Otto Kretschmer
Banned
What in your opinion would be the best long term strategy that Umayyads, Abbasids and other dynasties could have taken to maximally weaken ERE?
Best strategy for Muslims against ERE
- Thread starter Otto Kretschmer
- Start date
In the case of the Fatimids, they would have been well-served if they nipped away at the periphery of Rome, focusing on capturing and holding islands like Cyprus and Crete, so they could use them as bases to launch raids, support pirate activities against the Romans, and also to project power into Roman territory, especially places like Cicilia and the Aegean Islands.
They also should have worked harder to mobilise Rome's enemies against it; The Bulgars were quite formidable opponents of Rome and engaged them in quite frequent wars in the Balkans. If the Fatimids and Bulgars were able to coordinate (especially in instances like the failed alliance in 924, where Bulgaria was able to provide a potent landward threat to Constantinople) they could have caused a great deal of damage to the Empire, splitting Rome's forces and attention between both powers, which would allow each to concentrate their forces and bring them to bear against the consequentially smaller roman forces available. There is also of course other possible co-belligerents like Armenia, Georgia (which actually allied itself to the Fatimids once or twice), and the seemingly unending line of would-be usurpers, who would (usually) be happy to give the Fatimids some sort of concession in exchange for their support. Granted, these would not be quite as useful as an alliance with the Bulgars, but I suppose any support is better than none.
Also, maintaining the Baqt is imperative to any long-term success for the Caliphates. In addition to ensuring that they will not have to spare any resources for southern campaigns, it gave them long-term stability in the Upper Nile & a consistent source of both slaves and other tribute, with the slaves eventually becoming an essential military asset for the Fatimids. In general, the Caliphates should seek to maintain peace on whatever fronts they can to ensure their undivided attention can be focused on the Romans.
They also should have worked harder to mobilise Rome's enemies against it; The Bulgars were quite formidable opponents of Rome and engaged them in quite frequent wars in the Balkans. If the Fatimids and Bulgars were able to coordinate (especially in instances like the failed alliance in 924, where Bulgaria was able to provide a potent landward threat to Constantinople) they could have caused a great deal of damage to the Empire, splitting Rome's forces and attention between both powers, which would allow each to concentrate their forces and bring them to bear against the consequentially smaller roman forces available. There is also of course other possible co-belligerents like Armenia, Georgia (which actually allied itself to the Fatimids once or twice), and the seemingly unending line of would-be usurpers, who would (usually) be happy to give the Fatimids some sort of concession in exchange for their support. Granted, these would not be quite as useful as an alliance with the Bulgars, but I suppose any support is better than none.
Also, maintaining the Baqt is imperative to any long-term success for the Caliphates. In addition to ensuring that they will not have to spare any resources for southern campaigns, it gave them long-term stability in the Upper Nile & a consistent source of both slaves and other tribute, with the slaves eventually becoming an essential military asset for the Fatimids. In general, the Caliphates should seek to maintain peace on whatever fronts they can to ensure their undivided attention can be focused on the Romans.
Focus on conquering Anatolia. Constantinople is too much of a hard nut to crack without securing supplies from territory under your control. Additionally unless you can wipe out the entire Byzantine fleet there will be plenty of bases for said fleet to harass Muslim shipping.
Personally, my view is that the Abbasids tended to neglect their naval agendas and tended to leave much of the naval impetus to pirates and raiders. While this had some lucrative effects upon gathering of slaves and loots from Italy and Latin parts of Europe, it worsened leverage over the ERE. Under the Umayyad, the pressure on the ERE was quite significant due to the effectiveness of Caliphal sponsored naval strikes in conjugation with campaigns along the coastlines. In my view, this is a successful strategy long term.
It is also good to possess a strong navy so as to extend the pressure of the ERE over a wider distance. By 850 CE, ERE was able to focus on individualized Islamic foes, rather than a wider array of Caliphal sponsored strikes. Most importantly, they could count on a lack of coordination between pirates and raider states in the Aegean and in the coastal Mediterranean Sea with the Abbasid sponsored campaigns and raider realms in Anatolia. This in my view greatly assisted the ERE, as it permitted them to deal with each separately.
As such, I would advise the Caliphate to undergo a more robust naval expansion and seek to attempt to reel in pirate realms in the Aegean into their sphere of influence, to better increase pressure on the ERE economy. With such a system, the Abbasid state may be able to deal a knock out blow to the ERE like Amorium and then with naval support, follow this up with conquest of the interior backed by raids on the entirety of Greece in coordination. Eventually, with such pressure mounting, Constantinople will submit or fall.
The issue is that the Abbasid tended to lack the geopolitcal positioning to 'focus' on the ERE. Their woes tended to be internal rebellion and their reform programs, which caused internalized warfare. Further, the Abbasid had much obligation in the east, where the Islamic realms, their vassals were in constant war with the Turkic tribes, the Tibetan Empire, the Zunbil states and of course the ongoing war with the Hindu states of Rajastan and the Indus Valley.
It is also good to possess a strong navy so as to extend the pressure of the ERE over a wider distance. By 850 CE, ERE was able to focus on individualized Islamic foes, rather than a wider array of Caliphal sponsored strikes. Most importantly, they could count on a lack of coordination between pirates and raider states in the Aegean and in the coastal Mediterranean Sea with the Abbasid sponsored campaigns and raider realms in Anatolia. This in my view greatly assisted the ERE, as it permitted them to deal with each separately.
As such, I would advise the Caliphate to undergo a more robust naval expansion and seek to attempt to reel in pirate realms in the Aegean into their sphere of influence, to better increase pressure on the ERE economy. With such a system, the Abbasid state may be able to deal a knock out blow to the ERE like Amorium and then with naval support, follow this up with conquest of the interior backed by raids on the entirety of Greece in coordination. Eventually, with such pressure mounting, Constantinople will submit or fall.
The issue is that the Abbasid tended to lack the geopolitcal positioning to 'focus' on the ERE. Their woes tended to be internal rebellion and their reform programs, which caused internalized warfare. Further, the Abbasid had much obligation in the east, where the Islamic realms, their vassals were in constant war with the Turkic tribes, the Tibetan Empire, the Zunbil states and of course the ongoing war with the Hindu states of Rajastan and the Indus Valley.
Could result in another akroinon the problem is that like manzkikert the invasion must have been done at a time where there was a potential civil war If not the thematic troops just harass them over the mountains and Anatolia and even if one theme revolts thar doesn't assure much after the themes where further divided
The problem with this is that it would cost time and money That they can't afford it's a trade of when it's donde assuming it's in the late 8th century well the tibetan empire would gladly love the attention being diverted also Constantine V most likely kills any army that ventures to deep in to Anatolia like he and his father did , if it's under Harún al-Rashid it migth be possible but even he faced a lot of internal struggles
The last window of opportunity is before the caliphate goes in full decline in the mid 9th century