sharlin
Banned
Simply put him under the treads of a tank and drive forwards verrrrrrrrrry slowly, or failing that steam roller.
Best Case Scenario for Germans at Kursk, 1943?
- Thread starter Anaxagoras
- Start date
Simply put him under the treads of a tank and drive forwards verrrrrrrrrry slowly, or failing that steam roller.
Modern research into the battle show that IISS Panzer Korps eviscerated 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokorovka. But 5th GTA still did enough to stop the Germans. The Soviets also had strong tank reserves moving in on the German right.
But suppose the II SS PzK did even better than they did on 12 July and were able to continue the ofensive towarrds Oboyan and Kursk next day. In this case they could be hit in the rear within a few days by hose ASoviet reserves. This could well result in a diasterous situation for the Germans with their arrmoured spearheads being cut ff in the vicinity of Oboyan and taking heavy losses,perhps even being desrtyoyed. Withhout II SS PzK the Soviets secure a strong bridgehead over the Mius with the option of developing anothe offensive from there in August. And 4th Kharkov beomes a disaster for the Germans
However,if Model managed to take Ponyri and achiweve a breakthrough in the North he can link up with Manstein's prong ofthe offensive and take Kursk. Operation Citadel achieves its objectives. The Germans then have a better chance to defeat the coming Soviet offensives at Orel and Kharkov. Once Citadel has started that is probably thebest outcome for the Germans
With an early attack in April or May the German problem is that they just were not ready. Although they could have gone for one of the less ambitious offensive options against one of the other salients.One of the less ambitious offensives would have just straitened out the line, Perhaps this might have released a few more divisions for Citadel.
With the March POD a late Raspuita might well have allowed Manstein to eliminate more of the Kursk salient or maybe even all of it.
But suppose the II SS PzK did even better than they did on 12 July and were able to continue the ofensive towarrds Oboyan and Kursk next day. In this case they could be hit in the rear within a few days by hose ASoviet reserves. This could well result in a diasterous situation for the Germans with their arrmoured spearheads being cut ff in the vicinity of Oboyan and taking heavy losses,perhps even being desrtyoyed. Withhout II SS PzK the Soviets secure a strong bridgehead over the Mius with the option of developing anothe offensive from there in August. And 4th Kharkov beomes a disaster for the Germans
However,if Model managed to take Ponyri and achiweve a breakthrough in the North he can link up with Manstein's prong ofthe offensive and take Kursk. Operation Citadel achieves its objectives. The Germans then have a better chance to defeat the coming Soviet offensives at Orel and Kharkov. Once Citadel has started that is probably thebest outcome for the Germans
With an early attack in April or May the German problem is that they just were not ready. Although they could have gone for one of the less ambitious offensive options against one of the other salients.One of the less ambitious offensives would have just straitened out the line, Perhaps this might have released a few more divisions for Citadel.
With the March POD a late Raspuita might well have allowed Manstein to eliminate more of the Kursk salient or maybe even all of it.
sharlin
Banned
Really the best case is to not fight the battle, even though the Germans killed more Soviet tanks, the losses they suffered were not possible to be replaced as easily as the soviets could replace theirs, and although the Germans killed more soviet tanks, the Soviets were in possession of the battlefield and were able to salvage far more than the Germans were.
Add some SOE-trained piranhas and a herd of angry grizzles with spiked armour on, and you just might have something there.
Agreed the best option was Manstein's Backhand blow option. However it was the Germans who ended upin control of the Prokhorovka battlefield at nightfall of the 12th July and they were able to conntinyuue with minor offensive operations (Operation Ro;and) for several more days. See Glantz The Battle of Kursk and Nipe (Decision in the Ukraine, Blood, Stweel and Myth. Also Valery Zamulin Demolishing the Myth.
In fact the idea that II SSPanzer Korps was destroyed at Prokhorovka has been debunnked.What actually happened was that 5th GTA was eviscerated by II SS PzK but the sacrifice of 5th GTA gained a critical day for the Soviets to bring up the armoured reserves which were sufficiebt to convince the Germans that therewas little to be gained from trying to continue with Citadel.
That is correct, I have a boardgame that this alternative is one of the scenarios.
In short the premise is this:Hitler listens to Mansteins proposal of a super
backhandblow so the Germans keep the 4th panzerarmy in reserve around Kiev and letting the rest of Armygroup south ride out the Soviet offensive falling back and inflicting casualties and after the Soviet offensive is exausted unleash 4th panzerarmy and destroy the Russians in mobile operations between Donets and Dnjepr.
A breakthrough by Model is doubtful at best. He was stopped within days IOTL even after poor commitment of Soviet armored reserves. Any further advance would come at such a high cost that the encirclement ring would easily be broken. Further he would have to shift several armored formations away to deal with Soviet attacks which would shred 2nd Panzer Army in his rear along the rest of the Orel bulge.
BlairWitch749
Banned
model got stopped because he got dicked over in the allottment of new armored vehicles and those he did get sucked (like the porsche tigers without defensive mg's) and kluge's plan of attack (almost zero armor in the breakthrough formations) was idiotic
BlairWitch749
Banned
disagree that backhand blow was the best option
1. manstein's plan depended on the russians attacking along his preplanned kill zones, where russian strength and largess (especially with lend lease) meant they could attack from unexpected directions in large numbers and thus wouldn't fall for his trap
2. superior russian force to space ratios would see manstein's forces only defeat some spearheads whilst the rest of the front collapsed
3. immobile front line infantry would be at great risk of being cut off
4. the new generation of german armored vehicles were not reliable for long road marches
5. the german army as a whole didn't have the fuel and ammo reserves or the fresh infantry to conduct the envisioned campaign
6. manstein's idea involved concentrating too much of the armor in small places, increasing the change that immobile infantry far from his concentrations would be destroyed
7. manstein's idea involved abandoning the donets basin which produced irreplacable war materials like nickle and maganese for the german army
the best idea in the context of the otl battle was guderian/speer/rommel sit put and do nothing (except minor line straightening and continued fortification of the front which had already been static for 4 months)
BlairWitch749
Banned
the 2nd ss panzer corps could have done better if wittman's heavy tiger company didn't accidently bump into the 185th tank brigade after silencing most of the 5th gta artillery... event though wittman's men destroyed the 185th, they consumed nearly all their shells and fuel in doing so, if instead the two forces missed each other (with the 185th being stopped cold by 48th panzer corps dug in forces) wittman would have ended up in the rear of the soviet brigades at prokorovka and probably turned it into a total route large numbers of prisoners and recovered tanks
the germans do better tactically but the strategic result, especially with hitler recalling forces to battle husky is largely the same
I read a timeline were this is done and the Russians end up doing a separate peace , which allow the Eastern front troop to go to France to stop the invasion. Seem a little ASB to me.
Deleted member 1487
It was Manstein not Guderian.
What does failure mean in this context? That the Germans would not regain all that they lost or that they would be wiped out?
If these areas were going to be lost anyway in the expected Soviet offensives, why does it matter if the Axis pulled out to save as many men as possible and wreck that area to deny it to the Soviets? Or was the objection that it was better to hold it as long as possible to extract as much of these minerals as possible?
Deleted member 1487
No, because it was Manstein's idea not Guderian's and to my knowledge Guderian never thought of it. It was just the 3rd Kharkov-style battle writ large, so clearly it originated with Manstein, not Guderian. Manstein IOTL suggested it to Hitler, but was denied.
That it would fail to achieve the result Manstein desired (A repeat of Third Kharkov on an even grander scale) and result in German losses equivalent to or greater than OTL.
Probably which is whyIsaid "If " Modelbroke thrugh.However his failure meant Citadeloverall would most likely fail even if AG South did better.In which case some of those mobile forces the Russians ciommitted at Ponyri can be redeployed as part of a pincer move against II SS PzK and III PzK who would then be in real trouble if they advanced beyond Prokhovka through Oboyam and Kursk.
But see Demolishing the Myth (Zamulin) and Blood, Steel and Myth (Nipe). The Red Army had plenty of strategic reseves
4th Guards Army
Renmants of the 5th GTA
27th Army
47th Army
The 3rd, 5th and 7thj Gaurd Cavalry Corps
The 4th Tank Corps, 3rd Gaurd Mechanized Corps and 1st Mechanized Corps
And theGermans just did not have the forces,particularly infantry divisions to stop that lot AND continue the attack on Kursk despite the evisceration of 5th GTA on the 12th. Had the Germans tried the result would likely have been a disaster.