Best Case Scenario for the CSA in the Gettysburg Campaign

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Japhy

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Best possible outcome is that when he proposes the idea to Jefferson Davis and Samuel Cooper, that it ends right then and there, and that Longstreet's Corps gets shipped off none the less to Eastern Mississippi to join the push to relieve Vicksburg. If Lee wants to dare a sortie north at that point even a Defeat is less devastating as it would keep the Union Army distracted from Virginia, and Longstreet is still going where he might actually do some good.

If we're talking once the Campaign Begins, have Lee not give into his General's stupid Glory-driven urge for battle (The Shoes story is a lie that makes no sense, down to the fact a Confederate column had already looted the town days before), and falls back as Longstreet suggested, to the mountains and a better position.
 

TFSmith121

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The US could ALWAYS have sustained the war effort

This is true only in a strictly military sense. If you take political and financial factors into account, the North could not have maintained its war effort much beyond 1864 if the South did significantly better on the battlefield than it did IOTL.

The US could ALWAYS have sustained the war effort longer than the rebels; cripes, simply by maintaining the blockade and holding DC, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, the Mississippi, northern Arkansas, Missouri, and New Mexico (all of which were accomplished by the time of Gettysburg), the Confederacy was doomed.

God was on the side of the bigger battalions in the American Civil War; the only thing the rebels had any advantage in, as Margaret Mitchell said, was arrogance.

Best,
 

Anaxagoras

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The US could ALWAYS have sustained the war effort longer than the rebels; cripes, simply by maintaining the blockade and holding DC, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, the Mississippi, northern Arkansas, Missouri, and New Mexico (all of which were accomplished by the time of Gettysburg), the Confederacy was doomed.

Only if political will in the North holds.
 
A CSA victory that does not seriously damage the AoNVA would only be a good start for the South. In 1864 Lincoln will send the AoP south seeking a big victory to boost his re-election chances. If he does not get a victory, he loses re-election and the CSA gets a negotiated peace. A CSA victory at Gettysburg does not guarantee a CSA victory in the war, but it does get them one step closer. 1864 is an election year and Lincoln will hear the clock ticking.
 

TFSmith121

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How's the political will in the south, by the way?

Only if political will in the North holds.

How's the political will in the south, by the way, by 1863?

Most of Tennessee gone, one-third of Virginia gone, much of Arkansas and Louisiana gone, Mississippi about to be closed at Vicksburg, outright "rebellion within the rebellion" in western Virginia and eastern Tennessee with significant numbers of USV units being recruited, rebellion and resistance in Appalachian pockets in North Carolina and Alabama, significant resistance to the draft just about everywhere, most significant ports closed, bread riots in Richmond and a half dozen other southern cities...not exactly sunny in the south by 1863.

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Anaxagoras

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How's the political will in the south, by the way, by 1863?

The difference is that Lincoln was up for election in 1864 and Davis was not. Davis was not going anywhere until 1868. So the Northern body politic would have the opportunity to vote into office an administration that would make peace in 1864, but Southern voters would not have that option.
 

TFSmith121

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Southerners, however, could vote with their feet...

as hundreds of thousands did, historically.

As dramatic as the "1864 election and McClellan's candidacy" is a potential turning point, the plain fact is despite the peace platform, McClellan campaigned as a war Democrat. His pledge was to fight the war "differently" (i.e. too bad for the USCTs, but what's an extra 150,000 men in a Civil War?), not to surrender to the rebels.

Not only couldn't McClellan win the election, even if he had, there's no way he could have followed the party platform or even his own campaign rhetoric - no CinC, in the middle of a war, is going to order 150,000 men de-mobilized because they had too much melanin...

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Anaxagoras

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As dramatic as the "1864 election and McClellan's candidacy" is a potential turning point, the plain fact is despite the peace platform, McClellan campaigned as a war Democrat. His pledge was to fight the war "differently" (i.e. too bad for the USCTs, but what's an extra 150,000 men in a Civil War?), not to surrender to the rebels.

McClellan was willing to play on both sides of the Peace Democrat and War Democrat divide. It wasn't until September of 1864, after Atlanta had fallen, that McClellan specifically repudiated the peace plank of the Democratic national platform. Before that, he was telling friends and supporters - such as Manton Marble, editor of the New York World - that he would be willing to enter into negotiations with the rebels. In 1863, McClellan publicly endorsed George Woodward, a noted Copperhead, as a candidate for governor of Pennsylvania.
 
Best possible outcome is that when he proposes the idea to Jefferson Davis and Samuel Cooper, that it ends right then and there, and that Longstreet's Corps gets shipped off none the less to Eastern Mississippi to join the push to relieve Vicksburg. If Lee wants to dare a sortie north at that point even a Defeat is less devastating as it would keep the Union Army distracted from Virginia, and Longstreet is still going where he might actually do some good.

So instead of having it do something that might actually have some possibility of influencing the Confederacy's fate, we send it to be unused* under an inferior commander**, further from anything that could lead to a significant consequence in the unfolding of the war***?

If we're talking once the Campaign Begins, have Lee not give into his General's stupid Glory-driven urge for battle (The Shoes story is a lie that makes no sense, down to the fact a Confederate column had already looted the town days before), and falls back as Longstreet suggested, to the mountains and a better position.
So how long does he sit there while hoping Meade is either so hard pressed by the administration or so stupid that he'll attack regardless of circumstances?



Now that my venting against "Let's assume that OTL was the worst possible scenario." is out of my system:


IMO, the best case scenario is something where Lee can maul the AotP badly enough for the Union to scramble to make up for the damage done to the rather low manpower wise eastern theater - which means taking men away from other theaters, which probably means Rosecrans, which makes life a lot easier on Bragg, which . . . actually does the Confederacy some good.

Best chance of that takes Lee being in a different battlefield than either Gettyburg or Pipe Creek and ideally being reinforced significantly.




* Let's say you send it in the second week of May (when this discussion came up OTL). It won't arrive before the end of the month at best. Without its trains, because shipping them would take too much time and too much rail capacity.

By that point, the situation sucks.

**: Whatever else you can say about Joe Johnston, his record in the field has fewer victories than Lee, and Lee succeeded at more of his campaign objectives than Johnston.

Men who died in the Gettysburg campaign died in a campaign that inflicted significant losses on the AotP as well. Men who died of disease in Mississippi's swamps while Johnston struggled to convince Davis 23,000 men isn't enough to face Grant died twiddling their thumbs and sniping.

***: I strongly recommend that anyone who hasn't read the thread already read what trice (a better read logistical and strategic student than me) notes in this thread on comparing operations in Tennessee and Missisippi to the eastern theater in the context of how the Confederacy might actually do something to the Union army anyone cares about: http://civilwartalk.com/threads/confederate-strategy-in-may-june-1863-the-what-ifs.10013/


In brief, though, what is a victory at Vicksburg going to do for the Confederacy? Virtually nothing. Its already essentially cut in two, Tennessee is no better off than OTL, and you just reduced Lee's army to probably less than 50,000 men (Pickett's and Hood's full divisions would be over sixteen thousand veteran infantry, and Lee may or may not get the OTL reinforcements he requested for his offense, so that leaves him without the infantry brigades of Pettigrew and Davis, the cavalry brigades of Grumble Jones, Imboden, Jenkins, and two of Robertson's cavalry regiments) versus an Army of the Potomac that is twice his size or more. And hardly likely to remain idle all summer.

Ignoring any reinforcements Hooker gets, and measuring its strength as of mid-May.

This is not a gain to the Confederacy - even ignoring the supplies captured campaigning in the OTL Gettysburg campaign.

So what triumph do you see Johnston achieving that I'm missing?
 
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TFSmith121

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My assumption is GBM was looking for Democratic allies

McClellan was willing to play on both sides of the Peace Democrat and War Democrat divide. It wasn't until September of 1864, after Atlanta had fallen, that McClellan specifically repudiated the peace plank of the Democratic national platform. Before that, he was telling friends and supporters - such as Manton Marble, editor of the New York World - that he would be willing to enter into negotiations with the rebels. In 1863, McClellan publicly endorsed George Woodward, a noted Copperhead, as a candidate for governor of Pennsylvania.

My assumption is GBM was looking for Democratic allies wherever he could find them; I'm hardly a GBM partisan, but I don't think anyone who threw himself into the Union cause as much as he did in 1861-62 would have been willing to accept CSA independence.

Obvioulsy, the man colored his remarks throughout the war, his campaign, and afterwards, but still - that seems a real stretch, given the available evidence.

Best,
 
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Anaxagoras

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IMO, the best case scenario is something where Lee can maul the AotP badly enough for the Union to scramble to make up for the damage done to the rather low manpower wise eastern theater - which means taking men away from other theaters, which probably means Rosecrans, which makes life a lot easier on Bragg, which . . . actually does the Confederacy some good.

Sounds about right, although I have never understood the oft-repeated idea that Lee winning in Pennsylvania would somehow force Grant to abandon the siege of Vicksburg. Some troops might have been detached from Rosecrans, but not Grant.

Best chance of that takes Lee being in a different battlefield than either Gettyburg or Pipe Creek and ideally being reinforced significantly.

Where would reinforcements for Lee come from? All Beauregard could spare had been sent to Johnston in Mississippi. Bragg was getting ready for a showdown with Rosecrans. A few regiments might have been pried from D. H. Hill in North Carolina, but would that be enough to make any difference?
 
Sounds about right, although I have never understood the oft-repeated idea that Lee winning in Pennsylvania would somehow force Grant to abandon the siege of Vicksburg. Some troops might have been detached from Rosecrans, but not Grant.

Yeah. Even if everything goes right in the east, Grant will be the last to be disrupted by the unfolding of events.

But from the perspective of mid May Richmond decisions, what can save Vicksburg?

Let's grant that Johnston is right about the situation at Jackson. How can the Confederates make up for what happened there faster than Grant can take advantage of it?

Thus my near rant about how sending Longstreet west would be wasted.
Where would reinforcements for Lee come from? All Beauregard could spare had been sent to Johnston in Mississippi. Bragg was getting ready for a showdown with Rosecrans. A few regiments might have been pried from D. H. Hill in North Carolina, but would that be enough to make any difference?
How are we defining "what could be spared"?

That's the problem facing the Confederacy in early May 1863 (before either Lee's request to be massively reinforced or the Army of Relief starts being formed). There is no force in the Confederacy that is going to be able to absorb losing significant numbers without potential consequences.

I can think of four brigades that Lee could have received with some effort (Corse, Jenkins, Cooke, Ransom) and others get into how big a gamble one is prepared to make.

The highest I've seen (leaving some areas pretty much guarded by crossed fingers and militia, but I'm listing it as what is even available if the will existed) would be:

3 brigades from Samuel Jones
4 brigades from Beauregard (including Evans's brigade)
3 from North Carolina and one from Richmond as another division

And as a final touch of Hail Marying, three from Buckner.

Plus the four above.

Yes, that would be pretty much "Let's send Lee everything that isn't nailed down." There are still the heavy artillery regiments, some amount of cavalry, local defense troops, militia, and that's about it - for every department from SW Virginia down to Florida.


It's a hell of a gamble.


But its - barely - logistically feasible. Politically is an open question, and what the Union would do in response is beyond the scope of answering your question.

But that's your "where".


Last Chance for Victory (a book I deeply regret getting) mentions Lee being sent a nice division from Bragg as a conceivable option, but given that a division without its trains and stuff is probably not what he needs, I'm ignoring it.
 
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I think that the political pressure that President Lincoln was under is being ignored on this thread. President Lincoln was a great man and a great President but he was also very politically astute. The Emancipation Proclamation was a political document, it freed few slaves as it only freed those in states currently in rebellion, states that President Lincoln had little control over. The slaves in the border states were not affected and those were states that Lincoln had control over. The real purpose of the Proclamation was to keep Great Britain and France from supporting and recognizing the CSA. A CSA victory at Gettysburg or somewhere else in Pennsylvania is going to put a lot of political pressure on Lincoln. He knows that 1864 is an election year, he knows that if he cannot produce a victory over Lee he is going to have a very difficult battle for re-election. He is going to really be pushing whoever is in command of the Army of the Potomac to engage and defeat Lee. If the AoP loses in the summer of 1864, and the odds are not good, they will be fighting Lee and his victorious AoNVA on their home ground, and probably under Lee's terms. This is not a formula for a US victory. Another loss to Lee, another time that the AoP comes back North defeated is really going to give the Democrats, especially the peace wing of the party, a big boost and just might put their candidate in the White House.
 
But more than what Lee does and what happens to Lee matters politically, though.

It does the anti-war crowd (or Confederacy) little good for Lee to crow loudly in August . . . and Atlanta to fall in September.

Not trying to dismiss your point - the Confederacy's best bet is to have this campaign have a dramatic enough impact to matter there, since materially the war can go on effectively indefinitely (not forever, but certainly years).
 
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I think that the political pressure that President Lincoln was under is being ignored on this thread. President Lincoln was a great man and a great President but he was also very politically astute. The Emancipation Proclamation was a political document, it freed few slaves as it only freed those in states currently in rebellion, states that President Lincoln had little control over. The slaves in the border states were not affected and those were states that Lincoln had control over. The real purpose of the Proclamation was to keep Great Britain and France from supporting and recognizing the CSA. A CSA victory at Gettysburg or somewhere else in Pennsylvania is going to put a lot of political pressure on Lincoln. He knows that 1864 is an election year, he knows that if he cannot produce a victory over Lee he is going to have a very difficult battle for re-election. He is going to really be pushing whoever is in command of the Army of the Potomac to engage and defeat Lee. If the AoP loses in the summer of 1864, and the odds are not good, they will be fighting Lee and his victorious AoNVA on their home ground, and probably under Lee's terms. This is not a formula for a US victory. Another loss to Lee, another time that the AoP comes back North defeated is really going to give the Democrats, especially the peace wing of the party, a big boost and just might put their candidate in the White House.
Grant probably comes East as OTL (as others have said, even if Gettysburg goes terribly, Grant will still have the victory at Vicksburg. He might even go earlier, since Meade will probably be gone soon after a defeat (OTL, Lincoln was displeased by his perceived hesitation after Gettysburg, but could hardly fire the man who finally beat Lee) and Lincoln will need a replacement. Not sure how that will affect the Chickamauga==>Chattanooga campaign, but I'd still put money on Sherman and Thomas successfully beating Bragg and his merry band of incompetents. And the rest of the campaign in the West shouldn't be too much behind schedule.

All this means, that even given a Union defeat at Gettysburg, it's likely the Union will be in a commanding position come the inauguration of the new president in March 1865 (since we know from OTL that Lincoln was determined to go all out during his lame duck period, with the goal of presenting his successor with a fait accompli). In such a position, GBM will probably feel politically obligated to finish the thing (since he was always convinced he was smarter than Lincoln).
 
Well, here's a thing though.

How does a defeat Gettysburg impact the Army of the Potomac and its need for manpower? The Eastern theater is at a low ebb for the Union - if the AoTP takes larger than historical losses, and Lee is still a danger, that probably means pulling from other areas.

And not necessarily being able to send men in response to Chickamauga - which is also probably impacted in regards to Lee sending men out West.

Ten or twenty thousand men more or less for any given army is a great deal in any given step along the way between mid-May and mid September.
 
Well, here's a thing though.

How does a defeat Gettysburg impact the Army of the Potomac and its need for manpower? The Eastern theater is at a low ebb for the Union - if the AoTP takes larger than historical losses, and Lee is still a danger, that probably means pulling from other areas.

And not necessarily being able to send men in response to Chickamauga - which is also probably impacted in regards to Lee sending men out West.

Ten or twenty thousand men more or less for any given army is a great deal in any given step along the way between mid-May and mid September.

I think even more important than manpower shifts will be who gets to command where? Who takes over the AoP? Will it be Grant, or will one of the AoP Corps Commanders catch Lincoln's eye? Lee will certainly be seen as almost undefeatable both in the CSA and the USA. How does that effect the decision making process in both governments? Manpower is important but where the shift in Generals happen is also important.
 
I think even more important than manpower shifts will be who gets to command where? Who takes over the AoP? Will it be Grant, or will one of the AoP Corps Commanders catch Lincoln's eye? Lee will certainly be seen as almost undefeatable both in the CSA and the USA. How does that effect the decision making process in both governments? Manpower is important but where the shift in Generals happen is also important.

Not more than he was OTL as of Gettysburg, but I agree.

Also, any generals killed or not killed TTL vs. those of OTL - the Army of the Potomac having Reynolds and Hancock (healthy) in 1864 is worth more than whether Meade keeps the AotP after losing to Lee, IMO.
 
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