Best possible strategy for the USSR against Nazi Germany

According to Stephen Kotkin, Stalin appears to have been attempting to negotiate such land swaps in good faith with the Finns - his problem was that the Finns just didn't trust him so the proposals went no-where. (I'd be interested to see what Kotkin said about the negotiations with the Baltic states.)

I'll return to this, if you don't mind: what exactly does Kotkin say about the negotiations and what is his basis for saying that the land swap offer would have been made in good faith? I am asking because Kotkin might have sources or reasoning I don't know of, and I am always interested to improve my knowledge on things that pertain to Finnish history.:)

The part about the Finns not trusting him is certainly true, though like I wrote above, it was not the only reason for rejecting the proposals/demands in 38-39.
 
I'll return to this, if you don't mind: what exactly does Kotkin say about the negotiations and what is his basis for saying that the land swap offer would have been made in good faith? I am asking because Kotkin might have sources or reasoning I don't know of, and I am always interested to improve my knowledge on things that pertain to Finnish history.:)

The part about the Finns not trusting him is certainly true, though like I wrote above, it was not the only reason for rejecting the proposals/demands in 38-39.

It was a brief aside during a lecture he gave, so there wasn't a whole lot of detail.

The context of the aside was Kotkin talking about Stalin's role in starting the Cold War, and how Stalin (based on his sources), was half stumbling into the Cold War blinded by incorrect understanding (for example, Stalin treated the US as if it were a normal European power, rather than a messianic revolutionary republic more akin the USSR itself), weighed down by the difficulty making up his own mind and hobbled by the distrust others viewed his diplomatic overtures with (which is where the Finland aside came).

fasquardon
 
It was a brief aside during a lecture he gave, so there wasn't a whole lot of detail.

The context of the aside was Kotkin talking about Stalin's role in starting the Cold War, and how Stalin (based on his sources), was half stumbling into the Cold War blinded by incorrect understanding (for example, Stalin treated the US as if it were a normal European power, rather than a messianic revolutionary republic more akin the USSR itself), weighed down by the difficulty making up his own mind and hobbled by the distrust others viewed his diplomatic overtures with (which is where the Finland aside came).

fasquardon

Just some months ago I read a 2016 book on Stalin that was quite relevant for this issue, Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo ("Stalin and Finland's destiny") by Kimmo Rentola, a University of Helsinki history professor. I've already referred to it a couple of times on the forum by now. Rentola looks at Stalin's treatment of Finland between the 30s and his death, and attempts to explain why he did the decisions he did with regards to the small Western neighbour. What stands out from Rentola's treatment is that a) Stalin apparently never had a "masterplan" for Europe, but his plans were changing all the time, depending on changing circumstances, and b) the events of the Winter War were the crucial thing that branded the relations between Stalin and the Finnish leadership in 1940-1953. To read Rentola's well-sourced (if pretty compact) book, it then appears that it was only through the Winter War that Finland became a "special case" for Stalin - the Finnish will and ability to put up a resistance apparently had a significant effect on him in terms of how he viewed Finland. Before that, we might argue that he viewed Finland in the same light as the Baltic states, only differing from them in terms of its more northern and on balance more peripheral geographical position, not in terms of the justification of its national existence. After early 1940, though, Stalin apparently had a grudging respect towards Finland, in that the nation apparently could put up a credible defence, and then attract foreign support for its cause (as manifested in the Allied intervention plans during the Winter War, of which Stalin apparently had a distorted view).

Stalin's treatment of Finland during the Continuation War and after it should then be seen in this light, especially as his view about the Finnish will and ability to defend themselves was probably reaffirmed through the battles of the summer of 1944. But, if we accept Rentola's thesis, we should not project this acceptance by Stalin to treat Finland as a special case into the pre-Winter War situation, or into a TL where there is not Winter War, especially to one where the Finns would cave in to Soviet demands in 38-39. In such a TL, Stalin would have much less will to treat Finland in an almost cordial fashion. We need to remember that even if it is sometimes claimed that Stalin "always" had a bit of a soft spot for Finland, in the purges he absolutely decimated the cadres of Finnish Communist leaders and civil warriors who had escaped into Soviet Russia post-1918.

So, this is the background I apply to the idea of Stalin making proposals about land swaps with Finland in good faith prior to the Winter War. On balance, I think Stalin making any proposals to the Finns in good faith is much more likely in the post-Winter War years than before it, or if the war never happened to convince Stalin about the Finns' will and ability to defend themselves.
 
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Before that, we might argue that he viewed Finland in the same light as the Baltic states, only differing from them in terms of its more northern and on balance more peripheral geographical position, not in terms of the justification of its national existence.

I think the parallel drawn between the Baltics and Finland is key here, which is why I'm very interested in seeing what Kotkin has to say about what Stalin was doing with the Baltics. It seems obvious that however Stalin was treating Finland before the Winter War, his approach to the Baltics must be largely the same and vice versa. So in light of the new evidence about Fenno-Soviet diplomacy in this period, if Stalin didn't know what he was doing in Finland, maybe the same was true in the Baltics? And if that's true, what exactly did it mean in practice?

And of course, given how wrong everyone in the West was about Stalin in other ways, maybe the "obvious parallel" that we see between Finland and the Baltics is not a parallel that Stalin saw...

I have no answers here, only questions.

As an example for how Stalin may have at once been plotting the destruction of the Baltic states and (in his mind) been acting in "good faith", perhaps he expected that once he'd humiliated the Bourgeoisie regimes, the workers of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would rise up and establish Proletarian states that would then ally with him. It seems incredible, but then, the force of Stalin's belief in Marxist-Leninism was pretty incredible too. If this wild speculation is correct (and I emphasise: this is wild speculation), then maybe the way things would have gone for a Finland that caved is that Stalin would take the extra defensive positions for Leningrad, fund Finnish Communist groups and wait a bit for the revolution. Then, as the Finnish state and rightist organizations showed they were capable counter-revolutionaries, Stalin would be "forced" to invade Finland to "help the revolution" and force Finland to be the ally he felt he needed.

I'd be surprised if the above speculation were correct, but then, Kotkin's work on Stalin has been full of surprises for me, so...

After early 1940, though, Stalin apparently had a grudging respect towards Finland, in that the nation apparently could put up a credible defence, and then attract foreign support for its cause (as manifested in the Allied intervention plans during the Winter War, of which Stalin apparently had a distorted view).

I wonder if the Finnish defence also convinced him that Finland would be a better buffer against NATO invasion if it were left free.

fasquardon
 
Yeah, pretty much saw "Icebreaker" and 'Stalin planning to attack Hitler' in the same sentence and was immediately turned off.



It was in the process of execution. Hirohito signed off on everything, and tremendous reinforcements were being sent to Manchuria. As far as Japan was concerned, the strengthening of the Kwantung Army in preparation for a war with the USSR was official policy for over a month, until the United States forced them to alter that stance.

Nonsense. You will have to show me those troop movements and logistics executed as you claimed.
 
Nonsense. You will have to show me those troop movements and logistics executed as you claimed.

Coox, "Nomonhan: Japan against Russia" p. 1051 and Koshkin, "Kantokuen: Barbarossa po-Yaponski" ch. 5. The buildup was authorized by Hirohito on the 7th of July, and according to Imperial General Headquarters order No. 506 (July 11th) its purpose was indeed to prepare for a war against the USSR. To this end a total of 629 separate units from the divisional level down were to be sent to Manchuria (many of which were "filler" intended to raise the existing structure up to wartime strength) - and an additional 5 divisions from the China Front were to be dispatched on top of this.

As it was, by August 9 some 300 of the planned units were actually sent to Manchuria, totaling 463,000 men, 23,000 vehicles, and 210,000 horses. Regional infrastructure, particularly railroads, had been significantly improved, and provisions for 2-3 months of warfare were transferred to the Kwantung Army in addition to what it already had on-hand. Air strength totalled over 1,000, though only around 800 were operational. Overall, a billion yen in military funds (something like a quarter of the army budget) were allocated to this OPLAN.
 
I mean actual executed troop movements and logistics orders laid on from IGHQ., Not mere mere paper claims as cited there. ^^^^^

Or here.

I think you will see my objections quite clearly.

I already told you that hundreds of thousands of trooper were actually moved, along with a huge quantity of supplies. Do you not believe the sources?

If you want an actual, physical list of field units moved to Manchuria (excluding those sent to the Korea Army and other related commands), then see pages 37 to 43 of Appendix I, "Japanese Preparations for Operations in Manchuria." The additions between July 11 and August 1 represent units assigned there during the Kantokuen buildup.
 
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Your sources and your claims do not convince I showed you why. Do better.


Try explaining IGHQ Army Order no. 506 for example.
 

nbcman

Donor
You mean this from the linked book in russian? I've extracted Chapter Five, War Plan "Kantokujen", Directive no. 506 (translated to English) in the spoiler tag below.
Chapter five


WAR PLAN "KANTOKUJEN"

Directive No. 506
In accordance with the decision of the Imperial meeting on July 2, 1941 the army headquarters and the Ministry of war of Japan developed a broad set of measures aimed at facilitating preparations for offensive operations against the Soviet armed forces in the far East and in Siberia. Japanese secret documents he received an encrypted "name tokushu jensju Kantogun" ("special maneuvers Kwantung Army") is abbreviated as "Kantokujen". July 11, 1941 Imperial rate sent to Kvantunskuju army and the Japanese army in North China a special directive no. 506, which confirmed that the aim "is to strengthen the readiness" manoeuvres to insurrection against the Soviet Union. «Kantokujen» was based on operational and strategic plan for the war against the Soviet Union, developed by the General staff in 1940,.

The experience of defeat at Khalkhin Gol forced the Japanese to use against a large group of SOVIET troops. Planned the following distribution of forces:

is on the East (seaside) direction, 1-th front (East), consisting of 19 divisions (3-army-5 divisions, 5-I-4 Division, 7-I-3 divisions, as well as separate brigades with parts of the gain, on the basis of which it was envisaged to deploy seven divisions to create the 2-nd and 8 th army);

— on the Northern (Amur) direction — 4-Army (3 divisions);

in the West (the area of the big Khingan) direction — 6-th Army (4 divisions).

The reserve Commander of the Kwantung Army, which had direct management actions of troops amounted to 4.

According to the strategic plan, anticipated number of consecutive strikes on selected areas to crush the grouping of Soviet troops in Primorye, Amur and Zabaykalye, capture basic communication, industrial and military food storehouses and breaking the resistance of the Soviet troops, forcing them to surrender.

Hostilities broke into two stages. The first planned, closing in on being the direction, to defeat the Soviets in Pomerania. The second is to capture the reference base of the Soviet Pacific fleet Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, occupy the then defeat the Soviet troops on the northern and Western directions. Parallel forces placed on the island of Hokkaido Division 7 and mixed Brigade in the southern Sakhalin to capture North Sakhalin and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. Also provided, depending on the security situation, carry out operations on the opposite coast of Sakhalin, USSR.

The plan was given wider use in hostilities of the Japanese air force, who were to "destroy enemy aircraft before the operation. Aim for six months of access to Lake Baikal and end the war.

However, in the first half of July 1941 g. General staff and the military Ministry has defined another idea of the plan "Kantokujen", which was issued in document "draft operations under current conditions". Unlike the plan of 1940-1941 Gg., planned simultaneous attack by two fronts — East and North. Main attack group in 20 divisions on the East. At the first stage of the operation, the forces of the three armies and one separate division was anticipated to be converging attacks in the locality of Manzovka. Then, after strengthening the three divisions, the Eastern Front troops were to capture the city of Khabarovsk.

The North was supposed to use the most combat-ready troops, taken from Chinese front. They should have been with the start of the offensive on the eastern direction quickly boost Cupid and cut off the Trans-Siberian railway. In this area had to be used 4 reserve Division of the Kwantung Army. An important objective of the operation in the north direction was the capture and retention of Ruhlovo train station, which is located near the northernmost point of the Manchu-Soviet border.

To the West, troops were to occupy defenses in border fortified areas. If successful on the East and North directions provided to deploy offensive in the West and capture Soviet territory to Lake Baikal, simultaneously making a foray into the Mongolian people's Republic of China. For this planned to draw forces operating in China.

In the course of operations intended to capture the Voroshilov (Ussuriysk), Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Iman, Kujbyshevku, Khabarovsk, Birobidzhan, Birokan, Ruhlovo area, Northern Sakhalin, Nikolayevsk-na-Amure, Komsomolsk, Sovetskaya Gavan and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.

In preparation for the implementation of the plan of "Kantokujen", command of the Kwantung Army demanded from the Center reinforcement troops to the North. 8 July in Tokyo, it was reported: "there is confidence that the forces of about 14 divisions can we defeat the enemy in Primorye. However, there is no certainty in victory on the northern front, having 6 divisions in the first Echelon and 3 in the second.

An important indication that the plan "Kantokujen" were nothing but a preparation for an attack on the USSR, is crafted to 25 June, the Japanese general staff and approved rate schedule for the completion of the preparation and conduct of the war.

The decision to mobilize — 28 June.

Publication of the directive on mobilization — 5 July.

Beginning of lift and troop concentrations — 20 July.

The decision on the beginning of the war — 10 August.

The outbreak of hostilities — 29 August.

Movement of four divisions from Japan — 5 September.

Completion of operations — mid-October.

As can be seen from the graph, the plan "Kantokujen" to some extent, was similar to the German plan "Barbarossa" and just assumed "lightning war" against the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the schedule of 5 July, a directive was issued Supreme command on the conduct of the first stage of mobilization

on the increase of the Kwantung Army into two divisions (51-57 and I-I). 7 July, the Emperor authorized the secret mobilization of 500 thousand. people, as well as ships with a total displacement of 800 thousand. tons for transportation of military cargoes in Manchuria.

Since the Imperial meeting emphasized the requirement to "covertly" complete military preparations for an attack on the USSR, had been taken to ensure the secrecy of the ongoing mobilization. She impl are disguised as training for the pre-conscription composition and was called "extraordinary appeal. The term "mobilizing" all documents and instructions had been replaced by "early formation. Were strictly prohibited all sorts of wires in army and other adopted in Japan in these cases, the ceremony.

22 July in violation of graphics only on two days began the concentration of troops at the Soviet border. However, the extent of secret hide mobilization was impossible. After all, during the lift and the concentration of troops under the plan only through points on the territory of Korea daily saw up to 10 thousand. soldiers and officers, 3.5 thousand. horses. Closely watched the progress of the mobilization of the German Ambassador Ott and military attaché of the Embassy of Alfred Kretschmer July 25, 1941 reported to Berlin that has already meant to 900 thousand. reservists aged from 24 to 45 years. It was noted that the Japanese army recruited persons owning Russian language.

This was reported in Moscow Sorge. 30 July he telegraphed to the Center: Invest and Intern (Jotoku Miyagi) said that in order for a new mobilization in Japan will be designed to more than 200 000 people. Thus, by mid-August, a month in Japan will be under the gun to about 2 million people. Since the second half of August, Japan could start a war, but only if the Red Army actually defeated by the Germans, resulting in defensive ability in the far East will be weakened. This is the view grouping Konoe, but how long he intends to wait for the Japanese general staff, it's hard to say right now.

Invest source is convinced that if the Red Army will stop the Germans in front of Moscow, in this case, the Japanese do not will perform.

In Manchuria came many attached units. According to the plan of mobilization of the first and second queue formed three fronts (Eastern, Northern and Western) 629 were sent to assigned formations and units, the total number of which corresponded to the number of 20 divisions. In addition, the war Ministry was planning to further strengthen troops in Manchuria five divisions. A significant portion of troops thrown with Sino-Japanese front. As a result, the Kwantung Army was doubled and totalled 700 thousand people. After carrying out the second stage of mobilization on order No. 102 dated July 16, 1941 to Manchuria and Korea focused 850 thousand. officers and soldiers of the Japanese army.

To participate in the war against the USSR Directive No. 519 bids on 24 July was formed so-called Kwantung Army Defense, who had performed the role of reserve. Embattled were given part of Division 7 Hokkaido, mixed Brigade in South Sakhalin, as well as military formations on the Kuril Islands. It was established in Tokyo in the summer of 1941 process for an attack on the USSR Supreme command has created a grouping of troops, the total number of which amounted to nearly 1 million troops.

In 1941 g. significant increase in the number of allocated for the war against the Soviet Union tanks, planes, increased number of artillery, Cavalry, engineering, rail and rear parts. In the Kwantung Army and Korea were established stockpiles of ammunition, fuel and food needed for the conduct of hostilities during 2-3 months.

According to the plan of "Kantokujen" in the war against the USSR had to engage troops puppet Manchukuo armies and Inner Mongolia. The army of Manchukuo was established after the occupation of Manchuria. All this was carried out by the army headquarters of the Kwantung Army. Direct management was entrusted to numerous Japanese military advisors. With a view to the utilization of human resources of Manchuria in the preparations for the war against the Soviet Union, the Japanese have accumulated here trained naval reserves. In 1940, Manchukuo was introduced Conscription Act. In the army were formed similar troops for childbirth connection and special parts, armed Japanese specimens of weapons carried out aimed at increasing militancy by the staffing of these compounds and parts of Japanese officers and projaponski configured by officers from local Chinese. "All activities on the strengthening of the Manchurian army, as well as the deployment of it on specific operating directions indicate that the headquarters of the Kwantung Army used this army in the war against the Soviet Union," stated in the materials Tokyo process.

The army occupied the Japanese Inner Mongolia was intended for the invasion of the composition of the Japanese troops in the Mongolian people's Republic of China. According to the plan "Kantokujen" provided for "creating an environment in which there would be a voluntary association of Outer Mongolia with Inner Mongolia.

Have not been forgotten and fled Soviet Russia belojemigranty. Compiled in Kwantung Army training beloemigyorantskoj youth in places of special settlements "indicated that such training is to strengthen the anti-communist and anti-Soviet spirit that would be reliable frames for carrying out sabotage against the SOVIET UNION. Since 1938, in Manchuria there were formed on the orders of the command of the Kwantung Army part of the whites intended to participate in the composition of the Japanese troops. Their task was the destruction of railroads and other utilities, the targeting of supply bases in the rear of the Soviet troops, reconnaissance, sabotage, anti-Soviet propaganda. After the adoption of the plan of "Kantokujen" by order of the Commander of the Kwantung Army from white emigrants were formed special parts to commit acts of sabotage on the Soviet territory.

Combine the white Guard troops in Manchuria had Ataman G.m. Semenov, who established himself as an active wrestler against Bolshevism ". According to some sources, during the events on Khalkhin Gol white Guard troops led by Semenov were part of the Japanese troops and numbered 16 thousand horsemen.

At the Tokyo process one of the drafters of the plan of war with the USSR General Tominaga Kjodzi revealed: "our plan a surprise attack on the USSR provided greater than before the war, the use of Russian whites as agents for intelligence against the Red Army in favor of Japan. Russian belojemigranty were supposed to be interpreters and guides and links headquarters of the Japanese army. And, finally, they had to be involved in the drafting of the anti-Soviet leaflets porazhencheskogo content ...» The white guards were used and the command posts in puppet armies.

Ground forces planned to support the Navy in Japan. His task was to ensure the amphibious landings in Kamchatka and Northern Sakhalin, destroying the ships of the Pacific fleet, the defeat in conjunction with ground forces of Soviet aviation on the direction being capture in Vladivostok and other regions Primorye. 25 July, having received the sanction of the Emperor, the naval command ordered about creating specifically for war against the USSR 5th fleet.

The main force of Japanese aircraft to be used on the East direction, in order to crush the Soviet troops in Primorye and promote offensive ground troops.

Forcing the preparation for insurrection against the Soviet Union has been accompanied by an increased propaganda and indoctrination of the population and the armed forces. Japanese print frankly izvrashhala causes, nature and course of the German-Soviet war. Controlled by militaristic leadership propaganda organs have taken under the protection of an ally of Japan by the triple Pact, in an attempt to prove that Germany is not the culprit in the war that she entered the war on the alleged "necessity", with a view to prevent attack by the Soviet Union. Hence followed concluded that Japan should take part in the fight against the "Communist aggression". For "justify" this finding bodies propaganda depicted the USSR country seeking to "enslave the China and Japan.

The pro-Government seal FTA called for military intervention against the Soviet Union. So, "Known in the day of the adoption of the Imperial meeting decision on secret preparations for war against the USSR claimed:" the war between Germany and the USSR was not only a war between the two States, she decides the fate of East Asia ". Not hiding and plotting targets capture Soviet lands. Newspaper "Hoti", referring to the occupation of the Eastern

territories of the Soviet Union, motivated by the need to facilitate the creation of this here "areas of shared prosperity", mastering the resources of Siberia.

For conducting military actions against armed forces of the Soviet Union in the far East and in Siberia originally planned to create a grouping in 34 divisions. Since the beginning of the German-Soviet war in Manchuria and Korea, there were only 14 staff divisions was rushing Kvantunskuju 6 army divisions from metropolitan France and 14 — Chinese front. Against this, however, has taken command of the Japanese expeditionary army in China, which stated that the movement from the Chinese on the front North of so many divisions "would mean forgetting the Chinese incident. In the end, the Center was forced to agree with this argument.

At the end of June 1941, military Ministry and general staff, it was decided to reduce the amount of resources allocated for the war against the USSR divisions to 25. Then, in July, it was decided to put the brunt of forces 20 divisions. Finally, on July 31 at a meeting of the Chief of the operational management of the General Shinichi Tanaka with a military Minister Tojo had finally decided to allocate for the war against the SOVIET UNION 24 divisions. This was due to the fact that the Japanese intended to achieve the objectives of the war against the USSR "low blood". July 1, 1941 at the meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Government and Imperial bet Deputy Chief of general staff Cukada To in sequence confirmation theory "ripe persimmon said:" we'll be prepared as it should be, but intend to have ( Manchuria and Korea) minimum troops to military action. We are not going to expose unnecessarily large number of connections ".

In fact, as a result of mobilization, as noted above, in Manchuria and Korea was created a large grouping of Japanese troops in the 850 thousand people. It is not limited to staff of trained divisions. And mobilized troops were not in the newly formed regular Division, and to increase the existing, as well as to create special divisions types "a" and "-1", which were about two times stronger than conventional whole divisions. If the usual Division, there were 13-16 thousand people, "a" Division — 24 600, and in Division "a" 1-29 400. Division of new type were in service with significantly more guns, tanks appeared within them.

Reinforced divisions were stationed in Manchuria. Of five which existed in the Japanese army divisions "type 1" all five were in the Kwantung Army. And of the 19 divisions of the type "a" after the mobilization of the composition of the Kwantung Army was to enter 12. In addition, there were placed 24 of the 58 Japanese Army brigades. Since as a result of mobilization in the Manzhou s and Korea was created by grouping of Japanese troops in the 850 thousand, we can assume that the largest consistent with 58-59 Japanese conventional infantry divisions. After all, the Japanese general staff and command of the army in the development of a plan of war against the USSR proceeded from the fact that in the far East and Siberia was stationed about 30 Soviet divisions. Therefore, they have sought to provide the necessary to conduct offensive operations dual superiority.

In the summer of 1941 g. Kwantung Army deployed against the USSR Mameluke six armies and a group of troops, not counting reserve. In accordance with the plan of "Kantokujen" for combat was formed three fronts: East consisting of 4 armies and reserve, North, comprising 2 armies and reserve and West, comprising 2 armies.

By the beginning of August for the invasion of the Soviet Union were mostly prepared. Approaching the prescribed timetable deadline for deciding on the start of the war — 10 August. However, the ruling circles of Japan showed indecision, waiting for the defeat of the Soviet Union to the West. At this time the Ambassador Ott in the telegram to Berlin as follows: evaluate the situation: "in regard to Japanese operational plan clarity yet, but they probably will not be limited to the area of Vladivostok and the onset of the North, but at the same time will be taken also offensive in the direction of Lake Baikal, namely along the Manchuria railway — Chita and from Kalgan across Outer Mongolia. The timing is not yet clear, but it can be assumed that the preparations for the attack, according to my considerations will take time until mid-August. In addition, major general Okamoto (Kjofuku) in conversation repeatedly mentioned that Japan will act only when the German units reached the Volga River.

As each day waiting policy reduced the possibility of carrying out a military campaign during 1941 (according to plan "Kantokujen" it was supposed to be completed before the onset of winter), army leadership in the Center and the command of the Kwantung Army decided to accelerate the start of the Japanese attack. 3 August at the war Ministry had prepared a document entitled "position in relation to the USSR" which required the "in case of Soviet attack, taking advantage of the moment to deploy military actions so that the Government take immediate decision start a war. " The drafters of the document "justify" its position so that the Soviet Union was preparing a preemptive strike on Japan. When this was used in Kwantung Army clearly provocative "information" that the troops of the Red Army in the Russian Far East were making allegedly offensive to stop the radio.

The contents of this document enabled the Kwantung Army alone provoke war with the USSR, entrusting the responsibility for its origin on the Soviet side. Provocative the aim of this action was so obvious that the Navy strongly opposed it. Navy officials removed from the draft document, the words "the beginning of the war. 6 August at the meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Government and Imperial rates adopted a document on measures of the Empire as a result of the current status of relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. It was written: "in the event of a frontal offensive of the Soviet Union, his troops will be discarded so as not to lose the initiative as a result of the transition to defensive actions. The position of the Empire against Soviet attack will be determined at a cabinet meeting.

On the same day the document was approved by the emperor. Then in the Kvantunskuju army betting directive was sent to the No. 523, which read: "When the actual assault of Russian Aviation and the impossibility to prevent the Kwantung Army Commander in order to fulfil the task can take place Aviation forces offensive on Russian territory. This directive is essentially the right to start a war with the Soviet Union, as in the times of the oaeoei-goal, was given command of the Kwantung Army.

Hardly worth saying that invented by Japanese supporters of an early attack on the USSR Soviet theory of pre-emptive attack "was thoroughly deceitful and provocative. In the hardest during the first months of the great patriotic war, the Soviet Government was extremely interested in preventing hostilities in the eastern parts of the country, sought to avoid a war on two fronts. The Red Army in the Russian Far East prepared not to "preventive strike", and to repel the perfidious attack Germany's closest ally — militaristic Japan, whose risk was high.

What needs to be explained about IGHQ Directive 506? And how is it contradictory to the buildup of Japanese units noted in JM-77 on multiple pages between 11 July 1941 and 1 August 1941 cited previously?
 
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Yup. So... Why did you misinterpret it and why is that quote (paraphrased and not primary source material) actually wrong? Explain it; if you can.

I already know, but I'm waiting for this one.
 
Moonpie claim.. such as paper plans (mere staff studies) not executed = actual executed military operation or deployed contingency.
Nonsense. You will have to show me those troop movements and logistics executed as you claimed.
Your sources and your claims do not convince I showed you why. Do better.


Try explaining IGHQ Army Order no. 506 for example.

First, you asserted that Japan's 1941 buildup was strictly defensive against a marauding USSR (with reference to a hypothetical conflict in 1939); I proved otherwise.
Then, you claimed that Kantokuen was only a paper contingency and nothing more; again I proved otherwise.
Then, you clamored for a specific list of orders and units involved, I showed you exactly that, demonstrating that, yes, Japan really was in the act of readying for war.

So now you're saying "no I'm not convinced, show me the text of the mobilization order" when it's already been established through multiple sources that:

1.) The Japanese Emperor already signed off on war preparation orders against the USSR​
2.) Those preparations were entirely offensive in nature, aimed at invading and occupying the Far Eastern region of the USSR​
3.) In accordance with the above orders, hundreds of thousands of men and massive quantities of logistical assets were moved into Manchuria in July-August 1941, and​
4.) Under favorable conditions, they would have attacked​
 
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Manman

Banned
Honestly you guys are thinking to hard. Just have the soviets take over finland. After that have the british attack them due to paranoia and that way you can have the soviets with a protected north, a protected south, and a much more paranoid and prepared soviet army.
 

nbcman

Donor
Yup. So... Why did you misinterpret it and why is that quote (paraphrased and not primary source material) actually wrong? Explain it; if you can.

I already know, but I'm waiting for this one.
I copied a section out of a document you cited regarding IGHQ Directive 506 from the link you posted. Now you expect me to track down more information to prove your citation is wrong? I don’t think so. If you want to prove your point, please provide what you already know.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Honestly you guys are thinking to hard. Just have the soviets take over finland. After that have the british attack them due to paranoia and that way you can have the soviets with a protected north, a protected south, and a much more paranoid and prepared soviet army.
...and a Nazi filled middle - perhaps you could think a little more...
 

Manman

Banned
Considering that the soviets wont have to worry about Leningrad and would have more forces in the south that helps out a lot even if they lose a lot of land. Plus honestly this asks for a better soviet strategy not a perfect one. That and the loss of any land would seem unrealistic.
 
Coox, "Nomonhan: Japan against Russia" p. 1051 and Koshkin, "Kantokuen: Barbarossa po-Yaponski" ch. 5. The buildup was authorized by Hirohito on the 7th of July, and according to Imperial General Headquarters order No. 506 (July 11th) its purpose was indeed to prepare for a war against the USSR. To this end a total of 629 separate units from the divisional level down were to be sent to Manchuria (many of which were "filler" intended to raise the existing structure up to wartime strength) - and an additional 5 divisions from the China Front were to be dispatched on top of this.

As it was, by August 9 some 300 of the planned units were actually sent to Manchuria, totaling 463,000 men, 23,000 vehicles, and 210,000 horses. Regional infrastructure, particularly railroads, had been significantly improved, and provisions for 2-3 months of warfare were transferred to the Kwantung Army in addition to what it already had on-hand. Air strength totalled over 1,000, though only around 800 were operational. Overall, a billion yen in military funds (something like a quarter of the army budget) were allocated to this OPLAN.

Thank you for the well-informed post. I vaguely remembered the build-up, but I didn't know it was so quick and massive.
 
I think that the best bet for Japan would if they could not hold back the USSR to just retreat to Japan and keep their fleets patrolling the sea close to Japan and become Fortress Japan.
 
Considering that the soviets wont have to worry about Leningrad and would have more forces in the south that helps out a lot even if they lose a lot of land. Plus honestly this asks for a better soviet strategy not a perfect one. That and the loss of any land would seem unrealistic.
The USSR would not give a inch of land unless it had to but assuming Japan still invades China the Russian conscripts would be facing elite Japanese man that had just come from a war and had a lot of resources at their disposal. I doubt that the Russians could hold.
 
That's it, and it trumps all of your rationalizations. Contingencies and events might have convinced him about the when, yeah, not about the whether.
When when is a question on whether to be at war with great Britain and eventually the United States, I guess its almost as decisive as whether.
My personal take on the question with a strict focus on what will preserve the USSR is to play Ball with Hitler, but let the US and Britain know they are willing to join if they get help.
Ideally for the USSR the war starts in the winter of 1941/42 with PH, and the Germans gearing up for a totally different kind of war.
 
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