Best Possible Preparation for WWI

Thank you for your efforts.

This suggests you need an inspired pre-war POD to generate the possibility of the Germans landing a decisive blow, assuming everything else goes exactly per OTL after the afforementioned POD. Of all the armies of 1914, it does not seem right to further pimp the Germans, at least without the catalyst of combat.

As I have prevously mentioned, making the west work always seams to require a daisy chain of multiple PODs for the possibility - whereas in simply heading east everything is easier, which is why I always bang on about the road not taken in the east...

I'm not entirely convinced the failure to be inspired by devine intervention is a genuine missed opportunity. I probably need to do some further reading about around the specific scenario you are outlining.

I'm not aware of any examples on the western front of defenders being overrun on any scale approaching strategic proportions. As I have previously mentioned, the Germans holding more of Northern France and/or winning the race to the sea are both quite doable, but the possibile gains are small beer compared to any one of a number of gains/ opportunities in the east.
Well we have already expland to you how this would be eminatly possible, and much more likely whith the Germans doing proper army groups command but I'm not sure there's anything we can do to convince you if you follow max Hofmann, idea that that large scale victory in the east would have done well and not gust git Germany boged down like every other army that has tried to do that. Besides I think I think we have moved into a digression at this point so we should gust agree to disagree and move on.
 
Thank you for your efforts.

This suggests you need an inspired pre-war POD to generate the possibility of the Germans landing a decisive blow, assuming everything else goes exactly per OTL after the afforementioned POD. Of all the armies of 1914, it does not seem right to further pimp the Germans, at least without the catalyst of combat.

As I have prevously mentioned, making the west work always seams to require a daisy chain of multiple PODs for the possibility - whereas in simply heading east everything is easier, which is why I always bang on about the road not taken in the east...

I'm not entirely convinced the failure to be inspired by devine intervention is a genuine missed opportunity. I probably need to do some further reading about around the specific scenario you are outlining.

I'm not aware of any examples on the western front of defenders being overrun on any scale approaching strategic proportions. As I have previously mentioned, the Germans holding more of Northern France and/or winning the race to the sea are both quite doable, but the possibile gains are small beer compared to any one of a number of gains/ opportunities in the east.

I don't think its a big leap from giving the General Staff Officer Bulow 'operational control' over 1st and 3rd armies within days of the war starting to an actual Army Group. Given how soon after the war began it was decided that Bulow (a General Staff officer unlike Kluck and Hausen) should have 'operational control' of 1st and 3rd armies I suspect some thought have been given to this before the war. I'd simply have this line of pre-war thought expanded to arrive at the Heeresgruppe conclusion, it would not require lots of men or materiel, just a few people for an expanded 2nd Army HQ staff.

It doesn't take divine intervention, rather it takes someone at that level on the spot too see the opportunity and exploit it. Moltke was too far away to see it, and had 2 other fronts to worry about and Bulow was too busy with is own Army to see opportunities arising on the far end of his neighbour's army. Herin lies the difference between operational control and an Army group; with OC Bulow gave 'small' orders to Corps in other Armies that assisted his own whereas with a HG he would give 'big' orders to the other Army

In WW1 to get an encirclement you needed enemy cooperation, otherwise they would simply retreat at the same speed as you could advance. At Tannenberg the Russians advanced into an exposed position where the Germans encircled them with the help of trains; in the West Lanzerac's position on August 21 was the only time an Army was similarly exposed and the Germans already mostly in place to possibly take advantage. The rest of the time in the west it was marching troops trying to outmarch other marching troops, with no inherent advantage.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I don't think its a big leap from giving the General Staff Officer Bulow 'operational control' over 1st and 3rd armies within days of the war starting to an actual Army Group. Given how soon after the war began it was decided that Bulow (a General Staff officer unlike Kluck and Hausen) should have 'operational control' of 1st and 3rd armies I suspect some thought have been given to this before the war. I'd simply have this line of pre-war thought expanded to arrive at the Heeresgruppe conclusion, it would not require lots of men or materiel, just a few people for an expanded 2nd Army HQ staff.
I think it might cause Moltke's brain to explode (not necessarily a bad thing). It is an entirely reasonable POD, but Murphy and his laws will have their fun - there's no guarantee the best alternative command structure would be selected, or the implementation of an experimental command structure will not have teething problems or best man for the job will ultimately be the one pulling the strings. A maze is difficult to navigate perfectly with neither elevation nor the benefit of hindsight.

In 1914 the Germans played an almost error free game of war, it's just they had a terrible game plan to work with - IMHO. It would have been a comparatively simple matter to update an alternative war plan over the weekend...

It doesn't take divine intervention, rather it takes someone at that level on the spot too see the opportunity and exploit it. Moltke was too far away to see it, and had 2 other fronts to worry about and Bulow was too busy with is own Army to see opportunities arising on the far end of his neighbour's army. Herin lies the difference between operational control and an Army group; with OC Bulow gave 'small' orders to Corps in other Armies that assisted his own whereas with a HG he would give 'big' orders to the other Army
I was suggesting that OTL it would have taken a dose of divine intervention (i.e. it was not really a missed opportunity due to realities on the ground), but certainly if you are chaining together PODs from before the war, then super easy, scarcely an inconvenience...

In WW1 to get an encirclement you needed enemy cooperation, otherwise they would simply retreat at the same speed as you could advance. At Tannenberg the Russians advanced into an exposed position where the Germans encircled them with the help of trains; in the West Lanzerac's position on August 21 was the only time an Army was similarly exposed and the Germans already mostly in place to possibly take advantage. The rest of the time in the west it was marching troops trying to outmarch other marching troops, with no inherent advantage.
This is my fundamental problem with the Germans attempting to seek a decisive battle in the west. In 1914 the Germans were superior to all comers, but after the French were forced to abandon their offensives, their qualitative differences on the field were not hugely significant. Indeed with the inherent advantage of the defensive and strained German logistics, the advantages to the Entente mounted as the Germans advanced.

I understand around Marne in 1914 the German position was far more precarious (i.e. the risk of catastrophic defeat was real, not theoretical). Again, in the east Imperial Russia demonstrated itself far more co-operative, beyond Tannenberg coughing up over a million prisoners during their great retreat in 1915. All the Germans need to do is turn up...
 

BooNZ

Banned
I was assuming the generic WW I as OTL. Of course, if Germany decides to go east first, then going through Belgium is counter-productive to say at least, even if Britain would join the war at an earlier or later date.

But Baltic initially is the best place to use the main part of the German navy, whether the plan is to go east first or Plan Schlieffen. The navy should act quickly however, since after period of weeks the minefields have been laid, Åland isles occupied etc.

If one was adventurous enough, then all Åland, Saaremaa and Hiiumaa (Dagö and Ösel) should be taken alongside with Suursaari (Hogland / Gogland) island in the Gulf of Finland. German Navy was powerful enough to complete a coup d'main in all said spots simultaneously.
From memory, minelaying commenced as part of the Imperial Russia's premobilisation, mobilisation - the Russians have a long history and expertise with naval mines. I understand the Russians initially retained one army for the defense of Petrograd, which suggests a priority that likely included the naval approaches to Petrograd including the Gulf of Finland. I recall there were significant naval batteries (beit of mixed quality) positioned to defend Petrograd/Gulf. Due to Russian paranoia, even early in the war, I don't think there would be very many soft targets in the approachs to Petrograd/ Gulf of Finland - which would be precarious spot for any hostile naval forces to loiter.

The OTL Operation Albion (the 1917 German ahphibious invasion of West Estonain archipelago) was very impressive, but I can't help but assume the Germans had learned something from the Entente misadventures in the Dardanelles. In my opinoin a more plausible scenario is the Germans perhaps bringing forward the OTL Operation Albion to late 1915, after an east first demolition of the Russian starting armies.
 
From memory, minelaying commenced as part of the Imperial Russia's premobilisation, mobilisation - the Russians have a long history and expertise with naval mines. I understand the Russians initially retained one army for the defense of Petrograd, which suggests a priority that likely included the naval approaches to Petrograd including the Gulf of Finland. I recall there were significant naval batteries (beit of mixed quality) positioned to defend Petrograd/Gulf. Due to Russian paranoia, even early in the war, I don't think there would be very many soft targets in the approachs to Petrograd/ Gulf of Finland - which would be precarious spot for any hostile naval forces to loiter.

The first Russian mine barrages at the approaches to the Gulf of Finland were laid literally within hours from the beginning of the war IOTL. These barrages included c. 2100 mines. In late summer and fall of 1914, several barrages more were laid by the Russians in the Gulf of Finland (I'd have to check my sources for actual numbers). And then c. 1650 mines were laid offensively in parts of the southern Baltic Sea, in 13 different operations, by the fall of 1914. In the late summer and fall of 1914, though, the extent of the coastal artillery positions, and their armament, was still very limited. The main work to build up the coastal artillery around the Gulf of Finland and in the areas just outside it begun in the spring of 1915. The summer of 1915 was also a time of a major mining effort by the Russians.

I'd say that with a quick and strong enough attack, the Germans could take the Ålands, Dagö and Ösel before the Russians have the time to occupy them with enough infantry and artillery to defend them. The attack would need to happen on the first weeks of the war to achieve the needed surprise. The Germans would have to be prepared to meet a Russian naval task force in battle somewhere to the north or northeast of Gotland, though, and they would have to expect the Russians to have laid some defensive mine barrages at least. It would then be a matter of contingency what ships the Russians would send to meet the German attack, under what orders, and under whose leadership. It would have to be a very bold attack and an ambitious landing operation, though, to the point of being seen as reckless by some, and such an idea might well get rejected if cooler heads and more careful minds prevail during the planning stage. Even if the German operation(s) would be successful in general, they would probably also lose many ships of different sizes - more likely to Russian mines than in actual battle against Russian ships, but both losses would be to be expected.

When we think of Operation Albion, we need to remember that it was realized at a time when the Russian fleet had been rendered practically useless as a military force, due to internal strife, revolutionary incitement and plummeting morale. This would not be true at the beginning of the war, so we would have to expect the Russian navy to be a more active and committed, actually battle-worthy adversary in that case - even if it would suffer from most of the traditional weaknesses we attribute to the Russian navy in this timeframe.
 
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BooNZ

Banned
The first Russian mine barrages at the approaches to the Gulf of Finland were laid literally within hours from the beginning of the war IOTL. These barrages included c. 2100 mines. In late summer and fall of 1914, several barrages more were laid by the Russians in the Gulf of Finland (I'd have to check my sources for actual numbers). And then c. 1650 mines were laid offensively in parts of the southern Baltic Sea, in 13 different operations, by the fall of 1914. In the late summer and fall of 1914, though, the extent of the coastal artillery positions, and their armament, was still very limited. The main work to build up the coastal artillery around the Gulf of Finland and in the areas just outside it begun in the spring of 1915. The summer of 1915 was also a time of a major mining effort by the Russians.
Sounds reasonable, although I understood many of the fortresses guarding Finland and Petrograd dated back decades, although their upgrade was likely haphazard, I would have assumed excessive Imperial Russian military spending on such would have seen some improvements. However, in context I believe we are likely focusing on the West Estonian archipelago, so your points are well made.

I'd say that with a quick and strong enough attack, the Germans could take the Ålands, Dagö and Ösel before the Russians have the time to occupy them with enough infantry and artillery to defend them. The attack would need to happen on the first weeks of the war to achieve the needed surprise.
The Germans would have to be prepared to meet a Russian naval task force in battle somewhere to the north or northeast of Gotland, though, and they would have to expect the Russians to have laid some defensive mine barrages at least. It would then be a matter of contingency what ships the Russians would send to meet the German attack, under what orders, and under whose leadership. It would have to be a very bold attack and an ambitious landing operation, though, to the point of being seen as reckless by some, and such an idea might well get rejected if cooler heads and more careful minds prevail during the planning stage. Even if the German operation(s) would be successful in general, they would probably also lose many ships of different sizes - more likely to Russian mines than in actual battle against Russian ships, but both losses would be to be expected.
Such a play would only make sense if the Germans had an eastern focus and if so, in 1914 resources remain finite and all available German forces would been best served bringing the pain to Imperial Russian armies on the mainland. With such a focus, by 1915 the Russians would have lost at least 4-5 of their starting armies and would have been forced to abandon Russian Poland**. Meanwhile, Germany would have conserved military strength compared to OTL and have far lighter commitments on the western Front (a far narrower front with more defensible terrain). A-H would have substantially conserved its prewar armies and is very unlikely to face the threat of an additional Italian front. Further, if Germany has not triggered the Belgium tripwire, Britain is likely (on the balance of probabilities) to have remained on the sidelines.

In this scenario the CP powers have ample unallocated resources available from 1915 onward for adventures in the Baltic, whist the Russians are struggling to stich together something to oppose the advancing CP forces. In some ways the Russian position in 1915 in this scenario is not dissimilar to OTL 1917, except the CP forces are far stronger and the Russian industry is yet to gain a full war footing.

**this assumes a late POD, which is implicit in the OP

When we think of Operation Albion, we need to remember that it was realized at a time when the Russian fleet had been rendered practically useless as a military force, due to internal strife, revolutionary incitement and plummeting morale. This would not be true at the beginning of the war, so we would have to expect the Russian navy to be a more active and committed, actually battle-worthy adversary in that case - even if it would suffer from most of the traditional weaknesses we attribute to the Russian navy in this timeframe.
In this timeframe the German navy was second only to the Royal navy in terms of quantity and quality - it had taken the best of German science and industry to close that gap. On paper the Russians were building a formidable battle fleet, but were unlikely to best the Germans any time soon, without lots and lots of lucky shots. I would expect significant elements of the Russian Navy sallying forth would be seen as an opportunity rather than a problem for the German Navy. In my opinion the most significant threat to such an amphibious operation would be mines, torpedo craft and mobile howitzers. Something like: Russian mines < German minesweepers < Russian small arms < German naval vessels < Russian mobile howitzers.
 
Sounds reasonable, although I understood many of the fortresses guarding Finland and Petrograd dated back decades, although their upgrade was likely haphazard, I would have assumed excessive Imperial Russian military spending on such would have seen some improvements. However, in context I believe we are likely focusing on the West Estonian archipelago, so your points are well made.

Yes, what I am talking about here is the most western part of the Gulf of Finland, and the islands north and south of the approaches to the Gulf, ie. the Ålands, Dagö and Ösel (and various smaller islands). While there had been significant work done earlier with the coastal artillery fortifications closer to Kronstadt and Petrograd, and around the Helsinki and Tallinn line (both being major bases for the fleet), in the west only quite limited work had been done prior to the war, and a lot of fortification effort would take place in 1915-1917 IOTL. There were of course older fortifications in the west as well, but then they were either disused or sorely lacking in updates, modern artillery and various facilities to make an actual difference.
 
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