Even that is complicated. The border battles certainly show what a mess unprepared attacks were, but the counterattacks deeper in the country was to some degree very helpful, as the German supply situation was worse and panzer/motorized divisions got overextended, so casualty exchanges were closer to 2:1 than any other battles (overall in 1941 it was something like 10:1 against the Soviets). Battles like Yelnya during the Smolensk encirclement. The stand fast pocket battles were when things really went badly against the Soviets like near the border, Kiev, and Vyazma-Bryansk (though with the last one that was simply a function of how little equipment there was to fight and coordinate, plus lack of officers and time to organize, leaving little option other than to stand and fight and try to break out later). Near the border at least the pocket battles served to delay the Germans and buy time for other armies to organize, while counterattacks east of Minsk by the Soviets were an utter disaster due to how poorly prepared Soviet forces were. There and in Galicia it would have done the Soviets much better to actually take to time to prepare to fight rather than 'racing toward the sound of the guns' when the invasion kicked off, as the mechanized corps simply fell apart on the march and under Luftwaffe attack.I think the role of counter-attacks wasting resources and soldiers from the first day and until the winter is key here. Standing fast would have been much better than what happened because of the counter-attack doctrine.
The German Kampfgeschwader bomber wings, namely KG 51, KG 54, and KG 55, contributed a series of heavy low-level attacks against Soviet ground targets. The headquarters of the Soviet 15th Mechanised Corps was destroyed, and its commander, General-Major Ignat Karpezo, was wounded. The Luftwaffe destroyed some 201 Soviet tanks in this area.[27]
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The five Red Army corps were mishandled while being concentrated into large powerful groups. The German troops sought to isolate individual units and destroy them. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe ranging over the battlefields was able to separate the supporting infantry and deny them resupply of fuel and ammunition.[28] Ultimately due to lack of adequate planning and overall coordination, the Soviet counter-attack failed to meet at Dubno.
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The 8th Mechanised Corps was so badly depleted, that the Stavka disbanded its headquarters and parceled out its remaining assets to other formations of the Southwestern Front.
You might be able to have a tactical victory or two but the PI are screwed strategically. They would have to hold for over a year and with the Japanese holding both the air and sea lanes it is impossible. The Japanese can send reinforcements but the US can not. You can't win in that situation.
Better defense of Malaya gets talked about a lot. Better defense of the Philippines is just as important, and one of the main reasons is the 48th Infantry Division of the IJA. This elite formation was one of the busiest Japanese divisions during the first year of the war. It was part of the invasion of Luzon and it captured Manila. It was then pulled out of the Philippines and sent to Java where it captured Surabaya and the surrounding oil fields. Then it went to Timor and finally got rid of the Australian and Dutch presence on the island.
Slow the Japanese down in the Philippines and the 48th doesn't get sent to Java in time or if it does it has taken heavier casualties in the process and then is less effective on Java meaning that operation takes longer meaning it gets to Timor later and that campaign drags on longer, perhaps even allowing the Allies to maintain a presence on part of the island. Of course if the campaign on Luzon is taking longer and the 48th still gets pulled out on time then the rest of that fight continues to drag on as well. Sand in the gears...