How so? I completely fail to see what the political situation has to do with actual performance on the battlefield. 100,000 men is 100,000 men regardless of whether they’re fighting for an ideology, squabbling nobles, or sheer bloodlust. Whether or not your seat of power is being threatened at home makes no difference during an artillery barrage. All the diplomatic skill in the world makes no difference if you can’t command worth a damn. That’s why there’s is a split between the army and the government in most functioning countries: because the military doesn’t need to concentrate on politics.
Nothing could be further from the truth; the character of a war, the emotions excited, and the objectives sought exert a dominating influence on the formulation and execution of strategy.
That is true, but that is different than the battlefield. Do you honestly think it matters what your politics are when you’re concentrating on commanding men in real time?
An analyst who cannot see the role of the general beyond the battlefield has no more an inkling of warfare than the last signed drummer boy. The only reason you're bothering commanding men is because of the political situation; only its political instrumentality distinguishes war from senseless slaughter.
Yes you can, that’s why the idea of a tactical victory/defeat and strategic defeat/victory exist. Let’s take Cannae, which was an undeniable triumph by Carthage and showcased Hannibal’s generalship. The fact that it didn’t destroy Rome’s ability to fight doesn’t make Hannibal a bad general, it means that victory couldn’t be won in the field.
And there's a reason strategic victories are overwhelmingly more important, and anyone who believes tactical victories are more important than strategic ones in assessing a general will have a very confusing ride through the history of warfare. I honestly have a hard time believing you seriously don't think strategy falls within a general's purview. The reason Cannae is important is because it got a substantial number of Rome's allies to defect, not because of the men left dead on the field; the fighting was simply a means to detach Rome's main source of troops. This was how Carthage attempted to win the war, and indeed how Rome did ultimately triumph. Scipio's achievement in Spain was not a double envelopment, but the removal of Carthage's most important source of military manpower, which led to Rome's ascendancy in the final phase of the war.
Because plenty of people who control armies are power hungry and decide that they should have it all. Santana was a pisspoor general, but managed to rule Mexico. Should we add points to his horrible battlefield performance because he happened to lead a country? No, it’d be like giving a bad dentist leniency because he’s good at doing his taxes.
I was going to say this was the most ridiculous thing you've said so far, but then I remembered everything else. Regardless, the union of political and military power has always been regarded as extremely advantageous, from Philip of Macedon to Frederick the Great and Napoleon; war is simply the continuation of politics with an admixture of other means. The politician and the general seek the same goals; they are entrusted with safeguarding the collective interests of their community and expanding its power. They differ only in that the general pursues this with armies while the politician employs negotiation. Indeed, both often use the others' means, even when not united in the person of a warlord. The division is to a degree artificial, being the product of historical developments in government structures rather than strict theoretical necessity. Political and military power throughout history have often been united in the head of state, whose practical sole function until the 19th century was as a warlord, precisely because it facilitates the coordination of violent and non violent means towards common ends.
And you can look at individual parts of a person without judging them as a whole. If I’m a good driver, that doesn’t change that I suck at my job. You should not give or take points in an unrelated category just because I’m good or bad at something.
They're not unrelated categories; it would be like saying you're a great chef because you can chop onions, peel vegetables, and brown meat really well when every dish you attempt still comes out a failure. Winning a given battle is only a portion of what a general does, and it is a means rather than an end in and of itself.
Yes, but that doesn’t mean that their ability as a statesman should be taken into account for how well they perform on the battlefield. Lee was fighting an aggressive war against a power with more industry and manpower while belonging to a diplomatically and economically isolated one, yet scored victory after victory because he was aggressive. We don’t discount his ability as a General because he was given a shit logistical and diplomatic situation, we discount his ability because he was a one trick pony. Generalship is how well you utilize the resources given to you, diplomacy is getting those resources, and logistics is making sure you can keep getting those resources. Grant was a decent general who was great at diplomacy and logistics, but that doesn’t change the fact he relied on overwhelming firepower rather than tactical brilliance. The objectives of a general are military, not diplomatic. You can be both a general and a statesman, but notice how the two are separate terms rather than general being all encompassing.
Again, my whole point is that there's more to a general than performance on the battlefield. Simply in terms of using resources effectively, the general must have a deep and practical understanding of the political objectives he's meant to obtain. The general is charged with determining military objectives, and can only do so in a rational manner to ensure success by keeping them in relation to the political objectives. Alexander pursued the destruction of the Persian armies because he could not rule Persia until their capacity to fight back was eliminated. The political goals of his campaigns exerted a dominating influence over their conception and prosecution. Frederick the Great set himself the military goal of occupying most of Saxony so he could achieve his political goal of getting something to trade for the County of Glatz at the end of the Seven Years War. The Duke of Wellington in 1815 disposed his forces to cover the approaches to Ghent because of the political importance of maintaining confidence in the Bourbon dynasty. Generals are not handed military objectives to achieve; they decide the military objectives based on the political goals of the war. This is the most important act of judgement a general can make, and making the wrong choice means a general has failed his highest duty.
Actually it’d be like being asked how the food of a restaurant was and then going on a rant about how the service was terrible and the place was filthy. Yes, that’s the whole experience, but the question was about the food, not anything else.
Battles are the platters that generals use to deliver you your political goals; if they don't
work, the general is a failure, no matter how nice they look.
Generals are given their commands because it is believed they will be good (or solely due to connections, but those types tend to be bad or mediocre) at winning battles, which in turn will win the war. It’s a vital distinction. If I hire an electrician to come fix the wiring on my AC because it’s sucking up too much electricity and making the bill cost too much, their job is still just fixing the AC rather than lowering my overall bill.
It's good then that we expect or should expect greater scope of judgement from generals we entrust with the lives of our countrymen and the honor of the nation than we do electricians. Generals
know their job is to win the war, not individual battles, and are given latitude to decide when and where to fight so they can tailor their campaign to the objectives of the war.
That shows poorly of him as a statesman, not as a general.
There is literally no way for a general to fail harder than for his military decisions to cause the defeat of his side. If this does not make someone a bad general, then nothing can.
Once again, this has nothing to do with battlefield performance. Blowing your alliance, bankrupting your nation, provoking a rebellion due to poor occupation policy, and a myriad other problems speak poorly of your diplomatic or economic skill, but they speak nothing of how well you command on the battlefield. Once again, Napoleon alienated his allies, blew through France’s manpower on numerous campaigns, failed to create an economic blockade on Britain despite having the strongest army around, thought logistics was a fancy word for looting the countryside, and got lots of people killed due to his ego. But he was damn good on the battlefield. He was a strong general, bad statesman, and poor economist. Overall, he was a lackluster leader, but that doesn’t change the fact that he was a good general. Performance on the battlefield is all that matters when judging a general’s skill. We don’t say “Oh, you were cut off from resupply and fighting with a force with poor morale? You obviously suck at leading soldiers,” so why would the inverse be true?
I wonder what you consider the scope of a general's responsibility. Tell me when to stop. Leading a charge on the battlefield. Committing reserves. Deploying the army. Drawing up its dispositions. Getting the army to the field. Choosing the field. Drawing the enemy to battle. Deciding when to fight. Picking the main theater of war. Deciding whether to delay a decision or pursue it. Targeting the enemy's ability to fight or their will. Administering and training armies. Raising armies. Negotiating peaces.
This is by no means the limit on the historical scope of generals' powers, as necessity has often led to their taking possession of the state to better unify the prosecution of the war effort, but even within a context of military subordination, they are almost always given latitude beyond 'the battlefield', whatever you think that to mean. If the responsibilities of a general really do stop at the battlefield, then you're using a worthless criterion (and we should then really be talking about politicians anyway), since historically very few generals indeed would content themselves with nothing more than drawing up an order of battle on the fated day. The best generals not only summon titanic mental energy and endurance, but apply this moral force where it will have the best effect, which almost always means towards ever higher spheres of warmaking, and sustain the same energy through to execution. Simply put, a good general prioritizes strategy over tactics; those who don't should never be entrusted with the swords they would presume to draw.
I was going to say you're 200 years behind the curve, but that's very unfair to the ancients, who understood the political dimensions of warmaking and the responsibilities of their leaders far better than you.