Best cost effective rifle

Depends on what you consider relevant; I edited my post while you were posting this with a doctoral thesis about the history of British rifle developments that is mostly about the EM-2 and by association the .270/.280 development:
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en...86(5d9a29fb-ced6-4d8e-bf3f-987f3db7b5b9).html

Ah, Matt Ford. A friend of mine!

The .280 predates the US-UK testing, but it was developed partially in anticipation of that test as well as to appease a faction within British arms development. By the time the test rolled around the round they developed had abandoned the 2000 yard delusion.

Really? Then why did they go to the trouble of developing the TADEN MMG?

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/896859.pdf
If you look at the 1950 testing document (p.20) the the average velocities at 78 feet from the muzzle for the .280 round average around that of the 7.92 Kurz. The muzzle velocity was probably close to that of the 7.62x39 of the AK-47. So whatever was laid out in 1947 or before was discarded by 1950, as the round actually tested was optimized for 500 yards or less. By the 600 yard mark it was dropping off substantially, though (without checking ballistics) probably less so than the 7.92 Kurz was at 400m.

So I guess .303 Mk. VII wasn't a 2,000 yd cartridge either, eh? Because the .280 was explicitly designed to have the same midrange trajectory height - which is probably why the original load specification has a nearly identical muzzle velocity and BC...

And as cited it never was used in war, ultimately being replaced 10 years later with the M2 ball that went right back to the 1906 design with a different metal alloy and improved propellants. Why compare with the M1 that was abandoned long before WW2 broke out?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.30-06_Springfield#History

So in 1932, they made the decision to abandon the .276 Pedersen despite the fact that the .276 outperformed a round whose development wouldn't begin for another four years?

You also seem to be neglecting the fact that M2 Ball was not the primary battle round of WWII. M2 AP was. It had a much heavier bullet and better distance performance.

Fair enough. Still, doesn't mean for what it was with hindsight that the Pedersen round wasn't ultimately better than the M2 Ball that the US went to war with.

You know what would have been worse? Not adopting a semiauto at all because you can't afford to change over to the new "better" round during the Great Depression.

I am not sure that the Hindsight Warriors really understand how narrow a thing the M1 Garand's adoption really was. Might try cracking Canfield's huge tome on the subject.

Check out that thesis I posted, it gets into the full picture of the development of the .280. Yes the .270 was stillborn, but not necessarily over the MMG requirement.

I've got no idea what Dr. Matt thinks, it's not like I'm personal friends with the guy and we share notes all the time or anything. :rolleyes:

pftRBky.png


The round used in the tests was a T104, which was slightly lighter and had 35% more propellant behind it (not sure about any differences in powders used between the British and US). It could stay supersonic longer due to substantially higher muzzle energy, which helps it avoid for longer the transsonic issues flat based rounds run into as they slow down.

T104 had a shorter supersonic range (by about 30 meters) than .280/S-12 with the original muzzle velocity of 2,415 ft/s. So there goes your theory.

The fact is that the .280/30 was clearly designed to retain energy well out to 2,000 meters, and - however select individuals felt at any given point in time - the .280 was always designed to give the option of being a good MMG round.

Again, depending on what role you want it to fill. The round tested in 1950 was designed with an anticipated 500 yard normal max combat range with a 600 yard max effective range, courtesy of that thesis I linked earlier in this reply and excerpts I edited into my previous post.
Also on p.19 they cite using 130 and 140 grain lead cores for the .280 and 150 grain lead cores for the .30 as a control group; groups are significantly tighter, but not excessively so.
So the data on p.18 is using lead cores with a heavier US round and the lead cored .280 ones.
Which shows that the issue isn't simply the steel cores, its the ranges that the rounds are designed to be fired at. Using the info from the thesis I cited (check out my previous post that was edited) the Brits by 1950 produced a rifle round meant to be used at 500 yards or less and controllable on full auto at short ranges. This was NOT a 2000 yard round.

Again, you need to read up more on the subject. You're inferring things that are easily refuted by additional context. And further, I feel as though I've done enough of your own legwork for you. ;)
 

Deleted member 1487

Ah, Matt Ford. A friend of mine!
And?

Really? Then why did they go to the trouble of developing the TADEN MMG?

So I guess .303 Mk. VII wasn't a 2,000 yd cartridge either, eh? Because the .280 was explicitly designed to have the same midrange trajectory height - which is probably why the original load specification has a nearly identical muzzle velocity and BC...
To have a multi-purpose MG for the LMG and MMG roles and try to make the .280 a universal round. Also in the MMG role area fire out to 2000 yards was used, so the factor that matters there is retained energy at 2000 yards, not individual direct fire round accuracy:
3480_46_21-theory-small-arms-fire.jpg

fig6-1.gif



So in 1932, they made the decision to abandon the .276 Pedersen despite the fact that the .276 outperformed a round whose development wouldn't begin for another four years?
There were a number of reasons why the .276 round was abandoned, your friend the Doctor says it was rooted in production factors in the midst of the Great Depression and fear of a Congressional fight over spending the money.

You also seem to be neglecting the fact that M2 Ball was not the primary battle round of WWII. M2 AP was. It had a much heavier bullet and better distance performance.
I'm going to need a source on that, haven't seen anything like that stated anywhere.
Edit:
I'm going to guess Bruce Canfield's book on the Garand.
http://forums.thecmp.org/showthread.php?t=166792
Sorry about the length of this, but this myth could use a bit of debunking.

Canfield took several leaps of faith. First, he relied on secondary sources to develop his conclusions about AP use rather than researching the subject himself. Next, he failed to factor in the long lead times involved in making big changes in production priorities and getting the stuff distributed to the using units. And finally, he made a huge mistake in assuming the July 43 decision to change small arms ammo ratios would be the final word on the subject.

On the latter, he missed this official U.S. Army account:

The basic unit of calculation in the determination of ammunition requirements was “the day of supply” for each caliber and type of ammunition. The day of supply represented the average number of rounds per weapon per day expected to be consumed on a theater-wide basis....until 1944 there was only one War Department day of supply (for each type of weapon) for all theaters collectively....On 10 June 1944 the War Department abandoned the single day of supply for all theaters and published separate days of supply for each of four major areas: the ETO, NATO, Asiatic and Pacific Theaters, and all other departments and bases including the zone of interior.
So, the July 43 policy (Canfield's only factual underpinning) which continued War Department control of ammo supply ratios was superceded less than a year later by a new policy wherein theater commanders were allowed to make that decision (obviously with WD input on production capabilities). Canfield whiffed on this change and blindly plunged ahead toward his conclusions.

For the ETO, the Campbell 80AP/20T mix relied upon by Canfield is simply wrong. Campbell even fails to understand the mix of ammo types was different for rifles and MGs in that theater. Canfield accepts Campbell's erroneous assumption.

All of the above comes with a couple of provisos: 1) requirements are about production and distribution. Because .30-06 was used in several weapons, factory packaging totals can only be used as a general guide - nobody who ever lived kept score on how many rounds were repackaged for local shortages, individual preferences, salvage, etc. Still, comprehensive procurement and distribution records are light years ahead of scattered unverifiable anecdotes (this is one of my favorite windmills to tilt at). And anyway, Canfield relies on requirements alone in forming his conlusions about AP use in combat. 2) Small arms ammo was considered expended when issued to the using unit, so rounds lost, damaged, destroyed, abandoned, etc. count the same as ones that came out of the muzzle. Probably a tiny percentage in the grand scheme of things, but, I think it's important to present the whole story.

Though imperfect, consumption figures (types as well as quantities) were used in preparing resupply requisitions (the WD didn't continue to do what they had done earlier in North Africa - just keep on automatically resupplying at predetermined planning rates). With established reserve stocks in theater to cushion the ups and downs, getting in the ballpark was close enough for long range planning. So, unlike Canfield's claim, the process of determining ammo types didn't stop in July 43, but continued to evolve as production capabilities and field experience led to changes both big and small.

Notice that Campbell paraphrased the Ordnance Committee in writing that AP "should take the place of Ball for general combat use." Canfield takes "should" and turns it into "did" - all without presenting any evidence. Sounds like he had a preconceived notion about AP use in combat and looked until he found a pair of secondary sources to confirm his existing belief.

You know what would have been worse? Not adopting a semiauto at all because you can't afford to change over to the new "better" round during the Great Depression.
Sure

I am not sure that the Hindsight Warriors really understand how narrow a thing the M1 Garand's adoption really was. Might try cracking Canfield's huge tome on the subject.
Point is it wasn't a performance issue in the end, it was a production/budget issue.

I've got no idea what Dr. Matt thinks, it's not like I'm personal friends with the guy and we share notes all the time or anything. :rolleyes:
And? His paper contradicts you.

T104 had a shorter supersonic range (by about 30 meters) than .280/S-12 with the original muzzle velocity of 2,415 ft/s. So there goes your theory.
Source?

The fact is that the .280/30 was clearly designed to retain energy well out to 2,000 meters, and - however select individuals felt at any given point in time - the .280 was always designed to give the option of being a good MMG round.
Because simple statements are facts?

Again, you need to read up more on the subject. You're inferring things that are easily refuted by additional context. And further, I feel as though I've done enough of your own legwork for you.
Right, so just utterly ignore what was in the document because you have no answer for it.
 
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To have a multi-purpose MG for the LMG and MMG roles and try to make the .280 a universal round. Also in the MMG role area fire out to 2000 yards was used, so the factor that matters there is retained energy at 2000 yards, not individual direct fire round accuracy:
3480_46_21-theory-small-arms-fire.jpg

fig6-1.gif

Goalpost moving. Remember, your original contention was that ".280 wasn't a 2,000 yard cartridge for MMGs". Now it's just "not a 2,000 yd direct fire round". Well no duh. Neither was .30 T65.

There were a number of reasons why the .276 round was abandoned, your friend the Doctor says it was rooted in production factors in the midst of the Great Depression and fear of a Congressional fight over spending the money.

Yeap, that would have a lot to do with it. Maybe you wouldn't need Matt Ford to tell you that if you'd actually read the lit.

I'm going to need a source on that, haven't seen anything like that stated anywhere.

Oh dear... You need me to do your research for you? Come on, I'm pulling all the weight here. It's not like the citations for this are difficult to find. Here, I even found one in the first book I looked in (HWS II, page 72):

VvS41IN.jpg


Clark Campbell also corroborates the change (Canfield, 637):

GWKAauj.jpg


Point is it wasn't a performance issue in the end, it was a production/budget issue.

Well, it was both. Neither could they afford to change, nor could .276 equal .30 M1 for the MMG.

And? His paper refutes several of the claims you made.

Really? Do you care to cite where? Be specific, now. We can't say for sure whether he does or not until you do more than just try to throw URLs at me.


My source is that I understand how sectional density is related to ballistic coefficient, and I can use JBM's ballistic calculator. Also there are a ton of graphs in the FAL book. You could go look yourself, if you had a copy. Here's a picture of my copy. See all the sticky notes, and the fact that the binding is coming loose? It's possible I've paged through it a time or two.

0f5AQ5Z.jpg


Because simple statements are facts?

You already conceded my point when you moved the goalposts, though, so I'm not sure why you're trying to pass it off as if I've not supported my statements.

Right, so just utterly ignore what was in the document because you have no answer for it.

You're like a flat-earther, jesus.

I am not dismissing what's written in the thesis - which I have read in other forms, such as Dr. Ford's book - I am saying you lack the basic foundational understanding to know the difference between danger space and maximum range for an MG. Or, at least, you lacked such until you quickly googled it after my last post and hastily moved your goalposts so you wouldn't have to admit you were wrong. Isn't the Internet amazing?
 
Sorry to keep kicking a dead horse, but that was the philosophy behind the StG44. It was made all metal stampings and required no milling or special metals unlike most rifles (including the AK-47). As noted the development cycle was abbreviated, so it was still rough around the edges, but with time could have been what the AK-47 eventually became. As it was the StG45 took the concept even further to reduce number of parts and make it absurdly quick and cheap to make. It was in effect the MP40 of rifles.

The Germans developed the art of high precision stamping to an art from by the late 1940's. The Russians tried to do it and failed which is why the AK47 had a milled receiver.
 
I'm going to stick my oar in the water here. In the OP the question is you are a moderately industrial country but lack the skilled labor force to produce fully machined high quality small arms for your forces. What would be the most cost effective rifle to equip your infantry units. There is another way of looking at this. Let's say you produce or buy rifles that cost 25% less than anything you could purchase from another supplier. I don't care if they are fully machined, use lots of stampings or made of fairy dust. If due to your nations bad luck, arrogance, the state of the world etc you find you are involved in a war with a neighboring country. And in that war, which primarily involves infantry actions your forces routinely lose those actions resulting in heavy casualties, lost territory and ultimately the war you find yourself mired in. And the loss of this war can be traced largely to the procurement decisions your nation made in equipping those forces. Then I would argue that you procured the least cost effective small arms for your army. Yes I realize that things are never that simple, but prior to the development of nuclear weapons "winning" a war has always meant in the end your troops standing on the contested ground or your enemies homeland with rifles in their hands or over their shoulders. If your troops lack the tools to do the job they've been given (or saddled with) then they in actuality have been provided with the most expensive equipment possible. It is expensive because it cost them their lives and possibly your nations freedom or very existance
 
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Deleted member 1487

Nice attempts at gas lighting. Clearly we're beyond the productive argument stage. Already posted a source deconstructing the issues with the M2 AP vs. Ball claim, already cited specifically from the thesis stating the .280 round tested in 1950 was a 500 yard round. Anyway I'm not going to waste any more time on you.
 
Nice attempts at gas lighting. Clearly we're beyond the productive argument stage. Already posted a source deconstructing the issues with the M2 AP vs. Ball claim, already cited specifically from the thesis stating the .280 round tested in 1950 was a 500 yard round. Anyway I'm not going to waste any more time on you.

No I am not trying to make you believe you are insane. If you believe you're insane just because of an argument you are having on the Internet, that is your problem. Not mine.

The edit you made to your post I simply didn't see, as I'd already begun replying before you made it. Now, what do we have here? Well, we have someone on a forum "debunking" Canfield (really, Hackley, Woodin, and Scranton, as it's their book Canfield quotes):

Sorry about the length of this, but this myth could use a bit of debunking.

Canfield took several leaps of faith. First, he relied on secondary sources to develop his conclusions about AP use rather than researching the subject himself. Next, he failed to factor in the long lead times involved in making big changes in production priorities and getting the stuff distributed to the using units. And finally, he made a huge mistake in assuming the July 43 decision to change small arms ammo ratios would be the final word on the subject.

On the latter, he missed this official U.S. Army account:

The basic unit of calculation in the determination of ammunition requirements was “the day of supply” for each caliber and type of ammunition. The day of supply represented the average number of rounds per weapon per day expected to be consumed on a theater-wide basis....ntil 1944 there was only one War Department day of supply (for each type of weapon) for all theaters collectively....On 10 June 1944 the War Department abandoned the single day of supply for all theaters and published separate days of supply for each of four major areas: the ETO, NATO, Asiatic and Pacific Theaters, and all other departments and bases including the zone of interior.
So, the July 43 policy (Canfield's only factual underpinning) which continued War Department control of ammo supply ratios was superceded less than a year later by a new policy wherein theater commanders were allowed to make that decision (obviously with WD input on production capabilities). Canfield whiffed on this change and blindly plunged ahead toward his conclusions.

For the ETO, the Campbell 80AP/20T mix relied upon by Canfield is simply wrong. Campbell even fails to understand the mix of ammo types was different for rifles and MGs in that theater. Canfield accepts Campbell's erroneous assumption.

All of the above comes with a couple of provisos: 1) requirements are about production and distribution. Because .30-06 was used in several weapons, factory packaging totals can only be used as a general guide - nobody who ever lived kept score on how many rounds were repackaged for local shortages, individual preferences, salvage, etc. Still, comprehensive procurement and distribution records are light years ahead of scattered unverifiable anecdotes (this is one of my favorite windmills to tilt at). And anyway, Canfield relies on requirements alone in forming his conlusions about AP use in combat. 2) Small arms ammo was considered expended when issued to the using unit, so rounds lost, damaged, destroyed, abandoned, etc. count the same as ones that came out of the muzzle. Probably a tiny percentage in the grand scheme of things, but, I think it's important to present the whole story.

Though imperfect, consumption figures (types as well as quantities) were used in preparing resupply requisitions (the WD didn't continue to do what they had done earlier in North Africa - just keep on automatically resupplying at predetermined planning rates). With established reserve stocks in theater to cushion the ups and downs, getting in the ballpark was close enough for long range planning. So, unlike Canfield's claim, the process of determining ammo types didn't stop in July 43, but continued to evolve as production capabilities and field experience led to changes both big and small.

Notice that Campbell paraphrased the Ordnance Committee in writing that AP "should take the place of Ball for general combat use." Canfield takes "should" and turns it into "did" - all without presenting any evidence. Sounds like he had a preconceived notion about AP use in combat and looked until he found a pair of secondary sources to confirm his existing belief.

Curiously, this "debunking" not only doesn't actually cite any information correcting Canfield/HWS, but it actually makes several errors. First, it conflates the "day of supply" (which was a metric used for accounting for ammunition needed in theater) with where authorization for ammunition allotments lay. "Day of supply" has nothing to do with "a policy where theater commanders were allowed to decide what ammo they wanted to use". All "day of supply" meant was the amount of ammunition, etc. needed to supply US and allied forces. The change from a universal DoS to a theater-specific one simply meant more appropriate ammunition reserves. The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply, defines it thus:

"There were no tables showing the number of rounds to be issued to any tactical unit, but there was a figure known as the "day of supply" on which ammunition requirements for individual weapons were based. The ammunition day of supply was an estimate of the average number of rounds that would be expended by each type of weapon per day in the course of planned operations."

Second, he confuses the word "should" as it's normally used by a military authority with a recommendation. "Should" does not in this case mean "it would be best to", it means "do it".

But let's assume he's right, and throw Canfield, HWS, and Campbell out, shall we. Is there any other evidence for .30 M2 AP being the standard combat round during WWII? I mean, besides all the soldiers who came home with the stuff, and the stockpiles of M2 AP that still to this day have not been burned through. Besides all that. Well, it turns out, the answer is yes:

daCa94b.png


The Ordnance Department, Planning Munitions for War, 405

Armor Piercing was apparently still the main .30 caliber ammunition by 1950, as well, as it was AP that LC was advised to start producing (along with .50 ball) when it was rebooted at the beginning of the Korean War:

lfrPzEH.png


And do we have photographic evidence of M2 AP being used by riflemen in combat? Why yes, we do!

EdNY4Xf.jpg


In fact, this remained Ordnance policy well into the 7.62 era. The original load for 7.62mm was not, for example, the lead-cored M80 Ball. That was only standardized in 1958. The two original loads were M59 Ball and M61 Armor Piercing, which differed only in their markings and the hardness of their cores. This had been the plan from 1946 onward:

XDlFIer.jpg
 

Where did I suggest the Germans helped design the AK? The Germans developed precision metal stamping to a high degree, the Russians could not duplicate it even after stealing all sorts of equipment post 45.

Might I suggest you read the article you quoted in more detail

"In contrast, it took Soviet engineers over a decade from the capture of German stamping equipment and expertise in 1945 to perfect the kind of alloy stamping needed for the eventual AKM. This fact leads me to believe that Soviet engineers were doing something with the AK that took a lot of innovating on their part, and not just copying work that Germans had already done."

Kalashnikov did what geniuses always do and stole the best ideas and designed what is arguably the most effective combat rifle of the 20th century.
 
...........................................................In terms of left overs, yes they were already made; if we don't count their cost of original manufacturing then of course the free rifle is the most cost effective, even if the ammo is more expensive to make replacements for (not an issue of old mothballed stuff works). In terms of training...in what capacity? The assault rifle is really not hard to train on compared to the bolt action (see the history of the AK47 after all) and the bolt action really requires practice to be able to have an effective range as long as an intermediate cartridge weapon due to the recoil. But again if you count old stuff as free, then yes there is argument that it is by far the most cost effective.[/QUOTE]
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Rifles left over from the last war are great ... provided your country won the last war.
OTOH consider the position of Germany which lost the last war and was forced to destroy its armament industry and millions of WW1 weapons. Hitler revived the German arms industry starting in 1933. Since most of the old tools had disappeared, they were free to invent new weapons: P38 pistol, MP40 SMG, MG34, MG42, FG42, Stg44 and a variety of Volksturm weapons.
So I would prefer to limit this discussion to weapons that were possible to build between 1933 and 1945.
 
We can agree that the Remington Nylon 66 was a major reduction of cost of manufacture, Nylon 66 was not developed until the 1950s. During WW2, nylon production concentrated on the parachute industry.

The real question is whether the Bakelite and Tenite (available in the 1930s) was strong enough to build rifle stocks. The second question is how many pressed steel bits were needed to make rifle last 10,000 rounds?

As for cartridges, a 6mm-ish, Kurtz, high velocity round would be ideal, but a tough sell. So we will probably end up with a 7.62mm Kurtz or 7.92mm Kurtz or a .30 cal Kurtz or a .303 Kurtz. The primary advantage of Kurtz ammo is that most of the tools for making barrels and bolts is already in use. You only need a few new dies to complete the conversion. As full-bore ammo stocks dwindle, you can convert old full-bore rifles to fire Kurtz ammo by re-cutting barrel butt ends, inserting blocks in magazines and adjusting sights. Iron sights good out to 400 or 500 yards (meters) are good enough.
 
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JFI the Chinese reworked their old ZB26's and 8mm Mauser Bren guns to 7.62x39 so an intermediate round using a short version of a battle rifle cartridge case can be retro fitted to existing weapons on refurbishment. This lets a change of ammunition work it's way gradually into the system with the old weapons using up the old ammunition stocks until the new ones take on the front line roles and then they can be gradually withdrawn and refurbished to the new intermediate standard. This still needs an investment in the new weapon manufacturing and time. The French were still in the process of converting Berthiers from 8mm Lebel to the later 7.5x54mm when WW2 began even though they had the MAS 36 in production and the MAS 40 coming into production soon. They were reduced to continuing to issue Berthiers and some Lebels in 8mm Lebel to second line users.

Within the ranges infantry engagements actually took place I still (and I acknowledge OT) would go with a bulk production cheapened equivalent of a ZK 343 in 9x25mm backed with a BESAL equivalent LMG and existing bolt actions for marksmen in existing battle rifle ammunition. The marksmen being able to double up as rifle grenadiers in lieu of light mortars. Keeping to theme of chap production engineering later a PIAT equivalent to double up as a heavier greater range mortar. A b*gger to use but does both jobs cheaply and simply. I am simply taking the concept of the simplest engineering that will perform the necessary tasks. Not the best performance in each task. Better to invest in a good artillery FOO combination and communications and logistics than spend resources on infantry superlatives. In war you are always choosing between the use of your resources. What you spend on infantry weapons limits what you can spend to support the infantryman with logistics, indirect fire, air support and so forth. Cost effectiveness (see I am back OT) has to be seen in the big picture. A simple thing like effective infantry training is a force multiplier. The American Civil War was a master class in getting shedloads of recruits to face off with each other but not teaching them or their officers how to use the weapons they had i.e. rifle muskets with a range of 900 yards but they met at musket ranges. The Soviets would have been in real trouble with the best of their weapons as standard had they not received thousands of US lorries. It is all far more complicated than the preferences of well meaning gun nuts. e.g. mortars are cheap to make and mobile but artillery has the ranges to swap its targeting around a greater area. But you can make mortars in a 3rd world engineering workshop whereas artillery needs special heavy engineering. There is no one fit to all users. What is cost effective for Finland would be madness for France.
 
If asked to design a cost-effective semi-automatic rifle during WW2, it would surround a breech mechanism similar to a Steyr AUG with the bolt-carrier and recoil springs sliding on rods. With the rods carrying most of the loads, the outer breech could be built of light-weight wood or Bakelite or Tenite or pressed sheet metal. The simplest breech would be lever-delayed blowback similar to the FAMAS.
The second alternative would be even more like an AUG with 2 rotating lugs at the front. Direct gas impingement would be the simplest, but I still like the notion of recoil spring(s) wrapped around the gas-piston (like an AK).
Forward-mounted recoil springs would allow a folding butt-stock or bullpup, both easier to carry in vehicles. The biggest challenge - with a bullpup - is figuring how to make it eject downwards. The best I can envision is ejecting slightly off-Center between 4 o'clock and 5 o'clock or between 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock. A simpler - but bulkier - alternative is having it eject to the side, but add a sheet metal trough that turns ejected cartridges downwards.
Natural, ammo would be .30" Kurtz or .303 Kurtz or 7.62 mm Kurtz or 7.92 Kurtz that is effective out to 400 or 500 yards/metres.
The barrel would be full-length (18-ish") with muzzle fittings for both a bayonet and rifle grenades.
Depending upon the availability of hard woods it might have a 3/4 length wooden stock. At the other end of the scale, it would have barely enough wood to prevent soldiers hands from freezing while fighting in the snow.
 
OT but an exemplar of cost effectiveness. The PPS 43
Note how the Germans could not help themselves from making their machine stampings of high quality and finish whereas the Soviets just bent heavy gauge steel in a press and still made a gun better than the STEN with a safely locked closed bolt. Put the magazine on the side and add a bipod and you have my cheapened ZK 343 preference.
 
The M1 is a great rifle and so were the Lee-Enfields. Several other highly effective battle rifles exist as well and i am not knocking any of them. I thought the topic was military effectiveness of a battle rifle as measured on a cost-per-unit basis?
 
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