Best General of the Early 18th Century

Who was the "best" General?

  • John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough

    Votes: 26 29.2%
  • Prince Eugene of Savoy

    Votes: 46 51.7%
  • Carolus Rex

    Votes: 12 13.5%
  • Someone else (who?)

    Votes: 4 4.5%
  • Claude Louis Hector de Villars, Duc de Villars

    Votes: 1 1.1%

  • Total voters
    89
So I saw a blog post or video or something somewhere recently calling Marlborough hands-down the best general of his generation. While he was certainly an excellent commander, I did think that saying he had no competition for that title would be...inaccurate and decided to start a poll/discussion. Turenne would be a bit too early to qualify, and Frederick a bit too late--I'd say Spanish Succession or Great Northern War for the most part would be where I'd think "same generation" would be found. So who do you all think was the most proficient general of that generation?
 
So I saw a blog post or video or something somewhere recently calling Marlborough hands-down the best general of his generation.

AFAIK, this is mostly the Anglophonic thingy. In the list of the "best generals ever" composed by the French in the late XIX or early XX he was not present at all; needless to say that the list was "French-heavy" (neither was Marlborough on the similar Russian list of "...ever..." composed slightly later: they just added Suvorov to the French list). Marlborough himself told Charles XII that for his military education to be complete he needs to fight a campaign under Charles' command but this, of course, was not a very subtle flattery during their failed attempt of a diplomacy.

However, in the French (and Russian) culture he was "immortalized" in a song "marlborough s'en va-t'en guerre" which you can listen on
the French, English and Russian versions of the text can be found on http://war-only.com/v-poxod-malbruk-sobralsya-iz-istorii-odnoj-pesni.html including Russian "soldiers' version" which was popular in 1812. :)

IMO, his career as an army commander was mostly a single war (in the 9 Years War he was mostly in a subirdinate position) which, of course, not a problem by itself; Charles XII also was a"general of a single war". What's probably is more important, is that in most of his famous battles he had Euegne as a very cooperative second-in-command (which one of Eugene's biographers rightly considered to be a BIG bonus). Of course, the fact that he was definitely a great general is undeniable.

While he was certainly an excellent commander, I did think that saying he had no competition for that title would be...inaccurate and decided to start a poll/discussion. Turenne would be a bit too early to qualify, and Frederick a bit too late--I'd say Spanish Succession or Great Northern War for the most part would be where I'd think "same generation" would be found. So who do you all think was the most proficient general of that generation?

Eugene makes into any Euro-centric list and it seems that on a continent he was considered a more important military figure than Marlborough because he participated in more wars and his actions brought more tangible results but here we are going to the issue "what makes one's the best"? The French definition was along the great achievement with the inferior forces which should remove Napoleon from their list because his formulated principle was "God is on the side of the big battalions" (and the whole notion is rather "romantic"). "Bonus point" for Eugene was that most of the time he had inferior numbers of the ill-paid and inadequately supplied troops hold together by his personal influence.


Charles XII was clearly over-rated. Of course, he was a great tactician (and did a lot to further increase quality of his troops) but as a strategist he clearly failed (perhaps because as a king he stuck to the "principles"). He was also greatly helped by the fact that most of his opponents clearly were of a low quality (in that regard Marlborough and Eugene are getting "points" for defeating the reputedly the best army in Europe, even if routinely badly led). OTOH, his tactics with a stress on a bayonet charge and full speed cavalry attack was rather unique for his time (one can see clear parallels with Suvorov's methods which became famous close to the end of the century, including the same neglect of artillery fire) and worked all the way to Poltava and the later engagements where bayonet was eventually "defeated" by a fire power.

IMO, the list is missing Villars.

Maurice de Saxe is probably closer to the middle of the XVIII century (became marshal in 1743 but his career started earlier).
 
Marlborough is, at the very least, the primus inter pares of the period. Of the "lesser" commanders, in addition to the obvious candidates above, I'd also consider Berwick and Boufflers worthy of consideration.
 
Marlborough is, at the very least, the primus inter pares of the period. Of the "lesser" commanders, in addition to the obvious candidates above, I'd also consider Berwick and Boufflers worthy of consideration.
Marlborough as a chief commander won zero wars; Eugene won two in a big way.
 
I would place Rhenskiöld among the best. Who but him performed a total annihilation of an enemy army like he did at Fraustadt?

Karl XII also deserves a honourable mentioning for the Grodno campaign, where the Swedish army separated the Saxonians from the Russians and then the Russian cavalry from the rest of their forces and forced the Russian infantry and artillery back to their camp devoid of supply, causing the Russians some 17 000 dead while losing only 100 men.
 
Marlborough as a chief commander won zero wars; Eugene won two in a big way.

Well, even Peter I, who was a quite mediocre general, managed to win a major war so this is a dangerous criteria. :)

However, I quite agree about Eugene: his career was longer and more successful both in the terms of victories and in the terms of "by-products" of these victories. Of course, Marlborough was an outstanding general and it can be argued that his strategic decisions as a supreme commander had been more than once frustrated by the alliance members but he did not win a war. More than that, success in Italy was Eugene's alone and in Spain the allies lost.
 
I would place Rhenskiöld among the best. Who but him performed a total annihilation of an enemy army like he did at Fraustadt?

Karl XII also deserves a honourable mentioning for the Grodno campaign, where the Swedish army separated the Saxonians from the Russians and then the Russian cavalry from the rest of their forces and forced the Russian infantry and artillery back to their camp devoid of supply, causing the Russians some 17 000 dead while losing only 100 men.

Charles and his generals had a considerable advantage due to the fact that they were dealing with a low quality (on their own admission) opponent that was further handicapped by the quarrels among its commanders (Menshikov and Ogilvi).

However, there is a problem with your numbers. Most of the Russian losses (8,000 during blockade and 9,000 during retreat, mostly non battle related) were due to the cold, diseases and starvation while for the Swedes you listed only the battle losses. Their total losses, including those from cold, diseases and starvation were at least 3,000 (the number Charles lost on his march to Grodno; taking into an account that during the operation BOTH armies suffered from the same problems, it is quite reasonable to assume that there were more losses later). It is also probably worth noticing that initial Charles' plan of trapping Russian army in Grodno failed: it escaped (with drowning artillery in a river) and attempts to catch it on a way to Brest failed.
 
Charles and his generals had a considerable advantage due to the fact that they were dealing with a low quality (on their own admission) opponent that was further handicapped by the quarrels among its commanders (Menshikov and Ogilvi).

However, there is a problem with your numbers. Most of the Russian losses (8,000 during blockade and 9,000 during retreat, mostly non battle related) were due to the cold, diseases and starvation while for the Swedes you listed only the battle losses. Their total losses, including those from cold, diseases and starvation were at least 3,000 (the number Charles lost on his march to Grodno; taking into an account that during the operation BOTH armies suffered from the same problems, it is quite reasonable to assume that there were more losses later). It is also probably worth noticing that initial Charles' plan of trapping Russian army in Grodno failed: it escaped (with drowning artillery in a river) and attempts to catch it on a way to Brest failed.

Sorry, I had no source for the sick and frozen Swedish losses. And while Grodno was not a strategic victory for the Swedes against the Russians, as about 5 000 infantry and most of the Russian cavalry got away and formed a core to build a new army on, it was a strategic victory in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as it ended the Russian ability to prevent Sweden from setting up its own order there (that promptly failed on its own merits, not due to Russian design) and knock Saxony out of the war.

Still though, facing somewhere between 3 to 4 times your own numbers and being effectively surrounded, Rhenskiöld and Karl XII turned that into knocking Saxony out of the war and ending the Russian military presence in any politically relevant parts of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth - Russia failed in its strategic goal to keep the Swedes in Poland and fighting there and to keep August in the war. The next phase was an invasion of Russia itself, something Peter and his commanders had been trying to avoid.
 
Well, even Peter I, who was a quite mediocre general, managed to win a major war so this is a dangerous criteria. :)

However, I quite agree about Eugene: his career was longer and more successful both in the terms of victories and in the terms of "by-products" of these victories. Of course, Marlborough was an outstanding general and it can be argued that his strategic decisions as a supreme commander had been more than once frustrated by the alliance members but he did not win a war. More than that, success in Italy was Eugene's alone and in Spain the allies lost.
Sure, it's not the end of the discussion, but it's definitely something to keep in mind from the beginning; you don't campaign for its own sake, and Eugene's victories led to the Habsburg monarchy's greatest period of expansion, whereas Marlborough's strategy led to Britain's withdrawal from the war and a disadvantageous peace. With regard to Peter I, we can say he triumphed because Peter the statesman picked an enemy so much weaker than his own empire that even Peter the general could eventually pull through.
 
No more from sound of drum retreat
When Marlborough and Galway beat
The French and Spaniards every day
Over the hills and far away.

Over the hills, and o'er the main
To Flanders, Portugal and Spain
Queen Anne commands and we'll obey
Over the hills and far away.
 
Sure, it's not the end of the discussion, but it's definitely something to keep in mind from the beginning; you don't campaign for its own sake, and Eugene's victories led to the Habsburg monarchy's greatest period of expansion, whereas Marlborough's strategy led to Britain's withdrawal from the war and a disadvantageous peace.

As I already said, we are in an agreement regarding Eugene's track record and, as I mentioned, Eugene is getting the "extra points" for achieving victories with the troops that were often inferior to those of his opponents (especially when he was facing the French) and under the circumstances when his troops were not properly supplied or paid on time (tells a lot about his personal authority among the troops).

The English and Dutch troops under Marlborough's command usually (AFAIK) did not suffer from supply or payment problems which made control over them easier. To be fair, Marlborough was regularly facing problems with the Dutch who had their own ideas and prefered to be on the safe side. However, it is rather unusual how good were relations between him and Eugene. It would be expected that a general of Eugene's reputation would be unhappy to become a subordinate of someone with practically no previous record but this did not happened: in their joined campaigns Eugene was always a willing (and quite helpful) second-in-command, which probably gives him "extra points".

With regard to Peter I, we can say he triumphed because Peter the statesman picked an enemy so much weaker than his own empire that even Peter the general could eventually pull through.

I'm afraid that you are giving too much credit to Peter statesman in the terms of this being his conscious well-planned decision but, objectively, it happened exactly that way. ;)
 
Charles XII was an awful General, among the worst that ever led an army. Many of his "victories" are just his opponents deciding they didn't want to fight. That's especially true of the Polish Campaign where the Polish nobles didn't want to see their personal army shattered as they wanted to keep it to fight other Polish nobles.

After almost every battle, Charles' opponents managed to escape and reform later- see for example Narva.

He rarely held onto much territory and his campaigns resemble a giant Cossack raid rather than an actual military effort

His Russian campaign that ends in the destruction of his army at Poltava is a comedy of the most amateur mistakes- he divided his forces, failed to plan any logistics and eventually plunged hopelessly deep into Russia without any hope of escape


Overall, he never grasped his relative strength against his opponents and craft a strategy that allowed him real victories
 
Sorry, I had no source for the sick and frozen Swedish losses. And while Grodno was not a strategic victory for the Swedes against the Russians, as about 5 000 infantry and most of the Russian cavalry got away

The numbers do not add up. At the time Charles arrived at Grodno with approximately 20,000 Swedish troops (losing 3,000 on the way from Warsaw) and few thousands Polish-Lithuanian troops, there were 30,000 Russian infantry and up to 6,000 cavalry in it (plus the Saxons who left soon afterwards). If we assume that the Russians lost 8,000 during the blockade and 9,000 during the retreat and that ALL their losses applied exclusively to the infantry, which is unlikely, then they should still have 13,000 infantry when they finally reached their base.

OTOH, I'm not quite sure about the 30,000 of infantry in Grodno: the same Wiki article is saying that the Russian army left on the winter quarters in Grodno amounted to 23,000 total (45 infantry battalions and 6 dragoon regiments) - "главная русская армия (Г. Б. Огильви и А. И. Репнин; 45 пехотных батальонов и 6 драгунских полков = 23 тыс. человек) осталась на зимних квартирах в районе Гродно"
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Гродненская_операция_(1706)

Here comes one of the typical idiocies of the Petrian warfare at its "best". Menshikov's cavalry (12,000) was staying near Minsk (100 miles away) incapable or perhaps unwilling to help Ogilvi in Grodno (there was an ongoing feud in which even commander of the Ogilivi's cavalry was participating on menshikov's side). While Grodno was chosen as the winter quarters for the main Russian army, the main supplies had been stored in Polotsk, approximately 250 miles away.

The rest comes as no surprise: Swedes had advantages in troops' quality and leadership while the allies started with the excessively complicated plan and the forces too separated to help each other.
 
No more from sound of drum retreat
When Marlborough and Galway beat
The French and Spaniards every day
Over the hills and far away.

Over the hills, and o'er the main
To Flanders, Portugal and Spain
Queen Anne commands and we'll obey
Over the hills and far away.

Yeah, sure. Except that Berwick and Vendome kicked the Brits out of Spain. Author of the song probably did not hear about the Battle of Almanza in which Galway commanded the allied forces and after which the allied cause in Spain was pretty much lost. :winkytongue:
 
His Russian campaign that ends in the destruction of his army at Poltava is a comedy of the most amateur mistakes- he divided his forces, failed to plan any logistics and eventually plunged hopelessly deep into Russia without any hope of escape

Actually, this was one of the rare cases when he did plan his logistics. As a result of his planning, his army was (as you said) divided with the "logistical" part of it being destroyed before it reached what's left by that time of his main force. But he definitely tried. x'D

To his defense, Nappy was not quite successful with his logistics in 1812.
 
Sure, it's not the end of the discussion, but it's definitely something to keep in mind from the beginning; you don't campaign for its own sake, and Eugene's victories led to the Habsburg monarchy's greatest period of expansion, whereas Marlborough's strategy led to Britain's withdrawal from the war and a disadvantageous peace. With regard to Peter I, we can say he triumphed because Peter the statesman picked an enemy so much weaker than his own empire that even Peter the general could eventually pull through.

Typically when you are discussing who is the best general, you’re talking about performance on the battlefield, which is different from diplomacy. Saying an individual general isn’t as good as some other general because one was on the winning side and the other wasn’t is about as off-topic as you can get. Battlefield prowess has nothing to do with strategic or diplomatic skill, as Napoleon showed.
 
Actually, this was one of the rare cases when he did plan his logistics. As a result of his planning, his army was (as you said) divided with the "logistical" part of it being destroyed before it reached what's left by that time of his main force. But he definitely tried. x'D

To his defense, Nappy was not quite successful with his logistics in 1812.

Not really. If he had properly considered logistics, he would have taken the main army to the Baltic where resupply by sea was available

If he had properly assessed his army's capabilities, he would have sought peace after Augustus had been deposed

If he had properly concentrated his forces, Lewenhaupt would not have been defeated at Lesnaya. Lucky for Charles, he fought Peter. A competent commander would have destroyed the Swedes piecemeal. First, Lewenhaupt, then Lybecker and then Charles long before he could get to the Cossacks
 
Not really. If he had properly considered logistics, he would have taken the main army to the Baltic where resupply by sea was available

If he had properly assessed his army's capabilities, he would have sought peace after Augustus had been deposed

If he had properly concentrated his forces, Lewenhaupt would not have been defeated at Lesnaya. Lucky for Charles, he fought Peter. A competent commander would have destroyed the Swedes piecemeal. First, Lewenhaupt, then Lybecker and then Charles long before he could get to the Cossacks

The Baltic provinces' countryside had been severely looted and ravaged by multiple Russian incursions by 1708, one of the reasons Karl XII did not go there was that it was considered impossible to support the main army there - the army needed to be able to move against enemy forces, not just hug the coast or stay in ports. The infrastructure of the time did not allow that much supply to be moved from the ports. The army lived off the land.
 
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