Best POD for Chinese reform

I am aware of that. However is it true that the Portuguese were unable to trade anywhere else in China? Adoption of crops is not some sort of innovative achievement,

How is the adoption of a new agricultural package not innovation? "Only a stagnant and close minded people would uproot their customs and diet to eat a new crop."

You'll also have to define what you mean by technological achievements; firearms and printing? Both were more advanced under the Ming. Medicine? Well, unlike the Song, the Ming imported European works.
 
I am aware of that. However is it true that the Portuguese were unable to trade anywhere else in China?

Trade how? The British didn't let any foreign ships trade in their colonies. is it your position that the British Empire in the 18th century was stagnant and inward looking?
 
How is the adoption of a new agricultural package not innovation? "Only a stagnant and close minded people would uproot their customs and diet to eat a new crop."

You'll also have to define what you mean by technological achievements; firearms and printing? Both were more advanced under the Ming. Medicine? Well, unlike the Song, the Ming imported European works.

The Song would seem to fall into that time span where trade from Europe to China was nearly impossible...and where Europe had very little to offer, anyways.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Not necessarily a good correlation to make.

I would argue that the increasing commercialization seen in the Southern Song period was the result of a consistent trends and policies, started and implemented in the Northern Song period, with the level of commercialization in the South a product of decades/centuries of government encouragement. Eg., the Northern Song actively promoted overseas trade even before the Jurchens, and was reaping the benefits of such policies by the time when they were reduced to the Yangtze.
Ok, granted, this one is probably true. Was commercilization (however you measure it) actually similar during the Ming or early Qing era then?

Now, in discussing which PoD is best for Chinese reform, it's an interesting question. I would, predominantly, argue that avoiding the Qing dynasty and allowing for a "native" Chinese dynasty would be the clearest path, either a continuation of the Ming or something else.

The primary problem that Chinese modernization would eventually face was the antiquity of Manchu dominated/favored systems, aimed at maintaining their (and their allies in the conquest of China's) position as a separate/special caste, with favored positions in government and military posts. The collapse of the Qing dynasty was a culmination of it, as it could not withstand conservative/reactionary pressures against change, and balance it against pro-western nationalist movements, when the ruling class is still, by the late 1800s, viewed as foreigners, largely due to their own policies.
Ok so this part is really problematic. First of all nationalist movements are by definition not very pro-western, and the sort of nationalism you are talking about crystallized -after- the fall of the Qing dynasty. The rise of modern Chinese nationalism is commonly dated to the may 4th movement in 1919.

You are right that there were certainly anti-Manchu...let's just say feelings among the Han population. But the real downfall of the Qing was not so much because of Manchus maintaining "position as a separate/special caste", it was their failure to do so. By 1911, power in China was held by

1) The conservative Gentry
2) Provincial legislatures
3) And most importantly, the Beiyang Army

All 3 of those were ethnic Han institutions, the Manchus were effectively powerless by the end and hence why when Yuan Shikai decided that it's in his interest to support the Republicans over the Qing the Qing went.

Getting rid of a foreign ruling class does get rid of the ethnic tensions, it does not, however, get rid of the institutional tensions modernization produces. I could perfectly see the exact same thing playing out with an ethnic Han dynasty on the throne.

Moreover, Qing society was considerably more "conservative" with heavy emphasis on state control, the government having to resort to adopting such a stance to legitimize itself as a dynasty, than Ming era society, which was comparatively more liberal, dynamic, and open. The Qing system, by merit of attempting to preserve the authority and power of a separate ruling class over "native Han" Chinese, lends itself to inflexibility and control, and could largely be what I consider to be the primary culprit of stagnation towards the 1800s onwards. You could see the comparative difference in Ming and Qing society in the vernacular literature written during the two eras (eg, the "Jing Ping Mei"), or how "moral" laws, such as homosexuality, were enforced (that is to say, there was no edict during the Ming, and a strongly enforced one during the Qing as part of a policy of state control). And strong anti-Manchu sentiment remained in both the scholarly classes (especially the "low" scholarly classes, eg. local teachers or tutors for the exams), among the remaining Chinese gentry (particularly in the South), and the general populace (especially with the Manchu edicts on the "queue" hairstyle and other forms of control over social expression).
The problem with this is that the Qing -wasn't- imposing effective state control in the 1800s to actually enforce any of those laws. Because the the population quadrupled and there was no corresponding increase in the number of administrators. The 19th century was particular devastating to the Qing because its ability to administrator the country was wobbling well before the Europeans showed up in force. I don't think the Qing (or any dynasty for that matter) even had officials below a certain level and relied on the Han gentry for low level governance.
This, combined with Opium and the collapse of the global silver trade in the early 1800s (up until the introduction of opium, China was the world's greatest importer of silver), would strain the Chinese economy at an critical juncture, lead to the Taiping, and seal the failure of the Qing to modernize; there was practically no Han Chinese loyalty left to the Qing government by then.
I have to disagree with this.

There was massive amount of Han loyalty to the regime at this period in time, see for instance, Zeng Guofan. It make no sense to state that "there was practically no Han Chinese loyalty left to the Qing government" in the time period you are speaking of when the ethnic Manchu banner armies were completely useless by the mid 19th century, and it was ethnically Han generals leading ethnically Han armies which put down the Taping rebellion.

Hell, if Yuan Shikai decided to go for a constitutional monarchy with himself as the real power rather than a Republic/New dynasty with himself as the head the Qing dynasty might very well still exist in the 1930s or even today. Because he was more or less playing the same role in the 1900s as Zen Guofan did in the 1860s.

Additionally, I find the idea of the Ming being focused on "inward perfection" to be inane and a ridiculous meme.
Right, and obviously I agree with this.

Throughout the Ming and early Qing era, China was a hotbed of economic activity and foreign trade; where do you think all the silver from the New World went? To Manila to be traded for Chinese goods, with the silver going straight back into China and the Chinese economy. Indeed, the inability of the Ming to adequately regulate the rampant inflation caused by the massive influx of silver (and the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy it fueled) is one of the main factors for their fall.
I actually don't know enough about this to comment, save that no state, European or Asian, were good at controlling inflation in this time period.
The treasure fleets were destroyed because they were an insanely expensive, largely symbolic endeavor that amounted to "showing the flag" around the Indian Ocean basin, a trade network where Chinese merchants were already the most influential group (the arrival of the Portuguese and Europeans would change that, but foreign Chinese merchant communities remained prominent in all the South Asian trade ports, and Chinese diaspora communities are still rather large throughout South Asia.).
Absolutely, the reason why the treasure fleet wasn't worth it is because there was really no commercially viable reason to make distant journeys at the time. Europeans could sail to the far east and buy spice and unload it at home for high enough profit rates to cover the risk premiums associated with the journey. There is no comparable trade goods for Chinese merchants to go to Europe for until possibly the 1800s.
 
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RousseauX

Donor
I wonder if, 100 years from now, we'll look at 1800-1920 as an aberration in world history, and not ask why it took the nations of the world so long to Westernize or if Japan was a fluke. Obviously Turkey, India, China, etc. are all now modern societies who have adjusted to societal changes. Maybe we ignore how long and painful the transition to "modernity" was in Europe because it took place over a longer period of time?

Rambling a bit, but hm.
I more or less agree with the rest of your post, and I'm highlighting this because this is more or less what I believe. The question shouldn't even be "why did China fall behind", it should be "how did Europe successfully modernize ahead of everyone else".

Countries, as of 2015, which has successfully copied western institutions/economic/military methods to achieve a first world standard of living similar to European countries which industrialized in the 19th century, is a tiny fraction of the total number of countries on the planet. I think those countries are:

South Korea
Taiwan
Japan
Singapore
Hong Kong

I guess you could probably plug in a few more countries in there like Chile or maybe Malaysia.

What's very striking is that countries all over the world has being importing western ideas and western technology for well over half a century now, and yet the vast majority of them never came to parity with the west. Japan was the singular success case of this happening and if you seriously believe that "exchange of ideas" or something similar was what was needed why developmental economics largely failed in the 20th century, let along the 19th when people tried to do exact this. The problem is that people look at Japan and start forming awfully unrealistic expectation of what a 19th century modernization project -should- look like.

Once you remove Japan as a reference point you start realizing the Qing era modernization and political management of international relations w.r.t imperial powers was actually pretty successful.


I know this is Pomeranz's point, but I don't think I buy it. In metallurgy, firearms, actual sciences (physics, biology, geology), Europe was ahead by this point. Certainly in maritime technology. One question that I don't know enough about is how far China was in financial innovation; Japan had a futures market in rice, for instance, but I don't know about China.
I vaguely remember Pomeranz talking bout how advanced the cash economy in China was, but I can't remember him talking about future markets and whether they existed


I don't see how that's true. England as more commercialized in 1700 than it was in 1400, but I don't think we'd say that this is because they lost control of France. Societies can innovate and develop.
Except you can trace clear alternative explanations as to why this happened (colonialism, better shipping technology etc) between 1400 and 1700. I don't think you can do the same with the Northern Song and Southern Song.
 
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Ok, granted, this one is probably true. Was commercilization (however you measure it) actually similar during the Ming or early Qing era then?

IMO it as probably greater. Here's a quote from the early 19th century:

As regards to traveling, nowhere can there exist greater freedom and independence of motion; each citizen may wander about among the eighteen provinces and settle where he pleases, undisturbed by any public functionary. . . . The liberty to traverse the various parts of the country unobstructed is almost indispensable to these people, continually as they are engaged in commercial operations. Of course the least impediment to free motion would check the great system of commerce which is the life and soul of this vast empire.-Abbe Huc, writing in The Chinese Empire in the 1850s.

The Ming and Qing didn't use paper currency, but that's because attempts to use it early on in both dynasties failed because no one trusted the government. And that's not super surprising; America and France both failed to get paper currency to work in the 18th century.

First of all nationalist movements are by definition not very pro-western,

I disagree with this. You're equating "pro-European or American rule" with "pro-western." China is a People's Republic ostensibly guided by Marxist doctrine and in actually guided by ruthless corrupt capitalism. It's hard to see this as not being Western.



There was massive amount of Han loyalty to the regime at this period in time, see for instance, Zeng Guofan. It make no sense to state that "there was practically no Han Chinese loyalty left to the Qing government" in the time period you are speaking of when the ethnic Manchu banner armies were completely useless by the mid 19th century, and it was ethnically Han generals leading ethnically Han armies which put down the Taping rebellion.

Hell, if Yuan Shikai decided to go for a constitutional monarchy with himself as the real power rather than a Republic/New dynasty with himself as the head the Qing dynasty might very well still exist in the 1930s or even today. Because he was more or less playing the same role in the 1900s as Zen Guofan did in the 1860s.

Right, and obviously I agree with this.

Europeans could sail to the far east and buy spice and unload it at home for high enough profit rates to cover the risk premiums associated with the journey. There is no comparable trade goods for Chinese merchants to go to Europe for until possibly the 1800s.

Hmm. On the other hand, the Ming and early Qing did actively oppose overseas trade. Imagine a Ming state that continued to wave the flag in Southeast Asia and Malaysia. Even in OTL, in the face of regimes that were at best neutral and often hostile to Chinese property rights, you saw Chinese settles throughout the region. Imagine if the Chinese government had decided to promote maritime trade in those regions?

Countries, as of 2015, which has successfully copied western institutions/economic/military methods to achieve a first world standard of living similar to European countries which industrialized in the 19th century, is a tiny fraction of the total number of countries on the planet. I think those countries are:

I think the standard of living is a very different question than western institutions, though. For instance, I don't think you can call Latin America, populated by European immigrants and settled by Europeans, "non-western."

But I agree with you that the Qing are often underrated; I disagree with you that they couldn't have done significantly better.


Except you can trace clear alternative explanations as to why this happened (colonialism, better shipping technology etc) between 1400 and 1700. I don't think you can do the same with the Northern Song and Southern Song.

Sure you can; population growth due to new crops and new technological innovations which weren't the product of imperial edicts.
 
Ok, granted, this one is probably true. Was commercilization (however you measure it) actually similar during the Ming or early Qing era then?
You certainly see a robust internal economy and trade network and by the late 1700s a robust cottage industry economy that everyone and their mothers (literally) were participating in, and intense internal economic competition especially after the Qing population boom (that occurred after Columbian crops such as the potato fully circulated through China).

But the point specifically was on the Northern Song, and I don't feel comfortable comparing "relative" commercialization. Too subjective. The Northern Song did implement pro-trade policies before being reduced, however, which is the point I'd like to make.

Ok so this part is really problematic. First of all nationalist movements are by definition not very pro-western, and the sort of nationalism you are talking about crystallized -after- the fall of the Qing dynasty. The rise of modern Chinese nationalism is commonly dated to the may 4th movement in 1919.
I'll concede the point here for you two to debate. Late (post-Opium War) Qing history is not my forte, and I'm not entirely comfortable arguing this.

Mostly, there was passive resentment and varying degrees of resistance to the state from varying levels of social strata, which were exacerbated by Qing disasters in the mid 1800s onwards. 1919 is where the nationalist movement crystallized, varying degrees of such were promulgated before then, and anti-Manchu sentiment was among the impetus for the Taiping rebellion, and plenty of rebellions, minor and large, before then.

Which is why I think a deeper integration of the Manchus into wider society, and a reversal of their policies of maintaining themselves as separate and aloof elites, is necessary to ensure the Qing dynasty can survive westernization.

I actually don't know enough about this to comment, save that no state, European or Asian, were good at controlling inflation in this time period.
China occupied, up until the introduction of Opium and the drastic reduction in silver production in the early 1800s (the former happened later than the latter) a unique and ultimately central position in the global economy, given just how ridiculous the amounts of silver it was importing (there was a reason why Ming/Qing era China never felt the needs to explore, because merchants were flocking to trade for Chinese luxury goods through Chinese merchant intermediaries, predominantly, and have been for centuries). It had, by all accounts, a massive internal economy. I'll dig up my sources, later today, but in one of the contributing factors the Ming had was being able to truly controlling the inflation that the massive amounts of silver was bringing, in conjunction with a whole slew of other problems (but inflation was primary). Not to say that it was all bad: the silver funded the expansion of the Chinese economy to unprecedented heights at the time and was important in funding many of the Ming's expensive and draining projects (like the modern additions to the Great Wall), and a vibrant vernacular culture.

After the early 1800s things changed, with the global silver trade drastically collapsing (which had its own effect on the Qing budget/economy), and the British efforts to commercialize opium in China, an the hopes that they could stem the continued influx of silver for tea (starting in ~the late 1810s, due to the fact Britain was on the gold standard because Newton made a major oppsie when denominating the exchange ratio between gold and silver, leading all silver to flee Britain), was so wildly successful that they were able to single-handedly reverse the balance of trade, so that China went from being a massive exporter (and importer of specie) into a net importer (and exporter of specie), reversing...hundreds of years of trade status quo.

Granted, there's been modern examinations of the role of arbitrage and the difference in bimetallic ratios between Europe and Asia as a possible contributing factor to the amount of silver China imported, but that's another story. I'll bring up the source on that later today, but look up Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700, Von Glahn (1996) in the meantime for an express look at this. It SHOULD have the figures on the silver trade and imports. If not and I'm confusing things, I've got other sources.
 
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RousseauX

Donor
IMO it as probably greater. Here's a quote from the early 19th century:

As regards to traveling, nowhere can there exist greater freedom and independence of motion; each citizen may wander about among the eighteen provinces and settle where he pleases, undisturbed by any public functionary. . . . The liberty to traverse the various parts of the country unobstructed is almost indispensable to these people, continually as they are engaged in commercial operations. Of course the least impediment to free motion would check the great system of commerce which is the life and soul of this vast empire.-Abbe Huc, writing in The Chinese Empire in the 1850s.

The Ming and Qing didn't use paper currency, but that's because attempts to use it early on in both dynasties failed because no one trusted the government. And that's not super surprising; America and France both failed to get paper currency to work in the 18th century.
Ok, fair enough, in that case I think we can probably assume commercial activities in southern China recovered to its pre-Mongol levels during the Ming at least.

I disagree with this. You're equating "pro-European or American rule" with "pro-western." China is a People's Republic ostensibly guided by Marxist doctrine and in actually guided by ruthless corrupt capitalism. It's hard to see this as not being Western.
I think we should draw a distinction between "pro-westernizing" and "pro-western".

Btw, were the Manchus ruling class actually -more- conservative than the Han ruling class at the time? I'm pretty hard pressed to find evidence for this either way.

Hmm. On the other hand, the Ming and early Qing did actively oppose overseas trade. Imagine a Ming state that continued to wave the flag in Southeast Asia and Malaysia. Even in OTL, in the face of regimes that were at best neutral and often hostile to Chinese property rights, you saw Chinese settles throughout the region. Imagine if the Chinese government had decided to promote maritime trade in those regions?
I don't think the Ming were actively opposed to maritime trade for more than a few decade in their nearly 300 year long rule in China. But yes, the government could have encouraged commerce more.


I think the standard of living is a very different question than western institutions, though. For instance, I don't think you can call Latin America, populated by European immigrants and settled by Europeans, "non-western."
The pint was never copying western institutions as an end goal, the point was always to do that in order to copy western material advantages in terms of economics and militarily.

But I agree with you that the Qing are often underrated; I disagree with you that they couldn't have done significantly better.
Ok, to be fair, they probably could have, I'm just not sure how much.

The problem I have is with the conventional Chinese government narrative which basically goes something like "It's all the Manchu Barbarian idiot's fault the century of humiliation happened" and "if only we had ethnic Han in charge everything would have being alright" that they have being propagating for century by now and really distorted historical view of the late Qing dynasty.



Sure you can; population growth due to new crops and new technological innovations which weren't the product of imperial edicts.

Which new crops?

This was way before the columbian exchange occured.
 
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And that's not super surprising; America and France both failed to get paper currency to work in the 18th century.

Sorry for a slightly OT nitpick, but there was never a time where paper currency failed and disappeared in the US like it did in 18th century France (or post-Yuan China). It spent the 19th century with some problems in its paper currency, but it had a more or less rich and vibrant (if chaotic) system, anyway. Rather, several different, closely related systems, over time.
 
Sorry for a slightly OT nitpick, but there was never a time where paper currency failed and disappeared in the US like it did in 18th century France (or post-Yuan China). It spent the 19th century with some problems in its paper currency, but it had a more or less rich and vibrant (if chaotic) system, anyway. Rather, several different, closely related systems, over time.

What about the Continentals during the Revolution? It might not have disappeared, but the US had its wonderful bout with hyperinflation.
 
What about the Continentals during the Revolution? It might not have disappeared, but the US had its wonderful bout with hyperinflation.

Individual states almost immediately re-established (or continued, since most of them existed during the war, too) paper currencies that, while running at discounts against specie, still circulated and were generally accepted internally. EDIT: These are actually pretty interesting and, along with international political concerns, were one of the driving forces behind the movement to strengthen the national government. State paper currencies were used to inflate private and public debts in the aftermath of the Revolution to provide relief to people who had borrowed heavily to survive the privation of the war and those who did not have the monetary resources to pay the tax bills necessary to support the various state debts. Shays' Revolt, for instance, would have included an inflationary currency issue as one of its primary demands had it been more successful in intimidating the Massachusetts state government. Major holders of proprietary wealth (read: various kinds of creditors and renters) didn't like this idea and they became one of the major political bases of the movement to draft and ratify the new Constitution.

Even as early as the 1780's in, say, Massachusetts, you also had '''private''' bank paper currencies circulating with great success. By the 1790's the US had a moderately healthy system of paper currency that would continue, with occasional violent fits, until today. The US has never been entirely thrown onto its coinage to survive like France or onto its coins and 'cash' like China.
 
Yes, but modernization is required for the success of modernization and the Qing more or less implemented the policies you were recommending without achieving it. More to the point, the existence of a central Chinese government capable of making deals with western powers is crucial to the preservation of Chinese territorial integrity.

What kind of restrictions did the Qing place on the exchange of ideas with Europeans post-1850? Which particular ideas do you feel need to be imported?

How do you explain the existence of western built railroads, or state owned armories, shipyards, and steel mills built with western expertise during the late Qing dynasty (some of those pre-1890 btw) that were very much similar to Meiji industrialization? Why did they fail to achieve the goal of industrialization?

If the Qing were to collapse in 1850, why would this not result in the political division of China like in the 1920s?


In what way could the Qing have implemented policies that both ensured the political existence of a central Chinese government and modernization, given the weakness of Chinese administration in the 19th century, better than OTL?

How different were the per capita level of industrial output between Spain and China around 1850?

Why did the following places fail to modernize to the same degree of success as Japan:

India
Egypt
Persia
Morocco

despite having far greater access and exchange with "western ideas" pre-1914? The real question you should be asking is why is that most of the world had far greater access to western ideas than Japan and yet it was Japan which singularly successfully modernized before the second half of the 20th century. You should probably also be asking why is there such a poor correlation between the extent of contact between a state with the west and the extent of the success of that state's modernization.




Same deal, what makes you think that the Qing failed to recognize how far behind they were?

What is the evidence behind the idea that the Qing couldn't deal with a Westphalia international order post 1860 or so?

Come to think of it, which "strategic decision" do you think the Qing made was particularly unreasonable post-second opium war?

When people talk about China and modernization a whole bunch of assumptions get thrown out with very little justifications which, when you examine them, turned out to be fairly baseless.

"OH we just need to borrow ideas from the west to modernize" is actually one of the more reasonable ones and the exact idea the Qing dynasty had historically, it's failure should demonstrate that it's false.

This is also blatantly wrong, legation cities and Shandong/Port Arthur isn't a carve up, China wasn't carved up at any point during the Qing dynasty. China was carved up in the 1920s due to the failure of the Republican government and the Beiyang army. You can tell by what % of Chinese territory was controlled by an entity other than the central government.

You're asking all the wrong questions. It's not that Qing China didn't make some progress, but that it was too little too late when they took modernization seriously post Taiping Rebellion. China is too big, too backwards and too attractive to imperialist exploitation by 1865 to pull a Meiji. It's best chance was for it to modernize much earlier.

Japan didn't have China's baggages. It was smaller and more cohesive. It wasn't hobbled by institutional corruption and wasn't ravaged by the opium trade. It had witnessed China's defeat by the British and learned it had to reform or die. The Meiji reforms saw a commitment to change that China would never attempt. Chinese reform was all about taking technology and ideas from the West and finding ways to fit into cultural norms so as to not upset existing order. Japan embraced disruptive change that made Chinese or Ottoman reforms look very half-assed.

The question is, given Chinese style reforms would take far longer, how can they get started earlier? The only way is if they recognize how far behind they were and the advantages of Westernization earlier. This can happen either with an earlier war or earlier trade contacts. The earlier the POD, the less top down this reform needs to be. Suffice to say short of war, the earliest the Chinese state would actively pursue reform would be the MaCartney Embassy, and only after there had been considerable groundwork of connections built at the grassroots level. Not having the Chinese Rituals conflict with the Catholic Church in the seventeen teens would be helpful.
 

RousseauX

Donor
You're asking all the wrong questions.
Why?

I'm asking you, once again, why was it that despite the fact most of the non-western world had far greater access to western ideas and technology pre-19th century than Tokugawa Japan, that Japan was able to implement modernization and none of the rest were?


It's not that Qing China didn't make some progress, but that it was too little too late when they took modernization seriously post Taiping Rebellion. China is too big, too backwards and too attractive to imperialist exploitation by 1865 to pull a Meiji. It's best chance was for it to modernize much earlier.
Which is difficult because not even -Europe- modernized much earlier.

Japan didn't have China's baggages. It was smaller and more cohesive. It wasn't hobbled by institutional corruption and wasn't ravaged by the opium trade.
Which wasn't because Japan was isolated, it's because the Tokugawa shogunate did a much better job at state building than China did in the 17th-19th centuries.


It had witnessed China's defeat by the British and learned it had to reform or die. The Meiji reforms saw a commitment to change that China would never attempt. Chinese reform was all about taking technology and ideas from the West and finding ways to fit into cultural norms so as to not upset existing order. Japan embraced disruptive change that made Chinese or Ottoman reforms look very half-assed.
Can you name some of those changes that Japan was willing to implement but China was not?

The question is, given Chinese style reforms would take far longer, how can they get started earlier? The only way is if they recognize how far behind they were and the advantages of Westernization earlier. This can happen either with an earlier war or earlier trade contacts. The earlier the POD, the less top down this reform needs to be. Suffice to say short of war, the earliest the Chinese state would actively pursue reform would be the MaCartney Embassy, and only after there had been considerable groundwork of connections built at the grassroots level. Not having the Chinese Rituals conflict with the Catholic Church in the seventeen teens would be helpful.

-By the time of the MaCartney embassy, it was not the case that China was significantly behind Europe, the advantages that Britain had over China during the Opium war only exited for a few decades, not centuries as you are making it out to be. You are confusing the mid-19th century with the late 18th century. The problem is that you are fundamentally regurgitating pop culture version of Chinese history, 1800-today, without engaging in critical thinking about it or checking to see if the things you are saying are actually true.

-It assumes that time was the key variable (it wasn't), that the barriers to modernization were fundamentally different in the 1790s vs 1850s (again, I argue the key components would largely be the same)

-I have absolutely no clue why the Catholic church mattered or why it would help with modernization (did any Christian non-western countries do better at modernization than non-christian Japan)? I think this comes from the misconception that Christianity == modernity.

Basically you need to actually read up on economic history of China late 18th-early 19th century, I personally recommend Pomeranz, and probably something on the Tokugawa Shogunate/Meiji Japan, for which I recommend Jansen. If the only history you read of China/Japan is one which discusses it in relation to the English speaking world then something ridiculously dumb like how China reacted to one emissary from the English speaking world determined its fate for the next 200 years come across as reasonable.
 
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You're asking all the wrong questions. It's not that Qing China didn't make some progress, but that it was too little too late when they took modernization seriously post Taiping Rebellion.

That's not really fair. The Qing Dynasty embarked on a significant Westernization campaign throughout the 19thC, especially during the period of the Tongzhi Restoration (1860s-1870s). Their customs service was run by a British national (sort of reflecting political realities, but still). Their naval fleet was the largest in Asia by 1894. Even the fact that the Qing had to go from 'tributary' diplomacy to 'treaty' diplomacy (and even negotiated treaty diplomacy as exemplified by the Zongli Yamen) in the space of around 20-40 years has to count for something.

China is too big, too backwards and too attractive to imperialist exploitation by 1865 to pull a Meiji. It's best chance was for it to modernize much earlier.

You could certainly argue that the population size of China was an obstacle to modernization - even as late as the Boxer Rebellion, Chinese soldiers remained poorly trained (they frequently sighted their rifles might farther than was necessary because of the belief that farther = better), but I think saying that Qing China was doomed is a bit excessive. After all, to foreign opinion its modernization efforts seemed to be succeeding even into the 1880s.

It had witnessed China's defeat by the British and learned it had to reform or die. The Meiji reforms saw a commitment to change that China would never attempt. Chinese reform was all about taking technology and ideas from the West and finding ways to fit into cultural norms so as to not upset existing order.

Japan certainly didn't immediately learn the lesson of China after the Opium Wars, considering that the Shimonoseki Incident of 1863-4 showed that Japan was still quite willing to attempt military means to restrict Western influence. Japan also definitely fit reforms into its existing order - the reinvention of the bushido idea, as an example; the conversion of many daimyo into political and economic elites is another.

The question is, given Chinese style reforms would take far longer, how can they get started earlier? The only way is if they recognize how far behind they were and the advantages of Westernization earlier. This can happen either with an earlier war or earlier trade contacts. The earlier the POD, the less top down this reform needs to be.

A person in the 1800s wouldn't have argued that China was 'far behind'. Administratively the Qing were ruling an empire of similar population, and arguably physical, size as the top of the European empires. Economic-wise, China was still around 30% of global GDP. Military-wise, the Qing had just concluded major logistical feats in Tibet and Turkestan. Yes, the signs of Qing decline were there, but imitating the West wouldn't have seemed like the answer, at least not from a traditional viewpoint.

Also, I really doubt the possibility of non-top-down Westernization. Ming and Qing China were much more 'absolutist' monarchies than what came before them, with decision power concentrated within small groupings or even a single person (as opposed to the Song, where the bureaucratic system made a lot of the decisions for the Emperor).

Suffice to say short of war, the earliest the Chinese state would actively pursue reform would be the MaCartney Embassy, and only after there had been considerable groundwork of connections built at the grassroots level. Not having the Chinese Rituals conflict with the Catholic Church in the seventeen teens would be helpful.

To be honest, the most realistic outcome for a Qing reform during the early-1800s would be an even more massive outbreak of the White Lotus Rebellion, as anti-Western sentiments combine with anti-Manchu sentiments to result in a bigger headache for the ruling dynasty.

But to answer the OP: the best POD for Chinese reform would be a more vigorous follow-up to the post-Tongzhi Restoration period, with Qing monarchs living for longer and therefore not having the Imperial court sucked into all sorts of intrigues and resultant legitimacy-loss. Of course, you also have to contend with the period of 'New Imperialism' in Europe and the accelerated pace of colonialism during this time, which deprived the Qing of breathing-space to conduct a more thorough reform.
 
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