Best use of "FLeet in being" in the 20th century?

Khanzeer

Banned
Please suggest a fictional scenario in which the fleet in being concept is put to the best use ?
Which naval/ air fleet could have exploited this most effectively? And would they go about it ?
HSF
KM
red navy in the cold war
Arab airforces against Israel?
South african defense forces
Feel free to add more
Thanks
 
Italy in WWII. It allowed them to wield effective sea control of the Central Mediterranean, not only cutting the Suez supply route and causing the Allied global shipping situation no end of grief, but also doing an excellent job protecting Axis supply lines to North Africa. The Afrika Korps had serious supply issues, but sealift was not one of them.
 
Tirpitz did almost nothing except sit in Trondheim. She still managed to tie down a great deal of the RN, and got a lot of RAF attention too. As a return on investment, it's hard to beat.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Tirpitz did almost nothing except sit in Trondheim. She still managed to tie down a great deal of the RN, and got a lot of RAF attention too. As a return on investment, it's hard to beat.

I agree with the above. It is a question of what the enemy would do with those tied-up forces being free.

The RN - and some heavy USN units - had other theatres where those ships would be more useful, initially the Med, but particularly the Pacific & Indian Oceans.
 
Italy in WWII. It allowed them to wield effective sea control of the Central Mediterranean, not only cutting the Suez supply route and causing the Allied global shipping situation no end of grief, but also doing an excellent job protecting Axis supply lines to North Africa. The Afrika Korps had serious supply issues, but sealift was not one of them.
That was as much the Regia Aeronautica as the Regia Marina, and the RM was in any case, far too active to be considered a fleet in being in the traditional sense.
 
Royal Navy Grand Fleet in WW1

Simply by existing it meant that Germany could not win - and every time they tried to fight it they came off 2nd best.

And Germanys increasingly drastic measures to bypass it and blockade the UK using USW brought the USA into the war.
 
I think describing the Great Fleet as an effective fleet in being is too generous. The Royal Navy was huge, modern, and expensive. The first thing it was supposed to do was act as a deterrent and it abjectly failed at that. Alternatively, the Royal Navy was supposed to in succession blockade the enemy, draw out the enemy (German) fleet, decisively destroy the enemy fleet, and then enjoy all the benefits of naval supremacy (open sea lines of communication to Russia, ability to conduct amphibious landings to flank the enemy at will, etc). It wasn’t able to do these things in any reasonable time frame: the Central Powers were able to drag the world into years of most devastating conflict and the final British “victory” was anemic.
 
I think describing the Great Fleet as an effective fleet in being is too generous. The Royal Navy was huge, modern, and expensive. The first thing it was supposed to do was act as a deterrent and it abjectly failed at that. Alternatively, the Royal Navy was supposed to in succession blockade the enemy, draw out the enemy (German) fleet, decisively destroy the enemy fleet, and then enjoy all the benefits of naval supremacy (open sea lines of communication to Russia, ability to conduct amphibious landings to flank the enemy at will, etc). It wasn’t able to do these things in any reasonable time frame: the Central Powers were able to drag the world into years of most devastating conflict and the final British “victory” was anemic.

What fleet in being did all that?
 

Khanzeer

Banned
Thanks
These are historical examples , can you think of fictional scenarios in historical timelines [ like ww1 ww2 cold war etc] where the fleet in being concept could have been used more effectively?
 
What fleet in being did all that?

No successful fleet in being did those things because successful fleets don’t get called a “fleet in being”. “Fleet in being” is what unsuccessful fleets get called retroactively after they’ve rusted at anchor to justify their expense. The British Royal Navy had a strategic mission at the beginning of World War I, and it it failed in that strategic mission.
 
No successful fleet in being did those things because successful fleets don’t get called a “fleet in being”. “Fleet in being” is what unsuccessful fleets get called retroactively after they’ve rusted at anchor to justify their expense. The British Royal Navy had a strategic mission at the beginning of World War I, and it it failed in that strategic mission.

Really? The British Royal Navy's strategic mission was to keep the sea-lanes to the UK (both intercontinental and cross-Channel) open, and close those to Germany. The former was disturbingly close to failure, but ended up a success. The latter was an expensive win; Jellicoe was 'the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon' and didn't. Britain needed certainty, total certainty, that it could not be cut off. You can't destroy the enemy if they won't come out and play.

The RN knew that the idea of a close blockade which would allow the landing of raiders in Frisia at will was unlikely to be feasible in a world full of torpedoes and mines. The Live Bait Squadron got its nickname well before it was sunk, because the professionals knew it had no business being there. As for opening the Baltic - that was a nice to have, not a fundamental mission.

Now if you make that statement about the HSF, you're a lot closer to being right. Not that the HSF's mission was ever likely to be achievable, but it certainly wasn't achieved.
 
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But the blockade was leaky and didn’t force Germany to the negotiating table before the damage had been done. Besides, my understanding (and correct me if I’m wrong) is that the blockade wasn’t actually intended to be a component of protracted siege warfare. The RN planners had just enough grasp of technology to realize that Copenhagening the HSF was a Bad Idea. The Distant Blockade was chosen over the Close Blockade because the British thought it was obvious that the Germans would have to come out and fight to break the blockade. After the “inevitable” destruction of the HSF the Royal Navy could enact dashing schemes like the Baltic Plan and Gallipoli* that would be real war winners. But in the real event, the Germans didn’t play ball, so millions died in the mud of France while the splendid Grand Fleet drilled endlessly in port.





*you start to see why this plan was maybe not the best even if it had worked
 
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But the blockade was leaky and didn’t force Germany to the negotiating table before the damage had been done. Besides, my understanding (and correct me if I’m wrong) is that the blockade wasn’t actually intended to be a component of protracted siege warfare. The RN planners had just enough grasp of technology to realize that Copenhagening the HSF was a Bad Idea. The Distant Blockade was chosen over the Close Blockade because the British thought it was obvious that the Germans would have to come out and fight to break the blockade. Then the Royal Navy could enact dashing schemes like the Baltic Plan and Gallipoli* that would be real war winners.

Gallipoli wasn't a failure for want of naval support - the Allies threw an entire navy at it. It was just a crap idea badly executed.

The Germans didn't come to the negotiating table because they didn't care about starving people to death to achieve Final Victory - hence, you know, the Turnip Winters. Had the Central Powers been well-fed and well-armed the collapses of 1918 probably wouldn't have happened, so "before the damage is done" is a very teleological way of looking at it.

Of course the blockade was leaky. Blockades are leaky, because the sea is very big. Close blockades, historically, leaked as well, cf. the Napoleonic Wars (leaked terribly because sailing ships and weather) and the American Civil War.No blockade could crash the German economy quickly, but I think the RN always took a more cynical view of "the Allied armies will finish this by Christmas".

Conversely, if you don't have a considerable margin of superiority over the HSF, you can't actually fight the war at all - can't keep the constant flow of cross-Channel supplies, can't feed the civilian population, can't get at the enemy in the colonies - you can sit at home and starve. A Navy is not, cannot be, a war-winning instrument against an almost pure land power - the "almost" is what makes the blockade worthwhile, and the blockade was only effective at the margins because the Central Powers put such a lot of their manpower and resources into the Front. But not having the Navy when your economy and war effort rely completely on sea transport is certainly a war-losing instrument.
 

Khanzeer

Banned
Tirpitz did almost nothing except sit in Trondheim. She still managed to tie down a great deal of the RN, and got a lot of RAF attention too. As a return on investment, it's hard to beat.
I wish Bismarck along with Salmon and gluckstein had been used in a similar way
 
No successful fleet in being did those things because successful fleets don’t get called a “fleet in being”. “Fleet in being” is what unsuccessful fleets get called retroactively after they’ve rusted at anchor to justify their expense. The British Royal Navy had a strategic mission at the beginning of World War I, and it it failed in that strategic mission.

The basic concept of a fleet in being is one that is kept safe until it can be used decisively - and generally impose strategic and tactical constraints on its enemies even while being kept safe.

So for example the Grand fleet was kept safe and went to sea (as in to seek battle - it went to sea a lot) when it was thought that it could be used decisively

There is no requirement for it to be an unsuccessful fleet and for the term to be used retrospectively.
 
Can a air fleet be used this way ? Any historical examples ?
Doesn't work. You try that, and a competent enemy will just bomb the airfields. Or hit them with SRBMs.

Fleet-in-being depends on harbors being safe. That just doesn't work in aerial warfare.
 
Italy in WWII. It allowed them to wield effective sea control of the Central Mediterranean, not only cutting the Suez supply route and causing the Allied global shipping situation no end of grief, but also doing an excellent job protecting Axis supply lines to North Africa. The Afrika Korps had serious supply issues, but sealift was not one of them.
Not to mention tying up the Royal Navy and allowing the Imperial Japanese Navy complete freedom in the East Indies
 
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