Best Plan for Imperial Germany?

[Fifty-Two]

First post, by the way. Cheers to meeting all you lads, I look forward to writing and posting plenty.

With that said-- I've seen surprisingly little discourse on Imperial Germany during the war as compared to the Nazis, who seem to be the hotter topic. I'd like to put forward a discussion- what would you consider the strongest general military plan going into the war for Germany?

This would mean "the 1905 Schlieffen Plan with the Dutch Invasion", "the OTL Schlieffen plan (doubtful)", "a defensive posture against France and focusing on Russia instead." Just vague strategic ideas for how you think that Germany could give herself the best chance of victory going into the conflict without relying on things like ASB, French or Russian incompetence, Italian non-participation, or Britain disregarding one of its guarantees.

Cheers, folks. Hope this sees some replies!

 

[Pax]

Honestly they nearly won IOTL in 1914, and again in 1917/1918. Considering they were fighting pretty much every single other major power at the same time in a two front war, that's not too bad. People seem to think that using the Dutch railroads would be enough to speed up their advance enough to perhaps win at the Marne, but IMO wouldn't it have just exposed them to problems with having to now deal with a massive, Netherlands sized thorn in their flank?

 

[TheTuck]

Although in retrospect it would seem wiser to go with the Russia first strategy, when looking at it from the Germans perspective their fears of repeating the catastrophes of Napoleon and Karl XII are not without merit. It may also seem wiser to adopt an entirely defensive posture, but that doesn't take into consideration the fears of the German General Staff of Russia building up too much and becoming too powerful, and let's not forget that France was still a threat, Germany had to strike and strike fast. In hindsight, although Germany's plan may not have achieved its goal of knocking France out of the war it did severely hamper French war making capabilities by capturing key industrial areas on the French border.

I think the best strategy for Germany would be to realize the impossibility of an immediate victory and instead focus on limited offensives to hamper the long-term ability of its enemies to wage war, the should have first followed the Schlieffen plan but instead of trying to take Paris, instead focus on taking the Channel ports, thereby hampering the ability of the British to operate on the Continent, and then digging in while moving troops to the East to parry any Russian thrusts and then launch a counter offensive to take Congress Poland, Kurland, and Riga and then dig in there and let both the French and Russians bleed themselves white trying to dislodge the Germans, after which they can demand some concessions in the West and a Polish-Lithuanian buffer state in the East.

Edit: Something major I forgot, absolutely do not pursue Unrestricted Submarine Warfare under any circumstances, the Germans absolutely cannot afford to have the United States in the war, also a good idea would be to mellow out about Francs-Tireurs, to as easy as possible on the occupied territories so you can maintain as good a reputation in the United States as possible, maybe MAYBE the Germans then could be able to embroil the United States and Britain in a conflict over the British blockade of Germany which could possibly force the British to ease up on it.

 

[Fifty-Two]

I think the best strategy for Germany would be to realize the impossibility of an immediate victory and instead focus on limited offensives to hamper the long-term ability of its enemies to wage war, the should have first followed the Schlieffen plan but instead of trying to take Paris, instead focus on taking the Channel ports, thereby hampering the ability of the British to operate on the Continent, and then digging in while moving troops to the East to parry any Russian thrusts and then launch a counter offensive to take Congress Poland, Kurland, and Riga and then dig in there and let both the French and Russians bleed themselves white trying to dislodge the Germans, after which they can demand some concessions in the West and a Polish-Lithuanian buffer state in the East.

In summary, "OTL but they stop attempting to push the Western Front once they achieve a defensible line which denies the English port access?"
I could see this working, but it would suffer from the same strategic issues as OTL- the French High Command was vehemently bent on constant attack and counterattack in any situation, diverting German men and materiel from the Eastern Front again and again in places like Verdun and at the Marne and Paschendaele, turning the situations on that side more to the Russians' favor. The impracticality of defending a front so large as the Eastern Front also looms large, but the question stands if the Brusilov Offensive would still break A-H's back in a situation where they are more prepared for a counterattack.

Honestly they nearly won IOTL in 1914, and again in 1917/1918. Considering they were fighting pretty much every single other major power at the same time in a two front war, that's not too bad. People seem to think that using the Dutch railroads would be enough to speed up their advance enough to perhaps win at the Marne, but IMO wouldn't it have just exposed them to problems with having to now deal with a massive, Netherlands sized thorn in their flank?

I agree, it's possible that invading the Netherlands would simply have turned it into a second Belgium. There's a chance (?) it could have overextended the British, though?
Another conjecture about the Netherlands is that it would destroy the only neutral supply port to the Germans through the war.

 

[Pax]

In summary, "OTL but they stop attempting to push the Western Front once they achieve a defensible line which denies the English port access?"
I could see this working, but it would suffer from the same strategic issues as OTL- the French High Command was vehemently bent on constant attack and counterattack in any situation, diverting German men and materiel from the Eastern Front again and again in places like Verdun and at the Marne and Paschendaele, turning the situations on that side more to the Russians' favor. The impracticality of defending a front so large as the Eastern Front also looms large, but the question stands if the Brusilov Offensive would still break A-H's back in a situation where they are more prepared for a counterattack.



I agree, it's possible that invading the Netherlands would simply have turned it into a second Belgium. There's a chance (?) it could have overextended the British, though?
Another conjecture about the Netherlands is that it would destroy the only neutral supply port to the Germans through the war.

There's a chance, but IMO what would have more likely happened is that the Germans would have been forced to send part of their troops to protect their flank from Dutch counterattack, meaning they stall at the Marne regardless. ITTL, however, the Germans have less men to compete in the race to the sea, and are beat at some of those battles by the Allies, perhaps most of them, cutting them off from the Channel. I could see Britain send troops into the Netherlands to keep the Germans back, but I'd imagine that the Germans would eventually be able to grind the Dutch, suffering heavy casualties while trying to breakthrough the Dutch riverine defenses, and opening up the possibility for better Allied offensives in 1915-1916. Maybe this could butterfly away things like the tank, but I'm not sure.

 

[TheTuck]

but it would suffer from the same strategic issues as OTL- the French High Command was vehemently bent on constant attack and counterattack in any situation, diverting German men and materiel from the Eastern Front again and again in places like Verdun and at the Marne and Paschendaele, turning the situations on that side more to the Russians' favor

In the end it didn't prevent Germany from defeating Russia IOTL, so it probably would not be too much more of an issue here.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

In the end it didn't prevent Germany from defeating Russia IOTL, so it probably would not be too much more of an issue here.

Germany dident defeat the Russian army militarily, per say, so it's not exactly something one can realistically expect for them to plan for during the early stages of the war. The events that lead to the collapse of the eastern front weren't something anybody could have expected in 1914

 

[TheTuck]

The events that lead to the collapse of the eastern front weren't something anybody could have expected in 1914

Russia already had a revolution that forced them to make peace in the Russo-Japanese War, so it wouldn't be unreasonable to hope for a similar political upheaval to force Russia to make peace.

 

[Grey Wolf]

Unlike Frederick the Great, 1914's German Empire is a modern industrial economy, and while strategically the idea of letting the Russians advance while you are defeating the French makes sense, it's not a strategy that had been tried in modern times. That's why after the early defeats in the East, they effectively junked their plan and pulled divisions from the West. It's an interesting hypothetical question as to whether the presence of those divisions would have meant victory there. But if the Russians crossed the Oder, the empire is going to go into full panic mode

 

[BooNZ]

what would you consider the strongest general military plan going into the war for Germany?

Plan:
1. Surrender the initiative and wait on the defensive (per existing German counter attack doctrines);
2. Maul the French offensives (per OTL, but on a grander scale);
3. Focus on and Counter attack the Russians (per OTL, but on a grander scale); and
4. Liberate poland (per OTL, but earlier).

Outcomes:
1. Neutral Belgium and Italy - Britain would also remain neutral without significant unforeseen PODs;
2. A-H military and manpower substantially intact - OTL wrecked by 1915;
3. Early liberation of Poland and Russian military broken until at least 1916;
4. French without doctrine or equipment to challenge German defenses until 1916;
5. Weaker or non-existent British blockade; and
6. No continental British military presence to worry about.

I think the best strategy for Germany would be to realize the impossibility of an immediate victory and instead focus on limited offensives to hamper the long-term ability of its enemies to wage war, the should have first followed the Schlieffen plan but instead of trying to take Paris, instead focus on taking the Channel ports, thereby hampering the ability of the British to operate on the Continent, and then digging in while moving troops to the East to parry any Russian thrusts and then launch a counter offensive to take Congress Poland, Kurland, and Riga and then dig in there and let both the French and Russians bleed themselves white trying to dislodge the Germans, after which they can demand some concessions in the West and a Polish-Lithuanian buffer state in the East.

Paris was never part of the Schlieffen plan - it was about attempting to destroy French armies, which even before the war the German military conceded was unlikely.

 

[Max Sinister]

The Schlieffen plan originally involved going west of Paris, which was cancelled due to lacking troops.

 

[BooNZ]

Germany dident defeat the Russian army militarily, per say, so it's not exactly something one can realistically expect for them to plan for during the early stages of the war. The events that lead to the collapse of the eastern front weren't something anybody could have expected in 1914

The Battle of Tannenberg essentially copied a 20 year old German war game. The collapse of the eastern front was predictable, but so was an extended ongoing advance into Russia that would follow. The ability of modern nations to cope with total war over an extended period was something the military was nervious about.

The Schlieffen plan originally involved going west of Paris, which was cancelled due to lacking troops.

...and the fact Schlieffen never seriously contemplated logistics.

 

[Fifty-Two]

Plan:
1. Surrender the initiative and wait on the defensive (per existing German counter attack doctrines);
2. Maul the French offensives (per OTL, but on a grander scale);
3. Focus on and Counter attack the Russians (per OTL, but on a grander scale); and
4. Liberate poland (per OTL, but earlier).

Outcomes:
1. Neutral Belgium and Italy - Britain would also remain neutral without significant unforeseen PODs;
2. A-H military and manpower substantially intact - OTL wrecked by 1915;
3. Early liberation of Poland and Russian military broken until at least 1916;
4. French without doctrine or equipment to challenge German defenses until 1916;
5. Weaker or non-existent British blockade; and
6. No continental British military presence to worry about.

Paris was never part of the Schlieffen plan - it was about attempting to destroy French armies, which even before the war the German military conceded was unlikely.

A few things to comment on about this-

Firstly, counterattacking the Russians on a grand scale would mean retaking the initiative, so I must assume that you mean losing the initiative only in the West.
Second, wouldn't Britain join anyway during mid-1915? To protect France was strongly in her interests, to maintain the balance of power. I hardly believe she would let Germany win.
Thirdly, what of the French High Command's plans to invade /Germany/ through Belgium should the Germans not take the plunge themselves?

 

[pompejus]

Attacking through the Netherlands would only cause the Germans more problems in the long run. If they can't finish off France (and I don't think they can), it means not only they lose a friendly port, it means they lose troops they need to occupy the Netherlands. Besides those troops, I consider it unlikely the Germans will be able to occupy all of the Netherlands. In a pre-paratrooper, pre- (well developpe) planes war, I doubt the Germans can breach the Dutch waterline. Especialy in a wat that does include heave artilery and machine guns. I think even the Dutch army would be able to stop the Germans*. It would mean an enlarged front for the Germans, they need to defend. The only way to avoid is to try to capture the Netherlands as quickly as possible, meaning they need to divert tropps from the French attack towards the attack on the Netherlands, meaning attacking the Netherlands would mean less chance for the Germans to defeat France quickly.

*and I don't think the Dutch would have to do it alone. I suspect the British would help them, although I suspect most help would come from South Africa. I think several Boers would sign up to help the Dutch defend their country.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

Russia already had a revolution that forced them to make peace in the Russo-Japanese War, so it wouldn't be unreasonable to hope for a similar political upheaval to force Russia to make peace.

Correct me if I'm wrong; you had a noticeable spike in the decentralized civil unrest that'd been steadily building in Russia which, due to a critical enough mass happening at the same time and including military mutinies resulted in the metaphorical aligning of planets that allowed it to coalesce into something harnessable by the reform-minded intelligentsia, at least as far as I understand it.

The Battle of Tannenberg essentially copied a 20 year old German war game. The collapse of the eastern front was predictable, but so was an extended ongoing advance into Russia that would follow. The ability of modern nations to cope with total war over an extended period was something the military was nervious about.
.

The ability of the Germans were capable of defending in the East isen't what I was questioning; rather, Germany coulden't predict that it had the ability to push Russian society to the brink of economic-industrial collapse and revolution, or to end up in possession of the last-man in attritional warfare (Particularly given Russia's strategic depth). That was one of the key reasons a "France First" strategy was deemed so nessicery; it was deemed possible to be able to make noticable enough quick gains in the West to get an early negotiated peace that would allow them turn their main force East (and thus present a situation where they could get the Russians to negotiate peace) in order to avoid an extended conflict's death blow to the economy (As one school of thought predicted) or to avoid Russia being able to mobalize enough of her manpower and get it to the front so that the combined Franco-Russian forces would achieve unassailable numerical superiority.

 

[TheTuck]

Correct me if I'm wrong; you had a noticeable spike in the decentralized civil unrest that'd been steadily building in Russia which, due to a critical enough mass happening at the same time and including military mutinies resulted in the metaphorical aligning of planets that allowed it to coalesce into something harnessable by the reform-minded intelligentsia, at least as far as I understand it.

That's kinda splitting hairs, many revolutions start off as decentralized civil unrest, and the goal wouldn't necessarily be overthrowing the Russian government, but to bring it to the peace table.

 

[FillyofDelphi]

That's kinda splitting hairs, many revolutions start off as decentralized civil unrest, and the goal wouldn't necessarily be overthrowing the Russian government, but to bring it to the peace table.

... and the vast majority of decenteralized civil unrest dosen't flare up into revolution. Sure, Germany would have thought it nice if Russia incidentally faced domestic problems and would exploit any oppritunities that came up (As they did IOTL), but counting on such a rehabilitating level hitting Russia when millions of lives and marks as well as the territorial integrity and honor/reputation of the German Empire are a stake isen't sound strategy. When asking about the best Imperial German strategy, we have to consider what was the wisest plan based on what could be known in 1914; not what if the Kaiser had a crystal ball.

 

[TheTuck]

... and the vast majority of decenteralized civil unrest dosen't flare up into revolution. Sure, Germany would have thought it nice if Russia incidentally faced domestic problems and would exploit any oppritunities that came up (As they did IOTL), but counting on such a rehabilitating level hitting Russia when millions of lives and marks as well as the territorial integrity and honor/reputation of the German Empire are a stake isen't sound strategy. When asking about the best Imperial German strategy, we have to consider what was the wisest plan based on what could be known in 1914; not what if the Kaiser had a crystal ball.

Well it did just that in the Russo-Japanese War, not all civil unrest Claire into revolution, but losing a war is one way to make it much more likely, it doesn't take a crystal ball to plan for that.

 

[RightHoJeeves]

IOT the Germans did about as well as they could reasonably have hoped. The potential for victory was there but always just out of their grasp. I think a good POD for an ultimate CP victory is that instead of attacking Verdun Falkenhayn decides to a coordinate a grand offensive against the Russians with the Austro-Hungarians. This would forestall the great debacle that was the Brusilov Offensive for the Austro-Hungarians as well as remove their pointless and stupid Italian offensive. Another year of crushing defeats might cause the Russian war effort to collapse sooner than it did IOTL while keeping the Austro-Hungarians in the game longer.

The downside is that no Verdun means a better coordinated Somme offensive with proper French support for the British but I think in the end the Germans withdraw to the Hindenburg Line regardless and the French and British could be expected to go no further. So in the end avoiding Verdun might put the CP in a better position to finish off the Italians in 1917 and then focus on British and French.

 

[Catspoke]

The strategy TheTuck mentions above, going after economic objective, the channel ports, the industry and mine of north eastern france (Above the Somme), Gives you the option of when that point is reached:

a) Continuing on, to put Paris, its river and rail connections and industries under siege, to complete the economic objectives
b) Going on the defensive and sending forces east to deal with whatever is needed in the east.

AND/OR: Have Conrad's Austrians not attack in Galacia, deploy well back of the frontier, etc. not not screw up in Galacia so bad. This messed up the Austrians for the rest of the war, probably brought Italy in, kep the Serbians around longer than they should have, changes the whole trajectory of the war in the east, keeps Falkenhayn around, avoids ASW, Germany wins.