Admiral Beez
Banned
And then bankroll the PIIGS and lose a ton in the process, followed later by inviting a millions Syrians to visit
How's that working out?Best use of German resources in WWII?
- Thread starter dandan_noodles
- Start date
How's that working out?The Soviets were able to build over a hundred thousand tanks in factories ripped up and hauled into the Urals, with a less efficient vertical integration model to take strain off the railroads. Main question is really what can be done with three times the steel and four times the coal. Germans didn't have enough rolling stock for the 41 invasion [they'd counted on capturing soviet rolling stock, which didn't materialize], so I figure that's one thing they could shore up. Still the problem of water towers along the railroads though.
I think the answer would be that a). the Nazis probably couldn't achieve that kind of increase and b). if they could it wouldn't much matter because they lacked many other critical resources.
So what, they might as well spend ten times the manhours on only marginally more effective tanks and let tons of steel, coal, and unskilled (slave) labor go to waste?
Cryhavoc101
Donor
And then bankroll the PIIGS and lose a ton in the process, followed later by inviting a millions Syrians to visit
Better so far than being viewed as war mongering monsters, bombed into the stone age and having said nation being occupied and torn in half for 3 generations
Deleted member 1487
Alright, leaving aside my earlier point that the best use of German resources was not going to war at all and adopting a trade based economy, I'll answer the question in the context of the war.
The best thing they could have done was have one main 'medium' tank chassis, which should have been the Pz IV. Forget the Pz III. I did a thread on this a while back. The Pz III had problems with its suspension until 1938 anyway, so given that the Pz IV was ready first and pretty much the same weight class as the Pz III it should have been adopted in 1938 as their sole tank of that weight class and just add different armament based on role. I'd say giving it the Rheinmetall-Borsig 75mm L41 gun that was developed in 1935 as its standard armament, fine for either AT or AP work, would allow the design to be standardized completely. Later the Germans realized their error and tried to make a Panzer III/IV so they only had one chassis for that weight class, but it was ready far to late to matter. Had they done so in 1938 they could have reaped major efficiencies in production and supply/training.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer_III/IV
Besides that adding dive bombing to a bunch of bombers, plus Udet's management of the Luftwaffe's production was criminal. Had Erhard Milch kept control from 1936 on they would have had a lot more aircraft earlier, plus avoid a lot of the technical problems with the Ju88 when it was forced to dive bomb. Same with the Me210 disaster and He177 fiasco. The Ta-154 problem might never have emerged with better technical leadership in the Luftwaffe. The easiest POD for all of that is just not have Walter Wever die in a plane crash in 1936 and Udet never gets into power, Milch stays in charge of production, and Wever's team stays in charge of technical development, which means Wolfram von Richthofen never becomes a field commander...which could have interesting butterflies technologically and in terms of field effect.
In terms of the navy not doing Plan Z. That was just dumb.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Z
I'd say the West Wall was a major waste. Just do some propaganda movies about making defenses that makes it look a lot more formidable than it was and do some fieldworks. Save heaps of metal that are more useful for other projects.
I'd say the Autobahn was a HUGE waste too. All that money and resources should have been poured into refurbishing the Reichsbahn and building new trains. That was badly needed and screwed the German rail system when the war started. The Autobahn did little more than offer jobs in construction, which all could have been put into something useful like refurbishing the rail system, which was far more militarily useful.
Otherwise I'd say not having the 1940 research halt and conscripting your engineers and scientists would be a big thing to avoid. Having 1 war production Czar appointed in 1939 instead of in 1942 would have been enormously helpful. The economy from 1936-1942 was called 'organized chaos' by the official history of the Bundeswehr on Germany in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_the_Second_World_War
Considerable waste was caused by corruption, bureaucratic competition, and waste until one authority effectively ran things and could stop all the nonsense going on. Before any Tooze-ian fanatics jump on me, Speer was hardly some miracle man, he just benefited from being the first official to have total authority, any person thrust into that role would have gotten the same benefit simply by eliminating all the orders and counter orders that messed up industry.
That's what I can think of off the top of my head besides the Napkinwaffe and proliferation of projects that came later in the war that were all big wastes. The V-2, Ratte, heavy tanks, etc.
The best thing they could have done was have one main 'medium' tank chassis, which should have been the Pz IV. Forget the Pz III. I did a thread on this a while back. The Pz III had problems with its suspension until 1938 anyway, so given that the Pz IV was ready first and pretty much the same weight class as the Pz III it should have been adopted in 1938 as their sole tank of that weight class and just add different armament based on role. I'd say giving it the Rheinmetall-Borsig 75mm L41 gun that was developed in 1935 as its standard armament, fine for either AT or AP work, would allow the design to be standardized completely. Later the Germans realized their error and tried to make a Panzer III/IV so they only had one chassis for that weight class, but it was ready far to late to matter. Had they done so in 1938 they could have reaped major efficiencies in production and supply/training.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzer_III/IV
Besides that adding dive bombing to a bunch of bombers, plus Udet's management of the Luftwaffe's production was criminal. Had Erhard Milch kept control from 1936 on they would have had a lot more aircraft earlier, plus avoid a lot of the technical problems with the Ju88 when it was forced to dive bomb. Same with the Me210 disaster and He177 fiasco. The Ta-154 problem might never have emerged with better technical leadership in the Luftwaffe. The easiest POD for all of that is just not have Walter Wever die in a plane crash in 1936 and Udet never gets into power, Milch stays in charge of production, and Wever's team stays in charge of technical development, which means Wolfram von Richthofen never becomes a field commander...which could have interesting butterflies technologically and in terms of field effect.
In terms of the navy not doing Plan Z. That was just dumb.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_Z
I'd say the West Wall was a major waste. Just do some propaganda movies about making defenses that makes it look a lot more formidable than it was and do some fieldworks. Save heaps of metal that are more useful for other projects.
I'd say the Autobahn was a HUGE waste too. All that money and resources should have been poured into refurbishing the Reichsbahn and building new trains. That was badly needed and screwed the German rail system when the war started. The Autobahn did little more than offer jobs in construction, which all could have been put into something useful like refurbishing the rail system, which was far more militarily useful.
Otherwise I'd say not having the 1940 research halt and conscripting your engineers and scientists would be a big thing to avoid. Having 1 war production Czar appointed in 1939 instead of in 1942 would have been enormously helpful. The economy from 1936-1942 was called 'organized chaos' by the official history of the Bundeswehr on Germany in WW2:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_the_Second_World_War
Considerable waste was caused by corruption, bureaucratic competition, and waste until one authority effectively ran things and could stop all the nonsense going on. Before any Tooze-ian fanatics jump on me, Speer was hardly some miracle man, he just benefited from being the first official to have total authority, any person thrust into that role would have gotten the same benefit simply by eliminating all the orders and counter orders that messed up industry.
That's what I can think of off the top of my head besides the Napkinwaffe and proliferation of projects that came later in the war that were all big wastes. The V-2, Ratte, heavy tanks, etc.
Deleted member 1487
Depends. They would be 'Not-sis' then. If Germany does all of what I suggest above, perhaps the POD is that Goring dies in 1936 instead of Wever, so Fritz Todt gets the 4 Year Plan and ends up taking over the economy and running it well, then its hard to say what the savings are spent on. Perhaps armaments plans are just on time. There would a quite a bit different if Goering is out in 1936, namely the Bf110 wouldn't be built, but the Fw187 would. The He177 wouldn't dive bomb or get the twin engines, rather 4 separate ones and be ready in 1941. There would be no Me210. The Ju88 wouldn't dive bomb and the Do217 wouldn't suffer its delays over dive bombing testing. Going into Poland there are perhaps more modern Panzers as they have standardized on the Pz IV with L41 75mm gun. That means in France they won't have problems with French or British armor and overall do better and have more bombers. The Do17 would be phased out in 1938 to make way for the early Ju88 (doesn't suffer delays due to dive bomb adaptation and resulting technical problems). They have a proper long range fighter going into the fight against Britain 1940, probably more Uboats too. I think they'd probably go for a longer strategy of blockade without Goring pushing the Battle of Britain idea. Britain might well get knocked out as a result of a properly run economy and Luftwaffe by 1941. If that is the case then invading the USSR is a lot easier and probably works (insofar as that means capturing Moscow due to a much stronger Germany without mismanagement and distracting other fronts, even if the Soviets mobilize and prepare for war). If Britain stays in the war until Barbarossa, then Barbarossa does better due to the German economy being better prepared and run, same with the Luftwaffe. Britain is certainly worse off if there was an effective blockade strategy enacted, but they are hanging on. Much of what happens from then on out comes down to whether Moscow is taken in October and what the fall out from that is.
The war overall would be a lot bloodier for the Allies and Germany hangs on until nukes are ready and then they get nuked in 1945. Perhaps in the meantime Hitler is successfully assassinated? Depending on butterflies maybe the US doesn't enter the war in 1941 or at all? A major POD in 1936 creates huge butterflies, so its hard to say exactly what happens.
While Germany getting nuked in 1945 would hurt ... would they, really? You spent most of a post describing either Britain dropping out (which IMO butterflies A-bombs on Germany, at least until the next war) or the Luftwaffe being much stronger (so a nuke in 1945 might still not be guaranteed to get through).
And even if the nukes got through, I hardly think Nazi Germany in charge from Brest to the Urals would just give up over getting nuked - it's a more effective and painful strategic bombing, not a war-winner in the numbers available in 1945-6.
And even if the nukes got through, I hardly think Nazi Germany in charge from Brest to the Urals would just give up over getting nuked - it's a more effective and painful strategic bombing, not a war-winner in the numbers available in 1945-6.
Deleted member 1487
By 1945 the level of attrition the USAAF alone could inflict on even a better run Luftwaffe would be immense. Even assuming the Luftwaffe beat its peak performance of production and more than doubles it for a 1945 total of 100k aircraft produced, mostly fighters, the USAAF made more than that in 1944 alone. That's not counting the RAF or VVS if the latter is still in the war. The USAAF was willing to pay the price to grind down the Luftwaffe in the air and had nearly double the people of Germany. The British had a white imperial population close to that of Germany's. In the end the RAF+USAAF alone would just grind down the Germans no matter the price so that nukes got through, even if at night. That's even assuming the best case scenario of Moscow being captured in 1941 and Stalin dying, leaving the USSR leadership and the Soviet government collapsed into civil war. Even assuming the Axis then got most of the Soviet resources west of the Volga and in the Caucasus, plus conquered Egypt in 1942 and forced the Allies into a dumb early invasion of France that fails the Wallies would simply grind Germany down in the long run.
Postponing the Holocaust would have been a close second. Exterminating an "enemy" that isn't even fighting you when real enemies are shooting at you from all sides is the sheer height of foolishness IMHO.
You can argue that if german have all these improvements - wiking posts - Dunkirk maybe turns different. f the 'miracle' don't occurs, and the BEF is captured, the probability of a negotiated peace with UK is way superior. If that goes, then no Africa operations - and you get much more forces against USSR. A much more powerful LW (solely dedicated to that front) and more land forces available. Add less need of resources to build u-boats -> even more planes and tanks.
About nukes - the wwii ones are launched on cities that are almost perfect targets. Against a european city - much more solid construction, the effect of a nuke - and a small kiloton one - is much less. Not even close to the one bomb - one city busted.
Also add that the probability of the bomber that carry the nuke have a much higher risk of being intercepted / shot.
If all goes well to Germany, the most probable result is a kind of Cold War.
About nukes - the wwii ones are launched on cities that are almost perfect targets. Against a european city - much more solid construction, the effect of a nuke - and a small kiloton one - is much less. Not even close to the one bomb - one city busted.
Also add that the probability of the bomber that carry the nuke have a much higher risk of being intercepted / shot.
If all goes well to Germany, the most probable result is a kind of Cold War.
I think we should also remember that the first nuke ever used was against a military target -Hiroshima was the HQ for the Japanese army operating in the south of Japan, awaiting invasion. If the preponderance of military targets owned by the Germans are in France, they may be willing to tough out one or two shots. Like, if the U Boat pens get nuked, yeah, it's pretty bad, looking at 20k military losses plus a lot of tonnage Untersee for good, but this war is costing the Germans 20k losses a day, and getting nuked by the Americans might undermine French resistance.
IIRC, some nuclear experts estimated that a 1 MT nuke in the center of London would kill like 10% of the population, and 5% of its GDP worth of assets; a nuke with one fiftieth the kilotonnage isn't world ending for a Germany with Lebensraum. That's not counting the effects of a miss, either; against hard targets, they recommend like 3-4 devices each to ensure a hit. One strategic target busted is not only not surefire allied victory, but it's not even a certainty with their current armament. If this scenario doesn't involve a successful Allied invasion of France, the Allies are also left in the dark as to the possibility of retaliation in kind, though they would also have to assume that retaliation with massed nerve agents is a possibility.
IIRC, some nuclear experts estimated that a 1 MT nuke in the center of London would kill like 10% of the population, and 5% of its GDP worth of assets; a nuke with one fiftieth the kilotonnage isn't world ending for a Germany with Lebensraum. That's not counting the effects of a miss, either; against hard targets, they recommend like 3-4 devices each to ensure a hit. One strategic target busted is not only not surefire allied victory, but it's not even a certainty with their current armament. If this scenario doesn't involve a successful Allied invasion of France, the Allies are also left in the dark as to the possibility of retaliation in kind, though they would also have to assume that retaliation with massed nerve agents is a possibility.
Redbeard
Banned
I think Germany's biggest problem was a basically flawed strategy. From the start Hitler counted on bluffing his way through and it was only due to the allies being even less prepared for war that he survived 1939. But after the Polish campaign the German army had practically emptied its stocks of artillery shells - starting a major war only with ammo for a minor campaign - that is indeed being unprepared and counting on bluff.
The campaign in 1940 was a string of "unlikely luckpearls" tied together by an unmatched tactical and operational efficiency but also together with the image of the Red Army after the Finnish Campaign created the misconception that Russia couldn't survive half a year of Blitzkrieg. Not being prepared for the Russian campaign going into 1942 and beyond IMHO was the biggest error, but perhaps more luck for the Red Army in Finland 1939-40 and bigger losses in France could change that? I guess it wouldn't take major PoDs.
If you have the opportunity I can recommend reading Nigel Askey's very comprehensive analysis of Barbarossa (Barbarossa - The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation) . Contrary to common beliefs it appears like German logistics and replacements actually worked well and sufficiently for the time the campaign was planned for (1941) and even left major assets not utilised (like most of the StuGs). Change planning to a 1941+ campaign and introduce war economy after the French campaign and 1942 might be very different. By spring 1942 the Red Army was extremely vulnerable with mainly untrained men and the factories in the Urals still not in full production.
Giving up the "Hausfrau" ideal and sending German women into the factories would alone be an important PoD, if not for other reasons then because the absense of forced labour would cool down sentiments in the occupied areas.
The next element of the flawed strategy materialised in actually engaging in a true world war by declaring war on USA. USA most likely would have entered the war against Germany sooner or later anyway, but for each month the focus of US resources on Germany can be postponed valuable time is gained. Declaring war on Japan instead would have been smarter (not likely - I know), but Germany had no interest in supporting a Japanese campaign that had no chance anyway. Actually it would have been in Germany's interest if the British Empire had not been humiliated like it was in OTL 1942 at Singapore. A British Empire feeling victorious in Asia would be much more defiant to the basic US strategy of "taking over global business" and lessen unity of the Wallies. Levving the Italians on their own in N.Africa and focussing on stiffening up defence of the Mediterranen coastlines probably would have been better for Germany. Not just because the Africa Corps took up the resources of an entire East Front army but also bacause that might support British focus on Asia. Of course Chruchill might try something absolutely stupid like invading "the soft belly" but that would probably end like the first time he tried that in WWI (incl. WC leaving politics).
BTW the Norwegian campaign was superflous as the German dependence on Swedish iron ore stopped after the Germans took possession of the French ironore and coal mines in N. France after the 1940 campaign. Next I wonder what the implications would have been of the Norwegian campaign having been "just" a British-French invasion of a neutral country? Unlike in WWI Denmark by 1940 wasn't capable of credibly preventing British attempts to threaten N. Germany but with the events in Norway I guess it would not be entirely implausible if Denmark officially joins the Axis. Not that it would in itself change much in the big war, but it would add extra resources as would the absense of the Norwegian losses and occupation force.
The campaign in 1940 was a string of "unlikely luckpearls" tied together by an unmatched tactical and operational efficiency but also together with the image of the Red Army after the Finnish Campaign created the misconception that Russia couldn't survive half a year of Blitzkrieg. Not being prepared for the Russian campaign going into 1942 and beyond IMHO was the biggest error, but perhaps more luck for the Red Army in Finland 1939-40 and bigger losses in France could change that? I guess it wouldn't take major PoDs.
If you have the opportunity I can recommend reading Nigel Askey's very comprehensive analysis of Barbarossa (Barbarossa - The Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis and Military Simulation) . Contrary to common beliefs it appears like German logistics and replacements actually worked well and sufficiently for the time the campaign was planned for (1941) and even left major assets not utilised (like most of the StuGs). Change planning to a 1941+ campaign and introduce war economy after the French campaign and 1942 might be very different. By spring 1942 the Red Army was extremely vulnerable with mainly untrained men and the factories in the Urals still not in full production.
Giving up the "Hausfrau" ideal and sending German women into the factories would alone be an important PoD, if not for other reasons then because the absense of forced labour would cool down sentiments in the occupied areas.
The next element of the flawed strategy materialised in actually engaging in a true world war by declaring war on USA. USA most likely would have entered the war against Germany sooner or later anyway, but for each month the focus of US resources on Germany can be postponed valuable time is gained. Declaring war on Japan instead would have been smarter (not likely - I know), but Germany had no interest in supporting a Japanese campaign that had no chance anyway. Actually it would have been in Germany's interest if the British Empire had not been humiliated like it was in OTL 1942 at Singapore. A British Empire feeling victorious in Asia would be much more defiant to the basic US strategy of "taking over global business" and lessen unity of the Wallies. Levving the Italians on their own in N.Africa and focussing on stiffening up defence of the Mediterranen coastlines probably would have been better for Germany. Not just because the Africa Corps took up the resources of an entire East Front army but also bacause that might support British focus on Asia. Of course Chruchill might try something absolutely stupid like invading "the soft belly" but that would probably end like the first time he tried that in WWI (incl. WC leaving politics).
BTW the Norwegian campaign was superflous as the German dependence on Swedish iron ore stopped after the Germans took possession of the French ironore and coal mines in N. France after the 1940 campaign. Next I wonder what the implications would have been of the Norwegian campaign having been "just" a British-French invasion of a neutral country? Unlike in WWI Denmark by 1940 wasn't capable of credibly preventing British attempts to threaten N. Germany but with the events in Norway I guess it would not be entirely implausible if Denmark officially joins the Axis. Not that it would in itself change much in the big war, but it would add extra resources as would the absense of the Norwegian losses and occupation force.