Best General of the Early 18th Century

Who was the "best" General?

  • John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough

    Votes: 26 29.2%
  • Prince Eugene of Savoy

    Votes: 46 51.7%
  • Carolus Rex

    Votes: 12 13.5%
  • Someone else (who?)

    Votes: 4 4.5%
  • Claude Louis Hector de Villars, Duc de Villars

    Votes: 1 1.1%

  • Total voters
    89
Typically when you are discussing who is the best general, you’re talking about performance on the battlefield, which is different from diplomacy. Saying an individual general isn’t as good as some other general because one was on the winning side and the other wasn’t is about as off-topic as you can get. Battlefield prowess has nothing to do with strategic or diplomatic skill, as Napoleon showed.

This is a pretty juvenile view of war and generalship. On the contrary, politics and war are a cohesive whole, sharing a basic logic. Generals must be statesmen to a degree, and statesmen have a responsibility likewise to understand the nature of the military means at their disposal. 'Battlefield performance' isn't something you can wall off from the larger strategic situation. If they were indeed so separate, we would be entitled to ask why so many generals sought to unify military and political power in their own person. Now, this isn't to say drawing up an order of battle and concluding an advantageous peace are the same skill, but rather that success as a general requires numerous connected skills. When we asses a general, we do look at the battles they fought, but we can only do so intelligibly when we put them in their strategic/political context. You don't fight them for their own sake; but rather to achieve a goal, and any evaluation of a general must consider how they met their objectives. If your assessment of a general doesn't encompass strategy, it's like reviewing a restaurant without mentioning the food. Generals are vested with their commands to win wars, not battles.

Marlborough didn't just happen to be on the losing side; his decisions in the seat of war directly caused his side to lose. If he was insensible to the political repercussions of his strategy, which caused the Allies to lose the war, there can be no harsher censure of his judgement. At best, you can say he completely misjudged the strength of his enemy; if he recognized that time was on his side (the Dutch and English being able to borrow money at lower rates than the French), he wouldn't have exposed his forces to severe losses like at Blenheim and Malplaquet, and would thus have kept his army in the field until the French were bankrupt. He fought well on the battlefield (until he didn't), but he was doing it for the wrong strategic reasons. We don't have to be held in rapt awe of battlefield victors; these men gamble with the lives of millions, and deserve to be held accountable for it. Frankly, men who unleash the savagery of war without a clear plan of how to win or success to justify it deserve to die on the scaffold.
 
This is a pretty juvenile view of war and generalship.

How so? I completely fail to see what the political situation has to do with actual performance on the battlefield. 100,000 men is 100,000 men regardless of whether they’re fighting for an ideology, squabbling nobles, or sheer bloodlust. Whether or not your seat of power is being threatened at home makes no difference during an artillery barrage. All the diplomatic skill in the world makes no difference if you can’t command worth a damn. That’s why there’s is a split between the army and the government in most functioning countries: because the military doesn’t need to concentrate on politics.

On the contrary, politics and war are a cohesive whole, sharing a basic logic. Generals must be statesmen to a degree, and statesmen have a responsibility likewise to understand the nature of the military means at their disposal.

That is true, but that is different than the battlefield. Do you honestly think it matters what your politics are when you’re concentrating on commanding men in real time?

'Battlefield performance' isn't something you can wall off from the larger strategic situation.

Yes you can, that’s why the idea of a tactical victory/defeat and strategic defeat/victory exist. Let’s take Cannae, which was an undeniable triumph by Carthage and showcased Hannibal’s generalship. The fact that it didn’t destroy Rome’s ability to fight doesn’t make Hannibal a bad general, it means that victory couldn’t be won in the field.

If they were indeed so separate, we would be entitled to ask why so many generals sought to unify military and political power in their own person.

Because plenty of people who control armies are power hungry and decide that they should have it all. Santana was a pisspoor general, but managed to rule Mexico. Should we add points to his horrible battlefield performance because he happened to lead a country? No, it’d be like giving a bad dentist leniency because he’s good at doing his taxes.

Now, this isn't to say drawing up an order of battle and concluding an advantageous peace are the same skill, but rather that success as a general requires numerous connected skills.

And you can look at individual parts of a person without judging them as a whole. If I’m a good driver, that doesn’t change that I suck at my job. You should not give or take points in an unrelated category just because I’m good or bad at something.

When we asses a general, we do look at the battles they fought, but we can only do so intelligibly when we put them in their strategic/political context.

Yes, but that doesn’t mean that their ability as a statesman should be taken into account for how well they perform on the battlefield. Lee was fighting an aggressive war against a power with more industry and manpower while belonging to a diplomatically and economically isolated one, yet scored victory after victory because he was aggressive. We don’t discount his ability as a General because he was given a shit logistical and diplomatic situation, we discount his ability because he was a one trick pony. Generalship is how well you utilize the resources given to you, diplomacy is getting those resources, and logistics is making sure you can keep getting those resources. Grant was a decent general who was great at diplomacy and logistics, but that doesn’t change the fact he relied on overwhelming firepower rather than tactical brilliance.

You don't fight them for their own sake; but rather to achieve a goal, and any evaluation of a general must consider how they met their objectives.

The objectives of a general are military, not diplomatic. You can be both a general and a statesman, but notice how the two are separate terms rather than general being all encompassing.

If your assessment of a general doesn't encompass strategy, it's like reviewing a restaurant without mentioning the food.

Actually it’d be like being asked how the food of a restaurant was and then going on a rant about how the service was terrible and the place was filthy. Yes, that’s the whole experience, but the question was about the food, not anything else.

Generals are vested with their commands to win wars, not battles.

Generals are given their commands because it is believed they will be good (or solely due to connections, but those types tend to be bad or mediocre) at winning battles, which in turn will win the war. It’s a vital distinction. If I hire an electrician to come fix the wiring on my AC because it’s sucking up too much electricity and making the bill cost too much, their job is still just fixing the AC rather than lowering my overall bill.

Marlborough didn't just happen to be on the losing side; his decisions in the seat of war directly caused his side to lose. If he was insensible to the political repercussions of his strategy, which caused the Allies to lose the war, there can be no harsher censure of his judgement.

That shows poorly of him as a statesman, not as a general.

At best, you can say he completely misjudged the strength of his enemy; if he recognized that time was on his side (the Dutch and English being able to borrow money at lower rates than the French), he wouldn't have exposed his forces to severe losses like at Blenheim and Malplaquet, and would thus have kept his army in the field until the French were bankrupt. He fought well on the battlefield (until he didn't), but he was doing it for the wrong strategic reasons. We don't have to be held in rapt awe of battlefield victors; these men gamble with the lives of millions, and deserve to be held accountable for it. Frankly, men who unleash the savagery of war without a clear plan of how to win or success to justify it deserve to die on the scaffold.

Once again, this has nothing to do with battlefield performance. Blowing your alliance, bankrupting your nation, provoking a rebellion due to poor occupation policy, and a myriad other problems speak poorly of your diplomatic or economic skill, but they speak nothing of how well you command on the battlefield. Once again, Napoleon alienated his allies, blew through France’s manpower on numerous campaigns, failed to create an economic blockade on Britain despite having the strongest army around, thought logistics was a fancy word for looting the countryside, and got lots of people killed due to his ego. But he was damn good on the battlefield. He was a strong general, bad statesman, and poor economist. Overall, he was a lackluster leader, but that doesn’t change the fact that he was a good general. Performance on the battlefield is all that matters when judging a general’s skill. We don’t say “Oh, you were cut off from resupply and fighting with a force with poor morale? You obviously suck at leading soldiers,” so why would the inverse be true?
 
How so? I completely fail to see what the political situation has to do with actual performance on the battlefield. 100,000 men is 100,000 men regardless of whether they’re fighting for an ideology, squabbling nobles, or sheer bloodlust. Whether or not your seat of power is being threatened at home makes no difference during an artillery barrage. All the diplomatic skill in the world makes no difference if you can’t command worth a damn. That’s why there’s is a split between the army and the government in most functioning countries: because the military doesn’t need to concentrate on politics.

Nothing could be further from the truth; the character of a war, the emotions excited, and the objectives sought exert a dominating influence on the formulation and execution of strategy.


That is true, but that is different than the battlefield. Do you honestly think it matters what your politics are when you’re concentrating on commanding men in real time?

An analyst who cannot see the role of the general beyond the battlefield has no more an inkling of warfare than the last signed drummer boy. The only reason you're bothering commanding men is because of the political situation; only its political instrumentality distinguishes war from senseless slaughter.

Yes you can, that’s why the idea of a tactical victory/defeat and strategic defeat/victory exist. Let’s take Cannae, which was an undeniable triumph by Carthage and showcased Hannibal’s generalship. The fact that it didn’t destroy Rome’s ability to fight doesn’t make Hannibal a bad general, it means that victory couldn’t be won in the field.

And there's a reason strategic victories are overwhelmingly more important, and anyone who believes tactical victories are more important than strategic ones in assessing a general will have a very confusing ride through the history of warfare. I honestly have a hard time believing you seriously don't think strategy falls within a general's purview. The reason Cannae is important is because it got a substantial number of Rome's allies to defect, not because of the men left dead on the field; the fighting was simply a means to detach Rome's main source of troops. This was how Carthage attempted to win the war, and indeed how Rome did ultimately triumph. Scipio's achievement in Spain was not a double envelopment, but the removal of Carthage's most important source of military manpower, which led to Rome's ascendancy in the final phase of the war.

Because plenty of people who control armies are power hungry and decide that they should have it all. Santana was a pisspoor general, but managed to rule Mexico. Should we add points to his horrible battlefield performance because he happened to lead a country? No, it’d be like giving a bad dentist leniency because he’s good at doing his taxes.

I was going to say this was the most ridiculous thing you've said so far, but then I remembered everything else. Regardless, the union of political and military power has always been regarded as extremely advantageous, from Philip of Macedon to Frederick the Great and Napoleon; war is simply the continuation of politics with an admixture of other means. The politician and the general seek the same goals; they are entrusted with safeguarding the collective interests of their community and expanding its power. They differ only in that the general pursues this with armies while the politician employs negotiation. Indeed, both often use the others' means, even when not united in the person of a warlord. The division is to a degree artificial, being the product of historical developments in government structures rather than strict theoretical necessity. Political and military power throughout history have often been united in the head of state, whose practical sole function until the 19th century was as a warlord, precisely because it facilitates the coordination of violent and non violent means towards common ends.

And you can look at individual parts of a person without judging them as a whole. If I’m a good driver, that doesn’t change that I suck at my job. You should not give or take points in an unrelated category just because I’m good or bad at something.

They're not unrelated categories; it would be like saying you're a great chef because you can chop onions, peel vegetables, and brown meat really well when every dish you attempt still comes out a failure. Winning a given battle is only a portion of what a general does, and it is a means rather than an end in and of itself.

Yes, but that doesn’t mean that their ability as a statesman should be taken into account for how well they perform on the battlefield. Lee was fighting an aggressive war against a power with more industry and manpower while belonging to a diplomatically and economically isolated one, yet scored victory after victory because he was aggressive. We don’t discount his ability as a General because he was given a shit logistical and diplomatic situation, we discount his ability because he was a one trick pony. Generalship is how well you utilize the resources given to you, diplomacy is getting those resources, and logistics is making sure you can keep getting those resources. Grant was a decent general who was great at diplomacy and logistics, but that doesn’t change the fact he relied on overwhelming firepower rather than tactical brilliance. The objectives of a general are military, not diplomatic. You can be both a general and a statesman, but notice how the two are separate terms rather than general being all encompassing.

Again, my whole point is that there's more to a general than performance on the battlefield. Simply in terms of using resources effectively, the general must have a deep and practical understanding of the political objectives he's meant to obtain. The general is charged with determining military objectives, and can only do so in a rational manner to ensure success by keeping them in relation to the political objectives. Alexander pursued the destruction of the Persian armies because he could not rule Persia until their capacity to fight back was eliminated. The political goals of his campaigns exerted a dominating influence over their conception and prosecution. Frederick the Great set himself the military goal of occupying most of Saxony so he could achieve his political goal of getting something to trade for the County of Glatz at the end of the Seven Years War. The Duke of Wellington in 1815 disposed his forces to cover the approaches to Ghent because of the political importance of maintaining confidence in the Bourbon dynasty. Generals are not handed military objectives to achieve; they decide the military objectives based on the political goals of the war. This is the most important act of judgement a general can make, and making the wrong choice means a general has failed his highest duty.

Actually it’d be like being asked how the food of a restaurant was and then going on a rant about how the service was terrible and the place was filthy. Yes, that’s the whole experience, but the question was about the food, not anything else.

Battles are the platters that generals use to deliver you your political goals; if they don't work, the general is a failure, no matter how nice they look.

Generals are given their commands because it is believed they will be good (or solely due to connections, but those types tend to be bad or mediocre) at winning battles, which in turn will win the war. It’s a vital distinction. If I hire an electrician to come fix the wiring on my AC because it’s sucking up too much electricity and making the bill cost too much, their job is still just fixing the AC rather than lowering my overall bill.

It's good then that we expect or should expect greater scope of judgement from generals we entrust with the lives of our countrymen and the honor of the nation than we do electricians. Generals know their job is to win the war, not individual battles, and are given latitude to decide when and where to fight so they can tailor their campaign to the objectives of the war.

That shows poorly of him as a statesman, not as a general.

There is literally no way for a general to fail harder than for his military decisions to cause the defeat of his side. If this does not make someone a bad general, then nothing can.

Once again, this has nothing to do with battlefield performance. Blowing your alliance, bankrupting your nation, provoking a rebellion due to poor occupation policy, and a myriad other problems speak poorly of your diplomatic or economic skill, but they speak nothing of how well you command on the battlefield. Once again, Napoleon alienated his allies, blew through France’s manpower on numerous campaigns, failed to create an economic blockade on Britain despite having the strongest army around, thought logistics was a fancy word for looting the countryside, and got lots of people killed due to his ego. But he was damn good on the battlefield. He was a strong general, bad statesman, and poor economist. Overall, he was a lackluster leader, but that doesn’t change the fact that he was a good general. Performance on the battlefield is all that matters when judging a general’s skill. We don’t say “Oh, you were cut off from resupply and fighting with a force with poor morale? You obviously suck at leading soldiers,” so why would the inverse be true?

I wonder what you consider the scope of a general's responsibility. Tell me when to stop. Leading a charge on the battlefield. Committing reserves. Deploying the army. Drawing up its dispositions. Getting the army to the field. Choosing the field. Drawing the enemy to battle. Deciding when to fight. Picking the main theater of war. Deciding whether to delay a decision or pursue it. Targeting the enemy's ability to fight or their will. Administering and training armies. Raising armies. Negotiating peaces.

This is by no means the limit on the historical scope of generals' powers, as necessity has often led to their taking possession of the state to better unify the prosecution of the war effort, but even within a context of military subordination, they are almost always given latitude beyond 'the battlefield', whatever you think that to mean. If the responsibilities of a general really do stop at the battlefield, then you're using a worthless criterion (and we should then really be talking about politicians anyway), since historically very few generals indeed would content themselves with nothing more than drawing up an order of battle on the fated day. The best generals not only summon titanic mental energy and endurance, but apply this moral force where it will have the best effect, which almost always means towards ever higher spheres of warmaking, and sustain the same energy through to execution. Simply put, a good general prioritizes strategy over tactics; those who don't should never be entrusted with the swords they would presume to draw.

I was going to say you're 200 years behind the curve, but that's very unfair to the ancients, who understood the political dimensions of warmaking and the responsibilities of their leaders far better than you.
 
Not really. If he had properly considered logistics, he would have taken the main army to the Baltic where resupply by sea was available

I'm afraid that you (a) missed sarcasm (there was smiley at the end) and (b) the fact that trying to do something properly and doing something properly is not the same. Charles definitely tried to arrange for a proper logistics (hence Lewnehaupt's army marching from Livonia with supply train and artillery). Doing things properly within framework of the ongoing campaign would mean making a realistic assessment of how long would it take to assemble reinforcements and supplies and to bring them to Mogilev where Charles was waiting. Rendezvous was planned for August, Lewenhaupt was not there even on September 26 when Charles gave up and marched toward Ukraine with Lewenhaupt still being 135 kilometers away. Point of the Rendezvous was reassigned but 2 armies were still widely separated which gave Peter an opportunity to attack Lewenhaupt at Lesnaya with the end result being loss of all Swedish supply train.

Chosing Baltic area as the main theater would make sense as a way to get back the Swedish territories already lost but "Charles-strategist" was planning a decisive blow which would force Peter to surrender (and give back everything he conquered). Of course, being a lousy strategist, Charles overestimated his potential and ability to achieve a desired goal: Russia was considerably bigger than Saxony and so was Peter's potential for raising the new armies.

If he had properly assessed his army's capabilities, he would have sought peace after Augustus had been deposed

Well, Peter offered peace more than once but Charles did not want to cede a single piece of the Swedish territory while Peter wanted to retain a part of Ingria with St-Petersburg.

If he had properly concentrated his forces, Lewenhaupt would not have been defeated at Lesnaya. Lucky for Charles, he fought Peter. A competent commander would have destroyed the Swedes piecemeal. First, Lewenhaupt, then Lybecker and then Charles long before he could get to the Cossacks

Well, it was not just Peter but his army in general: its general quality was not up to the Swedish level and its generals were, shall we say, "average". However, at Lesnaya the strategic goal was achieved: Lewenhaupt brought to Charles few thousands soldiers without artillery and supplies, generally making his situation worse. "Getting to the Cossacks" was one of the worst things Charles could do: most of them remained loyal to Peter and supplies collected by Mazepa had been destroyed by Menshikov. Charles ended up in a middle of nowhere in the systematically destroyed area. By the time of Poltava risk of confronting him was minimal.
 
Typically when you are discussing who is the best general, you’re talking about performance on the battlefield, which is different from diplomacy.

Battles constitute just a part of the war. The armies of the XVIII century had been doing a lot of maneuvering, marching and sieges so general's quality includes ability to maintain his troops in a good order, coordinate their movements and to gain an upper hand by combination of all means available. For example, Battle of Denain was, strictly speaking, not a major battle but rather a successful maneuver with the minimal losses on both sides. However, it turned to be a decisive event that allowed French to regain most of the towns they had lost in the region in previous years and to make a reasonably good peace.

Saying an individual general isn’t as good as some other general because one was on the winning side and the other wasn’t is about as off-topic as you can get. Battlefield prowess has nothing to do with strategic or diplomatic skill, as Napoleon showed.

This simply does not make sense if one is talking about a general in charge of an army: both tactics and strategy must be parts of his qualifications and Napoleon at his peak performance demonstrated close to the perfect combination of both, which allowed him to win the wars.
 
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As I already said, we are in an agreement regarding Eugene's track record and, as I mentioned, Eugene is getting the "extra points" for achieving victories with the troops that were often inferior to those of his opponents (especially when he was facing the French) and under the circumstances when his troops were not properly supplied or paid on time (tells a lot about his personal authority among the troops).

To be fair, Marlborough paid a lot of attention to making sure he always had adequate supplies, so if he rarely had to fight a battle with unsupplied troops that's largely a reflection of his own skill.

Marlborough didn't just happen to be on the losing side; his decisions in the seat of war directly caused his side to lose. If he was insensible to the political repercussions of his strategy, which caused the Allies to lose the war, there can be no harsher censure of his judgement. At best, you can say he completely misjudged the strength of his enemy; if he recognized that time was on his side (the Dutch and English being able to borrow money at lower rates than the French), he wouldn't have exposed his forces to severe losses like at Blenheim and Malplaquet, and would thus have kept his army in the field until the French were bankrupt. He fought well on the battlefield (until he didn't), but he was doing it for the wrong strategic reasons. We don't have to be held in rapt awe of battlefield victors; these men gamble with the lives of millions, and deserve to be held accountable for it. Frankly, men who unleash the savagery of war without a clear plan of how to win or success to justify it deserve to die on the scaffold.

I think you're the one misjudging the strength of the sides. Even if England and the Netherlands were able to borrow money more cheaply, France was still easily the largest and wealthiest country in Europe, so there's no guarantee that just sitting tight and staying on the defensive would cause the French war effort to collapse. Plus, the anti-French coalition was a fissiparous one at the best of times, so there was always the danger that, if it looked like the Allies weren't making any headway, one or more countries would pull out, causing the war effort to collapse (which is in fact what ended up happening). Blenheim was fought to prevent Vienna falling to the French, an occurrence which would have certainly led to Austria surrendering and the collapse of the Grand Alliance, and is widely considered one of the greatest victories of the war, so singling it out as an example of senseless and unjustified slaughter brought about by bad English strategy seems a little odd.

As for why the Allies lost, I'd say there are two main reasons, neither of which had anything to do with Marlborough. The first is the Allies' demand that Louis send troops to help remove Philip V from Spain, without which he'd almost certainly have agreed to a peace in 1708 or early 1709. The second is the election of Archduke Charles as Holy Roman Emperor, and consequent unwillingness of the rest of the Allies to replace a Bourbon domination of Europe with a Hapsburg one.
 
To be fair, Marlborough paid a lot of attention to making sure he always had adequate supplies, so if he rarely had to fight a battle with unsupplied troops that's largely a reflection of his own skill.

I did not deny his skills but he was usually well funded while Eugene usually was not.

I think you're the one misjudging the strength of the sides. Even if England and the Netherlands were able to borrow money more cheaply, France was still easily the largest and wealthiest country in Europe,

It is true to a certain degree but it should be remembered that by his endless wars and and court-related expenses Louis XIV was consistently destroying French economy. Somewhere in the middle of the WofSS he was forced to melt most of the silver plate to get money and by the end of a war France was in a very bad shape.

As for why the Allies lost,

I'm not sure that they "lost". They definitely did not get everything they wanted when at the peak of their success but each of the allies got something substantial.

I'd say there are two main reasons, neither of which had anything to do with Marlborough. The first is the Allies' demand that Louis send troops to help remove Philip V from Spain, without which he'd almost certainly have agreed to a peace in 1708 or early 1709. The second is the election of Archduke Charles as Holy Roman Emperor, and consequent unwillingness of the rest of the Allies to replace a Bourbon domination of Europe with a Hapsburg one.

I would not say that the allies "lost" because each of them got at least something valuable. Of course, the Whig policy of "No Peace Without Spain" seems, at least with a benefit of a hindsight, quite idiotic because it would mean to something close to a revived empire of Charles V, which hardly was in the British interests.
 
I think you're the one misjudging the strength of the sides. Even if England and the Netherlands were able to borrow money more cheaply, France was still easily the largest and wealthiest country in Europe, so there's no guarantee that just sitting tight and staying on the defensive would cause the French war effort to collapse. Plus, the anti-French coalition was a fissiparous one at the best of times, so there was always the danger that, if it looked like the Allies weren't making any headway, one or more countries would pull out, causing the war effort to collapse (which is in fact what ended up happening). Blenheim was fought to prevent Vienna falling to the French, an occurrence which would have certainly led to Austria surrendering and the collapse of the Grand Alliance, and is widely considered one of the greatest victories of the war, so singling it out as an example of senseless and unjustified slaughter brought about by bad English strategy seems a little odd.

As for why the Allies lost, I'd say there are two main reasons, neither of which had anything to do with Marlborough. The first is the Allies' demand that Louis send troops to help remove Philip V from Spain, without which he'd almost certainly have agreed to a peace in 1708 or early 1709. The second is the election of Archduke Charles as Holy Roman Emperor, and consequent unwillingness of the rest of the Allies to replace a Bourbon domination of Europe with a Hapsburg one.

For the allies, it was more important that they avoid a major defeat than appear to be making superficial progress; they were on the defensive, and with their superior financial institutions but lesser physical strength, time, which they could purchase more cheaply, was on their side. Even great victories like Blenheim came at a cost; Marlborough lost a quarter of his army in a day of fighting, and what the Allies could take spread over several years, they couldn't if the losses were concentrated in a few days. Malplaquet was even worse, and pushed the Tories towards a withdrawal from the war. Marlborough's failure in that campaign led to the collapse of the Allies' commonality of interest, the center of gravity of successful coalitions.
 
As for why the Allies lost, I'd say there are two main reasons, neither of which had anything to do with Marlborough. The first is the Allies' demand that Louis send troops to help remove Philip V from Spain, without which he'd almost certainly have agreed to a peace in 1708 or early 1709. The second is the election of Archduke Charles as Holy Roman Emperor, and consequent unwillingness of the rest of the Allies to replace a Bourbon domination of Europe with a Hapsburg one.

There was also the fact that the war was drawing on seemingly without end, and increasingly bloodily (. Something Marlborough had tried to prevent by advocating a) an advance down the Moselle and b) an amphibious landing on the Channel coast supplied by the Royal Navy, in both cases bypassing the pre carre. The first was blocked by Villars and the second by the Dutch.

Even great victories like Blenheim came at a cost; Marlborough lost a quarter of his army in a day of fighting, and what the Allies could take spread over several years, they couldn't if the losses were concentrated in a few days.

They could have taken the loss of Vienna even less, which was on the cards before the Schellenberg, and a plausible threat still existed until Tallard's army was destroyed and Marsin's ejected from the Danube valley.

Malplaquet was even worse, and pushed the Tories towards a withdrawal from the war. Marlborough's failure in that campaign led to the collapse of the Allies' commonality of interest, the center of gravity of successful coalitions.

I wouldn't call the campaign of 1709 a failure. It certainly wasn't a repeat of Ramillies, but Tournai and Mons weren't trivial fortresses, and the alliance held together for years afterwards.
 
I wonder what you consider the scope of a general's responsibility. Tell me when to stop. Leading a charge on the battlefield. Committing reserves. Deploying the army. Drawing up its dispositions. Getting the army to the field. Choosing the field. Drawing the enemy to battle. Deciding when to fight. Picking the main theater of war. Deciding whether to delay a decision or pursue it. Targeting the enemy's ability to fight or their will. Administering and training armies. Raising armies. Negotiating peaces.

You touched the very important issue of discussing a subject that was not clearly defined (during my career I found that this is a problem extending well beyond the historic discussions). Usual result of such discussions is an unproductive mess. :teary:

Here we have at least 2 major areas requiring the clear definition:

1st, meaning of the term "general". Even if we limit it to the XVIII century it may mean (a) any officer of a certain rank including those who never had an independent command, (b) commander of an army, (c) supreme commander of all fighting armies.

Each of these meanings implies different duties and while personally leading charge of the troops may be laudable in the (a) and sometimes even (b) it is hardly complimentary for (c). Personal training of the troops down to the platoon level - the same because a supreme commander should have other things to do.

On the opposite level of the duties, the diplomatic negotiations are rarely a part of (a)'s duties, often part of (b)'s and almost definitely a major part of (c)'s. The same goes for the tactical moves and strategy.

Surely, picking the theater of war is not (a)'s business and rarely even (b)'s, even Eugene did not have a complete freedom of choosing on which theater exactly he wants to fight.

2nd, related to the 1st, is criteria of the "best": with the duties being noticeably different, how can you use one-size-fits all approach? What if general of category (c) really excels in the activities associated with (a) and (b) but fails in (c)? Charles XII is the most obvious case within this time slot. He was probably the best tactician while being a failure as (c). Villars and Eugene formally were on (b) level (with some allowances for a great independence) and were successful both in strategic and diplomatic duties which could belong to (c). Marlborough was (c) outside Peninsula but his de facto control over the non-British troops was limited; he was definitely very good in the strategic & battlefield areas but his somewhat over-advertised diplomatic skills were adequate mostly for keeping the alliance together because his negotiations with Charles XII failed (I wonder who could be successful with this one) and so did his negotiations with the French (even with the allowance for him not completely sharing the Whigs political views). So how are we going to prioritize them objectively?
 
Nothing could be further from the truth; the character of a war, the emotions excited, and the objectives sought exert a dominating influence on the formulation and execution of strategy.




An analyst who cannot see the role of the general beyond the battlefield has no more an inkling of warfare than the last signed drummer boy. The only reason you're bothering commanding men is because of the political situation; only its political instrumentality distinguishes war from senseless slaughter.



And there's a reason strategic victories are overwhelmingly more important, and anyone who believes tactical victories are more important than strategic ones in assessing a general will have a very confusing ride through the history of warfare. I honestly have a hard time believing you seriously don't think strategy falls within a general's purview. The reason Cannae is important is because it got a substantial number of Rome's allies to defect, not because of the men left dead on the field; the fighting was simply a means to detach Rome's main source of troops. This was how Carthage attempted to win the war, and indeed how Rome did ultimately triumph. Scipio's achievement in Spain was not a double envelopment, but the removal of Carthage's most important source of military manpower, which led to Rome's ascendancy in the final phase of the war.



I was going to say this was the most ridiculous thing you've said so far, but then I remembered everything else. Regardless, the union of political and military power has always been regarded as extremely advantageous, from Philip of Macedon to Frederick the Great and Napoleon; war is simply the continuation of politics with an admixture of other means. The politician and the general seek the same goals; they are entrusted with safeguarding the collective interests of their community and expanding its power. They differ only in that the general pursues this with armies while the politician employs negotiation. Indeed, both often use the others' means, even when not united in the person of a warlord. The division is to a degree artificial, being the product of historical developments in government structures rather than strict theoretical necessity. Political and military power throughout history have often been united in the head of state, whose practical sole function until the 19th century was as a warlord, precisely because it facilitates the coordination of violent and non violent means towards common ends.



They're not unrelated categories; it would be like saying you're a great chef because you can chop onions, peel vegetables, and brown meat really well when every dish you attempt still comes out a failure. Winning a given battle is only a portion of what a general does, and it is a means rather than an end in and of itself.



Again, my whole point is that there's more to a general than performance on the battlefield. Simply in terms of using resources effectively, the general must have a deep and practical understanding of the political objectives he's meant to obtain. The general is charged with determining military objectives, and can only do so in a rational manner to ensure success by keeping them in relation to the political objectives. Alexander pursued the destruction of the Persian armies because he could not rule Persia until their capacity to fight back was eliminated. The political goals of his campaigns exerted a dominating influence over their conception and prosecution. Frederick the Great set himself the military goal of occupying most of Saxony so he could achieve his political goal of getting something to trade for the County of Glatz at the end of the Seven Years War. The Duke of Wellington in 1815 disposed his forces to cover the approaches to Ghent because of the political importance of maintaining confidence in the Bourbon dynasty. Generals are not handed military objectives to achieve; they decide the military objectives based on the political goals of the war. This is the most important act of judgement a general can make, and making the wrong choice means a general has failed his highest duty.



Battles are the platters that generals use to deliver you your political goals; if they don't work, the general is a failure, no matter how nice they look.



It's good then that we expect or should expect greater scope of judgement from generals we entrust with the lives of our countrymen and the honor of the nation than we do electricians. Generals know their job is to win the war, not individual battles, and are given latitude to decide when and where to fight so they can tailor their campaign to the objectives of the war.



There is literally no way for a general to fail harder than for his military decisions to cause the defeat of his side. If this does not make someone a bad general, then nothing can.



I wonder what you consider the scope of a general's responsibility. Tell me when to stop. Leading a charge on the battlefield. Committing reserves. Deploying the army. Drawing up its dispositions. Getting the army to the field. Choosing the field. Drawing the enemy to battle. Deciding when to fight. Picking the main theater of war. Deciding whether to delay a decision or pursue it. Targeting the enemy's ability to fight or their will. Administering and training armies. Raising armies. Negotiating peaces.

This is by no means the limit on the historical scope of generals' powers, as necessity has often led to their taking possession of the state to better unify the prosecution of the war effort, but even within a context of military subordination, they are almost always given latitude beyond 'the battlefield', whatever you think that to mean. If the responsibilities of a general really do stop at the battlefield, then you're using a worthless criterion (and we should then really be talking about politicians anyway), since historically very few generals indeed would content themselves with nothing more than drawing up an order of battle on the fated day. The best generals not only summon titanic mental energy and endurance, but apply this moral force where it will have the best effect, which almost always means towards ever higher spheres of warmaking, and sustain the same energy through to execution. Simply put, a good general prioritizes strategy over tactics; those who don't should never be entrusted with the swords they would presume to draw.

I was going to say you're 200 years behind the curve, but that's very unfair to the ancients, who understood the political dimensions of warmaking and the responsibilities of their leaders far better than you.

Your entire thing is thinking that the disparate parts of war are all one thing when they are rather interlocking parts that can be separated and examined individually. I never said diplomacy, logistics, allied coordination, and administrative ability are useless or less important than generalship, I said that they don’t have anything to do with generalship, which is how one performs on the battlefield. Yes, making sure you don’t alienate your powerbase is important, but that’s diplomacy. Yes, the economic and resource-mobilizing aspects of war are important, but those are administration. Making sure your troops are supplied is logistics. Commanding men on the battlefield is generalship. You confuse being a leader with being a general. You’re calling a square a rectangle.

Tell me when to stop

It ends at targeting the enemy’s ability or will to fight, although I would content that picking the theatre of deployment is beyond the scope of a general and is a mix of politics and a unified high command. But once a general has been deployed to a region, their skill is determined by how well they utilize their resources (casualty ratio, how often they outstrip their supply lines, whether they can lead their army without getting it savaged, inspiring the men, extracting themselves from lost situations, knowing when to call it quits, etc.). Beyond that it is a different set of abilities. And once again, you can be a good general and an abysmal failure at diplomacy. And, once again, I bring up Napoleon, who you conveniently choose to ignore. He was a mediocre leader who succeeded due to his skill as a general. He could win battles, but never secure a stable peace. And that is all I have to say on the matter because a. Your condescension is pushing me close to actionable offenses, b. You ignore what I said in order to repeat something that I only disagree with in terms of classification, c. You’re a tactless individual who can’t even show basic respect.
 
I'm not sure that they "lost". They definitely did not get everything they wanted when at the peak of their success but each of the allies got something substantial.

Well, the war ended with a Bourbon on the throne of Spain, so in that sense you could argue that the Allies lost. Then again, they did manage to prevent a Franco-Spanish union, and the British at least certainly came out of the war in a better situation than they'd gone in, so I'd say that the UK won the peace regardless of whether you think the Allies or French won the war.

For the allies, it was more important that they avoid a major defeat than appear to be making superficial progress; they were on the defensive, and with their superior financial institutions but lesser physical strength, time, which they could purchase more cheaply, was on their side. Even great victories like Blenheim came at a cost; Marlborough lost a quarter of his army in a day of fighting, and what the Allies could take spread over several years, they couldn't if the losses were concentrated in a few days. Malplaquet was even worse, and pushed the Tories towards a withdrawal from the war. Marlborough's failure in that campaign led to the collapse of the Allies' commonality of interest, the center of gravity of successful coalitions.

As @Captain Seafort pointed out, the French were threatening to take Vienna before Blenheim; had they succeeded, the Austrians would certainly have been knocked out of the war, which would have been far more damaging to the Allied war effort than the loss of 12,000 soldiers. Also, I don't see how you can say that the Allies were on the defensive: the war started with Philip V on the throne of Spain, and the Allies had to try and kick him out, for which a defensive strategy wouldn't have worked for obvious reasons. Nor could a defensive strategy have guaranteed that France would go bankrupt, since it would mean that Louis would be able to pick and choose which theatres he sent his men to fight in, so limiting his military operations to what he could afford.
 
Marlborough was (c) outside Peninsula but his de facto control over the non-British troops was limited; he was definitely very good in the strategic & battlefield areas but his somewhat over-advertised diplomatic skills were adequate mostly for keeping the alliance together because his negotiations with Charles XII failed (I wonder who could be successful with this one) and so did his negotiations with the French (even with the allowance for him not completely sharing the Whigs political views).

I don't think Marlborough was in charge of negotiations with the French, was he? I know Louis' agents tried to bribe him to write despatches home saying that the war was hopeless and England should sue for peace, but peace negotiations were carried out by Her Majesty's Government.
 
Your entire thing is thinking that the disparate parts of war are all one thing when they are rather interlocking parts that can be separated and examined individually. I never said diplomacy, logistics, allied coordination, and administrative ability are useless or less important than generalship, I said that they don’t have anything to do with generalship, which is how one performs on the battlefield. Yes, making sure you don’t alienate your powerbase is important, but that’s diplomacy. Yes, the economic and resource-mobilizing aspects of war are important, but those are administration. Making sure your troops are supplied is logistics. Commanding men on the battlefield is generalship. You confuse being a leader with being a general. You’re calling a square a rectangle.



It ends at targeting the enemy’s ability or will to fight, although I would content that picking the theatre of deployment is beyond the scope of a general and is a mix of politics and a unified high command. But once a general has been deployed to a region, their skill is determined by how well they utilize their resources (casualty ratio, how often they outstrip their supply lines, whether they can lead their army without getting it savaged, inspiring the men, extracting themselves from lost situations, knowing when to call it quits, etc.). Beyond that it is a different set of abilities. And once again, you can be a good general and an abysmal failure at diplomacy. And, once again, I bring up Napoleon, who you conveniently choose to ignore. He was a mediocre leader who succeeded due to his skill as a general. He could win battles, but never secure a stable peace. And that is all I have to say on the matter because a. Your condescension is pushing me close to actionable offenses, b. You ignore what I said in order to repeat something that I only disagree with in terms of classification, c. You’re a tactless individual who can’t even show basic respect.
If you really think there's nothing more to generalship as such than tactics I don't know what to tell you.

As @Captain Seafort pointed out, the French were threatening to take Vienna before Blenheim; had they succeeded, the Austrians would certainly have been knocked out of the war, which would have been far more damaging to the Allied war effort than the loss of 12,000 soldiers. Also, I don't see how you can say that the Allies were on the defensive: the war started with Philip V on the throne of Spain, and the Allies had to try and kick him out, for which a defensive strategy wouldn't have worked for obvious reasons. Nor could a defensive strategy have guaranteed that France would go bankrupt, since it would mean that Louis would be able to pick and choose which theatres he sent his men to fight in, so limiting his military operations to what he could afford.
I'm using Blenheim here as an example of the costs of a decisive battle strategy, and it differs to a degree from Marlborough's later battles because of the urgency of the situation; he was not faced with similar necessity at Malplaquet, for example. Risk and opportunity always go side-by-side in war. A decisive battle in theory offers greater results than a score of sieges, but blood and good fortune is required for the former, while the latter is primarily a matter of money. By pursuing a decision, Marlborough was playing to the French strengths, rather than those of the maritime powers, who had the financial resources to pursue a cautious Fabian strategy. By avoiding a decision but maintaining the war of sieges, they could have forced Louis XIV to maintain a large army in the region, which he could not do indefinitely.

@alexmilman

I would propose that we try to limit the discussion at least to independent commanders, if not supreme commanders/commanders of main armies, on the grounds that their efforts produce the most important results, and that the criteria for best be their ability to produce results in the context of their situation.

Just to throw out some examples, Frederick the Great in the Seven Years War did not achieve results on the scale of Eugene's conquest of Hungary. However, the fact that he was not utterly crushed and his kingdom partitioned between the three great powers, and that he managed to retain all his territory with sound finances, reflects well on him, given the disparity of forces involved. While Frederick limited his efforts and could thus boast few positive results owing to the disparity of forces, Eugene achieved extraordinary results against the Ottomans with basic parity of forces.

On one extreme ends of the spectrum, Alexander the Great achieved extraordinary results despite remarkable inferiority of strength. On the other end, the fact that England, a small state in comparison to France, was able to defy and even humiliate its larger, more powerful rival in the Edwardian phase in the Hundred Years War reflects very poorly on the generalship of Philip VI and John II.

Just so I'm not misunderstood, inferiority of forces is never a good thing; the duty of the statesman and the general is to set themselves up for the greatest success, and the best way to do this is by employing the greatest possible force. Inferiority in this respect can only be a necessary evil in war, and can only be justified by success. Nevertheless, for us as analysts, we recognize that certain talents are best displayed in adversity of one kind or another, and great generals enable their states to win greater successes than they otherwise would, allowing small states to punch above their weight and large ones to contemplate supremacy.
 
I'm using Blenheim here as an example of the costs of a decisive battle strategy, and it differs to a degree from Marlborough's later battles because of the urgency of the situation; he was not faced with similar necessity at Malplaquet, for example. Risk and opportunity always go side-by-side in war. A decisive battle in theory offers greater results than a score of sieges, but blood and good fortune is required for the former, while the latter is primarily a matter of money. By pursuing a decision, Marlborough was playing to the French strengths, rather than those of the maritime powers, who had the financial resources to pursue a cautious Fabian strategy. By avoiding a decision but maintaining the war of sieges, they could have forced Louis XIV to maintain a large army in the region, which he could not do indefinitely.

The War of the Spanish Succession was a war of sieges: Marlborough fought four battles but over thirty sieges, for example. Even a war of sieges will involve some battles, however, so simply dismissing Marlborough as a bad general for fighting battles seems more than a little unreasonable.
 
The War of the Spanish Succession was a war of sieges: Marlborough fought four battles but over thirty sieges, for example. Even a war of sieges will involve some battles, however, so simply dismissing Marlborough as a bad general for fighting battles seems more than a little unreasonable.
There's a difference between fighting battles out of necessity or opportunity and making them your preferred course of action; Marlborough didn't have to put his army through the meat grinder of Malplaquet, and in doing so he contributed materially to the Tory anti-war faction and its political ascendancy. It would have been one thing if by his threat to Mons he could have induced Villars to attack him in a strong position -he was under orders not to let the fortress fall- but Marlborough allowed himself to be drawn into a frontal attack on a fortified position. Marlborough was trying to pursue a rapid decision when time was on his side, and the course of events did not vindicate his judgement.

All that said, I don't necessarily think Marlborough is a bad general. Certainly, I wouldn't go as far as some experts I know who think Marlborough's thinking is wholly antithetical to the Early Modern period; the pursuit of decisive battle and the strategic offensive were definitely valid strategic approaches during this period according to circumstances. My view though is that it happened not to be the optimal course in the War of Spanish Succession, and Marlborough deserves to be held accountable for his part in that disappointment.

Moreover, when it comes to writing history, I think peoples' interpretations have been a bit colored by Whiggish historical thought; because later armies in the Napoleonic Wars through the 20th century sought decisive battles with success, Marlborough's approach heralded the future and was therefor good. When the focus is too narrowly tactical, concentrating on i.e. casualty figures, it gives a false impression of clarity in a very ambiguous war, a field of human activity already dubbed the province of uncertainty. In my opinion, this distracts us from the most important criteria in judging a general, which is strategic results, where Marlborough falls somewhat short of his Anglophone reputation. You can still argue that Marlborough was a great general, I just want to be sure people are doing so for the right reasons.
 
Lewenhaupt did not carry supplies and artillery for the main army - the main army lived off the land. Lewenhaupt was to move from Livonia through some pretty devastated lands that were low-density population from the start. The supply he brought with him was for his own force, not for the main army and would have been completely inadequate for the main army. Peter Englund makes it pretty clear in his book on Poltava that the reason Karl XII did not stick around and wait for Lewenhaupt was the lack of supplies, which would not have been resoved by acquiring whatever Lewenhaupt brought with him.

Lewenhaupt lost the supplies and the artillery and about half his force at Lesnaya, but that did not really effect the supply situation of the main army.
 
All that said, I don't necessarily think Marlborough is a bad general. Certainly, I wouldn't go as far as some experts I know who think Marlborough's thinking is wholly antithetical to the Early Modern period; the pursuit of decisive battle and the strategic offensive were definitely valid strategic approaches during this period according to circumstances. My view though is that it happened not to be the optimal course in the War of Spanish Succession, and Marlborough deserves to be held accountable for his part in that disappointment.

What exactly do you think was disappointing about the War of the Spanish Succession from the Allied perspective? I mean, sure, they didn't keep Philip from the Spanish throne, but they did manage to prevent a Franco-Spanish union, which had been the big fear, and their failure in Spain owed far more to the local population's preference for Philip over Charles than it did to any flaws in Allied strategy in the Low Countries. (Indeed, if anything a Fabian strategy there would have made the Allied forces in Spain even less likely to win, since it would have enabled Louis to divert more troops to the Peninsula.) Other than that, various Allied powers got their hands on bits of the Spanish and French empires, and Britain got some highly advantageous trading rights to the New World. Maybe they didn't get everything they'd demanded, but then very few wars end with one side getting everything it asks for.
 
I don't think Marlborough was in charge of negotiations with the French, was he?

I stand corrected: at Geertruidenberg (1710) he was present as an observer. However, after the talks failed he was accused in the attempts to prolong the war so perhaps people did not believe that he was present just as a piece of a furniture. But with Charles XII he definitely had and blew face-to-face talks.

There was also a rather bizarre episode when Peter tried to bribe Marlborough in expectation that he'll convince Charles to switch from the "Eastern theater" to the main European one (don't ask me about the logic) offering for the services granted a princely title, a big ruby and monetary "compensation". Nothing got out of it but it gives an indication that Marlborough did have a reputation as a diplomat.
 
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