial importance picked arbitrarily, and the conclusions reached upon their feasibility have, one the whole, proved sound. The routes were:
a. London-Edinburgh-Glasgow-Dublin-London;
b. London to the Riviera;
c. London-South Africa, with the suggestion that both East and West African routes be operated;
d. The Atlantic Route, preferably by the Azores and using aircraft carriers rather than risking fog off Newfoundland;
e. London-Norway-Sweden-Russia. Both this and the Atlantic Route, it was thought, might be operated by existing airships.​
2. Considering the future of the aircraft industry the Committee felt it essential to the future security of the Empire that civil air transport be developed to create a market for the products of the aircraft industry. This would in turn stimulate it to produce newer and better aircraft and accessories which would rebound to the benefit of the R.A.F.;

3.The Committee put it up to the Cabinet to decide whether the air transport was to be either State-owned or State-aided. Air transport, they held, was unlikely to be of any large extent for some years to come and in consequence the Government must aid the aircraft industry to weather the period while surplus war stocks were being used up and civil aircraft were being developed.

This was sound advice. Unfortunately, the Government chose to ignore it and to muddle through. Winston Churchill announced in the House of Commons in 1920 that "civil aviation must fly by itself." It did not. And so in the end the Government was forced to pay subsidies. To anticipate, in 1924 Imperial Airways was created as the "chosen instrument" as a result of the Hambling Report of the previous year. Finally in 1939 the British Overseas Airways Corporation (B.O.A.C.) came into being, but it was too late, for war came before this new public company could do the great things for which it had been created.
Another report that the Government ignored was the Report on Imperial Air Routes of 1919 prepared by the Advisory Committee on Civil Aviation. It said that the first priority should be given to developing the route to India and ultimately thence to Australia and second priority to the route from the UK to South Africa. The section on the Indian route to be developed first should be Egypt to Karachi as the conditions for aerial navigation on that section were judged to be the most favourable.
The committee next had to determine who could best perform the initial work. The R.A.F. was ruled out as improper, a semi-public company because it would be apt to become overly bureaucratic, but, because no company was likely to undertake the work without State aid, they voted for a private company aided by the State providing W/T, Met', and, possibly, "Air Ports."

Equally sensibly, they recommended that primarily mails be carried, with passengers and freight regarded as ancillary business. Unfortunately, this latter advice was neglected by London, but adopted by Washington with great success.[\QUOTE]
 
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I can't get the wording right with this, but here goes.

To Flesh Out Post 43...
Phase 4 - The Domestic Airlines 1919-39
Part 3 - 1919-24 TTL - Wheat Kept


ITTL Frank Pick was able to persuade the other members of the Civil Aerial Transport Committee (CATC) that the Government should argue for freedom of passage at the next meeting of the I.C.A.N. (International Commission for Air Navigation) and that Civil Aviation should be the responsibility of the Board of Trade (and after its creation the Ministry of Transport) instead of the Air Ministry.

The Cabinet accepted the recommendations and civil aviation became the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport, which IOTL was created in May 1919 and given control over railways, roads, canals, docks and from 1921 merchant shipping. The first Secretary of State for Transport was Eric Campbell Geddes whose last job was First Lord of the Admiralty and who would later become infamous for his eponymous axe. However, he was less famous for being the Deputy General Manager of the North Eastern Railway before the Great War and go on to be the chairman of Imperial Airways from its formation in 1924 to his death in 1937.

IOTL the Government provided the infrastructure of W/T, Met', and airports recommended by the committees, but no financial support, which meant that the benefits of the infrastructure provided by the British state were only felt by the heavily subsidised continental airlines that forced the British airlines out of the sky.

ITTL the Cabinet was prepared to pay subsidies to the British overseas airlines from the beginning so that they could compete with their foreign rivals. As has already been explained in earlier posts the Civil Aviation Department in cooperation with the Post Office organised a network of overseas air routes that reached all the major capitals of Europe, Cape Town, Nigeria (via a branch of the Cape line), Sydney and Hong Kong, which was completed by 31st March 1924. In accordance with the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Civil Aviation's report on the Imperial Air Routes the aircraft flying these routes belonged to a group of 4 state aided companies. The airlines primarily carried mails, with passengers and freight regarded as ancillary business.

ITTL the Civil Aviation Department also subsidised a firm to operate the London-Edinburgh-Glasgow-Dublin-London route proposed by the CATC. I want to say that this would form the core of a network of domestic routes, which would include services to the Channel Islands, Isles of Scilly, Isle of Mann and the Scottish Islands, which would be in operation by the end of March 1924, but it might take longer than that. That is not on the grounds of insufficient time, but insufficient money. Although I have quadrupled government spending on Civil Aviation over this period there might not be enough to complete the overseas routes and the domestic routes by March 1924 and priority was given to developing the overseas routes.

I had said that there would still be a Hambling Report in 1923 that recommended the merger of the existing overseas airlines into Imperial Airways on 1st April 1924, but I'm not sure that the domestic airline should become part of it. IOTL part of the argument behind creating Imperial Airways was that subsidising competing airlines was wasteful and if competition was required it would be provided by the foreign airlines on the European routes. However, the airline that operated the domestic routes wasn't in competition with the overseas air lines. Instead it complimented them by providing a network of feeder services.

IOTL the 5 companies that were merged into Imperial Airways passed 15 aircraft onto the new company and ITTL I had previously said that the companies that formed Imperial Airways had about 120 aircraft between them. I want to say that the firm operating the domestic routes had about 30 aircraft on 31st March 1924 regardless of whether it became part of Imperial Airways on the next day, which would increase the total fleet of the British airlines from 15 IOTL to 150 ITTL.
 
The oozlum bird returns...
That's probably too many airlines.
I presume that when you wrote airlines it was a typo for airliners.

Then be warned that I'm aiming for 220 in 1931 instead of 22, that is 176 by Imperial Airways and 44 by the domestic airline. That will move the UK up to second in the league table of European airliner fleets, with France in first place with 295 and Germany third with 177.

And for 1939 I've already quadrupled the British overseas airlines to 352 aircraft and want to quadruple the domestic airlines to 268 aircraft for a grand total of 620 airliners, though that is probably pushing it as it would give the UK about half of the European airliner fleet.
 
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To Flesh Out Post 43...
Phase 4 - The Domestic Airlines 1919-39
Part 4 - 1924-31 TTL


IOTL the Southern Railway became the biggest shareholder in Imperial Airways and three of the "Big Four" railway companies owned the Railway Group of airlines in partnership with Imperial Airways. Therefore ITTL it would be logical for the airline set up in 1919 to operate the domestic routes would have been owned the railway companies. Then the next logical step would be for the firm to become the British Isles Division of Imperial Airways in 1924 when the Hambling Report recommended that the UK needed one strong airline instead of a handful of weak ones.

This would fit in with the OTL trend for mergers in the UK, which in addition to the Grouping of the railways in 1923 and the creation of Imperial Airways in 1924 saw the creation of Imperial Chemical Industries in 1926. Furthermore it also fits in with the international trend for airline mergers. IOTL the Germans merged most of their airliners into Deutche Luft Hansa (D.L.H.) in 1926, which with a combination of Germany's population, territory, geographic position in Europe, government subsidies and the management of Erhard Milch became Europe's dominant airline.

OTOH the domestic airline didn't have any competition until the first half of the 1930s when the independents appeared. This was because the airliners that were available in the 1920s meant the airlines could only survive with the aid of Government subsidies. It didn't compete directly with the overseas airlines either and instead provided a network of services that fed into the overseas routes.

The OTL Railway Group of airlines was, according to Davies, a half-hearted affair. He gives the impression that the railway companies set their airlines up to stop the development of a form of transport that would take traffic away from their long distance rail routes. But IOTL the government, recognised, "the need for solid, practical support, and a rational administrative framework for air transport," from the beginning of civil aviation and had done a lot about it. Therefore the railways would have operated the domestic airline created in 1919 with a lot more vigour, because they knew if they didn't the Government would cancel their licences and transfer them to a firm that did. Then all the revenue lost from the long distance rail routes would go to that firm instead of them. The same logic was applied to the overseas airlines set up in 1919, which were owned by the shipping lines, that is, they would rather loose traffic to an airline that they owned than one that belonged to someone else.

Regardless of its corporate structure between 1924 and 1931, the British airline industry would have grown from my estimate of 150 aircraft in 1924 to 220 in 1931. In 1924 the 150 was made up of 120 operated by the overseas airline and 30 operated by the domestic airline. The 220 in 1931 consisted of 176 airliners operated by Imperial Airways on the overseas routes and 44 aircraft operated on the domestic routes. This increased the British share of the European airliner fleet from a pathetic 3% of 762 aircraft to a respectable 23% of 960 aircraft.

My critics may think that 220 airliners in 1931 was too many, but the British Air Lobby of 1931 ITTL would think it was far too few, because French airlines had a total of 295 airliners in 1931.
 
Airliners would be most valuable if they flew over densely-packed cities and over across-Channel ferries.
From the Flight International article dated 28th January 1937 about the Maybury Report via the Flight Archive.

Maybury Committee Manchester Hub Mk 2.jpg
 
The De Haviland Flamenco with twin Perseus engines fills that slot, pity it did not fly till late 1938. Somehow butterfly that aircraft forward a couple of years could make a real difference.
Excellent typo! If you are going to make a mistake, that's the way to do it!
 
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