Best Red Army Action June 1941

Units that stood fast were pocketed and became prisoners or corpses. The Germans had the mobility to flow around positions that were not vital and the ability to pound those that were vital.
 

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I think the role of counter-attacks wasting resources and soldiers from the first day and until the winter is key here. Standing fast would have been much better than what happened because of the counter-attack doctrine.
Even that is complicated. The border battles certainly show what a mess unprepared attacks were, but the counterattacks deeper in the country was to some degree very helpful, as the German supply situation was worse and panzer/motorized divisions got overextended, so casualty exchanges were closer to 2:1 than any other battles (overall in 1941 it was something like 10:1 against the Soviets). Battles like Yelnya during the Smolensk encirclement. The stand fast pocket battles were when things really went badly against the Soviets like near the border, Kiev, and Vyazma-Bryansk (though with the last one that was simply a function of how little equipment there was to fight and coordinate, plus lack of officers and time to organize, leaving little option other than to stand and fight and try to break out later). Near the border at least the pocket battles served to delay the Germans and buy time for other armies to organize, while counterattacks east of Minsk by the Soviets were an utter disaster due to how poorly prepared Soviet forces were. There and in Galicia it would have done the Soviets much better to actually take to time to prepare to fight rather than 'racing toward the sound of the guns' when the invasion kicked off, as the mechanized corps simply fell apart on the march and under Luftwaffe attack.
For example:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Brody_(1941)#Summary
The German Kampfgeschwader bomber wings, namely KG 51, KG 54, and KG 55, contributed a series of heavy low-level attacks against Soviet ground targets. The headquarters of the Soviet 15th Mechanised Corps was destroyed, and its commander, General-Major Ignat Karpezo, was wounded. The Luftwaffe destroyed some 201 Soviet tanks in this area.[27]
....
The five Red Army corps were mishandled while being concentrated into large powerful groups. The German troops sought to isolate individual units and destroy them. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe ranging over the battlefields was able to separate the supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition.[28] Ultimately due to lack of adequate planning and overall coordination, the Soviet counter-attack failed to meet at Dubno.
....
The 8th Mechanised Corps was so badly depleted, that the Stavka disbanded its headquarters and parceled out its remaining assets to other formations of the Southwestern Front.
 
The other two threads on this subject have brought me back around to the consideration of cumulative effects.

You might be able to have a tactical victory or two but the PI are screwed strategically. They would have to hold for over a year and with the Japanese holding both the air and sea lanes it is impossible. The Japanese can send reinforcements but the US can not. You can't win in that situation.

A strategic victory is not necessarily in permanently holding the PI. At Wake the first landing was stuffed & the IJN had to pull ships and men out of the schedule for a second try. OTL the Japanese ran ahead of schedule in their S Pacific campaigns. How many of these tactical or operational setbacks does it take to damage their schedule and forces at the end of the campaign?

Better defense of Malaya gets talked about a lot. Better defense of the Philippines is just as important, and one of the main reasons is the 48th Infantry Division of the IJA. This elite formation was one of the busiest Japanese divisions during the first year of the war. It was part of the invasion of Luzon and it captured Manila. It was then pulled out of the Philippines and sent to Java where it captured Surabaya and the surrounding oil fields. Then it went to Timor and finally got rid of the Australian and Dutch presence on the island.
Slow the Japanese down in the Philippines and the 48th doesn't get sent to Java in time or if it does it has taken heavier casualties in the process and then is less effective on Java meaning that operation takes longer meaning it gets to Timor later and that campaign drags on longer, perhaps even allowing the Allies to maintain a presence on part of the island. Of course if the campaign on Luzon is taking longer and the 48th still gets pulled out on time then the rest of that fight continues to drag on as well. Sand in the gears...

To use this specific example. A more effective defense in PI attritions the 48th Div more, making it less effective on Java, & eventually unavailable on Timor, or perhaps defeated there. To use another example the Germans lost roughly 55,000 dead & 200,000+ general casualties in the six weeks of the campaign in the west. Leaving aside altering the breakout and encirclements, how much does the campaign change if a more effective Allied defense in the first week costs the attack 55,000 dead in the first three weeks? What can a better defense in the opening days or weeks cost the attack beyond the historical result, and how great does that cost have to increase before the strategic situation starts to alter. When the Germans launched the attack south to Paris and beyond roughly half their tanks were still inoperable & effectively lost to the campaign. How is the second half of the campaign affected if the attack is attrition a extra 15%, 25%, 50% in the first half. OTL The Red Army inflicted over 50,000 dead on the Germans in the first six weeks, about the same as the Allies in 1940. After nine weeks at the end of August the cumulative German loss was 390,000 men. If a alerted defense kills/wounds/sickens 25% more Germans & leaves 25% more tanks in the repair depots how do the 487,000 men lost affect the next month of campaigning?
 
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